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In the China Seas, there are two territorial disputes that
have obstructed the development of exploration and exploitation of
natural resources in the region. One of these is the Tiao Yu Tai
(Senkaku) Islands dispute in the East China Sea, between China (ROC
and PRC) and Japan. The other is the Nansha (Spratly) and Hsisha
(Paracel) Islands dispute in the South China Sea, contested by China
(ROC and PRC), Vietnam and the Philippines. Both cases concern
sovereignty over these offshore islands, which is of great importance
in determining their effect on the continental shelf boundaries.
Some monographs have been produced in connection with the
China Sea island disputes, but few authors deal with the fundamental
concepts of the boundaries problem in relation to the delimitation
of the China Seas' continental shelf boundaries. Most writers on
this topic either exhibit a lack of historical knowledge, documentation
and information, as well as of expertise in the Chinese language and
affairs, or they reveal a lack of legal synthesis. The topic is
generally regarded by most international lawyers with a mixture of
apprehension and fascination in approximately equal proportions.
Apprehension, because the lex lata and lex ferenda are complex, and
the fact that the documentation is mainly in the Chinese language
obscures the topic and makes it something of a dangerous minefield
for non-specialist. Fascination, because intellectually the problems
raised by the progressive development of the law of sea, especially
in relation to sea boundaries, are perhaps more stimulating than
those raised by any other branch of law at the present time.
The primary aim of this dissertation is to provide a reliable
survey of all aspects of the boundary problems concerning the
delimitation of the continental shelves of the Tiao Yu Tai, Nansha
and Hsisha Islands in the East and South China Seas. The work is
divided into four parts. Part One, entitled "Land Boundaries and
Title to Territory", deals with legal relations between state and
territory, an understanding of which is essential to an analysis of
the territorial and seabed delimitation dispute concerning the above-
mentioned islands. Part Two, entitled "Delimitation of Submarine
Boundaries", traces in detail the development of the continental shelf
doctrine, in particular, the difficult questions arising in respect
of small islands. Part Three, entitled "Boundary Problems concerning
the Tiao Yu Tai, Nansha and Hsisha Islands" brings the two preceding
parts together, exploring and analysing the complex problems posed by
the Tiao Yu Tai, Nansha and Hsisha Islands in the East and South China
Seas. The controversy surrounding the legal status of these islands,
as well as the rules governing the delimitation of their continental
shelf boundaries, are examined and assessed. Part Four concludes
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CHAPTER I
LEGAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1. Introduction
The main legal function of the boundaries of a state
is the delimitation of the area in which that state possesses
the right to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any
other state. A preliminary examination of territorial
boundary problems in general illuminates the underlying
causes of the problems of delimitation which have led, and
will continue to lead, to conflicts between states over
disputed claims. Such a study also helps to explain the
distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights which
are an essential feature of the continental shelf doctrine.
Since this doctrine is based on the natural prolongation of
land territory into and under the sea, the rules for its
delimitation are therefore related in principle to the
customary rules for the delimitation of land territories.
Moreover,disputes concerning delimitation of the
continental shelf of the TiaoYu Tai and Nansha Islands in
the East and South China Seas, to which this dissertation
is directed, are as much a dispute over ownership of the
land territory of the islands concerned as over the legal
rules for submarine boundary delimitation in the presence
of these small islands.
2.
International law does provide - largely thanks to a
series of decisions by judicial and arbitral tribunals -
certain guidelines regarding the principles upon which the
rules concerning the delimitation of boundaries, whether
territorial or submarine boundaries, are based. This Chapter,
therefore, investigates the basic principles upon which
delimitation of boundaries have been based from time
immemorial to the present day.
A passage which puts the international law of boundaries
in a nutshell can be found in the judgment of Max Huber, the
arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Arbitration, which concerned
the right to sovereignty over an island in the Pacific between
the archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Netherlands East
Indies:
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies
independence ... Territorial sovereignty is, in general,
a situation recognised and delimited in space, either
by so-called natural frontiers as recognised by
international law or by outward signs of delimitation
that are undisputed, or else by legal engagements
entered into between interested neighbours, such as
frontier conventions, or by acts of^recognition of
States within fixed boundaries ....
If, however, no conventional line of sufficient topo¬
graphical precision exists or if there are gaps in the
frontiers otherwise established, or if a conventional
line leaves room for doubt ... the actual, continuous
and peaceful display of State functions is in case of
dispute the sound and natural criterion of territorial
sovereignty.
1. [1928] II RIAA, p.838.
2. Ibid., p.840.
3.
This passage puts the international law of land
boundaries in a nutshell. The definition of sovereignty
per Huber seems to fall into five component parts as follows:
(1) Natural frontiers as recognised by international law;
(2) Signs of outward delimitation which must be:
(a) Outward
(b) Undisputed
(3) Treaties or agreements;




(5) Recognition of states with fixed boundaries.
This Chapter may be regarded as an extended commentary upon
them.
In this Chapter we shall first of all attempt to analyse
the terminology of territory, title to territory and territorial
sovereignty, and then with the help of some new evidence go on
to consider the legal nature of international boundaries.
The lawyer will normally regard the legal character of
international boundaries as that of delimiting spatially the
territorial sovereignty of states.
Boundaries, even under a strictly legal analysis, serve
a variety of functions, confer differing legal rights, and
impose differing legal obligations. This raises special
4.
problems for the delimitation of land territory, where the
diversity of legal bases and boundary functions is most
manifest. There is, hoivever, a substantially greater
homogeneity in maritime and submarine boundary functions
as well as in air space.
The second vexed issue in writing on international
boundaries, is that of terminology. Boundary refers to a
line, while frontier refers to a long narrow zone or region
which fronts or faces another state. It is legally significant
to draw the distinction between "frontiers" and "boundaries"
which mark either the de facto or de jure limits of political
sovereignty, or the extension of land territory under the sea.
The third issue to be discussed is the chronology of
the establishment of a boundary from allocation to delimitation,
demarcation and administration. Allocation refers to the
initial political division of territory. Delimitation means
the selection of a boundary site and its definition.
Demarcation means the construction of the boundary in the
landscape. Administration is the exercise of jurisdiction and
in effect governs the territory. These categories afford
both a useful terminology and a convenient classification
into which legal issues relating to territory and boundaries
may be fitted. The chronological stages of allocation,
delimitation, demarcation and administration may overlap in
time, be separated, perhaps widely, in time, or indeed one
stage or another may never occur or never be completed. As
5.
the international boundary passes through the stages of
allocation, delimitation and demarcation, its definition may
become increasingly precise and the location of the boundary
may alter.
The fourth issue to arise is the classification of
boundaries. State boundaries are generally marked by special
signs, but this is not necessarily true in all cases and
is unlikely to occur in the case of seabed boundaries.
Boundaries may be described as !natural' or 'artificial';
it is possible to classify them in many ways. Although all
the types of boundary recognised as international boundaries
have been subjected to various classifications, such as
'morphological1, 'phenomenological' and 'genetic', the legal
classification of international boundaries has never been
undertaken. As we shall see, writers on boundaries tend to
define and classify 'boundaries' and 'frontiers' using
'scientific', 'organic' or 'military' criteria, but most of
them have little knowledge of law. An attempt at a legal
classification of 'boundaries' and 'frontiers* is therefore
made in order to categorise boundaries by (a) the right
reserved to states within them, and (b) the obligation imposed
upon states to respect them.
2. Terminology:
2.1 Territory
The idea of the state implies a relation to territory,
3
or rather the ownership of a certain quantity of territory.
3. Sheldon Amos, Lectures on International Law (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1876), p.34.
6.
One of the essentials of sovereign statehood, as understood
by the orthodox international lawyer, is jurisdictional
4
supremacy over some reasonably identified territory.
Territory is not only essential to the existence of the
modern state, but its acquisition and loss, the extension
and contraction of state frontiers, are traditionally the
primary indicia of national power and prestige. For instance,
China still officially seeks the return of about 7,000 square
miles of Siberian border territory from the Soviet Union.5
The word 'territory', is the English form of the Latin
Territorium, originally meaning the land lying round the
ancient city-state, devoted to agriculture and the pasturing
of stock. Today its denotation has extended to the area
subject to the powers of government exercised by the modern
4. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory
is necessarily exclusive and absolute: Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116; 136; Church v. Hubbart
2 Cranch 187; 234. See also J.B. Moore, A Digest of
International Law, Vol. 11 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1906), p.4.
5. It was admitted by Lenin and Trotsky that more than
600,000 square miles of Siberia were seized from China
by Tsarist Russia under 'unequal treaties'. For details,
see Horst Pommerening, Per Chinesisch-Sowjetische
Grenzkonflikt: Das Erbe der Ungleichen Vertrage, (Olten
und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag AG, 1968);
George Ginsburgs and Carl Pinkele 'The Genesis of the
Territorial Issue in the Sino-Soviet Dialogue: Substantive
Dispute or Ideological Pas de Deux?', in J.A. Cohen
(ed) China's Practice of International Law: Some Case
Studies, (Harvard U.P., 1972), p.167. On February 24th
1982 the Soviet Government have proposed a resumption
of talks with China on their border dispute. The Scotsman,
24 February, 1982, pp. 3, 8.
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state. At the same time, by a peculiar inversion due to the
draftsmen of the American Constitution and their imitators,
the term is applied to areas outside political divisions which
are not completely organised. So that, in this sense, a
'Territory' is something which is not a state. But, whatever
the origin or the ambiguities of the term a territory must of
necessity have limits or boundaries, be large or small, a
world empire or a town allotment.^
In law, territory is a much wider conception than that
of mere land. It means any area of the earth's surface
(including all land, sea and submarine areas and air space)
which is subject to sovereign rights and interests. 'It is
the land which confers upon the coastal state a right to the
7
waters off its coast'. The rights and interests which a
state has in respect of the sea—bed of the internal waters and
territorial seas is under the legal regime of territorial
sovereignty. The state's authority over the mineral resources
of its land territory and territorial sea is thus based on the
concept of territorial sovereignty as an essential part of its
legal personality; its sovereign rights over the mineral
resources in the soil and subsoil of its continental shelf,
6. F.W.S. Cumbrae—Stewart, The Boundaries of Queensland,
(Brisbane: Government Printer, Anthony James Cumming,
1930), pp. 3-4.
7. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951, p.133.
See below, 3.2.
8.
are however derived from the geographical concept of natural
Q
prolongation. The rights and interests which a state has
with regard to the high seas and the exclusive economic zone,
amount to less than sovereignty and do not make these maritime
areas territory in law. Similarly, air space is the subject
of sovereignty, but apparently not outer space, so that
different sets of rights and duties apply to a commercial
aircraft in flight around the world from those which apply
to a satellite.
The possession of territory is essential to the
9
conception of the modern state, and, within its territory,
the modern state has absolute jurisdiction and express rights
of extra-territoriality, based upon treaty or capitulation.10
8. See e.g., the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ
Reports, 1969, p.31. In the U.K.-French Continental
Shelf Arbitration (First Decision), France contended
that the geographical and geological considerations
which it has invoked establish the existence of natural
links between the continental land mass of France and the
whole Channel Islands region, including the submarine
areas of these islands. Its legal position is justified
by the basic factors underlying the notion of natural
prolongation. 54 ILR (1979), pp. 89-90. See below,
Chs.5,6 and 7.
9. Without territory a legal person cannot be a state.
Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 states the
basic criteria for statehood: "The State as a person of
international law should possess, inter alia, a defined
territory". See 165 LNTS (1936), No. 3028, p.25.
10. See e.g., Arts. XVI, XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII
and XXIX of the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844; Arts. X, XXIII,
XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX and XXXI of the Treaty of
Whampoa, 1844. See G.W. Keeton, The Development of
Extraterritoriality in China, Vol. II (London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1928), pp. 277-85.
9.
The extent of the territory is determined by historical events.
It has very considerable influence on the political character
and importance of the state, and it is closely connected with
several important legal and international questions. These in
, . 11
many cases turn upon questions of boundaries.
To sum up, we now have a reasonably clear idea of the
legal concept of territory and of the nature of its relationship
to the state. First, a state fully sovereign has complete
12
authority over its territory. Territory is an essential
element of the state: it is one of the triad of factors -
'territory1, 'population' and 'government' - generally
13
recognised as the major components of any modern state.
Secondly, the territory of a state may fairly be regarded as
its 'international property', as analogous to land owned by
11. See e.g., The Delimitation of the Polish-Czechslovakian
Frontier (Question of Jaworzina)(Advisory Opinion) Case,
PCIJ Series B, No, 8; the Delimitation of the Serbo-
Albanian Frontier (Question of the Monastery of Saint-
Naoum) Case, PCIJ Series B, No. 9; the Frontier between
Turkey and Iraq (Mosul Boundary) Case, PCIJ Series B,
No. 12; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ
Series A/B, No. 53; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ
Reports, 1953, p.47; Certain Frontier Land Case, ICJ
Reports, 1959, p.209; Temple of Preah Vihear Case, ICJ
Reports, 1962, p.6; Rann of Kutch Arbitration, 50 ILR
(1976) p.2; Beagle Channel Arbitration, 52 ibid., (1979)
p.93. See below, Chs. 2, 3 and 4.
12. Quicquid est in territorio, est etiam de territorio,
and qui in territorio meo est, etiam meus subditus est.
13. Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention, 165 LNTS (1936),
No. 3802, p.21. Cf. C.R. Crawford, "The Criteria for
Statehood in International Law", 48 BYIL (1976—77),
p.93; idem, The Creation of States in International Law,
p. 36.
10.
an individual under municipal law. Thirdly, the territory
of a state may be regarded as the primary sphere within which
it exercises its governmental powers or 'jurisdiction'.
Fourthly, territory may be considered not in relationship
to the state, but rather in its relationship to its population.
It may be seen as the 'property' of its inhabitants and,
dynamically, as the basis for the exercise of 'self-determination'
and the establishment of new states.
2.2 Title to Territory
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, Max Huber made the
following remarks:
Titles of acquisitions of territorial sovereignty in ...
international law are either based on an act of effective
apprehension, such as occupation or conquest, or, like
cession, presuppose that the ceding and the cessionary
Powers or at least one of them, have the facuj^y of
effectively disposing of the ceded territory.
It is self-evident that in principle title to territory falls
into the sphere of international law when supplying both broad
principles and detailed rules for the delimitation of territorial
sovereignty. Historically one of the oldest, and still the
most persistently attractive approaches is to treat territory
as the 'international property' of the state; territorial
sovereignty is then regarded as analogous to a private law
right of property. Borrowing the terminology of municipal
14. II RIAA, p.839. Title by conquest resolves itself
juridically into title by cession. It should be noted
that 'conquest' may not per se, under contemporary
international law, act as a lawful mode of acquiring
state territory.
property law, a state whose sovereignty over territory is
questioned must show 'title' to that territory.
The term 'title' in municipal property law covers the
reasons whereby the owner of lands has the just possession
of his property, titulus est justa causa possidendi id quod
nostrum est. Generally, 'title' means a right to property
considered with reference either to the manner in which it
has been acquired, or to its capacity of being effectively
transferred.
'Title' is, however, an equivocal term. It is commonly
used to describe both the facts recognised in law as conferring
a right and, elliptically, as the right itself. In a developed
legal system in which the range of facts which are — and,
equally important, the facts which are not - recognised as
creating a legal right are reasonably well-defined, the
ambiguity is of little importance. In international law the
case is different. A claimant to territory may call to his
aid a wide range of facts allegedly constitutive of a legal
right of sovereignty: the exercise of governmental functions
in the territory, either peacefully or in consequence of
16
military force; geographical factors such as the nearness of
15. Co. Litt. 3456.
16. In the Eastern Greenland Case, the court observed that
'in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with very
little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights,
provided that the other State could not make out a
superior claim". PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, p.46. Cf. the
Clipperton Island Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1107; the
Island of Palmas Arbitration, ibid., p.829; the Minquiers
and Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports, 1953, p.4; Argentine-Chile
Frontier Case, XVI RIAA, p.109. In the Island of Aves
Arbitration (the Netherlands-Venezuela) (1857), the
Arbitrator/
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the disputed territory to, or its 'continuity® with, territory
17
over which the claimant is the undisputed sovereign; social
considerations such as the exploitation of the region by
nationals of the claimant state, or evidence of the wishes of
18
the inhabitants. Military security may be invoked as a
ground for placing territory under the control of one claimant,
19
rather than a foreign and potentially unfriendly power.
Arbitrator held that as the government of the Netherlands
did nothing except utilize the fishing on such island
through its subjects, while the government of Venezuela
had been the first to hold an armed force there and to
exercise acts of sovereignty, it thus confirmed the
dominion which it had acquired through a general title
derived from Spain. Recueil des arbitrages internationaux,
by A. de la Pradelle and N. Politis, 2nd ed. Vol. II
(Paris: Les Edition Internationales, 1957), p.412.
17. See e.g., the Bulama Island Arbitration (Great Britain-
Portugal) (1870), Recueil des arbitrages internationaux,
Vol. II, p.604; Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA,
pp. 854-55, 870; The Anna (1805) 5 C. Rob. 373; Secretary
of State for India v. Sri Raja Chelikani Ramo Rao (1916),
32 TLR, 652; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports
1969, p.31. See below, Ch. 7.
18. An early example of the application of interests of the
local population is to be found in Art. 3, Vienna Treaty
between Nassaux and Prussia of 1815. See A.M. Stuyt,
Survey of International Arbitrations 1794-1970 (Leyden:
A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), No. 17, p.20. See also the London
Protocol between Great Britain and Russia for the
delimitation of the Afghan frontier of 1885, ibid., No. 140,
p.145. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the Court
found it possible to take account of geographical and
socio-economic considerations in its judgment. ICJ Reports,
1951, p.116. Cf. Art. 4 of the Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958. See below, Ch. 7.
19. The Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are the obvious
examples. See 2b BDIL, Sec. Ill, p.191.
13.
History in the form of traditional links - discovery by
nationals of the claimant's, commercial, political and social
contacts - between the disputed territory and a claimant state
20
may be relied on. The attitudes of foreign governments in
'recognising' formally or tacitly 'acquiescing' in claims of
sovereignty may be pleaded, together with legal transactions
affecting the territory, such as treaties purporting to
transfer sovereignty over a disputed territory, or implying
21
by reference the sovereignty of the claimant.
There is, however, room for considerable and legitimate
doubt as to which of these facts are recognised as vesting
'title' to territory, or at least a legal presumption in favour
of a claimant, and which may at most have influence as elements
in a sort of 'equity' which may be called in aid in appropriate
circumstances, but which could not oust an established legal
22
title. There is, indeed, a substantial body of judicial and
academic opinion which, drawing on the analogies provided by
20. See e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports, 1953,
p.47; Case Concerning Over Certain Frontier Land, ICJ
Reports, 1959, p.209; Temple of Preah Vihear Case,
ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6. See below, Chs. 2,3,4.
21. Cf. Frontier between Turkey and Iraq (The Mosul Boundary)
Case, PCIJ Series B, No. 12; Temple of Preah Vihear Case,
ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6. See below, Chs. 2,3,4.
22. See e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports,
1969, p.3; Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration,
54 ILR (1979), p. 6. See below, Chs. 2 and 7.
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municipal private law, favours 'possession' as the primary
determinant of territorial sovereignty. The claimant whose
sovereignty is disputed must show 'effective, uninterrupted,
and permanent possession' effected in the name of the state.
Title to territory, like the Roman law counterparts, requires
the presence of corpus as well as animus. It is founded upon
two elements: 'the intention and will to act as sovereign,
23
and some actual exercise or display of such authority'.
There is, however, a divergence of opinion as to whether
or not effective control of territory is essential only to
the initial acquisition of title, or is essential also to its
maintenance. In principle, property law analogies suggest
that title to territory may be lost by abandonment or derelictio,
but international tribunals have been slow to admit a loss of
sovereignty due to failure to exercise governmental functions
so long as there is evidence of an unimpaired 'intention and
will' to retain sovereignty. Likewise, it is maintained in
theory that the concepts of extinctive and acquisitive
prescription may operate to divest a state of sovereignty once
acquired or to vest title in a state exercising governmental
23. Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-6.
See below, Ch. 2.
24. A thing which is thrown away is understood by the act
to be abandoned. Abandonment is defined as a voluntary
relinquishment of a known right with no intention to
reclaim. Menzel v. Liszt 49 Misc. 2d. 300, 267, N.Y.S.
2d. 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See below, Ch. 4.
15.
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functions in territory adverse to the original sovereign.
Again, however, the practice of international judicial
tribunals provides no unambiguous support for the application
of these principles. Traditionally, international law has
also accepted armed force as a legitimate means of transferring
sovereignty over territory. 'Subjugation* - the conquest of
the entire territory of a state, involving the extinction of
the personality of the state and the transfer of sovereignty
to the victor — has traditionally been regarded as a good
26
•title' to territory, and so, similarly, has the retention
of territory after the close of hostilities either with, or,
after the passage of a significant period of time, without a
formal cession of territory by treaty. Conversely, there is
doubt as to whether a treaty purporting to transfer sovereignty
over territory operates to vest title ipso jure, or whether
control over the territory must first be effectively asserted.
The scope of the concept of 'possession' of territory, and the
25. In the British Guiana Boundary Arbitration (1897) 21
Hertslets Commercial Treaties, p.1123, the parties
agreed that 'adverse holding or prescriptions during
a period of fifty years shall make good title'. See below, Ch. 3.
26. "Subjugation" involves the extinction of the personality
of the state and transfers of sovereignty to the victor.
See generally, Alphonse Rivier, Principes du Droit des
Gens, Tome III (Paris: Libraire Nouvelle de droit et de
Jurisprudence, 1896), p.436; R.Y. Jennings, "Government
in Commission", 23 BYIL (1946), pp. 140-41; L. Oppenheim,
International Law, Vol. 2, 7th ed. Edited by H. Lauterpacht
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1952), p.600; Morris
Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Univ. of
California Press; Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1959), p.601.
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existence or not of something akin to an abstract right of
property or 'ownership' in international law is thus a matter
for dispute.
There are, however, other schools of thought that reject
the application of private law analogies in the law of territory.
On one view, territory is no more than the primary sphere of
activity of the state, the space within which it exercises
legislative, executive and judicial functions. State territory
is then the exclusive sphere of validity of the national legal
order. In effect, this view equates territorial sovereignty
to 'territorial jurisdiction': sovereignty is acquired and
lost with the expansion and contraction of jurisdiction. At
any given moment, the criterion for determining the limits
of state territory is the 'principle of effectiveness', for
it is the effective exercise of governmental functions which
28
constitutes 'title' to territory.
Very different notions of territorial sovereignty have
been associated with nineteenth and twentieth century nationalist
movements and democratic political theory. For those desiring
to change an existing territorial situation, the concept of
27. Cf. H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of
International Law (Archon Bks, 1970), pp. 91 et seq.
28. See e.g., the Guiana Boundary Arbitration [1904] XI RIAA,
p.11; Island of Palmas Arbitration [1928] II RIAA, p. 838;
Clipperton Island Arbitration [1931] ibid., p.1104;
Eastern Greenland Case, [1933] PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53;
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47;
Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) Case, ICJ Reports,
1975, p.3. See below, Chs. 2, 3.
territorial sovereignty as associated solely with the rights
of the existing political sovereign is naturally an anathema.
The fundamental territorial relationship must rather be
29
regarded as tne nexus between the land and xts inhabitants.
In one form this provides no more than a legal basis for
30
self-determination: territorial sovereignty is vested not
in the state but in the 'people®, who have an inherent 'natural
or 'human' right to modify existing demarcations of territorial
29. A permanent population is necessary for statehood, though
as in the case of terri tory, no minimum limit is
apparently prescribed. This does not, of course, mean
that all the territory of the state must be inhabited;
in particular uninhabited offshore islands can be
included in state territory. Cf. Art 1 of the Montevideo
Convention of 1933, 165 LNTS (1936), No. 3802, p.21;
Crawford, o£. cit., pp. 85 et seq. Art. 4 of the 1920
Arbitration Convention between Estonia and Latvia states:
'In arriving at their decision [on the boundary question]
the Commission will take into account ethnographical
and historical principles ... and the interests of the
local population'. 2 LNTS (1920), No. 66, p.188.
30. For example, on 12 February 1953 the United Kingdom and
Egypt signed an agreement concerning 'Self-Government
and Self-Determination for the Sudan*. Cmd. 8904 (London:
HMSO, July 1953); the French people by a referendum
on 8 January 1961 recognised the right of the Algerians
to choose their political destiny in relation to the
French Republic. Evian Agreements for independence of
Algeria, 18 March 1962, I ILM (1962), p.214; in 1975
the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable right
to self-determination of the population of the Spanish
Sahara. A/Res. 3292 (XXIX), adopted on 13 December
1974, XII No. 1 UN Chronicle (January 1975), pp. 58-59,
XII No. 10 ibid., (1975), pp. 5-10. A/Res. 3458 (XXX),
XIII No. 1 ibid., (1976), pp. 91-92. Cf. A/Res. 1514
(XV), 14 December 1960, the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
Cf. Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) Case, ICJ Reports,
1975, p.3. For details, see A. Rigo Sureda, The
Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination (Leiden:
A.W. Sijthoff, 1973).
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sovereignty, even to the extent of establishing a new state.
'Title® to territory is the will of the population. In
another form, this concept developed into a dubious biological
mysticism. The bond between territory and population is
organic. The nation state, once established, could be regarded
as a sort of biological organism, subject to quasi-biological
31
laws of groxvth and decay. This view is inherently expansionist;
dismemberment of a state established on ethnic principles is
viewed with the horror of vivisection. This political concept
is one of dangerous vagueness as encouraging inordinate
imperialist claims, and its application has led to some
disastrous results.
Another school of thought would make title to territory
primarily dependent upon recognition or acquiescence by the
international community as a whole. In part, this stems from
no more than a desire for an organisation of the existing
decentralised procedures for territorial change. It has,
however, roots in the fact that recongition and acquiescence
do serve as procedures for resolving certain territorial
32
problems. Externally, sovereignty over territory has two
31. The concept of the state as a living organism facilitates
the expansion of its frontiers. It is called the
•biological' or 'organic' school of political geography.
See F. Ratzel, Politische Geographie, 3rd ed. by
E. Oberhummer (Munchen, Berlin and Leipiz, 1897).
See below, 4.2.3.
32. Cf. Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53.
See below, Ch. 2.
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main aspects: on the one hand, it involves the exclusion of
the authority of all states other than the territorial
33
sovereign; it provides a basis for entry into relations on
the basis of sovereign equality with other states. Recognition
of territorial sovereignty, express or tacit, serves at the
least as an indication that title will not be disputed; it
precludes the recognising state from subsequently contesting
the title. At most it may be argued that, not only is the
external exercise of sovereignty dependent upon recognition,
but that recognition also constitutes title to the territory
35
in respect of which sovereignty is recognised.
33. Judge Huber held in the Island of Palmas Arbitration that
•territorial sovereignty ... involves the exclusive right
to display the activities of a State'. 'Conversely, the
right to be a state is dependent at least in the first
instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers
with respect to some area of territory'. II RIAA, p.839.
See below, 2.3.
34. A state becomes an international person when it possesses
the three essential elements: population, territory and a
government which holds the power in the territory of this
population. Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention
states the basic criteria for statehood: 'The State as a
person of international law should possess, Inter alia,
a defined territory'. 165 LNTS (1936), No. 3802, p.21.
Cf. Crawford, o£. cit., 48 BYIL (1976-77), p.93; idem,
The Creation of States in International Law, p.36.
35. The external sovereignty of any state may require recognition
by other states in order to render it perfect and complete.
See Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 6th English ed.,
Rev. by A.B. Keith, Vol. 1 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1929),
pp. 45-46; Crawford, The Creation of States in International
Law, pp. 36-40. See below, Ch. 4.
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In practice we shall find when we come to look more
closely at the basis of title to territory that none of these
is completely satisfactory. Each concentrates on one of the
complex elements in the relationship between state, territory,
population and the international community, to the neglect of
others. Each fails to take account of the possibility that
territorial titles may rest upon not merely multiple, but
also on a single factor.
2.3 Territorial Sovereignty
State territory, of which, we must remember, the
continental shelf is the natural submarine prolongation, is
the entire amount of land within the boundaries of each state.
The territory of the state comprises those parts of the earth's
surface which are subject to its sovereignty, whereas the
continental shelf has been deemed by treaty and custom to
be subject only to sovereign rights. 'Sovereignty' is a word
much used and abused, but its most important connotations are
36
clear enough. It signifies an 'absolute and perpetual power'
36. 'Sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual power of a
public which in Latin is termed majestas ...' see De J.
Bodin Angeuin, Le.s Six Livres de la Republique, (Paris :
Chez Jacques du Puys, 1576), L.I. IX, p.125. Bodin used
the word souverainete as well as old terms like majestas
and summa potestas. He considers the summa potestas
bound by the laws of God and of nature. There is little
dispute that the meaning of sovereignty in constitution
law is equivalent to suprema potestas, the highest legal
order, power or authority. Just as Bodin had said that
the sovereign power must belong exclusively to the Ruler,
so Althusius, the German Calvinist insisted that this
majestas must belong exclusively to the People. See
F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C.A. Watt & Co., 1966),
pp. 132-33. Sovereignty, since Bodin defined it as a
supreme power has become the mark of a true state.
21.
or 'authority1: 'absolute', in the sense that it is
independent of any superior authority other than law -
'Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies
37
independence': 'perpetual' in the sense that it is
indefinite or permanent in duration. 'Power' or 'authority'
exercised by a state or any other entity which falls short
of these requirements is, by definition, not 'sovereignty'
but rather 'jurisdiction' or 'control', limited in duration
or to purpose. Sovereignty in respect of individuals is
termed 'personal sovereignty', and in respect of territory
'territorial sovereignty'. The similarity in terminology,
however, disguises significant differences between the two
concepts. Personal sovereignty involves the power or
authority of the state to make and to enforce laws to govern
the conduct of individuals. It implies reciprocal rights
and duties; its counterpart is the bond of 'allegiance',
temporary or permanent, which links the individual to a
given state. In general, it is municipal law which determines,
on the basis of criteria such as citizenship, nationality and
presence within state territory, the bond of personal
37. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.838.
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sovereignty or allegiance. International law leaves
states, in this respect, a wide measure of discretion,
possibly limited by broad general principles, certainly
limited by explicit obligations undertaken towards other
states. The implications of the relationship of personal
sovereignty are of great importance for municipal law, but
rarely of any concern to international law.
Territorial sovereignty, on the other hand, is of
relatively little significance in municipal law. Territory
may, for example, be under the * sovereignty1 of a state, but
yet not within the sphere of application of its municipal
law. This will be the case if, say, an area such as the
territorial sea or air space is deemed in international law
to be under the sovereignty of a state which has made no
provision for the application of its laws to that area.
Similarly, annexed or ceded territory will not normally
automatically be subject to the municipal law of the new
38. The common—law doctrine of allegiance to the Crown is
to be found in Calvin Case (1608), 77 E.R. 377;
H. Lauterpacht, 'Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection,
etc., over Aliens', 9 Cambridge LJ (1947), p.330;
Clive Parry, British Nationality (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1951), pp. 7-8; idem, Nationality and Citizenship
Laws of the Commonwealth and of the Republic of Ireland
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1957), Ch. 2, p.28; J. Mervyn
Jones, British Nationality Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1956), pp. 1, 3, 51-57. The advisory opinion of the
ICJ on the Western Sahara shows, legal ties of territorial
sovereignty over people or land must be distinguished
from ties of allegiance, in the case of persons, and
from mere customary rights in relation to land,
ICJ Reports, 1975, p.12.
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sovereign. Conversely, the fact that a given state
legislates and enforces its laws in respect of persons
within a certain territory does not necessarily imply its
territorial sovereignty. For a state may perform acts of
sovereignty in respect of its nationals wherever they may
be, providing it does not infringe the territorial sovereignty
39
of any other state. A state may perform all the normal
functions of government in territory over which its sovereignty
is excluded: territory 'leased' by treaty, for example, or
territory administered under mandate or trust.
Territorial sovereignty is, in general, a situation
40
recognised and delimited m space. It is of paramount
41 ...
importance for international law. The delimitation of
39. Cf. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951
p.116; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U,K.-Iceland)(Merits)
Case, ICJ Reports, 1974, p.3.
40. Cf. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.838.
Max Huber adds that 'territorial sovereignty ...
involves the exclusive right to display the activities
of a state. This right has as corollary a duty: the
obligation to protect within the territory the rights
of other states, in particular their rights to integrity
and inviolability in peace and in war, together with
the rights which each state may claim for its nationals
in foreign territory', ibid., p.839. See above,
41. Suontausta asserts that the primacy of international
law is established on a basis of territorial loyalties.
See Tauno Suontausta, La Souverainete des Etats
(Helsinki, 1955)
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territorial sovereignty is always a matter of international
concern. It always has 'an international aspect', the more
so as the territorial claims of each state match with, and
may conflict with, the claims of its neighbours, or with
42
the interests of the international community as a whole.
Nevertheless, in the normal case, in which the territory of
the state is not the subject of international dispute, we
look to the internal public law of the state for a definition
of its territory and not to international law. Normally,
municipal law will describe the territory of the state for
the purposes of government and the jurisdiction of the
courts. A few states include in their constitutional
instruments detailed descriptions of the boundaries of
43
national territory. More usually, the limits of national
claims must be adduced from a variety of sources: municipal
legislation, international agreements, maps, governmental
practice and unilateral declarations claiming sovereignty
over territory. In case of doubt, a formal statement by the
executive is usually conclusive for a municipal court.
42. Great importance is attached to the principle stated by
the Court in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case that:
'the delimitation of sea areas has always an international
aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will
of the coastal state as expressed in its municipal law*.
ICJ Reports, 1951, p.132. Valuable as this statement of
the principle is, it leaves a lot of questions unanswered,
for merely to say there is an 'international aspect'
does not take the matter very far. Cf. The S.S. Lotus,
PCIJ Series A, No. 9, p.10. See below, 3.2.
43. See, e.g., Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines of 1971. See below, Ch. 9.
25.
Internationally, however, all these sources are no more
than evidence of claims to territorial sovereignty. From
the standpoint of international law, municipal law is no
more than a fact. In consequence, municipal legislation
purporting to delimit state territory is merely a claim to
sovereignty, and not its determinant. The same applies to
delimitation of the continental shelf. The same is also
true & fortiori of, for example, more informal evidence of
territorial claims in the form of governmental activities,
. . . 44
official and unofficial maps. When sovereignty over
territory is in dispute, municipal law provides only appoint
of departure. It represents no more than a claim opposed
by a similar claim on the part of another state. Thus, to
take the most striking example, the Constitutions of both
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Korean Democratic
People's Republic (North Korea) contain formal claims to
45
sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula. Clearly these
claims cannot be reconciled by reference to the municipal
law of the claimants.
44. See e.g., Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.852-54;
Clipperton Island Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1105;
Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovak Frontier (Question
of Jaworzina) Case, PCIJ Series B, No. 8, p.33;
Delimitation of the Serbo-Albania Frontier (Question of
the Monastery of Saint-Naoum) Case, PCIJ Series B, No. 9,
p.21; Case concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land, ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209; Temple of Preah Vihear
Case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p.22; Rann of Kutch Arbitration,
50 ILR' p.2, at pp. 105-113, 123-126, 420-423, 443-444,
485; Beagle Channel Arbitration, 52 ILR, p.165, 182,
203—206. See below, Chs. 2, 3, 4.
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2.4 Boundaries and Frontiers
Boundaries and frontiers are elements of the landscape
which mark either the de facto or de jure limits of political
46
sovereignty. In Pope et al v. Blanton, County Judge, et al.,
the United States, District Court, Northern District, Florida
held that:
the right of the state to fix its boundaries has
never been questioned by any nation, by the Congress,
or before, by any citizen of the state, and this
acquiescence over a long period of time in the
establishment of the boundary of the state is not
only entitled to consideration by a country in
determining the right of the citizen to question
the power of the sovereign state to change its
boundary, but sufficient to stop the subject from
questioning the right of the state to exercise
dominion over its boundaries fixed by the ^
Constitution and approved by the Congress.
The dividing line (the line of 'delimitation1 or
'demarcation') between one political state and another, or
45. See e.g., Ch. 1, Art. 3 of the South Korean Constitution
of 1962 which provides: 'The territory of the Republic
of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its
adjacent islands'; Ch. 1, Art. 1 of the North Korean
Constitution which provides: 'The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea is an independent socialist State
which represents the interests of all the Korean people'
[italics added]. Cf. Art. 2 of the Constitution of
Ireland of 1937 which provides: 'The national territory
consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and
the territorial seas' [italics added].
46. J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries
(London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967), p.28.
47. 10 F. Supp. 18 (1935); 8 Annual Digest and Reports of
Public International Law Cases (1935-1937), Case No. 57,
p.171. Cf. Pope v. Blanton, 229 U.S. 521 (1936).
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between administrative units or between geographical regions
of various types is called a 'boundary2. It is generally
defined as 'any separation, natural or aritifical which
48
marks the confines or line of two contiguous zones'.
In civil lav/, a boundary is an imaginary line which
marks the confines or line of division of two contiguous
estates. The boundaries can be fixed either by proved acts
of the respective owners or by statutes or orders of the
authorities having jurisdiction or in absence of such acts,
statutes or orders by legal prescription. In international
law, the major legal function of the boundaries and frontiers
of a state is to delimit the area in which that state
possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of any other state. Accordingly it is clear that the
international boundaries are the imaginary lines on the surface
of the earth which separate the territory of one state from
that of another, or from unappropriated territory, or from
48. The term 'boundary' is applied to include the objects
placed on or existing at the angles of the frontier
lines of separation. See Curtis M. Brown, Boundary
Control and Legal Principles (New York: John Wiley,
1957), p.59. Boundary is usually defined by a certain
mark, such as a post, ditch, hedge, dyke, wall of
stones etc. It is used to indicate the line which
divides one territorial entity from another. See
J.R.V. Prescott, Frontiers and Boundaries, 2nd ed.
(London: Groom Helm, 1978), Ch. 1.
28.
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the sea-bed and subsoil of the open sea. In Manchester
v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court of the United States said:
Within what are generally recognised as the territorial
limits of states by the law of nations, a state can
define its bound^gies on the sea and the boundaries
of its counties.
Thus the sovereignty of a state extends to the seaward
limit of its marginal seas and seabed.^1
Boundary delimitation, in principle, should be seen
52
as a matter for the states concerned. It may be fixed by
49. D.W. Johnson, "The Role of Political Boundaries", 4
Geographical Review (1917), p.108; S.B. Jones, Boundary-
Making, A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and
Boundary Commissioners (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1945), p.7; L. Oppenheim,
International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1, 8th ed H.
Lauterpacht (ed) (Longman, 1961), p.531; S. Whittemore
Boggs, International Boundaries - A Study of Boundary
Functions and Problems (New York: A..M.S. Press, 1966),
Ch. 1, p.3; T.S. Murty, "Evidence on Traditional
Boundaries and Some Problems in its Interpretation",
8 Indian J.I.E. (1968), p.484; P.K. Menon, "Settlement
of International Boundary Disputes", 8 Anglo-American L.R.
(1979), p.24.
50. 139 U.S. 264; Annual Digest and Reports of Public International
Law Cases 1938-40, Case No. 52 } p.138.
51. Art. 13, Draft Convention on the Territorial Waters,
Harvard Research in International Law, 23 Special Number
AJIL (1929), p.244. Cf. William E. Masterson, Jurisdiction
in Marginal Seas with Special Reference to Smuggling
(New York; The MacMillan Co., 1929), Pt. v, pp. 375 ert seq;
Geoffrey Marston, The Marginal Seabed (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1981), pp. 260-69. See below, Ch. 5.
52. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the Court said that
the delimitation of sea areas has always an 'international
aspect*. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.132. In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, the Court emphasised that
delimitation must be the object of agreement between
the states concerned. ICJ Reports, 1969, p.3. Cf.
I. Bernstein, Delimitation of International Boundaries
(Tel Aviv U.P., 1974). See below, 3.2.
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a treaty between two or more adjacent states, or by a
unilateral act - of occupation, annexation, prescription etc.
Since boundaries have been of critical importance in inter¬
state relations the view has been held that they should
generally not be disturbed. This recognition of boundaries
may be tacit or stipulated by international agreement. Some
Afro-Asian states have raised the question of boundaries
established at the time when these countries were under
colonial domination. It seems, however, that most Afro-
Asian countries have declared themselves in favour of the
53 ...
principle of uti possidetis, which was applied in Latin
America in the nineteenth century during the liberation of
the former Spanish colonies and which provided that boundaries
between Latin American states should correspond to the
administrative boundaries which existed between different
54
parts of the Spanish colonial empire.
53. Uti possidetis, ita possideatis means 'as you possess,
you shall continue to possess'. The term is derived
from classical Roman Law in which it was used to denote
an edict of the praetor, the purpose of which was to
preserve, pending litigation, an existing state of actual
possession of real property nec vi, ne clam, ne precaris
between individual claimants. J.B. Moore, Memorandum
on Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica - Panama Arbitration,
1911 (Rosslyn, Va.: The Commonwealth Co., 1913), p.5.
See also J.H.W. VERIJL, International Law in Historical
Perspective, Vol. 8 (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976), p.301.
54. Uti possidetis could be described as a form of 'critical
date'. The technical learning about the 'critical date'
(i.e. the date by reference to which a territorial dispute
must be deemed to have crystallised) is important in
territorial disputes ; it has become increasingly important
since the arguments before the ICJ in the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case (ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47) made it inevitable
that/
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One vexed issue, in writings on international boundaries,
is that of terminology. From a practical point of view, it
is evident that states may be divided by what is notionally a
widthless line - marked as such on maps and perhaps clearly
delineated, by boundary posts, for example, on the ground.
Alternatively, states may be separated by zones, which may be
of undetermined width and which usually take the form of
relatively unpopulated areas or impassable physical features,
such as mountain ranges, deserts, rivers, swamps, lakes,
that in the Argentine-Chile Boundary Arbitration (XVI
RIAA, p.115) and in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration (50
ILR, p.2) the respective Parties endeavoured to raise
arguments concerning the critical date. For details,
see L.F.E. Goldie, "The Critical Date", 12 ICLQ (1963),
p.1251. In the case of South America the 'critical
date* was generally taken to be 1810. See, e.g., the
Bolivia-Peru Boundary Arbitration (1922), XI RIAA, p.141;
the Colombia-Vene'Zuela Boundary Arbitration (1922),
I RIAA, p.223. In Central America the 'critical date*
was 1821. Art. 5 of the compromis between Guatemala
and Honduras of 1930, 137 LNTS (1933), No. 3159, p.232.
By contrast, the delegation of Afghanistan observed
that in Latin America most boundary disputes had been
settled by arbitration and that one could not say, in
the circumstances, that the old principle of uti
possidetis had been applied. II YBILC (1974), p.73;
Suzanne Bastid, "Les problemes territoriaux dans la
jurisprudence de la cour internationale de Justice",
107 Recueil des Cours (1962), p.489.
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troughs, valleys and canyons.55 In the case of a zonal
division, we may expect the zone to be accompanied by a
boundary.
Empires in the past usually preferred frontiers to
boundaries as surrounds for the peripheries of their
territorial jurisdictions. Frontier zones were thus regarded
5i
as buffers or insulation belts, which might be neutral zones
57
but were more likely to be areas of suzerainty. In the
modern international community of nation—states, boundaries,
which are lines of political delimitation and demarcation,
are the convention and are internationally sanctioned notions
of political legitimacy, and are further encouraged by modern
55. C.B. Fawcett, Frontier: A Study in Political Geography
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), pp. 5-6; Boggs, op. cit.,
p.22; A.O. Cukwurak, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes
in International Law (Manchester U.P., 1967), pp. 11
et seq. For troughs, see below, Ch. 7.
56. It has been suggested that a zone of the sea—bed and
subsoil bying between the 200 metre isobath and the
continental rise should be brought under some kind of
a compromise regime and has been formulated in terms
of several different proposals. Those of most interest
are Professor Henkin's buffer zone [Louis Henkin, Law
for the Sea's Mineral Resources, ISHA Monograph No. 1
(Columbia Univ., 1968), pp. 46-48]; the Stratton
Commission's "intermediate zone" (Stratton Commission
Report, pp. 151-53) and the "trusteeship zone"
recommended in the 1970 United States Draft Convention
on the International Seabed Area (UN Doc. A/AC.138/25;
UN Doc. A/8021 (1970)). For discussion, see R.Y.
Jennings, the United States Draft Treaty on the
International Seabed Area - Basic Principles, 20 ICLQ
(1971), pp. 433-52. See below, Ch. 6.
57. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, France asserted
that contemporary suzerainty was sufficient to found
a title in the French King over the disputed islets
which had not been subsequently displayed. ICJ Reports,
1953, p.75.
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systems of communication and techniques of map-making.
Frontiers have become obsolete, and boundaries are the
58
standard form.
A useful distinction has been made between the terms
'boundary' and 'frontier'. A boundary is a clear divide
between sovereignties which can be marked as a line on a
59
map. It has, as it were, length but not area, e.g. the
Curzon Line between Russia and Poland, the McMahon Line
between India and Tibet,^ the MacArthur Line and the Rhee
Line between Japan and South Korea demarcating exclusive
fishery zones off their coasts,^1 the Brevie Line between
62
Vietnam and Kampuchea; the 17th parallel in Vietnam, the
58. Peter Lyon, "Regional Organisations and Frontier Disputes",
Evan Luard (ed) The International Regulation of Frontier
Disputes (London: Thames & Hudson, 1970), pp. 112 et seq.
59. Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing
Problem (London: Pall Mall, 1968), p.4; John Burke (ed)
Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed. Vol. 1
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), pp. 243-44.
60. For details, see Alastair Lamb, The McMahon Line: A Study
in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to
1914, Vols. I and II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1966).
61. Guenter Weissberg, Recent Developments in the Law of the
Sea and the Japanese-Korean Fishery Dispute (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 6,8,10-14,76,77,95; Choon-ho
Park, "Marine Resource Conflicts in the North Pacific",
in Douglas M. Johnston (cd), Marine Policy and the Coastal
Community (London: Groom Helm, 1976), pp. 220-22.
62. The Brevie line was named after a French Governor-General
and was drawn originally in 1939 to divide the administrative
and police jurisdiction between the French colony of
Cochinchina and the protectorate of Cambodia. Although
it was accepted by both sides as the de facto line of
control, Vietnam has not accepted the Brevie line as the
'state frontier'. The Kampucheans, however, do not see
the Brevie line as merely a line for administrative and
police jurisdiction but think of it as the 'state frontier'.
Lee Yong Leng "Offshore Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia",
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (Nov. 1978), p.182.
See also Far Eastern Economic Review (3 Feb. 1978), p.23.
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38th parallel in Korea and the 49th parallel separating
Canada from the United States - these are also examples of
63
boundaries in this sense. A frontier, as that term was
understood by authorities on British imperial border questions,
such as Lord Curzon and Sir Henry McMahon, is a Zone rather
64
than a line. It is a tract of territory separating the
centres of two sovereignties, e.g. the North-West Frontier:
the zone lying between the British-administered territory
of the Indus plains and the sphere of authority of the Afghan
government. A frontier zone may well be of very extensive
area, and a dispute over the exact whereabouts of a boundary
line through a frontier zone can involve large tracts of
63. Lamb, Asian Frontiers, p.4. See below, 3.2.3.
64. A frontier is a region or zone having width as well as
length. Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, Vol. 1,
p.279. In the reign of Antoninus Pius (AD 81-161)
Rome extended its occupation of Britain to the line
of the Forth and Clyde, and defended its most northerly
frontier of the Empire with a fortified wall extending
from Bridgeness 37 miles west, to Old Kilpatrick.
See William Hanson and Gordon Maxwell, Rome's Most
Northerly Frontier: The Antonine Wall (Edinburgh U.P.,
1982). Cf. E.H. Hills, "The Geography of International
Frontiers", 28 Geographical Journal (1906), p.146;
Thomas Holdich, "Political Boundaries", 32 Scottish
Geographical Magazine (1916), p.501; Modesto Seara
Vazquez, "Zones of Influence", 27 YBWA (1973), p.301.
34.
territory. 5 The Sino-Indian boundary dispute,^ because
it concerns such a line through a frontier zone, involves
more than 50,000 square miles of territory. Thus, the Sino-
Indian border along the Himalayas represents a frontier
rather than a boundary. Moreover, on 29 November 1954, an
Agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Ethiopia
whereby the British Military Administration was withdrawn
from certain regions adjoining the frontier of British
Somaliland. The Agreement contains a Schedule describing
the regions from which the British Administration was to be
withdrawn, and this was accepted and recognised as an inter-
67
national frontier between Ethiopia and the Somaliland.
65. Lamd, Asian Frontiers, p.4.
66. See generally, A.P. Rubin, "The Sino-Indian Border
Disputes", 9 ICLQ (1960), p.96; K.K. Rao, "The Sino-
Indian Boundary Question and International Law", 11
ibid., (1962), p.375; idem, "The Sino-Indian Boundary
Question: A Study of Some Related Legal Issues",
3 Indian J.I.L. (1963), p. 151; W.F. Van Eckelen,
Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); S.P. Sharma, "The
Indian-China Border Dispute: An Indian Perspective",
59 AJIL (1965), p.16; Alastair Lamb, The China-India
Border; The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (Oxford
U.P., 1964), p.l; idem, The McMahon Line, loc. cit.;
idem, "Treaties, Maps and the Western Sector of the
Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute", 1 Australian YBIL (1965),
p.37; A.O. Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes
in International Law (Manchester U.P., 1967), p.153;
G.N. Rao, The India-China Border: A Reappraisal (London:
Asia Publishing House, 1968); J.E.S. Fawcett, "General
Course on Public International Law", 132 Recueil des
Cours (1971-1), p.441. See below, 4.1 and Ch. 2.
67. BTS, No. 1 (1955), Cmd. 9348. For discussion, see
D.J.L. Brown, "The Ethiopia—Somaliland Frontier Dispute",
5 ICLQ (1956), p.245.
35.
Although in common parlance, the words 'boundary' and
'frontier' are used interchangeably, there is a clear
difference between them; the distinction is endorsed by
Kristof:
The boundary is defined and regulated by law, national
and international, and as such its status and character¬
istics are more uniform and can be defined with some
precision. But the frontier is a phenomenon of history;
like history it may repeat itself, but, again like
history, it is always unique. It is difficult to
pinpoint essential^geatures of the frontier which are
universally valid.
The distinction between a 'boundary' and 'frontier' is
69
legally significant. In the Rann of Kutch Arbitration,
for example, between India and Pakistan in 1968, it was
68. Kristof, "The Nature of Frontier and Boundaries",
49 Annals of the Association of American Geographers
(1959), p.273.
69. The Indo-Pakistan Western-Boundary Case Tribunal Award,
19 February 1968 (Government of India Press, 1968);
7 ILM (1968), p.633; 50 ILR (1976), p.2. For discussion,
see A.L.W. Munkman, "Adjudication and Adjustment -
International Judicial Decision and the Settlement of
Territorial and Boundary Disputes", 46 BYIL (1972-73),
p.70; C.J. Chacko, "The Rann of Kutch and International
Law" 5 Indian J.I.L. (1965), p.147; R. Khan, "Relinquish¬
ment of Title to Territory - The Rann of Kutch Award -
A Case Study" 9 Indian J.I.L. (1969), p.157; Mukund
G. Untawale "The Kutch-Sind Dispute: A Case Study in
International Arbitration" 23 ICLQ (1974), p.818;
T.S.R. Rao, "An Appraisal of the Kutch Award", 9
Indian J.I.L. (1969), p.143; R.P. Anand, Studies in
International Adjudication (Delhi: Vikas Publ. 1969),
p.218; J.G. Wetter, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration",
65 AJIL (1971), p.346; D.H.N. Johnson, "International
Arbitration Back in Favour?", 34 YBWA (1980), p.305,
at pp. 320-22. See below, Ch. 2.
36.
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contended by Pakistan that the area of the Rann formed
in its entirety a part of the boundary between Pakistan and
India - i.e. the Rann was a 'frontier* - and that no 'boundary'
in the sense of a widthless line had ever been established.
India, on the other hand, contended that the boundary ran
roughly along the northern edge of the Rann; this was the
boundary shown in pre-partition maps, and was the 'traditional,
well-established and well-recognised boundary'. The Tribunal
was required by both parties to decide inter alia whether the
boundary in dispute was a historically recognised and well-
established boundary. It held that the Rann constituted a
broad belt of boundary between the neighbouring countries.
There was no historically recognised and well-established
boundary in the area in dispute. If the Tribunal had accepted
Pakistan's argument in its entirety, and had therefore accepted
70. The Ranna in this case was described by Judge Gunnar
Lagergren as 'a unique geographical phenomenon' and
by Judge Bebler as 'a peculiar surface, most akin
to marsh or swamp'. Its peculiarity lies in the
fact that the Rann is sometimes a desert and is
sometimes flooded with water. This led Pakistan to
describe it as 'a marine feature' whilst India
considered it to be land. Pakistan claimed that the
boundary should run through the middle of the Rann,
while India contended that the entire Rann was Indian
territory. Johnson, o£. cit., 34 YBWA (1980), pp. 320-21.
Long before the creation of Pakistan, the then Foreign
Department of the British Government of India made
it clear in 1906 that it was more correct to define
the Rann of Kutch as 'marsh' than as a 'lake* or
'inland sea'. K.K. Rao, The Kutch-Sind Border Question
(The Indian Society of International Law, 1965).
37.
that its duty under the terms of the compromis was to reduce
a 'frontier* zone to a 'boundary' line, then Pakistan's
claim for the division of the Rann between the two parties
on the median-line principle would no doubt have been
successful.
At present, a frontier of a state is not just represented
by a line but by a plane which vertically delimits the land,
71
sea and air space of a state, including the seabed and subsoil.
Delimitation of liquid mineral deposits (whether fluid or
gaseous) which extend across a natural frontier on land
territory or a boundary line on the continental shelf between
adjacent or opposite states requires cooperation between
neighbouring states as regards common deposits of oil and
72
gas. It is noteworthy that to draw a boundary line in
accordance with the proper principles and rules relating to
the determination of boundaries is one thing, but how to
. . 73
divide an area with an underlying "deposit" is another thing.
71. Cf. J.V.R. Prescott, The Political Geography of the
Oceans (London: David & Charles, 1975). See below, 4.4.
72. See, e.g., Art. 4 of the 1965 Agreement between the U.K.
and Norway relating to the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf. Norway No. 1 (1965), Cmnd. 2626; the 1965 Agreement
between the U.K. and the Netherlands relating to the
Exploitation of Single Geological Structures Extending
Across the Dividing Line on the Continental Shelf of the
North Sea, Netherlands No. 2 (1965), Cmnd. 2831.
See below, Ch. 7.
73. See, e.g., Art. 46(1) of the 1960 Treaty between the
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning
Arrangements for Cooperation in the Ems Estuary which
states that 'this Treaty shall not affect the question
of the course of the international frontier in the Ems
Estuary. Each Contracting Party reserves its legal
position in this respect'. 509 UNTS (1964) No. 7404, p.4,
at p.94. It may be appropriate to mention here that,
when/
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The territorial sea as a maritime space is inseparably
connected with the land territory of which it is an appurtenance.
The state's authority over the mineral resources of its land
territory and territorial sea is based on the concept of
territorial sovereignty as an essential part of its legal
personality; its sovereign rights over the mineral resources
in the soil and subsoil of its continental shelf, however,
are derived from the geographical concept of natural prolongation.
The question of delimitation of the maritime and submarine
boundaries can also be answered by reference to the fundamental
75
principles of territorial sovereignty. This rule has been
succinctly stated by Richards in the following terms:
Sovereign States are entitled to all those rights which
are necessary for ^e preservation and protection of
their territories.
when analysing the former Judgment of the ICJ on
"Contestations relatives au trace de la frontier",
Dr. Bastid has noted that in them 'can be discerned
certain tendencies showing that there is a distinction
to be made between conflicts concerning frontiers and
those to do with the attribution of a territory'.
Suzanne Bastid, "Les problemes territoriaux dans la
jurisprudence de la cour internationale de justice",
107 Recueil des cours (1962-III), p.452.
74. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969,
p.31. Cf. the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration,
54 ILR (1979), pp.89-90, 93-94, 99-101; the Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports, 1978, p.3.
See below, Chs. 5 and 7.
75. On 28 January, 1981, Dom Mintoff, Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Malta,
informed the Registrar of the ICJ that 'Malta's interest
in her continental shelf boundaries is of a legal character
since the continental shelf rights of states are derived
from law, as are also the principles and rules on the
basis of which such areas are to be defined and delimited'.
20 ILM (1981), p.330.
76. D.H.N. Johnson, "The Contribution of Sir Erie Richards
to the Science of International Law", 39 BYIL (1963),
p.378.
39.
3. Chronological Stages of Establishment of International
Boundaries
An international boundary separates the territorial limits
of neighbouring states. It marks the limits of the region
77within which the state can exercise its own sovereign rights.
It is plain that territorial boundaries are always determined
by political and not judicial action. For instance, in a
controversy between the United States and a foreign state
as to its boundary, the Courts will follow the decision of
those departments of the Government to which the assertion
of its interests against foreign states is confided, i.e.
78
the legislature and executive.
Lapradelle and Jones have both adopted a convenient
terminology for analysing the stages in the history of a
boundary: allocation, delimitation, demarcation and adminis¬
tration. As Jones puts it:
77. V. Adami, National Frontiers in Relation to International
Law (London: T.T. Behrens, 1927), p.3; S.P. Sharma,
International Boundaries Disputes and International Law:
A Policy Oriented Study (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Private
Ltd., 1976), p.3; P.K. Menon, "International Boundaries
- A Case Study of the Guyana-Surinam Boundary", 27
ICLQ (1978), p.738.
78. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 253; Garcia v.
Lee, 12 ibid., 511; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.,
13 ibid., 415; U.S. v. Reynes, 9 Howard 127. Cf.
Francis Wharton (ed), A Digest of the International Law
of the United States, Vol. 1 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1886), Ch. 1, para. 22.
40.
In respect to governmental processes, there are four
main stages in the history of a boundary: (1) political
decisions on the allocation of territory, (2) delimitation
of the boundary in a treaty, (3) demarcation of the
boundary on the ground, and (4) administration of the
boundary. Chronologically, these stages may overlap,
may succeed each other promptly, or may be separated
by gaps of many years. Allocation and delimitation may
take place at a single conference. On the other hand,
a general allocation of territory may be agreed upon
long before boundaries are delimited. One part of a
boundary may be demarcated before others are delimited.
There are boundaries formally delimited years ago that
have not yet been demarcated. Some boundaries have
remained unadministered for many years, while others
have been under de facto administration before they
were delimited, or eve^before the final allocation of
territory was decided.
This analysis affords both a useful terminology and
a convenient classification into which legal issues relating
to territory and boundaries may be fitted. It cannot, however,
be accepted in its entirety without comment.
3.1 Allocation:
In using the phrase 'allocation of territory', Jones
appears to be thinking primarily in terms of 'political'
decisions by international conferences, such as those taken
by the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War.
The term is also appropriate to describe other formal bilateral
or multi-lateral arrangements acknowledging or transferring
sovereignty or sovereign rights over territory. It is not,
79. Jones, o£. cit., p.5 [italics added]. Cf. J.R.V.
Prescott, Political Geography (London: Methuen, 1972),
p.63. Cf. Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontiere Etude de
droit international, Les Editions Internationales
(Paris: etude de droit international, 1928), pp. 132-40.
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however, a terra of legal import in the sense that one might
speak of a title to territory by allocation. Thus, this
reference to allocation as the primary purpose of boundaries
is not a reflection of legalism but accords with the attitudes
80
of the politicians who make territorial arrangements.
3.1.1 Land Frontiers
A political decision on the allocation of territory
might be made - such as the General Assembly Partition
81
Resolution on Palestine - which imposed no legal obligation
to accept it, and from which it would therefore be inappropriate
to derive a title to territory. Nevertheless, if the parties
to a territorial dispute have entrusted its solution to a
tribunal, and that tribunal 'allocates' the territory to
80. Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic
Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst; University of California
Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979), p.3. Cf.
A.C. McEwan, International Boundaries of East Africa
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Ch. 2, p.11. On 27
September 1961, the United States joined with the
States of Delaware, New Jersey and New York and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the Delaware River
Basin Compact. The Compact created the Delaware River
Basin Commission and empowered it to allocate the waters
of the basin to and among their respective political
subdivisions, 75 Stat. 688-89, 691-93, 712-13.
81. With regard to the resolution of the General Assembly on
29 November 1947 in favour of the partition of Palestine,
see A/Res. 181 (II), UN Doc. A/519. In 1946, the British
Government insisted that the eastern part of Palestine
be called 'the Kingdom of Transjordan*. It is now called
•the Kingdom of Jordan' and it occupies approximately
77 per cent of the area of the former mandated territory
of Palestine. For details, see M. Cohen, Palestine:
Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy,
1936—1945 (Oxford U.P., 1978); Mohammed K. Shadid,
The United States and the Palestinians (London: Groom
Helm, 1981); E. Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy
Places, Anglo-Israel Associated Pamphlet No. 19 (London,
1968); Henry Cattan, Palestine and International Law
(London: Longman, 1973). See below, 4.2.2.
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(or divides it between) one or other party, then it may be
not inappropriate to describe the 'allocation* (or, in the
case of an arbitral or judicial tribunal, the appropriate
term would be 'adjudication') as the root of title. Even
in this case, however, a formal agreement between the parties
will normally follow the decision of the tribunal. Moreover,
the successful party may rely on some prior 'title' upon
which its claim had originally been based.
There are, however, certain cases in which a 'political
decision on allocation of territory' may well constitute a
root of title. Thus the Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian
82
Frontier (Question of Jaworzina), the Delimitation of the
Serbo-Albanian Frontier (Question of the Monastery of Saint-
83
Naoum), and the Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq (Mosul
84
Boundary) cases are the obvious examples. In these cases,
the PCIJ, in effect, gave decisions on the allocation and
delimitation of frontiers on the basis of status quo ante.
International agreement may determine the sovereignty,
administration or use of hitherto unclaimed areas or resources,
or of areas or resources to which claims of doubtful legal
82. PCIJ Ser. B, No. 8. See below, 3.1.2 and Ch. 2.
83. PCIJ Ser. B, No. 9. See below, Ch. 2.
84. PCIJ Ser. B, No. 12. In the British Guiana Boundary
and the Rann of Kutch Arbitrations decisions on
allocation of substantial portions of territory and
on the delimitation of the boundary between the areas
awarded to each party were combined. See respectively,
11 RIAA^ P-ll; 50 ILR (1976), p.2. See below, Ch. 2.
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validity have been made. The partition of the New World
and of Africa, of maritime and submarine areas, air and
outer space, and the polar regions, are cases in point.
International agreement may also determine the allocation
85
of 'Mandate' and 'Trust' territories, or establish new
states.
3.1.2 Maritime Zones
Apart from rivers, even substantially enclosed maritime
areas were regarded as being under the jurisdiction of the
sovereign of the surrounding land. Thus, Vattel said:
If a sea is entirely inclosed within national territory
and connects with the ocean only by a channel of which
the Nation can take possession, it would seem that such
a sea is no less susceptible of occupation and ownership
than the land, and it should come under the same juris¬
diction as the land surrounding it. The Mediterranean
Sea was in former times completely surrounded by Roman
territory, and the Romans, by making themselves masters
of the strait connecting it with the ocean, could subject
that/
85. The Mandate is an exalted form of trust. It makes the
object of every Mandate not merely the protection of the
funds and property of one or more beneficiaries, but,
under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
it establishes the fundamental rule that the Mandate
must be administered for 'the well-being and development
of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under
the strenuous conditions of the modern world*. See
generally, D. Campbell Lee "Mandate: How they are
working?", 12 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1926),
pp. 31-47; James C. Hales, "Some Legal Aspects of the
Mandate System: Sovereignty - Nationality - Termination
and Transfer", 23 ibid (1937), pp. 85-126; Norman
Bentwich, The Mandate System (London: Longmans, Green
& Co., 1930), p.135. Cf. International Status of South
West Africa (Advisory Opinion) Case, ICJ Reports, 1950,
p.128; South-West Africa - Voting Procedure (Advisory
Opinion) Case, ICJ Reports, 1955, p.67.
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that sea to their sovereignty and claim the ownership
of it. They did not violate, in so doing, the rights
of other Nations, since an individual sea is clearly
destined by nature to the gge of the countries and
Nations which surround it.
It may be discerned that in this passage Vattel was not so
careful in the case of maritime areas as he was concerning
land areas to distinguish the acquisition of sovereignty or
87
imperium from the acquisition of ownership or dominium.
He admitted that the sea near the coasts of a state might
be appropriated to some extent. He, however, justified this
ownership of sovereignty on a number of grounds, and, although
in his discussion he uses both the terms 'ownership* and
'sovereignty', his use of them is perhaps not wholly in¬
discriminate since it bears some apparent relationship to
their justification. Larger areas might only be placed under
the imperium, that is, power or jurisdiction of a state.
86. E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Vol. Ill, English
trans, by Charles G. Fenwick (1758; rpt. Washington:
the Carnegie Institute, 1916), Bk. I, Ch. XXIII, p.110,
para. 294.
87. The term dominium is usually translated as 'ownership',
and it describes the right of property of the individual
in the land which he may own, and that of the Nation
or State, considered as a collectivity of individuals
in its territory. Imperium is usually translated into
English as 'sovereignty' or, by the older writers, as
'Empire'. See L. Oppenheim (ed) The Collected Papers
of John Westlake on Public International Law (Cambridge
U.P., 1914), pp. 134-35. Cf. Sir Henry Sumner Maine,
Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, Second
impression of the seventh ed. (London: John Murray,
1905), Lecture XIII, p.371.
45.
It is interesting here to recall that Grotius also
refers to the possibility of sovereignty over the sea being
acquired 'by means of territory, in so far as those who sail
over the part of the sea along the coast may be constrained
from the land no less than if they should be upon the land
itself'.88
In fact, it would appear from the type of claims made
that the possibility of constraint from the shore, and
89
therefore the relevance of even a notional cannon-shot range,
was significant only in claims to areas of sea which were
deemed part of the territory of the coastal state for the
purpose of excluding hostilities from the neighbourhood of
neutral states.
Indeed, a state may have a peculiar possession of portions
of the sea, so as to exclude the universal or the common use
by other states. Sir William Scott held in The Twee Gebroeders,
Northolt Master, that portions of the sea might be acquired
by prescription, just as rivers can when they flow through
contiguous states: the banks on one side may have been first
settled, by which fact the possession and property may have
88. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Vol. II, English
trans, by Francis W. Kelsey (1646; rpt. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1925), Bk. II, Ch. Ill, XIII, p.214.
89. Bynkershoek declared that potestatem terrae finitur
armorum vis, the control from the land ends with the
range of weapons. Cornelius van Bynkershoek, De Dominio
Maris Dissertatio, English trans, by Ralph van Deman
Magoffin (1774; rpt. New York: Oxford U.P., 1923),
Ch. II; Cf. J.K. Oudenbijk, Status and Extent of
Adjacent Waters (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970) pp. 68, 107.
46.
been acquired, or cessions may have taken place upon conquests,
or other events. But the general presumption ce-rtainly bears
strongly against such exclusive rights and the title is a
matter to be established, on the part of those claiming under
it, in the same manner that all other legal demands are to
90
be substantiated by clear and competent evidence, ie. by
proof of ancient and constant usage.
This view has been repeated in the case of the Le Louis,
91
Forest of 1817. A French vessel, the Le Louis, which sailed
from Martinique to the coast of Africa and back, was captured
ten or twelve leagues to the southward of Cape Mesurada by
the British Queen Charlotte cutter and carried to Sierra
Leone. Action was brought against her in the vice-admiralty
court of that colony for being concerned in the slave-trade
contrary to the French law. Lord Stowell held that:
maritime states have claimed a right of visitation and
enquiry within those parts of the ocean adjoining to
their shores, which the common courtesy of nations has
for their common convenience allowed to be considered
as parts of their dominions for various domestic purposes,
and particularly for fiscal or defensive regulations, more
immediately affecting their safety and welfare. Such are
... hovering laws, which within certain limited distances
more/
90. (1801) 3C. Rob. 336, 339. In the Schooners Fame,
Mr. Justice Story deemed it possible that a state might
have an exclusive use founded on the acquiescence or
tacit consent of other states. 3 Manson's American
Reports, p.150.
91. J. Dodson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in
the High Court of Admiralty, Vol. II (London: Joseph
Butterworth, 1828), p.120.
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more or less moderately assigned, subject foreign
vessels to such examination. This has nothing in
common with a right of visitation ^gd search upon the
unappropriated parts of the ocean.
There is no inconsistency between these views and those of
Grotius, who says that one who has occupied a part of the
sea cannot hinder navigation which is without weapons and
of innocent intent, and when such a passage cannot be prevented
by land, and when it is generally less necessary and more
93
likely to produce damage; for Grotius must be understood
to be speaking of the natural right of a state, and not of
an instituted right founded on the tacit consent of other
states.
Russia endeavoured in the last century to revive the
old controversy in connection with the Behring Sea and Alaska,
and later the United States claimed maritime areas as
successors to Russian dominion over Alaska beyond the
94
Bynkershoek limit, but without success. The Arbitral
92. Ibid., pp. 245-46. [italics added].
93. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk. II, Ch. Ill, XII, p.212;
Cf. Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1688;
rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934) Bk. IV, Ch. V.
Sec. 8, p.563.
94. The U.S. claims following the purchase of Alaska from
the U.S.S.R. in 1867 to an extent of water 150 miles
by 700 were derived from a Russian ukase, the revocation
of which the United States had been instrumental in
procuring. Great Britain, however, rejected the
American arguments, and denied that Russia had ever
exercised jurisdiction over the maritime areas in
dispute, which had always been visited by trading
vessels of all nations. For historical background,
see Lord McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I
(Cambridge U.P., 1956), p.241; T.W. Fulton, The
Sovereignty of the Seas (Edinburgh & London: William
Blackwood & Sons, 1911), pp. 581-85, 696; J.B. Moore,
International/
48.
Tribunal, in the Behrinq Sea Fur Seal Arbitration of 1893,
manifested the prohibition of acquisition of territorial
95
sovereignty over the high seas. After having acquired
sovereignty over Alaska, the United States extended its
territorial jurisdiction and control, and made regulations
regarding seal fishing in a part of the high seas in the
Behring Sea. In 1886 the United States seized British vessels
engaged in seal fishing in the Behring sea, outside territorial
waters. By a compromis of 1892, Great Britain and the United
96
States agreed to submit this dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal.
International Arbitrations. Vol. I, Ch. X.VII, pp. 755-917;
M.S. McDougal and W.T. Burke, The Public Order of the
Oceans (New Haven & London: Yale U.P., 1962), pp. 942,
948-49, 965; D.M. Johnston, The International Law of
Fisheries (New Haven & London: Yale U.P., 1965),
pp. 205-12. William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and
the Law of the Sea (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971), pp. 26 et seq.
95. Report of Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration
1895; Award of Tribunal appended Pt. XIII. See also
9 BFSP (1821-22); 12 ibid., (1824-25); 57 ibid., (1866-67);
79 ibid., (1887-88); 81 ibid., (1888-89); 90 ibid.,
(1897-98). For summary, see Moore, International
Arbitrations, Vol. 1, p.945.
96. The questions which have arisen between the U.S. and
Great Britain concerning the jurisdictional rights of
the U.S. in the waters of the Behring Sea, and concerning
also the preservation of the fur seal in or habitually
resorting to the said sea, and the rights of the citizens
and subjects of either country as regards the taking of
fur-seal in or habitually resorting to the said waters,
shall be submitted to a tribunal of arbitration. See
Art. I of the compromis of 1892; 84 BFSP, p.48.
49.
The arbitrators recommended a regime based upon a more
rational application of the lex lata. It should be noted
that this Court, as a Court of law, could not render judgment
97
sub specie legis ferendae. This Award decided mainly in
98
favour of Great Britain, stating that the United States
could not exercise rights of sovereignty over any part of
the high seas. The effect of this award on the positive
rules of international law was twofold. First, the invalidity
of the American claims to a right in ownership in the fur-
seals while in the high seas, outside the three mile limit,
97. Anticipate the law before the legislator has laid it
down. More recently, in the South West Africa (Judgment)
Cases, the Court stated that its duty was to apply law
as it found it, not to make it. ICJ Reports, 1966, p.48,
para. 91; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Merits) Case, ICJ Reports
1974, pp. 23-24; Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR
(1979), p.483.
98. Claim of pelagic ownership in favour of Great Britain;
admission of the necessity for regulation of pelagic
sealing and of their proposals for doing so in favour
of U.S.A. The immense documentation of the case fills
eight volumes of the Command Papers for 1893, while the
diplomatic correspondence occupies a very large space in
the State Papers from 1887 to 1892. A succinct summary
is to be found in H.A. Smith, (ed) Great Britain and the
Law of Nations, Vol. II (London: P.S. Kings & Sons, 1935),
pp. 99-109; Johnston, oj>. cit. , pp. 205-12; T.B. Browning,
"The Behring Sea Question", 7 LQR (1891), pp. 128-149;
idem, "The Behring Sea Question", ibid., pp. 199-200;
idem, "Natural Law and the Behring Sea Question", ibid.,
pp. 315-36; William Williams,"Reminiscences of the Behring
Sea Arbitration", 37 AJIL (1943), p.562. Cf. The
Franconia (R. v. Keyn)(1876) 2 Ex. D. 63, in which the
British claim to jurisdiction over the seas around its
islands.
50.
was established. Secondly, Roman law maxims, the foundation
of so much international law, were proved inadequate to
decide modern international relations. It is plain that
a most inappropriate strain is put upon the Roman rule when
its test of private ownership of animals and land, the
animus revertendi, is made to do duty in decisions regarding
the public ownership of animals ferae naturae in the high
99
seas.
In the Award of the Grisbadarna Arbitration100 among
the reasons given by the allocation of the Grisbadarna bank
to Sweden was that Sweden had performed various acts in
the Grisbad srna region (for instance, the placing of the
beacons, the measurement of the sea and the installation of
a light boat101) acts which involved considerable expense.
99. Award, Point 5: "The United States has not any right of
protection or property in the fur-seals frequenting the
islands of the United States in Behring Sea. when such
seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit".
Cf. M.J. Farrelly, "Recent Questions of International
Law", 10 LQR (1894), p.254-55. For interpretation of the
Award, see The Ship "Oscar and Hattie" v. Reg. (1894);
Reg, v. The Ship "Shelby" (1895) and Reg, v. The Ship
"Viva" (1896). Moore, International Arbitrations,
Vol. 1, Case Nos. 50, 53 and 55 respectively.
100. [1909] XI RIAA, p.147. English trans, in 4 AJIL (1910),
p.233; J.B. Scott, The Hague Court Reports (New York:
Oxford U.P., 1916), p.121, at p.130. See below, 4.1.
and Chs. 4 and 6.
101. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, French activity was
notable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in
relation to the Minquiers in particular; hydrographic
surveys and the placing of buoys outside the reefs of
the Channel. The Court held that the French buoy-
laying outside the reefs cannot be considered as a
manifestation of state authority over the islets.
ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 70-71. In the Frontier Land
Case, the Netherlands asserted that tax had been
collected by her from the disputed plots. ICJ Reports,
1959, p.228. See below, Ch. 2.
51.
In doing so, Sweden was not only exercising its right but
even more was performing its duty; whereas Norway showed
much less solicitude in this region in these various
regards.
Under the international lav.' of the sea at that date,
the maritime area was allocated into three zones, distinguished
by the nature of the control which the coastal state can
102
exercise over them. Nearest to the state's shores are
its inland, or internal waters. Beyond the inland waters,
and measured from their seaward edge, is a belt known as
103
the marginal, or territorial sea/ Beyond the territorial
102. Cf. U.S. v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 89 S. Ct. 773, 22
L.Ed. 2d. 44 (1969). On the threefold allocation of
the sea, see generally, C.H.M. Waldock, "International
Law and the New Maritime Claims", 1 International
Relations (1956), p. 163; France de Ha'rtingh, Les
conceptions sovietiques du droit de la mer (Paris:
Librairie Generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1960),
pp. 10, 60-65, 109; L.J. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays
in International Law (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1964),
pp. 4-5; idem, "Some Reflections on the Present and
Future Law of the Sea", in Maarten Bos (ed), The Present
State of International Law and Other Essays (The
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1973), pp. 143-81; A. Shalowitz,
Shore and Sea Boundaries (Washington, 1962), Vol. 1,
pp. 22-24; M.P. Strohl, The International Law of Bays
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 3-4; P.W. Birnie
"The Law of the Sea Before and After UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II",
in R.P. Barstcn and Patricia Birnie (ed) The Maritime
Dimension (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp. 8-26.
103. Waters within the baseline of the territorial sea are
considered internal waters. Draft Art. 26 of the ILC,
Official Records of the General Assembly, 11th Session,
Suppl. No. 9 (A/3159), p.7. D.P. O'Connell, "The
Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea", 45 BYIL (1971),
pp. 303-83. Cf. C. John Colombos, "The Distinction
Between Territorial and Internal Waters", in Symbolae
Verzijl (La Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), p.118.
52.
104
sea are the high seas. The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
and the Gulf of Fonseca^J Arbitrations (insofar as they
related to bays) and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries"^ ^ and
107
Icelandic Fisheries Cases involved decisions on the
allocation of the sea areas and their delimitations.
The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea formulates,
in very general terms, important legal principles and rules
applicable to determine both the extent of maritime and
108
submarine zones to which a state may legitimately lay claim
and the manner in which the seaward boundaries of those
zones are to be determined, which will be examined in detail
in subsequent chapters in the light of this historical
analysis.
1910 Award in Scott (ed), The Hague Court Reports,
1916, p.141. See below Ch. 5.
11 AJIL (1917), p.674. See below, Ch. 5.
ICJ Reports, 1951, p.116. See below, 3.2.
ICJ Reports, 1974, p.3. See below, Ch. 5.
Arts. 74 and 83 of the Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78 (28 August 1981).
At present a trend towards the 12-raile limit of the
territorial waters, 24-mile of the contiguous zone
and 200-mile exclusive economic zone is almost
universally evidenced. See Legislation on Coastal
State Requirements for Foreign Fishing, Legislative
Study No. 21 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation







3.2 Delimitation and Demarcation
Boundary terminology is not entirely standardised in
use, and many writers use the terms "delimitation" and
"demarcation" as synonyms - which, in the purely verbal
sense, they indeed are. Nevertheless, it is convenient to
use two separate terms to refer to two distinct stages in
the establishment of a boundary.
Paul de Lapradelle, writing in 1928, distinguishes
between self-imposed limitation of domain as a voluntary
act of the Roman Empire and delimitation of territory by
mutual agreement between two sovereignties. He said:
Delimitation is a Carolingian institution. It was
born, in a transition period, between Latin unity
and feudal distribution, by the introduction of the
Germanic principle of Frankish partition into^^e
surviving framework of the Roman Universitas.
In 1896 Sir A. Henry McMahen first drew the distinction
between "delimitation" and "demarcation":
Delimitation I have taken to comprise the determination
of a boundary line by treaty or otherwise, and its
definition in written, verbal terms; 'Demarcation'
to comprise the actual laying down of a boundary line
on the ground, and its definitio^^y boundary pillars
or other similar physical means.
These definitions were accepted by Lord Curzon in his
Romanes Lecture on Frontiers at Oxford in 1907. He defined
the terms as follows:
109. Lapradelle, o£. cit., pp. 25-6.
110. Colonel Sir A. Henry McMahon first made use of these
definitions in a lecture given to a military institute
at Woolwich about 1897. See 24 Minutes of Proceedings
of the Royal Artillery Institution (1897), p.224;
Idem, "International Boundary", 84 Journal of the Royal
Society of Arts (1935), p.4.
54.
'Delimitation* means the choice of a boundary site
and its definition in a treaty or other formal
documents. It is a more precise step than the
general allocation of territory which preceded it,
but less precise than the demarcation which usually
follows ... 'Demarcation' is used only^f<j>r the
marking of the boundary on the ground.
Thus, by their very nature, delimitation and demarcation
are operations of completely different character, though the
latter complements and stabilises the former. They will not
normally be performed by the same personnel, but the
demarcation commission may, and usually should, be given
limited powers of delimitation, by having authority to
make minor alterations of the paper boundary to suit local
conditions. Delimitation is normally a diplomatic procedure,
the work of treaty-makers, who should decide, on trustworthy
evidence, the boundary that will be acceptable to both high
contracting parties. Demarcation is a field operation;
its purpose is to mark the boundary on the ground for all
to see. It is the crux of all boundary making. As Holdich
rightly puts it:
It is in this process that disputes usually arise, and
weak elements in the treaties or agreements are apt to
be discovered. Important features are found in
unexpected positions, and a thousand points of local
importance crop up which could never have been taken
into account by the delimitators, whose^^efinitions
leave them unconsidered and unadjusted.
111. Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers, The Romanes Lecture
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p.51.
112. T.H. Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making
(London: Macmillan, 1916), p.179.
55.
In short, it is now generally agreed that delimitation
is the process of defining a boundary on maps and in
diplomatic documents, demarcation is that of marking it
out on the ground. In other words, delimitation means the
choice of a boundary site and its definition in a treaty
or agreement; demarcation is the actual tracing of the
boundary by a commission after the coming into force of
113 . .
the treaty. This was illustrated by an Advisory Opinion
delivered by the PCIJ concerning the Jaworzina Boundary
in 1923:
... the word aborsement (marking out) used by the
Conference of Ambassadors has not always, in fact,
nor necessarily, the narrow technical meaning which
the Czechoslovak Government desires to give it.
The process of marking out does not merely consist
of the actual placing of posts and stones which are
to indicate the line separating two neighbouring
countries; the expression must be held to include
all operations on the ground ... For marking out
must always be preceded by the fixing of the line.
A similar approach, formulated in slightly different
terms, was made by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Argentine-
Chile Frontier Arbitration."*'"*"^ The Tribunal tended to
interpret the words 'delimitation' and 'demarcation* in
accordance with the respective definitions given above.
In a good number of boundary treaties the legal
distinction between 'delimitation' and 'demarcation' is
113. Menon, o£. cit., 27 ICLQ (1978), p.742.
114. PCIJ Ser. B/8, p.47 [italics added]. See above, 3.1.1.
115. [1902] IX RIAA, p.35.
56.
not always observed; for example, in Article 3 of the
Franco—Siamese Treaty of 13 February 1904 delimiting the
frontier in the region of Preah Vihear it was provided
that 'delimitation of the frontier should be carried out
by a Mixed Commission under Article 1 and 2' . As the
task of the Franco—Siamese Delimitation Commission was to
establish the practical location of a boundary line, to
survey on the ground and subsequently to map this is, in
fact, a process of 'demarcation' rather than 'delimitation':
therefore it might be more properly perhaps termed
•demarcation'.
It is significant to note that in the Temple of Preah
Vihear Case the Mixed Commission set up to delimit the
watershed boundary in the Preah Vihear region under
Articles 1 and 2 of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904,
did not find 'demarcation' (or marking the boundary on
the ground) called for. With regard to 'delimitation'
and 'demarcation', the Court stated that:
There are boundary treaties which do no more than
refer to a watershed line, or to a crest line, and
which makj^rjo provision for any delimitation in
addition.
116. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, ICJ Reports,
1962, p. 16. See below, C'hs. 2, 4.
117. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.34. For discussion, see D.H.N.
Johnson, "The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear",
11 ICLQ (1962). p.1183; Cedric Thornberry, "The Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)", 26 Modern L.R.
(1963), p.448; K.K. Roa, The Preah Vihear Case and the
Sino-Indian Boundary Question, The Sino-Indian Boundary
Question and International Law, No. 1 (The Indian
Society of International Law, 1963); See below, Chs. 2, 4.
57.
It must be pointed out that, the Court went on to refer to
the provisions in the Treaty of 1904 regarding delimitation
and the mapping of the frontier. The Court said that these
provisions were made because France and Siam 'regarded a
watershed indication as insufficient by itself to achieve
certainty and finality. It is precisely to achieve this
118
that delimitations and map lines are resorted to'.
However, it must be understood that 'delimitation' is not
to be read as 'demarcation' in this context: the two are
different. All that was required at the most for the
purposes of delimitation was to fix the co-ordinates of
119
the points through which the watershed passes.
Where lines are actually marked out on the ground by
the parties to the transaction and at the time of the
transaction and are called for by the deed, the lines so
marked most clearly show the intentions of the parties and
118. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.34. See below, Chs. 2, 4.
119. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sir Percy Spender
said: 'No question of demarking the northern frontier
ever arose and ... that frontier has never been
demarked during the fifty odd intervening years.
It remains much the same today as it was then. The
Mixed Commission appears to have decided to fix the
points of the extremities of the northern frontier
on the west and on the east and to have agreed that
between those two points the frontier need no further
delimitation other than the Treaty itself provided.
Ibid., p.101, at p.117.
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120
are presumed paramount to other considerations (clearly
expressed contrary intentions etc. being excepted). Was
Fawcett right to reckon that:
The demarcation of territory on the surface of the
earth does not present any great physical difficulties.
Whether lines are to be drawn on land or on water,
the combination of normally permanent physical
features, as reference points, with accurate methods
of surve^i^g and measurement can yield clear and firm
results.
In a number of cases, parties have found on occasions
that a particular locality as described in the treaty did
not exist at all. This was the case, for instance, in the
controversy which arose between Great Britain and the United
States in connection with the Treaty of 1783 which referred
to a range of highlands south of the St. Croix River as the
dividing line between two systems of rivers. In fact no
such range of highlands existed; nor was it shown on the
map used by the negotiators. A dispute also arose as to
the identity of the St. Croix River. The dispute was
122
settled by arbitration in 1798.
120. In the Island of Timor Arbitration [1914] 9 AJIL (1915),
p.240, the arbitrator declared that Art. 3, No. 10 of
the 1904 convention concerning the boundary of Dutch
and Portuguese possessions in the Island of Timor,
ought to be interpreted in conformity with the conclusions
of the Netherlands for the boundary; and that a
reproduction of the surveillant map signed by the
arbitrator was appended as annex VII to the present
award of which it should be an integral part. See
below, 4.1.
121. J.E.S. Fawcett, International Law and the Uses of
Outer Space (Manchester U.P., 1968), p.18 [italics added].
122. The St. Croix River Case, J.B. Moore, International
Adjudications, Ancient and Modern (1929-30), Vol. II,
p.373. Cf. A.F.N. Poole, "The Boundaries of Canada",
42 Canadian Bar Review (1964), pp. 100-139.
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Demarcation of sea-bed boundaries, particularly their
outer limits, is likely also to be made in the absence of
precise information, or on the basis of information which
subsequently proves to have been misleading or wrong.
123
The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration which is
discussed in detail elsewhere in this work, raised interesting
questions in this respect.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
124
in United States v. Texas, is another example of a
rectification of a geographical description1''5 used in a
treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain.
123. Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration, Miscellaneous
No. 15 (1978), Cmnd. 7438; 54 ILR (1979), p.6. See
below, Chs. 4, 5, 6.
124. (1896) 162 U.S. I, 37-42.
125. Where the parties to a binding agreement purport to
carry it into effect by a document which is not in
accordance with the agreement, that document can be
rectified. This principle of rectification can apply
to vary boundaries of land defined by a conveyance,
if they do not accord with what the parties agreed in
their prior contract. Craddock Brothers Ltd. v. Hunt
[1923] 2 Ch. 136. American cases of rectification,
such as Les Wilson & Co., v. United States, 245 U.S. 24;
Jeems Fishing and Hunting Club v. United States, 260
U.S. 561. The original boundaries of lakes were grossly
and probably fraudulently in error;in the first case,
Moon Lake as it originally meandered consisted of
835 acres, yet investigation on the ground showed that
it was impossible for a lake to have existed at the
time of the original survey; in the latter case the
original surveyors falsely ran a portion of the
meander line so as to omit 230 acres of dry land.
Under such circumstances the meander line and not the
lake was held to be the true boundary of the upland
owner. The remaining land, that lying between the
false meander line and the lake, belonged to the
United States as undisposed public lands.
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It is noteworthy that in the Beagle Channel Arbitration
!L 26
(Argentina-Chile)' Argentina contended that when a
boundary treaty provides for a demarcation on the ground
it cannot be regarded as final and conclusive until the
127
demarcation has been carried out. Since the 1881
Boundary Treaty (Tratads de Lircites) makes no provision
for any demarcation of the boundary in the Beagle Channel
region, Argentina therefore argued that there is 'no
subsequent conduct of the Parties, including acts of
128
jurisdiction, can have any probative value'. The Tribunal
however, did not agree with this view. It held that:
The purpose of such procedures [for demarcation on
the ground] is not to delay the allocation of
sovereign rights over territories, which it is the
very object of a boundary treaty to determine, but
simply to make adjustment of such particular lines
as may not be sufficiently clear from the necessarily
general terms of the Treaty - that is ... lines which
can be adjusted in the light of purely local conditions
without affecting the principles on the basis of which
they were adopted. True, this may effect the application
of the terms of the Treaty within an already allocated
area, but this is a far cry from concluding that the
Treaty itself is inoperative for as long as delays,
tardiness or other circumstances hold up the demarcations,
and that in the meantime it creates no capacity, for
either Party to within the area it considers
allocated to it.
126. [1977] 52 ILR (1979), p.97. Cf. Chilean-Argentine
Relations: The Beagle Channel Controversy. A Carto¬
graphical Selection (Geneve 1979). For discussion, see
Malcolm Shaw, "The Beagle Channel Arbitration Award",
6 International Relations (1978), p.415.
127. The Beagle Channel Award, para. 78.
128. Ibid., para. 169(a) and (b).
129. Ibid., para. 169(b). See below, Ch. 2. Cf. D.H.N.
Johnson, "The Conclusions of International Conferences",
35 BYIL (1959), p.l.
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It is useful at this po">nt to refer to the following
statement made by Professor Brownlie:
First, the notion of demarcation is sometimes applied
too readily. Thus a source, for example a map, may
classify an alignment as 'demarcated' when in fact
the proportion of pillars to the length of the boundary
is very small or a proportion of pillars, numerous
or not when emplaced, has been removed or become
unidentifiable. Secondly, when an international
agreement specifies that the alignment follow a
specific natural feature such as watershed, then the
process of survey and mapping of the watershed line
is technically demarcation, even if no markers are
placed on the ground."
The word 'demarcation' is regularly used to mean the
actual laying down of boundary lines on the ground, and its
definition by boundary pillars or other physical means.
'Delimitation* is the proper word to indicate agreed lines
131
on the sea. Thus in the First United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, the U.S. proposal stated that:
130. Brownlie, op. cit., p. 4 [italics added].
131. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.l/L.116, 1 April 1958; United
States of America proposal, Article 2, pa a. 4.
See UNCLOS, Official Records, Vol. Ill: First Committee
(Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone), Summary Records
of Meetings and Annexes (A/CONF.13/39), p.243. Cf.
S.W. Boggs, "Delimitation of Seaward Areas Under
National Jurisdiction", 45 AJIL (1951), p.242. However,
during the Senate Committee hearings on the Submerged
Lands Act, Mr. Madden, the Assistant Attorney General
of Louisiana, said: 'I believe it was first the Secretary
of Commerce, or the Treasury, to fix a line to show
the demarcation between inland waters and the high
seas'. Hearings on S.155 and other bills before the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., (1949), pp. 179-80, 194; Hearings
on H.R. 5991 and H.R. 5992 before Sub-Committee No. 1
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., (1949), pp. 74-75. Cf. U.S. v. Louisiana,
394 U.S. 11, 89 S. Ct. 773, 22 L. Ed. 2d. 44 (1969).
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The word 'demarcation' is now generally accepted to
mean '... the actual laying down of boundary lines
on the ground, and its de^irjition by boundary pillars
or other physical means'.
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ declared
that 'the delimitation of sea areas has always an international
aspect', 'although it is true that the act of delimitation
is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal
state is competent to undertake it, the validity of the
delimitation with regard to other states depends upon
133
international law*.
For instance, this was also the case in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases. On 2 February 1967, the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG), Denmark and the Netherlands
signed two Special Agreements for the submission to the ICJ
of the question:
What principles and rules of international law are
applicable to the delimitations as between the
parties of the are^^of the continental shelf in
the North Sea ...?
The three Governments further agreed to ask the Court to
join the two cases and that they would delimit the continental
shelf in the North Sea between their countries by agreement
132. United States of America proposal (article 12),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.l/L.116. UNCLOS, Official
Records, Vol. Ill: First Committee (Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone), Summary Records of Meetings and
Annexes (A/CONF.13/39), p.243.




in pursuance of the decision requested by the Court. Thus,
the Court was not asked actually to establish the boundaries
between the parties but, rather, to provide them with legal
guidelines for the delimitation.
In substance, the case of Denmark and the Netherlands
was that delimitation was to be governed by the principles
and rules of international law which are expressed in
Article 6(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf. The Federal Republic, on the other hand, contended
that the delimitation of the continental shelf between the
parties in the North Sea is governed by the principle that
each coastal state is entitled to a just and equitable
share based on criteria relevant to the particular geographical
situation in the North Sea: that the equidistance method in
Article 6(2) of the Convention cannot, in this case, be used
for the delimitation of the continental shelf unless it is
established by agreement, arbitration, or otherwise; and
that it will achieve a just and equitable apportionment
of the continental shelf among the states concerned. The
Court took the view that there are two concepts of delimitation:
either by mutual agreement or in accordance with equitable
. , 135
principles.
Having regard to the language of the Special Agreements
and to more general consideration of law regarding the regime
of the continental shelf, the task of the ICJ was neither the
135. ICJ Reports, 1969, p.33.
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apportionment of the regime areas concerned, nor their
division into converging sections, but rather delimitation.
The Court defined what it understood by the term 'delimitation'.
It said:
Delimitation is a process which involves establishing
the boundaries of an area already, in principle,
appertaining to the coastal State and not the
determination de novo of such an area. Delimitation
in an equitable manner is one thing, but not the same
thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a
previously undelimited area, even though in a number
of cases tljie^results may be comparable, or even
identical.
The Court went on to say that 'the process of delimitation
is essentially one of drawing a boundary line between areas
which already appertain to one or other of the States
137
affected'. In giving judgment in a case involving the
principles of demarcation of a continental shelf as between
two coastal states, the Court emphasised most importantly
that delimitation must be the object of agreement between
the states concerned and that such agreement must be arrived
at in accordance with equitable principles (i.e. when one
party is not a party to the Geneva Convention).
Jones proposed seven main methods of demarcation,
namely, complete definition, complete definition with power
136. Ibid., p.22, para. 18.
137. Ibid. In the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration
54 ILR (1979), p.6, both disputants were parties to the
convention.
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to deviate, identification of major turning points,
identification of courses and distances, zoning, identification
138
of natural features and definition in principle. He
also uses the term 'definition' for the verbal description
of the boundary in the instrument of delimitation, and
•description' for the detailed description of the boundary
in the final report of the demarcation commission. It will
also be necessary to adopt this terminology.
3.3 Administration
The administration of territory is an element of the
traditional modes of occupation, prescription and conquest;
it is a precondition for the operation of the process of
recognition or acquiescence, and is an important element
of 'the continuous and peaceful display of territorial
139 140
sovereignty' and the concept of consolidation.
138. Jones, op. cit,. p.58; idem, 'The Description of
International Boundaries', 33 Annals of the Association
of the American Geographers (1943), p.102.
139. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.829.
140. The essence of 'consolidation by historic titles' is
that title to territory rests upon a complex of
interests and relations which in themselves have the
effect of attaching a territory or an expanse of sea
to a given state. It is, in effect, the 'organic'
link between state and territory which constitutes
title. For discussion, see Charles de Visscher,
Theory and Reality in Public International Law,
English trans, by P.E. Corbett (Princeton U.P., 1968),
pp. 24-28; Georg Schwarzenberger, "The Fundamental
Principles of International Law", 87 Recueil des Cours
(1955-1), Ch. VIII, p.358; idem, "Title to Territory:
Response to A Challenge", 51 AJIL (1957), pp. 310-11;
Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 336-37;
E.D. Brown, The Legal Regime of Hydrospace (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1971), pp. 84-85. See below, Ch. 2.
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Taking possession of a territory, the new possessor
must establish some kind of "administration" thereon to
show that the territory is actually governed by the new
possessor. If within a reasonable time after the acts
of taking possession, the possessor does not establish
some responsible authority which exercises governing
functions, there is then no effective occupation, since
in fact no sovereignty is exercised by any state over the
141
territory.
Administration is the last stage in the boundary-
making process. It is the exercise of jurisdiction and
in effect governs the territory. * Adequate administration'
means that the occupation must have elements of stability
and permanence, and not be merely temporary, and that the
form and means of administration must be effective, given
142
the nature of the territory. This last qualification
is important, for obviously the same standard and machinery
of administration is not required for sparsely inhabited or
141. In The Fama (1804) 5 C. Robinson 115, Lord Stowell
held that 'where a title is meant to be established
for the first time, some act of possession is usually
done'. In the Guiana Boundary Arbitration [1904] XI
RIAA, p.11, the Tribunal stated that the occupation
cannot be held to be carried out except by effective,
uninterrupted, and permanent possession being taken
in the name of the state, and that a simple affirmation
of rights of sovereignty or a manifest intention to
render the occupation effective cannot suffice.
142. J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations, 2nd ed., (Middlesex,
England: Penguin, 1971), p.67.
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143 . 144
uninhabited regions, such as Greenland, Antarctica
145
or the U.K. island of Rockall.
The degree of state activity required to establish title
would depend upon the character of the territory. Accordingly,
the manifestation of sovereignty over a small and distant
143. The area of Greenland is titally 2,175,600 square
kilometres. 5/6 of this area is covered by permanent
'inland ice', and parts only of the western coast
had been settled. In the case of Eastern Greenland
where the Court pointed out in many cases that
international tribunals have been satisfied with very
little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign
rights provided that the opponent could not make out
a superior title. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22.
Cf. Isi Foighel, "Home Rule in Greenland 1979",
48 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret (1979),
p.4; the Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No. 577 (29
November 1978), ibid., p.10. In the Clipperton
Island Arbitration, where the island was uninhabited,
physical and continuing occupation was not required
as a condition of possession. II RIAA, p..1108.
144. In Antarctica Cases where the United Kingdom claimed
to have a title by reason of historic discoveries
followed by a long-standing and peaceful display of
sovereignty, e.g., the issue of Royal Letters Patent
which made provisions for the government of these
territories and passing the whaling and sealing laws.
ICJ Reports, 1956, pp. 12, 15; the Antarctic Treaty,
41 Department Of State Bulletin No. 1069, December 21,
1959, p.911; see also Cmnd. 913, Miscellaneous No. 21
(1959). Cf. the 1980 Convention on the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 19 ILM (1980),
p.837; Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Recommendations
Adopted at the Eleventh Meeting, 20 ILM (1981),
pp. 1265-70. See below, Ch. 5.
145. The Island of Rockall was formally taken in the name
of Her Majesty on 18 September 1955 in pursuance of
a Royal Warrant dated 14 September 1955 addressed to
the Captain of Her Majesty's Ship Vidal. In 1972,
the Island of Rockall Act was pronounced and Rockall
is incorporated into the United Kingdom as part of
the County of Inverness. See The Island of Rockall
Act 1972 (C.2). See below, Ch. 3.
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island, sparsely inhabited or uninhabited, cannot be
expected to be frequent. Just as the Arctic and inaccessible
regions of Eastern Greenland demanded relatively little
evidence of effective administration to establish title,
146
so also does the title to small islands.
There is no doubt that in certain circumstances a right
of sovereignty may be recognised in the absence of actual
administration of territory. A state does not and cannot
manifest governmental functions over every part of its
territory in equal measure - or, in some parts, at all.
It has always been accepted that the sovereignty of the
state extends to uninhabited and uncultivated lands within
its borders. If such territories are on, as distinct from
within, its perimeter, then it is probable that sovereignty
depends upon recognition by neighbouring states and the
existence of a boundary delimited by custom or treaty.
That is, a unilateral claim to sovereignty unaccompanied
by the exercise of governmental functions over an area
disproportionate to the area under de facto settlement and
administration may be treated as ineffective in international
law. Policy may, however, lead to its recognition. It may,
moreover, be accepted that the 'natural boundaries' of
146. If a state lands an army and sets up a complete
settlement and administration on a small island, the
act of sovereignty creates title tout d'un coup, since
the power disposed by the occupying authority suffices
for exclusiveness. See D.P. O'Connell "International
Law and Boundary Disputes", 54 Proceedings, ASIL (1960),
p.77, at pp. 83-84. Cf. The Clipperton Island
Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1108.
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territory claimed may set the limits to sovereignty
irrespective of any manifestations of governmental adminis¬
tration. Since actual administration cannot normally
prevail against clear evidence of possession, it is probably
only where such evidence of administration is ambivalent
or absent that other criteria have decisive weight. Take,
for example, the Isles of Aves Arbitration (Netherlands-
147
Venezuela). This dispute between the Netherlands and
Venezuela related to sovereignty over the Island of Aves
and was referred to the Queen of Spain, who acted as sole
148
arbitrator under the compromis of 1857. As the Netherlands
had done nothing except utilise the fishing on this island
through its subjects, while Venezuela had been the first to
hold an armed force there and to exercise acts of sovereignty.
The aribtrator thus confirmed in 1865 the dominion which
Venezuela had acquired through a general title derived from
Spain. Fishing for turtles and gathering eggs in the island
147. 1865. Award in Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. 5,
p.5037; La Fontaine, Pasicrisie internationale (Berne,
1902), p.152; A. de Lapradelle et N. Politis, Recueil
des arbitrages internationaux, Deuxieme ed. Tome II
(Paris: Les Editions Internationales, 1957), p.404;
J.H. Ralston, The Law and Procedure of International
Tribunals, Rev. ed. (Stanford U.P., 1926), p.315.
148. Art. 1 of the 1857 Caracas Convention provides: "La
question du droit de domination et de souverainete de
l'ile Aves sera soumise a l'arbitrage d'une puissance
amie, prealablement choisie d'un commun accord."
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was held as not supporting sovereignty but only signifying
a temporary and precarious occupation of the island without
149
being an exclusive right. The island was therefore
awarded to Venezuela, who had to pay an indemnity to the
Netherlands for the loss of the fishing rights of its
subjects.
In the Eastern Greenland Case,15^ it seems the PCIJ
was very much influenced by the two awards on sovereignty
over islands, the Island of Palmas"1"51 and the Clipperton
152
Island Arbitrations. One of the difficulties of the
PCIJ's decision was whether concepts drawn from two awards
relating to relatively small islands were applicable in all
aspects to a big island. The PCIJ's discussion of the
evidence for the Danish 'intention and will to act as
sovereign', and 'actual exercise or display of such authority'
149. On the question of the visits of Jersey fishermen to
the island in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, France,
in fact, after 1839 allowed British fishermen to go
peacefully to the disputed islets. U.K. however, has
never allowed the French to frequent these islets.
ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 57-59. Professor O'Connell thus
rightly observed that 'mere exploitation by fishermen
unaccompanied by legislative and executive action
designed to render their exploitation nationally exclusive
cannot found title'. D.P. O'Connell, International Law,
2nd ed., Vol. I (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p.418.
150. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22.
151. [1928] II RIAA, p.829.
152. [1931] II RIAA, p.1105.
153. The Danish assertion that the Nortvegian 'occupation'
was invalid rested upon three bases: (1) that Denmark
had enjoyed and had peacefully and continuously exercised
an uncontested sovereignty over Greenland for a long
time; (2) that Norway had recognised Danish sovereignty
over the whole of Greenland; (3) that Norway was estopped
by quid pro quo, a promise (the Ihlen Declaration) given
by the Norwegian foreign minister in 1919 to desert from
occupying any territory in Greenland. PCIJ Ser. A/B,
No. 53, p.44. See below, Ch. 4.
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show a lack of consideration of the relative scale of the
disproportion between the size of the landmass and the
exiguous display of authority.
In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, the Court considered
the contentions of both parties that they possessed an
ancient or original title to the islands but concluded:
What is of decisive importance ... is the evidence
which relates directly to the^ggssession of the
Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.
Having regard to the special character of these semi-habitable
islets, France argued that she had performed effective acts
of sovereignty. In 1929 a French national, Monsieur Leroux,
had been building a hut on Maitresse lie of the Minquiers. 15j
It may be observed that there was apparently no evidence
that any administrative action had been taken by France
afterwards. In this respect the Court attached * in particular,
probative value to the acts which related to the exercise
of jurisdiction and local administration and to legislation'.15^
It found in favour of the United Kingdom on the ground, inter
alia, that British authorities during the greater part of
154. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.57.
155. Ibid., pp.71-72. See also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
"The Law and Procedure of the ICJ, 1951-54: General
Principles and Sources of Law", 30 BYIL (1953), p.46.
156. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.65.
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the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century have
exercised state functions in relation to both groups of
. . , 157
islands.
In the Frontier Land Case (Belgium v. The Netherlands),
where the disputed plots were described as heath and formed
part of a complex system of intermingled enclaves, the ICJ
decided, as regards such plots, that acts 'largely of a
routine and administrative character' performed by local
Netherlands officials did not suffice to establish a
boundary line different from the one to be derived from the
158
boundary convention between the two states.
In the Rann of Kutch Arbitration, Pakistan stressed
that the starting point in any process of consolidation is
'actual possession, actual control, physical exercise of
sovereignty. Without that, the process does not begin'.
In support of this proposition, Pakistan quoted a passage
from Professor Jennings to the effect that actual effective
157. Ibid., pp. 67, 70. In the oral proceedings,Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice adhered that the United Kingdom is in sole
effective possession and invoking an ancient title and
a long continuance of this possession; that all the
normal manifestations of sovereignty during that
period are carried out from the British side, and none
from the French. These and many other factors create
a virtually irresistable presumption that the islands
were British at the earlier dates. ICJ Pleadings,
1953, Pt. II, pp. 94-95.
158. The treaty line had attributed sovereignty over the
disputed plots to Belgium. ICJ Reports. 1959, p.209.
See below, Ch. 2.
control is necessary both for the creation of a title and
its maintenance, and that the process of consolidation cannot
begin to operate until actual possession is first accomplished
In addition, it must be added that the administration
of territory, though very relevant to title over uninhabited
islands, is unnecessary to establish the title to submarine
areas, not only because submarine areas differ by nature
from the land territory, but also because 'the submarine
areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the
territory over which the coastal state already has dominion'
- in the sense that, although covered by water, they are
a 'prolongation', 'continuation' or 'extension' of a state's
160
land territory. The important considerations here are
not dissimilar in relation to submarine areas to those
applied in terra nullius or uninhabited land territory.
Actual administration of submarine areas is somewhat fictional
Actual exploitation of natural resources is probably the
most decisive consideration.1^1
159. 50 ILR (1976), pp. 105, 385. Cf. R.Y. Jennings, The
Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester
U.P., 1967), p.26. See below, Ch. 2.
160. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969,
p.31, para. 43. Cf. Art. 2(3) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf; the Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports, 1978, p.36, para. 86
See below, Chs. 6 and 7.
161. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases indeed the
ICJ referred to existence of deposits of resources as
a factor to take into consideration in delimiting the
boundaries between the three states concerned and it
appears from the subsequent agreements giving effect
to the decision in that case that the parties did take
into consideration Denmark's existing exploitation in
part of the area. These points are more fully discussed
in subsequent chapters.
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4. Classification of Boundaries
In this section we may include the boundaries of
mandated and trusteeship territories, leased territories
and territories under military occupation. Maritime
boundaries other than the boundaries of the territorial
sea form a further category: the boundaries of the
•continuous zone1, fishing zones, conservation zones, or
pollution zones. The boundaries of the 'continental shelf'
and exclusive economic zone, strictly speaking, delimit the
space in which certain 'sovereign rights' may be exercised.
Agreements for collective and regional defence delimit
areas for military purposes, and may coincide with the
boundaries of political 'sphere of influence' or 'interest'.
Economic boundaries to 'free trade areas', etc. although
they will normally coincide with the political boundaries
of state sovereignty, on occasion do not, and in either
case they are legally distinct.
Indeed, it may be argued that some of the confusion
which has surrounded issues relating to the lawful and
unlawful use of force by states stems from the confusion
or assimilation of boundaries of differing legal functions.
For the definition of concepts such as 'aggression',
'intervention' and 'self-defence' and the elaboration of
the concept of 'territorial integrity' for the purposes
of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, together
with the scope of the powers of regional organisations
under Chapter VIII of the Charter, all require some clear
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conception of the boundaries within which the transgression
or defence takes place.
Before attempting a legal classification of boundaries,
however, it will be advantageous to examine the classifications
of boundaries offered by geographers, strategists and
political scientists, for it may well be that these
classifications also have some legal significance. For
162
this purpose, it is suggested that such classifications
be divided into three categories.
4.1 Natural Classifications
Natural boundaries are considered to be determined
by geomorphological characteristics. They are thus
morphological boundaries. This classification raises two
problems: First, what is a 'natural' boundary? Secondly,
are any 'natural boundaries' recognised by international
law?
In the usual sense, a 'natural* boundary is defined by
some prominent physical feature of the earth's surface, such
as the sea, a mountain range, a desert, a great river, a
trough, a valley and a canyon. There are distinct uses of
natural boundaries in an effort to avoid territorial disputes.
First, a natural feature, such as a river, may be taken as
the traditional custom line dividing two states. Second, the
162. The oldest classification of boundaries, for example,
is into 'natural' and 'artificial' boundaries. Boggs,
op. cit., p.22.
natural feature, for instance a watershed line, may be
ta en in a treaty or custom as the embodiment of the agreed
line of division. Third, the feature may be thought to be
'the natural place for a boundary', as in the case of the
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mountain range dividing Timor Island in two.
Four types of 'natural boundary' have been distinguished,
namely, naturally-marked boundaries, natural defence boundaries,
3 64
natural barriers to trade, and natural communication divides,
which are differentiated further as to degrees of hindrance.
It may also be remarked that, on examination, natural
boundaries will rarely constitute 'boundaries' according to
the terminology adopted here. Rather they will take the form
of 'frontier zones': lakes, rivers, sea, desert, swamps,
forest, mountain ranges and similar physical features such
as troughs, valleys and canyons.
The establishment of a 'natural frontier' will therefore
not ipso facto establish a precise boundary line. This is
because natural boundaries are in themselves never complete
defences.Even the magnificent and definitive Himalayas
163. See e.g., The Island of Timor Arbitration, II RIAA,
p.481. See also 9 AJIL (1915), p.240. See above, 3.2.
Cf. Daniel Wilkes, "Territorial Stability and Conflict" in
C.E. Black& R.A. Falk (ed), The Future of the International
Legal Order, Vol. Ill (Princeton U.P., 1971), p.168.
164. Richard Hartshorne pointed out three kinds of natural
barriers; See Boggs, op. cit. , p.25; Cf. Jones, ojd. cit.
p.7.
165. It is widely accepted that India's claim in the western
sector of the Sino-Indian frontier is very weak, ignoring
as it does the natural frontier of the Karakoram range and
seeking to incorporate the Aksai Chin plateau area on the
Chinese side. WTiile from the Indian side the Aksai Chin
leads nowhere and is extremely difficult to reach, it lies
astride a traditional Chinese trade route. See John
Gittings, "India and China try to fix their frontier",
The Guardian, 10 December 1981, p.7. See above, 2.4
and below, Ch. 2.
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did not prevent the British from marching on Lhasa in the
166
almost inaccessible Tibet.
It will be recalled that Max Huber, in the Island of
Palmas Arbitration, refers to 'so-called natural frontiers
167
as recognised by international law.' It is true that
so-called 'natural frontiers' have already been discussed
by writers on the law of territory. And yet reference to
the manner in which territorial sovereignty or other
territorial rights are acquired will suggest that 'natural
boundaries' should perhaps be recognised in international
law in two senses only. First, where a boundary is
established by international agreement, or by a unilateral
act, such as occupation, annexation etc., it may be that
a 'naturally marked boundary' is selected, such as a river,
a mountain range, a trough, a valley, a canyon, or the edge
of the continental shelf, to cite some examples. Secondly,
where no express act of delimitation has taken place, there
may well be a presumption in favour of a particular natural
boundary. Thus where a state has taken possession of a
part of an island, it may be presumed that it has constructively
occupied the whole.
166. Roderich Peattie, Look to the Frontiers (New York,
London: Harper Brothers, 1944), p.56.
167. II RIAA, p.829. See above, 3.3.
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In the Bulama Island Arbitration (Great Britain v.
Portugal), the Island of Bulama was adjacent to the mainland
and so near the mainland that cattle could cross at low
water; therefore the aribtrator based the award of the
disputed territory to Portugal on the Portuguese possession
of the mainland and the appurtenance of the island:
Islands in the vicinity of the mainland are regarded
as its appendages: ... the ownership and occupation
of the mainland includes the adjacent islands, even
though no positive = of ownership may have been
exercised over them.
In the Minguiers and Ecrehos Case (Britian v. France),
relating to disputed British and French claims to certain
channel islets, the French Government referred to the
principle that the 'land dominates sea'. It argued that
the state to which the principal islands belong should also
possess sovereignty over the islands whose territorial
* * * . 169status xs uncertain.
A state occupying the mouth of a river may also be
presumed constructively to occupy the entire river basin.
170
In The Anna, La Porte, Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell)
found that a dependent island formed by accretion, was a
natural appendage of the mainland. Ownership of this accretion
was resided in the adjoining riparian state. In Secretary
of State for India in Council v. Chelikani Rama Rao, the
168. Moore, International Arbitration, Vol. 5, p.1909,
at p.1919.
169. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.98.
170. (1805) 5 C. Rob. 373; 2 BILC, 699.
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Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had to consider
171
whether islands formed by alluvium (land formed as a
result of accretion) in the mouth of a river in India were
Crown property:
The point is geographically within three miles of
British territory: at that point islands have risen
from the sea. Are those islands no man's land?
The answer is, they ajj^not; they belong in property
to the British Crown.
The greatest advance by states in support of their
claims to adjacent submarine areas is the principle that,
in the words of the Truman Proclamation of 1945, 'the
continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the
land-mass and thus naturally appurtenant to it'.1/3 This
is not only repeated in numerous proclamations, but was
also confirmed by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. The result of this is that the right
171. Land formed as a result of accretion is called alluvium
(or alluvio). In case of alluvial deposits, the Roman
Jurists held that the possessor of the adjoining bank
of a river had a proprietary title to them. If an
island were formed in the channel of the river, the
possessor of the neighbouring bank had a right of
property in it; on the other hand, if an island
were formed in the mid—channel, it would be the common
property of the owners of the two banks. See Dig. I.XL.
Tit.I, para. 7; Just. Inst. Lib. II, Tit. I, para. 22.
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration II RIAA, p.839
the Arbitrator said that an accretion to a portion of
territory where there exists an actual sovereignty
capable of extending to a spot which falls within its
sphere of activity. See also the Chamizal Boundary
Arbitration [1911] XI RIAA, p.309.
172. [1916] 85 LTPC, p.222, at p.224.
173. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303; 13 Department
of State Bulletin, No. 327, Sept. 30, 1945, p.485.
See below, Ch. 5.
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of the coastal state over the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area
of the territorial sea, do not depend on occupation,
174
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
If the coastal state does not explore its submarine area
or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake
these activities, or make claims to that submarine area,
175
without the express consent of the coastal state. The
concept of natural appurtenance was also supported by the
176
ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. The Court,
177
in fact, called it 'determinant' and 'fundamental'.
The ILC stated in its 1^56 report:
Neither is it possible to disregard the geographical
phenomenon whatever the term - propinquity, geographical
continuity, appurtenance or identity - used to define
the relationship between the submari^gareas in question
and the adjacent non-submerged land.
It is important to note that the conception of unity
or physical identity of the continental shelf area, as
distinguished from mere contiguity, underlies the principal
geographical explanations of the phenomenon of the continental
shelf. The Truman Proclamation stated that the continental
174. Article 2(3) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf.
175. Article 2(2).
176. ICJ Reports, 1969, p.22.
177. Ibid., p.31.
178.11 YBILC (1956), p.298. See below, Ch. 6.
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shelf resources frequently form a seaward extension of a
179
pool or deposit lying within the territory. The ICJ
pointed out in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that
•the institution of the continental shelf has arisen out
of the recognition of a physical fact; and the link between
this fact and the law, without which that institution would
never have existed, remains an important element for the
180
application of its legal regime.' The Court, therefore,
called the continental shelf an inalienable 'appurtenance'
of coastal states and 'natural prolongation or continuation
181
of the land territory or domain'.
Writers have on occasion sought to show that there
are rules of international law laying down certain natural
or artificial boundaries, the watershed and the crestline
182 183
on a mountain boundary; the thalweg or median lines
179. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Feb. Ref. 12303. 13 Dept.
of State Bulletin, No. 327, Sept. 30, 1945. See below,
Ch. 5.
180. ICJ Reports, 1969, p.51.
181. Ibid., p.31.
182. 'When a river forms the boundary between two states
it is usual to say that the true line of demarcation
is the thalweg, a German word meaning literally the
"downway"; that is the course taken by boats going
down stream, which again is that of the strongest
current, the slack current being left for the convenience
of ascending boats. Thai in the sense of valley enters
into thalweg only indirectly. The immediate origin of
the word lies in the use of berg and thai to express the
upward and downward directions on a stream, like amont
and aval in French.' John Westlake, International Law
Pt. I (Cambridge U.P., 1910), p.144 and n.l. The
thalweg was held to apply to the Niagara River in Re
Village of Fort Erie and Buffalo and Fort Erie Public
Bridge Co. [1927] 61 0LR 502; 1 DLR 723 and to the Rainy
River by Rainy Lake River Boom Corporation v. Rainy
River Lumber Co. [1912] 27 0LR 131; 6 DLR 401. Writers
of7
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of authority tend to support the proposition that the
thalweg is the main navigable channel, though they
do not examine the problem which may arise when the
deepest channel and the main navigable channel are
different. The definition of thalweg seems to fall
into two distinct groups: those in which the thalweg
is coincided with the navigable channel, as in the
definitions suggested by the US Supreme; Court in
Iowa v. Illinois (1893) 147 US 1; Minnesota v. Wisconsin
(1920) 252 US 273; Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906)
202 US 1; New Jersey v. Del aware (1934) 291 US 361
per Cardozo; and those in which the thalweg is referred
simple to the major channel as in the Argentine-Chile
Frontier Arbitration [1966] XVI RIAA, p.109.
183. In Grisbadarna Arbitration the median line claimed
by Norway would have enclosed the Grisbadarna fishing
banks within Norwegian territorial waters, and thereby
deprive Sweden of a rich fishing ground which had been
consistently exploited by Swedish fishermen for longer,
and to a greater extent, than by Norwegians. The
tribunal rejected the thalweg as the line of boundary.
Scott, The Hague Court Reports, p.121. See below,
3.1.2. In the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy
and the District of Gex, the Court referred to the
lake boundary between Switzerland and Sardinia on
Lac Leman as the 'middle line'. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 46,
p.121. It is instructive to note, in consequence,
that the 'median line' rule for the delimitation of
non-navigable rivers was incorporated into Art. 6(1)
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
for the delimitation of the submarine areas between
opposite states. See below, Ch. 7.
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on a river boundary; the lines of equidistance and median
lines on the continental shelf; the maritime boundary line
runs along the edge of the territorial sea. The evidence
in favour of these alleged rules of international law will
be considered in detail in later chapters, but it is
appropriate here to anticipate the conclusion that will
be reached; alleged rules of customary international law
purporting to lay down specific boundaries constitute no
more than presumptions of varying validity which are founded
on the concept of constructive occupation.
4.1.1 Morphological Boundaries or Frontiers
Naturally marked boundaries have been subjected to
excessive classification. The relative merits of different
natural features, for this purpose, have often been examined,
one kind of boundary being preferred to another by different
states. Such discussion, however, has little point, because
when such boundaries were adopted, their advantage lay
chiefly in the fact that they were obvious and unambiguous.
In early times they were not chosen because they were difficult
to cross or because they presented a military barrier to
invasion; it is only in comparatively modern times that
the actual course of a political boundary has come to be
a matter of military significance to the state that is
enclosed by it. The boundary lines themselves are of only
two kinds; those made to conform to conspicuous features
of the natural landscape and those defined in geometrical
terms, such as parallels, meridians, arcs or circles and
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straight lines drawn between turning points. The principle
on which a particular line is chosen, whether to separate
ethnic or cultural groups or to provide access for a state
to resources or facilities, often has little to do with
the way in which it is made to conform or not to conform to
landscape features. The latter is a morphological classification;
the former, a functional one.184
From the morphological point of view, boundaries may,
for convenience, be grouped into those which have been made
1) to follow the course of a mountain or hill range;
2) to follow the line of rivers, canals and lakes;
3) to run through a desert, a forest, or a swamp; or
4) to conform with some other physical (geographical/
geological) feature that may have been conspicuous in the
185
landscape such as troughs, valleys and canyons.
When alignments are based upon natural features, such
as rivers and escarpments, the boundary produced is not
truly described either as •natural' or as 'artificial1.
Natural features do not readily provide the precise principle
of allocation required. Thus a river line has to be
elaborated or constructed in terms of the median line for
184. Norman J.G. Pounds, Political Geography, 2nd ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 83-86.
185. Ibid. Cf. Hills, op. cit., 28 Geographical Journal
(1906), p.146; Thomas Holdich, "Geographical Problems
in Boundary Making", 47 Geographical Journal (1916)
p.421.
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a non-navigable river or the thalweg (mid-channel) for a
. ,. . 136
navigable river.
In the case of a river with broad flood zones, straight
lines between pillars established on the banks and on
islands may be substituted for the 'river line'. In other
words, natural features may lack sufficient definition. The
relatively precise alignment based upon a river or escarpment
is ultimately no more and no less than other boundaries.
In areas of dense population or mineral deposits and
in tense political situations, boundaries are not truly to
be described as 'artificial'. A boundary alignment is no
more and no less artificial than any other entity which
conveys an idea and which cannot be reduced to some simple,
or single, site or physical presence. Examples are the
notion of a nation, a linguistic or other 'minority' group,
a corporation or a college. In any case, even in the case
of an unmarked boundary, the principle of the boundary will
be a basis for both action and restraint on the part of
187
governments, administrators and police officials.
186. Unless there is a limitation provided by the admission
act, the line of division between states bordering on
a river is the centre of the main channel of the stream.
See e.g., Indiana v. Kentucky 136 US 479; Washington
v. Oregon 211 US 127.
187. Brownlie, loc. cit.
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4.2 Artificial Classifications
These are purely arbitrary classifications determined
without any universal criteria. The main types in this
category are: military boundaries, scientific boundaries
and organic boundaries.
'Artificial frontiers' or boundaries, are those
boundary lines which are not dependent upon natural features
of the earth's surface for their selection but have been
artificially projected geographic lines: meridians,
188
parallels, highways, walls. canals, roads, neutral zones
and geometrical boundaries. No attempt will be made in this
work to use the terms 'natural boundaries' and 'artificial
boundaries' in the strict or technical sense, and it is
therefore not necessary to define them precisely because
189
all boundaries are in fact artificial.
This type of classification has, moreover, been
criticised, mainly on two grounds: first the ambiguity of
the term 'natural boundary' as distinct from 'artificial
boundary' - together with the fact that normally a; nation's
188. Curzon, o£. cit., p.23; C.M. Brown, o£. cit., p.59.
189. The Romans of antiquity very often constructed boundary
walls, and the Chinese Long Wall (known as the 'Great
Wall') may also be cited as an example. For the
Antonine Wall, see Hanson and Maxwell, loc. cit;
for Long Wall, see Owen Lattimore, "A Ruined Nestorian
City in Inner Mongolia", 84 Geoq. Jour. (1934),
pp. 493-94; idem, Inner Asian Frontier of China (New
York: Amer. Geog. Society, 1940); See above, 2.2.
87.
'natural boundaries' are those to which it desires to
expand, and the use of the concept may frequently disguise
a territorial claim; and secondly the inherent tendency
of this classification to attribute superiority to the
'natural' as against the 'artificial' boundary. Whatever
the merits of the classification for non-legal purposes,
for our purposes we need only ask whether, and in what
sense, 'natural frontiers' or 'natural boundaries' are
recognised by international law, and how far they are
relevant to delimitation of seabed boundaries.
4.2.1 'Military' Boundaries or Frontiers
A more generalised classification of boundary functions
has been given, namely into military and non-military. This
distinction conforms roughly with that made by Spykman
between boundaries as lines of contrast of power structures
and as lines of demarcation between legal systems. Total
warfare has diminished the distinction between military and
non—military functions, as it has forced the legal system
to conform to the demands of the power structure. The
ultimate generalisation with regard to boundary functions
is the obvious one that an international boundary limits
191
the domain of an absolute sovereignty.
191. Nicholas John Spykman, "Frontiers, Secretary, and
International Organization", 32 Geography Review
(1942), p.436, at p.437. Cf. Jones, 0£. cit., p.12.
Economic warfare also encompasses a great range of
non-military functions.
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4.2.2 'Scientific' Boundaries or . Frontiers
In one sense the term 'scientific' frontier or boundary
has been used by writers as a synonym for a 'strategic'
192
frontier which is itself a sophisticated development of
the 'natural' frontier. Thus, with reference to a mountain
frontier, Lord Curzon described the 'scientific frontier'
as 'a frontier which unites natural and strategical strength,
and by placing both the entrance and the exit of the passes
in the hands of the defending Power, compels the enemy to
193
conquer the approach before he can use the passage'.
As Jones remarks, 'obviously, terms like "defending
Power" and "enemy" are not used objectively'. His further
objection is that 'there can be no "scientific boundaries"
in critical borderlands where there are no natural barriers
of consequence'. His thesis cannot, however, be entirely
194
accepted. For although the most obvious 'scientific
frontiers' may be natural barriers, numerous examples of
the establishment of artificial barriers with a strategic
purpose may be cited in the form of palisades, mounds,
192. E.g. the Northern Manchuria is strategically an important
buffer land. For details see Andre Lobanor-Rostovsky,
"The Problem of Strategic Frontiers", Frontiers of the
Future (California U.P.: Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1941), p. 91; C.B. Fawcett, Frontiers, Ch. VIII, p.85.
193. Curzon, o£. cit., p.19.
194. Jones, o£. cit., p.9.
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ramparts, walls, barbed wire, minefields and defoliated
195
zones. The Israel capture of the Syrian Golan Heights
in 1967 after the Six-Days'-War is an obvious example to
196
reduce the vulnerability of artillery attack.
195. Prescott, Political Geography, p.71.
196. In 1948, war broke out between Zionists and Palestinians.
Armies of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt invaded.
By the end of the war the new State of Israel controlled
an area one-third larger than allotted by UN plans.
In 1956, after secret agreement with Britain and France,
Israel attacked Egypt and occupied Sinai and Gaza Strip.
Later forced by international pressure to withdraw to
the 1948 cease-fire lines. The 1967 Six-Days'-War
gave Israel control of Syrian Golan Heights, West Bank,
Gaza and Sinai peninsula. The truth about the Arab-
Israeli conflict is that the refusal of Arab governments
other than Egypt to recognise and make peace with
Israel necessitates security boundaries for Israel
which are far removed from her pre-1967 ones.
See generally, Nathan Feinberg, The Arab-Israel Conflict
in International Law (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press,
1970); Y.Z. Blum, Secure Boundaries and Middle East
Peace (The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, 1971). The
question as to whether Israel has or has not purported
to annex those occupied areas. If it has, such
annexation during a state of war did not, even under
the traditional international law, confer sovereignty
by military occupation. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
precludes such a title under the contemporary inter¬
national law because an international illegal act
cannot be the basis of title to territory. Neither
is self-defence a basis for such a title. This
principle is also applicable to non-members as well.
Art. 2(6) of the UN Charter. See above, 3.1.1.
90.
Are 'scientific* or 'strategic' frontiers or boundaries
recognised by international law in that they may constitute
'natural' frontiers or boundaries? Our answer must be the
same as in the case of natural frontiers. It must ..however,
be added that boundary treaties may make provision implicitly,
by say designating a 'natural barrier' to form part of a
boundary for the establishment of a 'strategic' frontier.
By the ordinary canons of treaty interpretation, therefore,
it will be appropriate in case of dispute to have regard
to the desire of the parties to establish such a barrier.
197
The Rann of Kutch Arbitration also provides a precedent
for taking account of strategic factors under the principle
of 'equity *.
Clearly, in so far as detailed 'scientific' procedures
of delimitation and demarcation are part of international
practice, they may be said to be recognised by international
law. A lack of detailed procedures will not, however, render
invalid or voidable a boundary which has otherwise been
clearly established. On the other hand, it may be said
that no boundary exists until it has been clearly demarcated
on the ground, and described on maps and, in the report of
the demarcation commission, is legally beyond question.
198
Conversely, the principle quieta non movere will lend
sanction to a boundary which has been definitively established.
197. 50 ILR (1976), p.2. See below, Ch. 2.
198. A settled state of affairs should not be disturbed.
See below, Ch. 2.
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Similarly, in the case of the establishment of a new
state, there are precedents for taking explicit account of a
strategic factor in delimiting its boundaries. It nay also
be considered whether there may be implied in the right of
'self-defence' a possible right - if the acquisition of
territory or the alteration of boundaries by force or threat
of force is in general prohibited by international law -
to the adjustment of a boundary to obtain better defence
199
against a neighbour guilty of 'aggression'.
After the 1967 Six-Days'-War between Israel and various
Arab nations (which resulted in the occupation of Arab
territories), what Israel proclaimed as admissable is the
attempt to base title to territory on 'conquest'. The
Guarantees Clause of the Security Council Resolution 242
Art. 2(c)^° is, however, subordinated to the principle
that every state in the area is entitled to live in peace
with 'secure and recognised boundaries'. Their territorial
inviolability and political independence with such secure
and recognised boundaries should be guaranteed. Does the
199. For details, see D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International
Law (Manchester U.P., 1958); Ian Brownlie, International
Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1963); C.H.M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the
Use of Force by Individual States in International Law",
81 Recueil des Cours (1952-11), p.455; Garry Feinstein,
"Self-Defence and Israel in International Law: A
Reappraisal", 11 Israel L.R. (1976), p.516.
200. UN Doc. S/Res. 242 (1967).
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phrase 'recognised boundaries' refer to boundaries, including
Jordanian and Egyptian as well as Israeli boundaries which
are still to be fixed, and then recognised? Can it possibly
refer to certain lines drawn by the Armistice Agreements of
1949, even though they were then explicitly stated not to
constitute political boundaries? The preambulatory restatement
in Resolution 242 of the 'inadmissability of acquisition of
territory by war' might be areassertion of accepted
. . _ .... 201
principle ex injuria ]us non oritur.
201. An unlawful act cannot normally produce results
beneficial to the law-breaker. As the illegal act
is merely a causa sine quo non it does not itself
produce legal consequences. Other maxims expressing
the same idea are nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam
conditionem facere potest and nullus commodum capere
potest de sua propria injurie. This concept logically
followed by the outlawry in the doctrine of war and
the use of force. See Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter
and Arts. 52 and 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties of 1969. Cf. Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (U.K. v. Iceland), ICJ Reports, 1973, p.47, per
Judge Padilla Nervo. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (F.R.G. v. Iceland), ibid., p.91. In the law
relating to acquisition of territorial sovereignty,
illegal activity may produce valid results by the
operation of prescription, acquiescence and estoppel.
See, e.g., the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ
Reports, 1951, p.116; In British Guiana Boundary
Arbitration (1899) Pari. Papers (1899) No. 7, Cmd.
9533, Art. 4 of the 1897 Treaty of Washington laid
down three specific rules, of which the first was
"Adverse holding or prescription during a period of
fifty years shall make a good title". See below, Chs.
3 and 4.
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There is a further sense in which the term 'scientific'
frontier or boundary is sometimes used, that is, to designate
simply the degree of sophistication of the methods used in
delimiting and demarcating a boundary. To quote Lord Curzon
again:
Local surveys or reconnaissances ... precede the
discussions of statesmen. Small Committees of
officials are frequently appointed in advance to
consider the geographical, topographical and
ethnological evidence that is forthcoming, and to
construct a tentative line for their respective
Governments; this, after much debate, is embodied
in a treaty, which provides for the appointment of
Commissioners to demarcate the line upon the spot
and submit it for ratification by the principals.
Geographical knowledge thus precedes or is made the
foundation of the labours of statesmen, instead of
supervening at a later date to cover them with
ridicule or reduce their findings to a nullity ...
Lastly, when the Commissioners reach the locality
cf demarcation, a reasonable latitude is commonly
conceded to them in carrying out their responsible
task. Provision is made for necessary departures
from the Treaty Line, usually 'on the basis of
mutual concession'; tribes or villages are allowed
to use watering places or grazing grounds across the
Frontier, or to choose on which side of the border
they will elect to dwell ... When the Commissioners
have discharged their duty ... beacons or pillars
or posts are set up along the Frontier, duly numbered
and recorded on a map. The process of demarcation
has in fact become one labour and
painstaking exactitude.
4.2.3 'Organic' Boundaries or Frontiers
The conditions of differential population growth,
population pressures, differential economic and technological
development and the influence of all these factors upon the
202. Curzon, o£. cit., pp. 50-51.
94.
political fate of countries attracted attention very early,
203
and gave rise to the organic theory of state. Friedrich
Rutzel was the first to develop the theory of organic growth
of state:
there are boundaries which change so fast, e.g.,
boundaries of expanding peoples, that it is possible
to speak directly of migratory boundaries ... the
apparentl jj^igid boundary is only the stoppage of a
movement.
Ratzel believed that the boundary was the peripheral organ
of the state and that its fluctuations governed the strength
or weakness of the state. The political concept is matched
by what might be called the 'biological' or 'organic' school
of political geography. State organisms are engaged in a
continuous struggle for existence, and therefore often consider
that aggressive expansion is necessary for their survival.
Thus the struggle for existence means a struggle for space.
Haushofer has incorporated such an idea:
We recognise the boundary through imperical observation
as an organ, a living being, destined either to shrink
or to push outward, not rigid, in no ca|g5a line - in
contrast to the theoretical concept ...
As territorial expansion is a mark of growth, so a sign
of decline is the relinquishment of land that is valuable or
206
necessary to a people's well-being. Advocates of the
203. Hans W. Weigert e_t aUL_, Principles of Political Geography
(New York: Appleton-Centry-Crofts, 1957), p.135.
204. Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geoqraphie, 3rd ed. by E.
Oberhummer (Munchen, Berlin and Leipiz, 1897), p.386.
205. Karl Haushofer, Grenzen in ihrer qeoaraphischen und
politischen Bedeutunq (Berlin-Grunewald: K. Vowinckel,
1927), p.13.
206. Ellen Churchill Semple, Influence of Geographic
Environment (New York, 1911), p.163.
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organic concept of boundaries have supported their case
with analogies of the human epidermis - as though the state
enjoyed life in the literal organic sense, with necessity
and physical requirements comparable to the physiological
needs of the human being. It is easy enough to visualize
the boundaries of a state expanding as it grows to maturity.
The withering and shrinking of senility and even the amputation
of limbs in youth and maturity are less edifying to contemplate.
From these, supporters of the 'organic' concept shrink:
once grown to maturity, the state and its boundaries must
be conserved for an eternrl prime. Accordingly, this approach
provides a basis for the acquisition and retention of
territory, it provides no mechanism for loss of territory
or for modification of an existing boundary - or even for
the most ordinary territorial transaction of cession.
The organic concept draws upon the superficial analogies
of science to impress the unthinking bystander with the
'living' character of the state. By this theory, boundary
changes occur only at intervals and usually as the result
of wars, conquest or revolution, and no boundary can be
permanently stable. Opposed to this concept is the one
that sees an analogy to political boundaries in property
boundaries. Property lines are not zones of struggle but
207
mutually recognised partitions. Moreover, the boundary
concept and the organic concept in essence have nothing in
207. Cf. Jones, o£. cit., p.9.
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common, and it can hardly be legally relevant to analogize
between two totally separate things.
Transmuted into legal concepts, the organic theory of
territory appears in a number of forms, each laying pre¬
dominant or paramount stress upon the characteristics of
territory which might link it most closely with a particular
state - geographical association, historic contacts, economic
use - and with the needs of the claimant - for security, in
particular, but also for economic and social reasons. It is
possible to exaggerate the organic link between State and
territory. In some forms plain economic, geographical and
social fact has been obscured in a miasma of sentiment
which not only defies application as a legal principle but
ceases to conform to reality.
4.3 All-comprehensive Classifications
Boggs propounds "a more comprehensive classification"
in his treatise "International Boundaries"; he also refers
208
to what have been called 'genetic boundaries'. The former
could in fact include the latter, as well as a legal
classification.
208. Under this category may be placed those classifications
of boundaries which contain a significant degree of
overlap between the two foregoing categories (Artificial
and Natural). For details, see Boggs, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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4.3.1 Phenomenological Boundaries or Frontiers
Many boundaries, however, do not fall within the
categories of 'naturally marked boundaries' and 'artificial
boundaries', as those terms are properly defined. In an
inaugural lecture, Nel classified boundaries as 'physical*
209
and 'political'. Although no systematic classification
is adopted to the great variety of boundary types found
throughout the world, a more 'comprehensive' phenomenological
classification of boundaries was attempted by Boggs in his
work on International Boundaries. For descriptive purposes,
the work is of considerable convenience, and as it will be
adopted as a basis for the arrangement of succeeding chapters
on the detailed legal problems involved in maritime boundaries,
it will be convenient to set it out here. The four major
210
groups or classes comprise:
(A) Physical types, that is, boundaries which follow some
feature marked by nature;
(B) Geometrical types, that is, straight lines, arcs of
circles, and similar types that disregard the physical
geography and topography of the country;
(C) Anthropogeographic types, related to human occupance
of the land;
(D) Complex or compound boundaries, such as compromise lines
adjusted to a multiplicity of factors.
They can be subdivided as follows:
209. Deryck E. Nel, A Plea for a More Politico-Geographical
Approach to Political Geography (Fort Hare U.P., 1966),
p. 42.
210. Boggs, o£. cit., pp. 25-6.
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(iii) Lakes, bays, and straits
(a) Median lines
(b) Principal navigable channel
(c) Bank or margin
(iv) Rivers and canals
(a) Median line
(b) Thalweg
(c) Bank or margin
(v) Swamps
(vi) Boundaries through territorial waters to the
high sea
(vii) Contour line (not the bank or margin of a river
or lake).
Geometrical types
(i) Straight line (meridians, and other great circles
(ii) Parallel of latitude
(iii) Rhumb line or loxodromic curve
(iv) Arc of a circle










(vii) Private property lines already existing
cadastral lines
(D) Complex or compound boundaries, such as compromise
lines adapted to a multiplicity of factors.
4.3.2 Genetic Boundaries or Frontiers
There is need for classification of boundaries that
pass beyond the mere physical factors, such as rivers and
mountains, and that take account of the relationship between
international boundaries and human society. And, indeed,
boundaries have no significance except in relation to human
beings. A genetic classification, which has been proposed
chiefly by Richard Hartshorne, with suggestions from Stephen
B. Jones and Derwent Whittlesey, is useful because it
represents an attempt to discover the adaptations of boundaries
to the factors of human occupation and use of the earth
and the development of different cultures and customs (and
vice versa). According to this classification, boundary
can be grouped into the following four categories:
100.
4.3.2.1 An antecedent boundary is a political boundary
that is drawn before the development of most of the features
211
of the cultural landscape. As societies have developed,
they have adjusted themselves to these boundaries, which have
thus acquired a historical and pragmatic sanction. The
boundary between Canada and the United States, established
and modified by treaty agreements between 1782 and 1846,
belongs to this category. There were of course a few settlers
and a more numerous body of nomadic trappers and Indians
along the line of this boundary during the period of its
delimitation; it was not, therefore, totally antecedent.
On the other hand, the boundary between Canada and Alaska
at the time when it was agreed upon by the Anglo-Russian
Treaties of 1825 and 1827 ran through entirely unsettled and
undeveloped territory. Such a boundary is totally antecedent
212
of pioneering.
211. Richard Hartshorne, "Suggestions on the Terminology of
Political Boundaries", Mitteilunqen des Vereins der
Geographen an der universitat Leipizq, (1936) pp. 180-92.
Abstract in 26 Annals of the Association of American
Geographers (1936), pp. 56-57. Cf. idem, "Geographic and
Political Boundaries in Upper Silesia", 23 Annals of the
Association of American Geographers (1933) p.195.
Amplifying this definition, Hartshorne has called attention
to the fact that along this 'antecedent boundary' in Upper
Silesia, the establishment of which antedated modern
industrialization by several centuries, there grew a great
development of mining and manufacturing on either side of
the line and that the development on each side had an
economic, transport, social, and cultural boundary which
almost exactly followed, or conformed to, the old German-
Russian political boundary - just because it was there.
In other words, an antecedent political boundary does not
merely endure in the face of new developments, but tends to
influence developments, so that they conform to it.
212. Pounds classifies boundaries according to the cultural
development in the borderland at the time when the
boundary was drawn. Pounds, ojd. cit. pp. 71-72.
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4.3.2.2 A subsequent boundary is one that is established
after the cultural patterns have been formed, and, as a
general rule, boundaries of this type conform to the borders
between 'major or minor divisions of natural and cultural
regions'. There has been a tendency for boundaries, especially
in Europe, to approximate more and more closely the cultural
divisions created by the differences of language. The
boundary of India and Pakistan is in approximate conformity
to a cultural division. Most recent transfers of territory
and exchanges of population have been designed to bring
political boundaries and cultural divisions into closer
213
harmony.
4.3.2.3 Superimposed boundaries are those that are
established after the territory to be divided has been
settled and developed but, unlike the subsequent boundaries,
they ignore completely the cultural and ethnic characteristics
of the area divided. The boundaries of the Hapsburg Empire
before 1918 belonged to this type. They cut off Romanians
from Romania, Poles from Poland, Serbs from Serbia, and
Italians from Italy. They were vigorously opposed by these
213. Ibid. The essential idea of the 'subsequent boundary'
is that it is established subsequent to the development
of the cultural pattern which now prevails. The German-
Polish boundary in Upper Silesia, which was laid down
in the period 1919-22, subsequent to the great German
industrial development prior to 1914, was in this
sense a subsequent boundary. Boggs, ojd. cit., pp. 28-29.
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minority peoples and did not survive the break-up of the
Hapsburg Empire in 1918. Many of the colonial boundaries
in Africa also belong to this group, especially those of
Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Each of these
bisects at least one tribal territory. In the category of
superimposed boundaries may also be included those which
derive from truce lines which have been established at the
conclusion of hostilities and have never been significantly
modified by subsequent treaties. The boundary between the
Netherlands and Belgium derives from such a truce line.
That between North and South Korea is also essentially a
truce line (the 38th parallel). The boundary around the
Gaza Strip and that enclosing the western extension of
Jordan were established when fighting ceased between Israel
and her neighbours in 1948; they have been neither modified
214
nor confirmed by international agreement.
4.3.2.4 Relict boundaries are those which have been
abandoned for political purposes but which nevertheless
remain discernible in the cultural landscape. For example,
traces of Turkish architecture in the Balkans and of Spanish
in the American Southwest demonstrate that these areas
214. Pounds, o£. cit., pp. 71-72. Cf. Hartshorne, o£. cit.,
26 Annals of the Association of American Geographers
(1936), pp. 56-57; idem, "The Functional Approach in
Political Geography", 40 ibid., (1950), p.97.
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formerly lay on the other side of important political
boundaries and derived aspects of their culture from
sources other than those prevailing today. Such relict
boundaries may well be archaeological curiosities in the
landscape, but they are of political importance only when
the former political area which evidence have left residues
of political feeling.^5
To conclude, it is observed that both these classificational
systems - the first phenomenological, the second genetic -
have proved practical for analysis of the way in which
boundaries create or avert conflict. On the other hand,
there is little reason to take into consideration 'natural'
and 'artificial' boundaries as all boundaries, in essence,
are settled by international agreements based to a large
extent on the application of equitable principles of inter-
216
national law.
215. Pounds, o£. cit., pp. 71-72. Hartshorne has described
the way in which one may trace the former Russo-German
border through the industrial region of Upper Silesia by
studying the architecture of houses and public buildings
as they differed from one another in the two empires.
216. See e.g., the Truman Proclamation of 1945 which states
that: 'In cases where the continental shelf extends to
the shores of another State, or is shared with an
adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by
the United States and the State concerned in accordance
with equitable principlese. US Presidential Proclamation
No. 2667, 28 September 1945. UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/l (1951),
pp. 38-39; the Royal Pronouncement of Saudi Arabia of
1949 affirms that the boundaries 'will be determined in
accordance with equitable principles by Our Government
in agreements with other States ... of adjoining areas',
Ibid., p.22 [italics supplied]; the Proclamation of
Abu Dhabi of 1949 proclaims that the boundaries are to
be determined 'on equitable principles, by us after
consultation with the neighbouring States', Ibid., p.23.
See below, Ch. 3. Cf. The North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p.3; Anglo-French Continental
Shelf Arbitration, 54 ILR (1979), p.6. See below, Ch. 7.
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5. A Legal Classification: Rights and Obligations of
States within Their Boundaries
A classification of frontiers and boundaries for legal
purposes is concerned less with the geographical, ethnic,
historical, strategic, etc. characteristics of boundaries
than with the rights and obligations of states. For legal
purposes, it is more useful to classify frontiers and
boundaries according to (a) the rights reserved to States
within them, and (b) the obligations imposed upon States to
respect them.^^
For the purpose of (a) we must classify boundaries as
delimiting
218
i) Territorial sovereignty (over land and sea areas
in the case of the 'territorial sea' and 'internal
. *219
waters')
217. In Mortensen v. Peters [1906] 8 F.(J) 93, the Scottish
Court of Justiciary declared that 'International law ...
is the body of doctrine regarding the international
rights and duties of states which has been adopted...'
218. The term 'territorial sovereignty* is used to designate
the fullest rights which a state possesses over territory
in international law. These include the executive,
judicial and legislative powers of government and, in
general, the power to dispose of territory and its
resources. The exercise of these powers is subject
only to rules of international law.
219. Territorial waters are those maritime areas which
usually extend from a line running parallel to the shore
to a specified distance (the limit of the territorial
sea) measured from low-water mark. Within these waters
non—coastal states may claim certain rights including
the right of innocent passage for their vessels.
Internal waters, however, are those maritime areas which
are situated within the baselines from which the territorial




ii) Sovereign rights (over submarine areas in the case
of the 'continental shelf' and the 'exclusive economic
221
zone') for the purposes of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the mineral resources.
and roadsteads, its internal gulfs and bays, straits,
lakes and rivers. In these waters, apart from special
conventions, ships of non-coastal states are not
legally entitled to a right of free access because
those areas fall under the complete sovereignty of
that state. See Arts. 2, 5 and 8 of the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc.A/CONF.62/L.78
(28 August 1981).
220. The term 'sovereign rights' is legally distinct from
'sovereignty*. 'Sovereignty' is equivalent to an
♦absolute right', whilst 'sovereign rights' is funct¬
ional, limited. See below, Ch. 5.
221. One of the important results of the negotiation at the
UNCLOS III is the broad support emerging for an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). In this zone of 200 miles from
the territorial sea baselines, coastal States would have
exclusive rights to both living and non-living resources.
It is significant that the EEZ is measured not from the
coast but from the baseline and that the coastal States
may draw straight baselines of great length, enclosing
as internal waters over a large marine area. For example,
the UK has drawn extensive straight baselines on the
west coast of Ulster which not only enlarges the areas
of internal water, territorial sea and the fishery limits,
but also extends the EEZ. Moreover, the EEZ does not
retain high seas status under the Draft Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UN Doc. A/Conf.62/L.78, 28 August
1981) but an sui generis impliedly as it came neither
within the definition of the territorial sea (Art. 2)
nor high seas (Art. 86). In current practice the legal
position is clear. The theoretical argument that the
EEZ should be regarded as part of the high seas is
repudiated by Communist China. It is argued that 'if
the EEZ were truly part of the high seas, then it would
make no sense talking about the establishment of such a
zone'. (Long Ching, Third UN Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 6 August 1974, Peking Review, No. 33, 16 August
1974, pp. 5-6). Similar expression is found in the US
Delegation Report for the Fifth Session of the UNCLOS III
in 1976 (Eleanor C. McDowell, Digest of United States
Practice in International Law 1976 (Dept. of State
Publ., 1977), p.344]. For details see Draft Convention




iii) Jurisdiction and control ~ (over contiguous /fishery/
Marston, "The Development of the Law of the Sea with
Special Reference to the Exclusive Economic Zone",
27 Issue 3 ULFJOTUR (1974), p.302; W.C. Extavour, The
Exclusive Economic Zone; A Study of the Evolution and
Progressive Development of the International Law of
the Sea (Geneve: Institut Ur.iversitaire de hautes etudes
internationales, 1979), Ch. v, p.171.
222. It should be noted that the term 'control' in the legal
sense is not jurisdiction. The power, therefore, is
primarily of the policeman rather than of the administrator
or judge. Cf. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "The Law and
Procedure of the ICJ, 1951-54: Points of Substantive
Law", Part I, 31 BYIL (1954), p. 379; idem, "The
General Principles of International Law Considered
From the Standpoint of the Rule of Law", 92 Recueil
des Cours (1957-11), pp. 157-58, para. 88; idem, "Some
Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea", 8 ICLQ (1959), pp. 113-14. See above, 2.3.
223. The contiguous zone is 'a zone contiguous to its
territorial sea' which fulfils the purposes of the
claims intended primarily for the repression of
smuggling and suchlike offences. In effect, the
coastal State does not have sovereignty over its
contiguous zone, but may exercise control therein,
in order to enforce compliance in its territory and
territorial sea with certain of its laws and regulations.
See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 33.
Cf. The Behring Sea Fur Seal Arbitration (1893),
Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. 1, p.755;
The I'm Alone Arbitration [1935] III RIAA, p. 1609;
J.A. Martial, "State Control of the Air Space Over
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone", 30
Canadian Bar Review (1952), p.245.
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22A
conservation/anti-pollution zones) ~ for the purpose:
custom, sanitation, fiscal, fishing, pollution,
preservation of the marine environment etc.
iv) General rights of administration and occupancy.
225
v) Belligerent occupation.
224. The waters of these zones retain their status as high
seas and are not subject to the sovereignty of the
coastal state. Cf. D.W. Bowett, The Laiv of the Sea
(Manchester U. P., 1967), pp. 20-26; Victor Fitzmaurice,
A Critical Assessment of Pollution Control Laws
Regulating the Development of Petroleum Resources in
the United Kingdom and Norwegian Sectors of the North
Sea (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1977);
Geoffrey Marston, "Delimitation of Maritime Zones -
Recent Commonwealth Decisions", 51 BYIL (1980),
pp. 263—67; The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act, 1970, 1969-70 Can., C.47. Under new
sections 741 and 769 of the 1971 Canadian Shipping Act,
a pollution prevention officer may require/go on board/
order any ship that he suspects on reasonable grounds
is carrying a pollutant and that is within waters to
which this Part applies, viz. a 100 mile zone from
the baselines. 1970-71, Can. C.27.
225. It is manifest that the military occupant cannot
acquire sovereignty durante bello. In the South West
Africa Cases, Judge Jessup expressed his opinion that:
•It is commonplace that international law does not
recognise military conquest as a source of title',
ICJ Reports, 1966, p.418. That belligerent occupation
does not itself transfer sovereignty is also confirmed
by Art. 47 of the Geneva Cilians' Convention of 1949,
Para. 358 of the United States Army Field Manual of
1956 and Para. 512 of the United Kingdom Manual of
Military Law of 1958.
108.
vi) Rights of administration and occupation with certain
226
restrictions, namely, ratione matenae, ratione
227 228




In connection with the sea, alignment of jurisdictional or
sovereign limits depends upon specific distances from the
230
baseline. In fact, the offshore sovereignty complex with
regard to the law of the sea comprises a system of juris¬
dictional limits separating:
226. (Jurisdiction) by reason of the subject matter.
227. (Jurisdiction) by reason of the party.
228. Conditioned by reference to time. In the Electricity
Company of Sofia Case, where Bulgaria as defendant
relied on the Belgian limitation ratione temporis. For
details, see Shabtai Roseanne, The Time Factor in the
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1960).
229. Territory as such is placed under the administration
of some state, for example, South Africa in the case
of South West Africa (Namibia), which will exercise
jurisdiction over it, that is, will perform all the
usual governmental functions of enacting legislation,
providing a judicial system and administering the area.
The exercise of rights of sovereignty may be restricted
by treaty or by custom. One state may 'lease' a part
of its territory to another either for a term of years
or in perpetuity. In this case, the lessee state will
in fact administer the territory, while the lessor
retains a theoretical 'sovereignty' over it. Cf.
Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty, 1898-1997: China,
Great Britain and Hong Kong's New Territories (Hong Kong:
Oxford U.P., 1980).
230. The baseline, in theory at least, represents the coast
and separates two areas of sovereign territory within
a single state.
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(1) Maritime zones of different categories belonging to
the same state;
(2) Maritime zones of a state from those with no sovereignty,
i.e. high seas; and
(3) Maritime zones of any category belonging to different
states. For example, the seaward limits of the territorial
sea is 12 miles from the coast and runs between a
231
sovereign state and an area without sovereignty.
It must be borne in mind that the continental shelf is
the natural prolongation of land territory under the sea.
Submarine boundaries are those which separate the submarine
areas of two (or more) coastal states. These limits qualify
as international boundaries in their function, but in almost
all instances are not marked by buoys in the superjacent
232
waters or marked on charts. In addition to the seaward
limits of the maritime and submarine areas, there are four
specific types of limits allowed for the great majority of
situations whereby sovereign and jurisdictional rights
between states need to be distinguished:
231. Cf. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951,
p.116. See below, Ch, 7.
232. Maps and charts frequently show symbolized lines
extending through water, as between or among islands
or between islands and mainland. Such lines normally
do not represent boundaries, and should not be so
construed. Rather, they serve as a catographic device
by which to indicate that all land areas on the one
side belong to one state and all land areas on the
other side belong to another state.
110.
1. Maritime boundaries separating the territorial seas of
adjacent coastal states.
2. Maritime boundaries separating the territorial seas of
opposite states.
3. Submarine boundaries separating the continental shelves
of adjacent states.
4. Submarine boundaries separating the continental shelves
of opposite states.
For the purposes of (b) we need to classify boundaries





v) Acts of international conferences and organisations
vi) Arbitration and judicial decision.
It might be possible to classify boundaries broadly according
to their legal effects as: unilateral, contractual or
dispositive. The obligations imposed by the boundary must
also be classified by degree, i.e. according to the
chronological stage reached in the process of allocation,
delimitation, demarcation and administration.
The issues involved in the first part of this classifi¬
cation - i.e. the rights defined by the boundary in connection
with the various rights which States may possess in respect
of territory. Here they need only be discussed in the
Ill-
context of specific types of boundary- However, it will be
useful to bear in mind a few simple points of legal principle
in connection with the second part of classification - the
obligations imposed by a boundary - which are sometimes lost
sight of or glossed over.
First, a frontier or boundary claimed by unilateral
act - of occupation, annexation, prescription, etc. - can
impose an obligation only upon the claimant state, and that
only through the principle of estoppel, preclusion or personal
233
bar. It may however, through the effluxion of time, attain
a more permanent status by application of the principle
234
quieta non movere. It may also result in the conferment
of 'acquired' or 'vested' rights upon individuals (property
rights, etc.) which may, by the same principle, be accorded
respect whatever the future fate of the boundary as such;
233. Modern international law finds itself armed with a
rather bewildering array of consensual and quasi-
consensual devices such as prescription, consolidation,
acquiescence, protest, waiver, recognition and estoppel.
These concepts have been applied in territorial and
boundary disputes. But they do not provide an altogether
satisfactory basis for decision: they are insufficiently
sophisticated to resolve complex problems. See Munkman,
op. cit., 46 BYIL (1972-1973), p.l; D.W. Bowett,
"Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relation
to Acquisition", 33 ibid (1953), p.176; I.C. MacGibbon,
"Estoppel in International Law", 7 ICLQ (1958), p.507;
G. Venturini, "La portee et les effets juridiques des
attitudes et des actes unilateraux des etats", 112
Recueil des Cours (1964-11), p.367; Antoine Martin,
"L*Estoppel en droit international public (Paris:
Editions A. Pedone, 1979). See above, Ch. 4.
234. See below, Ch. 2.
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or may, indeed, influence any future agreed or impartial
delimitation of the boundary.
Secondly, bilateral and multi-lateral agreements bind
only the parties to them, and the same must in principle be
true of treaties establishing international frontiers or
235
boundaries. Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.
Again, of course, the principle quieta non movere may give
dispositive effect to boundaries in the original contract.
Nevertheless, in principle, no boundary delimited contractually
can generally affect the rights of possible future claims
of third parties. In particular, such doctrines as the
uti possidetis principle adopted in the nineteenth century
in South and Central America as a type of Latin American
236
Monroe Doctrine could not as such legally prohibit -
235. Art. 18(a) of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on
Treaties provides: "A treaty may not impose obligations
upon a state which is not a party thereto". Arts. 34-38
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
For details, see R.F. Roxburgh, International Conventions
and Third States (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917),
Chs. IV and V, pp. 29 et_ seq; Lord McNair, The Law of
Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), Ch. XVI, p.309;
idem, "A Note on Pacta Tertiis", Varia Juris Gentium. Liber
amicorum J.P.A. Francois (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1959),
p.188; I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Manchester U.P., 1974), pp. 76-79; Christos L.
Rozakis, "Treaties and Third States: A Study in the
Reinforcement of the Consensual Standard in International
Law", 35 Zap R.V. (1975), pp. 1-40.
236. The doctrine was a rule of policy, not law. It was not a
legal ground on which an international tribunal could
possibly hold that the title of a European Power to
territory in South and Central America was void in law.
For Monroe Doctrine, see C. Tower, The Origin, Meaning
and International Force of the Monroe Doctrine", 14
AJIL (1920), p.l; A. Pearce Higgins, "The Monroe Doctrine",
5 BYIL (1924), pp. 103-18; Charles Rousseau, Droit
International Public, Tome IV (Paris: Sirey, 1980),
Ch. 2, pp. 53-108.
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although, allied to the Monroe Doctrine, they might, and
did, politically inhibit - claims by extra-continental
poxvers to unadministered regions.
Thirdly, to claim that a boundary is established by
custom, it must be shown that the custom in question is at
least bilateral as between the relevant neighbouring States.
Tribal or popular custom, or unilateral state claims may
influence, but cannot constitute, international custom.
Fourthly, a boundary established for a certain purpose,
and marking the limit to the exercise of certain rights,
cannot be regarded as a boundary limiting the exercise of
other rights. For example, a boundary established to
delimit a sphere of influence, an area of exclusive admin¬
istration and control, or an area under belligerent occupation,
does not necessarily delimit the boundaries of territorial
sovereignty. It may, however, acquire a different status
through the passage of time.
Fifthly, in legal terms, a frontier is not a boundary.
The establishment of a frontier - for example, a river or
mountain range - does not of itself supply a more detailed
boundary delimitation.
To conclude, we can see there are both differences and
similarities in land and sea boundary principles and background.
Both are, however, relevant to the problems of delimitation




FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
BOUNDARIES
1. Introduction
It has been shown in the previous chapter that the
major legal function of a state boundary is to define the
region in which the state possesses the rights to exercise
jurisdiction and to exclude any other state. The primary
object of the boundary is thus to maintain territorial
'stability' and effectiveness. In this chapter we shall
consider these two fundamental principles which are
connected with the establishment of boundaries. First,
there is the principle of stability, which has consistently
been given paramount importance by international judicial
and arbitral tribunals, emphasising the need for stability
of territorial situations. Secondly, there is the principle
of effectiveness, which is also relied on by international
tribunals relating to land and sea areas. One should note
that these principles of 'stability' and 'effectiveness'
are essential elements in boundary settlements.
2. Principle of Stability
International law aims at maintaining security and
stability; it protects title to territory where this
objective would otherwise be defeated; it substitutes title
to territory when the object is no longer served by
maintaining ancient rights, and when in fact, it might
actually be subverted by doing so.
115.
The clear delimitation of its territory furnishes the
state with the recognised setting for the exercise of its
sovereign powers. The establishment of at least the relative
stability of this territory is a function of the exclusive
authority which the state exercises within it, and of the
coexistence beyond its frontiers of other external political
entities endowed with similar prerogatives. De Visscher
clearly over-emphasises the significance of the 'firm
configuration' and 'stability' of state territory. Not
only does this furnish 'the state with the recognised
setting for the exercise of its sovereign powers' but
furthermore, as territory has long been a framework for
security, stability is the factor which above all guarantees
security. The security that people feel in the shelter of
recognised frontiers is a confidence that has grown in them
with the consolidation in a community of aspirations and
memories of the bonds uniting them to a soil that they
occupy. It is this aspect especially that has played a
major role in the establishment of modern states. This
sentiment may explain the extreme sensitivity of opinion
to every issue relating to territorial integrity.1
1. Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public
International Law, English trans, by P.E. Corbett
(Princeton U.P., 1968), p.206. We should bear in mind
that modern international law did not give prominence to
the real right attached as such to the territory but to
the right attached to the people of the territory.
See II YBILC (1974), p.73, para. 417.
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The picture is attractive; but one has only to consider
how few boundaries in Africa, America, Asia or Europe are
even a century old, and few states can in fact boast
fifty years of independence, to see that it is quite
false. The only people to whom this could apply would be
those in the oldest European states, namely, France and
Spain, that have undergone least radical alteration in
frontiers in the last five hundred years. The attachment
of the individual to the land may be strong; it is not
necessarily reflected in attachment to a particular state,
or in the configuration and stability of state boundaries;
still less to the maritime extensions of such states.
2.1 Quieta Non Movere
2
The principle quieta non movere was invoked by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Grisbadarna Arbitration
(Sweden - Norway). It stated that:
Whereas ... it is a settled principle of the law of nations
that a state of things which actually exists and has
existed for a lgn9 time should be changed as little
as possible....
2. A settled state of affairs should not be disturbed.
Cf. Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p.67, at
pp. 79-81. For discussion, see I.C. MacGibbon, "Some
Observations on the Part of Protest in International
Law" 30 BYIL (1953), p.138; idem, "The Scope of
Acquiescence in International Law", 31 BYIL (1954)
pp. 152, 159; idem, "Estoppel in International Law"
7 ICLQ (1958), p.507. See below, Ch. 4.
3. [1909] XI RIAA, p.147, English trans, in 4 AJIL (1910)
p.233; J.B. Scott, The Hague Court Reports, Vol. I
(1916-32), pp. 121, 130. In Her Majesty's Attorney-
General for British Honduras v. John Bristowe and
Charles Thomson Hunter, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council held, in an information of intrusion
relating/
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This principle of general law is particularly supported by
4
Gidel and de Vxsscher.
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ maintained
that 'for a period of more than sixty years the United
Kingdom Government itself in no way contested' the Norwegian
establishment of a well-defined straight baseline system.5
The term 'historical consolidation' in international law
made its first appearance as a basis of territorial title
in this case. Norway was able to show that neither the
promulgation of Decrees establishing its baseline system,
nor their application, had met with opposition by foreign
states. Of this the Court observed:
Since ... these Decrees [Norwegian Decrees of 1869
and 1889] constitute ... the application of a well-
defined and uniform system, it is indeed this system
itself which would reap the benefit of general
toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation ^
which would make it enforceable as against all states.
relating to land in British Honduras, that the defendants
having shown sixty years adverse possession there from
before 1817, by themselves and their predecessors in
title, without disturbance or effectual claim by the
Crown, such information must be dismissed. (1880)
L.R. 6. App. Cas. 143; 2 BILC 403.
4. G. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer, Vol. Ill
(Paris: Sirey, 1934), p.634. It is also the case in
Muslim Law, Majaliat El Alkam, Art. 15. Cf. Separate
Opinion of Judge Ammoun in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p.101, at pp. 113-14.
5. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.138. See below, Ch. 7.
6. Ibid. The term 'historic consolidation' in relation
to the acquisition of an historic title was first
resorted to as dictum in this case where the Court
justified the validity of the application by Norway
of the straight baseline system on the ground of "an
historic consolidation which would make it enforceable
as against all states'.
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At first glance, this might appear to mean no more than
that title to maritime areas depends for its validity erqa
omnes upon acquiescence over a significant period of time
by the generality of maritime states. It seems that the
Court recognised the existence both of 'immemorial possession'
('straightforward possession' or 'possession simpliciter')
and of 'prescription' (adverse possession) as modes of
acquiring title to territory. Also, the Court seems to
have confirmed the view that the appropriation by a single
state of areas, which under general international law would
be high seas, is a kind of 'adverse possession' at the
expense of the international community which requires the
7
toleration or acquiescence of the generality of states.
Q
De Visscher elaborated the concept of 'consolidation'
into a criterion for determining sovereignty over both land
7. Ibid., p.139. Cf. Separate Opinion of Judge Hsu Mo,
p.154. See D.H.N. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in
International Law", 27 BYIL (1950), pp. 350 e_t seq;
idem, "Consolidation as a Root of Title in International
Law", 13 Cambridge L.J. (1955), p.222. See below, Ch. 3.
8. 'Consolidation' in municipal law means the combination,
in a single measure, of statutory enactments relating
to the same subject-matter scattered over different Acts.
In essence, consolidation does not make any fundamental
change in the form of the law. The law consolidated
was embodied in Statutes, and after consolidation it
still remains Statute law. Sometimes, where a particular
phrase in the Acts consolidated has received judicial
interpretation, the phraseology is altered so that
occasionally effect is given to case law by consolidation.
Viscount Birkenhead, Points of View, Vol. I (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1922), VI, p.151.
119.
and sea areas in which, paradoxically, neither acquiescence
nor the passage of time play an important role. Thus, as
Professor Johnson says, de Visscher has embraced under a
single heading of 'consolidation' both 'prescription' and
•immemorial possession' by founding them on the juridical
9
basis of acquisition. De Visscher's concept of consolidation
reflects the experience of the Anglo—Norwegian Fisheries Case,
and it provides a fair description of the criteria applied in
that decision, and in other decisions relating to sea areas,
like the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries"*"^ and Gulf of Fonseca^
Cases. It is thus worth quoting his formulation of the
concept, which he associates with the fundamental interest
of the stability of territorial situations and the principle
quieta non movere.
9. Johnson, o£. cit., 13 Cambridge L.J. (1955), p.223;
Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p.336. 'Prescription'
and 'immemorial possession' have always been embraced
in the heading 'acquisitive prescription' but de
Visscher prefers the term 'consolidation'. See R.Y.
Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International
Law (Manchester U.P., 1963), p.25 n.l. Cf. Johnson,
op. cit., 27 BYIL (1950), p.332.
10. In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration
(United States - Great Britain)(1910) XI RIAA, p.167,
at p.197, the Arbitral Tribunal recognised that:
'conventions and established usage might be considered
as the basis for claiming as territorial those bays
which on this ground might be called historic bays'.
11. II AJIL (1917), p.674.
120.
This consolidation, which may have practical
importance for territories not yet finally organised
under a State regime as well as for certain stretches
of sea, such as bays, is not subject to the conditions
specifically acquired in other modes of acquiring
territory. Proven long use, which is its foundation,
merely represents a complex of interests and relations
which in themselves have the effect of attaching a
territory or an expanse of sea to a given State. It
is these interests and relations, varying from one
case to another, and not the passage of a fixed term,
unknown in any event to international law, that are
taken into direct account by the judge to decide
in concerto on the existence or non-existence of a
consolidation by historical titles. ... it can be held
to be accomplished not only by acquiescence properly
so called, acquiescence in which the time factor can
have no part, but more easily by a sufficiently
prolonged absence of opposition either, in the case
of the land, on the part of States interested in
disputing possession or, in maritiijig waters, on the
party of the generality of States.
The essentials of this formulation have been proven long
use, allied to a complex of interests and relations which
in themselves have the effect of attaching a territory or
an expanse of sea to a given state, and acquiescence or a
sufficiently prolonged absence of opposition. Its major
defects are its vagueness - it makes no attempt to analyse
the complex of interests and relations involved - and it
merely purports to be yet another mode of acquiring title
to the existing traditional list. Moreover, it does require
some time element (long use, prolonged absence of opposition)
to operate and also some element of acquiescence, whether
properly so called or not. Consequently, it can provide
12. De Visscher, o]3. cit. , p.209.
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little guidance for the decisions of concrete disputes.
The theoretical formulation which best approximates
to the detailed criteria actually followed by tribunals
is that of Sir John Fischer Williams:
If indeed we ask, not what is in fact the basis on
which the actual international ownership of territory
rests, but what are the considerations by which an
international tribunal would normally be guided if
called on to decide the fate of a territory, we shall
find, perhaps, the most authoritative statement of
those considerations in the recitals to the treaty
... signed at Paris on October 28, 1920, between the
Principal Allied Powers ... and Roumania ..., for
regulating the destinies of Bessarabia ... The reasons
given are (1) the interests of the general peace of
Europe, (2) geographical, ethnographical, historical,
and economic considerations, (3) proof given that the
population desired the actual settlement made, and
lastly (4) the desire of Roumania to guarantee good
government generally and, in particular, protecj^on
of racial, religious and linguistic minorities.
This formulation provides a modern set of considerations
appropriate to territorial changes, and also accords
surprisingly accurately - although not founded on them -
with the considerations which have been applied by judicial
tribunals to resolve questions of disputed sovereignty over
land territory.^5
13. For comment, see Johnson, ojd. cit., 13 Cambridge L.J.
(1955), pp. 222 jet seq; Jennings, ojd. cit., pp. 23-28.
Cf. A.L.W. Munkman, "Adjudication and Adjustment -
International Judicial Decision and the Settlement of
Territorial and Boundary Disputes," 46 BYIL (1972-1973),
p.1, at p.104.
14. Sir John Fischer Williams, "Sovereignty, Seisin, and
the League", 7 BYIL (1926), p.24, at p.34.
15. Munkman, jO£. cit. , p. 104.
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Similarly, in the preamble of a boundary treaty, the
governments of the Argentine Republic and the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay considered that
While they have identical rights over the said section
of the river, there are other factors which should be
taken into account when setting it as a boundary, for
example, its general configuration, the characteristics
of its navigable channels, the presence of islands in
its bed, historical claims to those islands and
instruments of present jurisdiction over them, and
also the practical requirements of navigation, have
decided to adopt as the boundary a composite line
which shall take into account the aforesaid considerations
and at the same time satisfy as fully as possible
the aspigations and interests of the two Contracting
States.
If one compares the passage quoted above with the judgment
of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, viz.,
'in balancing the factors in question, it would appear that
various aspects must be taken into account. Some are related
to the geological, others to the geographical aspects of the
situation, others again to the idea of the unity of any
deposits. These criteria ... can provide adequate bases
17
for decision, adapted to the factual situation', it appears
16. Treaty between the Argentine Republic and the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay concerning the boundary constituted
by the River Uruguay. Signed at Montevideo, on 7 April
1961. See 635 UNTS (1968), No. 9074, p.98 [italics added].
In the Argentine-Chile Frontier Arbitration [1966]
XVI RIAA, p.109, at pp. 176-77, the Court concluded,
on the basis of the historical and scientific evidence,
that the Eastern Channel of the River Encuentro is the
major channel.
17. ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 50—51, para. 94. The Court
explained that there is no legal limit to the consider¬
ations that States may take into account to ensure the
application of equitable principles. Various features
had to be put into the balance including geological
and/
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that the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries
is chiefly in connection with an equitable division in all
aspects of the continental shelf among the states concerned.
In practice, stress is often laid on the need for acceptable
agreed delimitation based on equitable solutions. There is,
as the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration shows, no
longer even a presumption in favour of the equidistance
principle in the delimitation of adjacent areas of shelf,
and the actual delimitation is based on equitable principles
and geographical phenomenon. Ibid., p.50, para. 93.
The Court further found that 'delimitation is to be
effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles' thus envisaging new negotiations. ICJ
Reports, 1969, para. 101(c)(i). In the Anglo-French
Continental Shelf Arbitration, the Court of Arbitration
found that in practice there was little difference
between the equitable principles applied in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases and the effect of talcing
into consideration 'special circumstances' under the
Continental Shelf Convention.
18. Miscellaneous No. 15 (1978), Cmnd. 7438, pp. 114-15,
paras. 245-46. Under Article 5 of the 1898 Convention
between France and Great Britain, the two Governments
agree 'to fix by mutual agreement ... the most
equitable delimitation between the British and French
possessions in the region situated to the West of the
Lower Niger'. A.M. Stuyt, Survey of International
Arbitrations (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), Nr. 194,
p. 200. See below, 2.6.3.
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2.2 Principal function of boundaries
One of the principal functions of the international
boundary is to preserve territorial 'stability'. Thus, in
1958 at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS I), the United Kingdom proposed, inter alia,
that:
In delimiting the boundaries of the submarine areas
... any lines which are drawn in accordance with the
principles set out ... of this article shall be defined
with reference to charts and to geographical features
as they exist at a particular date and reference shall
be ma^ to fixed permanent identifiable points on the
land.
Iran pointed out that the United Kingdom proposal was
intended to prevent any subsequent fluctuation of the
boundary once it had been defined. The United States also
expressed its view that the British amendment would give the
20
median line, once established, greater stability.
In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Greece contended
that the dispute concerned the delimitation of the continental
shelf boundary between Greece and Turkey. The Court observed
that:
The dispute relates to the determination of the
respective areas of continental shelf over which
Greece and Turkey are entitled to exercise the
sovereign rights recognised by international law.
It/
19. UN Doc. A/CONF.13/C.4/l.28 (21 March 1958), UN Doc.
A/CONF.13/42, p.134.
20. UN Doc. A/CONF.13/C.4/SR.32 (9 April 1958), UN Doc.
13/42, pp. 94-95, paras. 13 and 25.
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It is therefore necessary to establish the boundary
or boundaries between neighbouring States, that is ...
to draw the exact line or lines where the extension
in space of the sovereign powers and rights of Greece
meet those of Turkey. Whether it is a land frontier
or a boundary line in the continental shelf that is
in question, the process is essentially the same, and
inevitably involves the same element of stability and
permanence, and is subject to the rule excluding
boundary agreegjnts from fundamental change of
circumstances.
2.3 Preambles to Boundary Treaties
It will be shown later that international judicial
and arbitral tribunals, when faced with boundary disputes,
sustained awareness of the importance of achieving •stability'
in all the proceedings leading to the finality of boundary
disputes in accordance with the principle interest reipublicae
22
ut sit finis litium. This proposition, as we shall see,
is also supported by the preambles to most boundary treaties.
It would be wrong to assume that the preamble to a treaty
is only textually part of the treaty, and that therefore it
has no legal effect, because it does not contain any
substantive provisions but consists merely of a recital of
facts and motives. If fact, from the interpretative standpoint,
21. ICJ Reports, 1978, pp. 35-36, para. 85 [italics added].
Turkey claims a bigger share of the potentially oil rich
Aegean continental shelf, that is, the sea-bed under the
high seas. It argues that the multitude of Greek islands
there can claim no sea-bed beyond their six mile
territorial sea. Mario Modiano, "Tension as Greek
meets Turk in the Aegean", The Times, 12 March 1982,
p.8; idem, "Truce agreed by Greece and Turkey", The
Scotsman, 22 April 1982; idem "Papandreous receives a
Turkish olive-branch", The Times, 7 November 1981, p.4.
22. Co. Litt. 303. It concerns the state that there be an
end of lawsuits.
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a preamble does have legal effect. A treaty usually contains
a statement of the motives or objects of the parties in
making it, and can therefore be used as a guide and aid in
interpreting the directly operative clauses. For example,
in the Asylum Case, the ICJ did use the preamble to a
+ 23treaty.
Preambles always embody the primary objects of the
texts. In boundary treaties, preambles often express the
intention of the party to achieve 'stability' in respect
of their acquired common boundary. For instance, in the
1961 Treaty between Argentina and Uruguay concerning the
boundary constituted by the River Uruguay, the preamble
stressed that the Contracting Governments 'have decided to
settle once and for all the question of the boundaries
situated in the section of the River Uruguay which constitutes
23. This is so in two ways especially: (1) in order to elu¬
cidate the meaning of clauses the purpose of which
might otherwise be doubtful; (2) to indicate the
juridical 'climate' in which the operative clauses
should be read, whether for instance literally or
restrictively, broadly or restrictedly. In the
Asylum Case, the Court took the view that the Havana
Convention must be interpreted strictly as having a
generally restrictive intention. ICJ Reports, 1950,
p.282. In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, Max Huber
referred to the terms of the preamble to the 1925
compromis between USA and the Netherlands which he
regarded as 'the evident ivill of the parties'. II
RIAA, p.869. See G.G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and
Procedure of ICJ: Treaty Interpretation and Certain
Other Treaty Points", 28 BYIL (1951), pp. 24-25;
Lord McNair, Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1961), Ch. XX, p.364. I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester U.P.,
1973), pp. 69-76.
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the frontier between the two countries'.
The inviolability of the boundary is considered
25
sacrosanct in the practice of states. Some boundary
treaties based their compromise, in particular, on the
ground of stability. In conformity with its Preamble of
the United States - Mexico Convention for the Solution of
the Problem of the Chamizal of 1963 provided that:
The United States of America and the United Mexican
States ... convinced of the need for continuing the
program of rectification and stabilization of the
Rio Grande which has been carried out under the
terms of the Convention of February 1, 1933, by
improving the channel in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez ^
region, have resolved to conclude a Convention ...
According to the preamble of the 1968 Agreement concerning
the sovereignty over the Islands of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi
and the Delimitation of the Boundary Line Separating the
Submarine Areas between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
Iran, the two Governments
24. 635 TJNTS (1968), No. 9074, p.98 [italics added];
709 ibid (1970), Annex A, p. 332 ejt seq.
25. For example, Art. 5 of the 1848 Treaty of Guadelupe
Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico states:
"The boundary line established by this Article shall
be religiously respected by each of the two republics
and no change shall ever be made therein, except by
the express of free consent of both nations lawfully
given by the General Government of each in conformity
with its Constitution". S. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong. 1 sess.
26. 505 UNTS (1964), No. 7374, p.185 [italics added].
Cf. 724 UNTS (1970), No. 7374 p.308. For a discussion
see L.C. Wilson, 'The Settlement of Boundary Disputes;
Mexico, the United States, and the International
Boundary Commission', 29 ICLQ (1980), p.38.
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Desirous of resolving the difference between them
regarding sovereignty over the islands of A1-'
Arabiyah and Farsi and [djesirous further of
determining in a just and accurate manner the
boundary line separating the respective submarine
areas over which each party is entitled by^inter-
national law to exercise sovereign rights.
Undoubtedly, there is an element of finality about the
expressions 'resolving' and 'determining' as used in this
context, which is intended by the parties to achieve
' stability'.
2.4 International Concession Agreement
The principle of stability as applied to the submarine
boundary is closely connected to the notion of concession.
A concession agreement, if analogised to municipal law,
lies somewhere between a 'contract' (between private parties)
and a 'treaty' (between governments) since it is an agreement
between a private party and a foreign government for the
purposes of exploration and exploitation of mineral resources.
In view of its juridical character, unless a specific clause
28
is provided, international law is not normally applicable.
For example, in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case,
the PCIJ held that a contract between a foreign investor
29
and a state could only be governed by some municipal law.
27. 696 UNTS (1969), No. 9976, p.212 [italics added].
28. E. Lauterpacht, "Some Aspects of International Concession
Agreements", 1 Bulletin of the Harvard International Law
Club (1959), pp. 5-8. Cf. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American
Oil (Aramco) [1958] 27 ILR (1963), p.117; Petroleum
Development (Qatar) Ltd. v. Ruler of Qatar [1950] 18
ILR (1957), Case No. 38, p.161. See below, 3.2.
29. 1929, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 20, p.41. Cf. the USA on behalf
of P.W. Shufeldt against the Republic of Guatemala [1930]
24 AJIL (1930), p.799. For summary, J.W. Garner,




More recently, in the cases of B.P. v. Libyan Arab Republic
31
and Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic, it is accepted that
certain contracts can be 'internationalised' in a number
of ways and therefore subject to a mixed regime of inter¬
national and municipal law.
Moreover, oil concession agreements always include
'stabilisation clauses' which act as an effective instrument
to guarantee the status quo and protect foreign investors'
32
interests. Thus, in Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic,
Professor R.J. Dupuy, the sole Arbitrator recognised that:
30. 1973 and 1974. Award (Merits), 53 ILR (1979), p.300.
31. 1975 and 1977. Award (Preliminary), 53 ILR (1979),
p.393; Award (Merits), p.422. For summary, see
D.W. Bowett, "Libyan Nationalisation of American Oil
Companies ' Assets", 37 Cambridge L.J. (1978), pp. 5-8.
32. See e.g., Clause 16 of the Deeds of Concession between
the Libyan Government and the Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Co. ("Topco") and California Asiatic Oil Company
("Calasiatic"), 1955-1968. 53 ILR (1979), pp. 455-7;
Letter of Guaranty, Petroleum Concession Agreement
between Egypt, the Egyptian General Petroleum
Corporation, the General Petroleum Company and the
Egyptian Petroleum Development Company Ltd. (EPEDECO),
1975; Peter Fischer (ed) A Collection of International
Concessions and Related Instruments. Contemporary Ser.
Vol. 1 (New York: Oceana Publ., 1981), p.191, at
p.310. Cf. Horsmans and Verwilghen, "Stabilite et
Evolution du Contrat Economique International"
Le Contrat Economique International (1975), p.451.
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Oil concessions... while remaining in the nature of
acts governed by public law, have a contractual
character which is much more designed to afford to
operators who assume important e^gnomic risks
guarantees of greater stability.'
Apart from oil concessions, long-term stabilised terms are
also used in contracts as incentives for foreign investment
34
promotion.
Upon change of sovereignty the successor state does
not automatically inherit the rights and duties comprised
in the concession agreement. These come to an end with
the extinction of the personality of one of the parties
to the contract, or the obliteration of its sovereignty in
the territory which is subject to the operations of the
concession. Besides his contractual rights, the concessionaire
has an equitable interest in his investment and labour.
The contractual duty expires with the change of sovereignty,
33. Award (Merits) 53 ILR (1979), p.478 [italics added].
For discussion see Robin C.A. White, "Expropriation
of the Libyan Oil Concessions - Two Conflicting
International Arbitrations", 30 ICLQ (1981), p.l.
34. See, e.g., the 1975 Agreement on Foreign Capital
Investment between the Government of Chile lies
in a very detailed set of guarantees which in principle
assure non-discrimination and non-interference by the
government in investment operations for 30 years.
See A Collection of International Concessions and
Related Instruments. Contemporary Ser., Vol. 1,
pp. 467-68. Cf. the United Nations General Assembly
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, UN Doc. A/Res. 1803 (XVII), 14 December
1962; A/Res. 2158 (XXI), 25 November 1966; A/Res.
2386 (XXIII), 19 November 1972.
131.
but the equitable interest in the factual situation survives.
35
This interest is described as an 'acquired right'.
It will be shown in a later chapter that in various
disputed submarine areas, for instance in the Aegean Sea
and China Sea, the disputants often grant concessions
overlapping each others'claimed shelf. Unless and until
their concession rights are guaranteed as being stable,
foreign companies would be reluctant to engage in any
offshore activities.
2.5 Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus
There is a doctrine in customary international law
that a party to a treaty may unilaterally invoke as a
ground for terminating or suspending the operation of the
treaty the fact that there has been a fundamental change
of circumstances from those which existed at the time of
the conclusion of the treaty. This is called the doctrine
35. There is no doubt that a change in the internal
organisation of a state might affect the execution
of an agreement so vitally as to bring into operation the
clausula rebus sic stantibus. See, e.g., Paszthy v.
Kasulakoff, A.D. 1919-42 (Supplementary Vol.) No. 41,
and In re Tatarko, A.D. 1949, No. 110, which the
District Court of Rotterdam cited the maxim forma
reqiminis mutata non mutatur civitas ipsa. For details
see D.P. O'Connell, "Economic Concessions in the
Law of State Succession", 27 BYIL (1950), p.943;
idem, State Succession in Municipal Law and International
Law, Vol. 1 (Cambridge U.P., 1967), pp. 304-52.
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of clausula rebus sic stantibus.
The problem of a state's right to cease or limit its
performance of the provisions of a treaty on the ground
that circumstances have changed is an old one. Its practical
importance may be exaggerated; but states dissatisfied with
the status quo continue to regard it as a welcome device
for escaping from burdensome treaties, while others fear
it as a threat to stability and to their interests.
Professor Kelsen observed that the clausula rebus sic
stantibus is in opposition to one of the most important
purposes of the international legal order; that is, the
37
purpose of stabilizing international relations. Although
this doctrine is a part of positive international law, it
may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating
36. Things standing so; under the circumstances. The
relevant maxim is Omnis conventio intelleqitur rebus
sic stantibus. In the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex Case, France, which invoked the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. maintained that it
does not permit any unilateral denunciation of treaty
on the ground of a change of circumstances. Switzerland,
however, disputed the existence in international law
of any right to a party to a treaty to terminate it
on the ground of changed circumstances, and gave as
its reason, inter alia, that the doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus does not apply to treaties creating
territorial rights. 1932 PCIJ Series A/B, No. 46.
Cf. PCIJ Series C, No. 58. Cf. S.M. Schwebel, "The
Alsing Case", 8 ICLQ (1959), pp. 341-45; Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland), ICJ Reports,
1973, pp. 18-21. Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice,
ibid., p.77. For details, see O.J. Lissitzyn, "Treaties
and Changed Circumstances (rebus sic stantibus)",
61 AJIL (1967), pp. 895-922.
37. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed.
Revised by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Inc., 1966), p.498.
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or withdrawing from a boundary treaty. Boundary treaties,
which were intended to define the limits of sovereignty,
39
must be capable of enduring. Thus, m the Beagle Channel
Arbitration, the Tribunal recognised that 'pending arbitration
in the event of a dispute, the boundary cannot be changed by
the unilateral action of either Party: nor could a Party be
permitted to adduce evidence in support of the existence
> 40
of a right to do so. This view seems to correspond with
38. Art. 62(2)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. It has entered into force on 27
January 1980. At the Vienna Conference on the Law
of Treaties, a great majority of the states had endorsed
the view that treaties establishing a boundary were
an exception to the fundamental change of circumstances
rule. II YBILC (1974), p.73, para. 417; II YBILC
(1966), p.259, para. 11. Cf. I YBILC (1980), p.8-15,
209, para. 35.
39. Sir Humphrey Waldock's 1963 draft, Second Report of
the Law of Treaties, II YBILC (1963), pp. 79-85,
draft Art. 22; Art. 22 proposed by the Drafting
Committee of the ILC on 28 June 1963, I YBILC (1963),
p.249. The expression 'to fix a boundary' referred
to the actual delimitation of frontiers and would
exclude such cases as the cession of an island.
I YBILC (1966), Pt. I, p.86, para. 16. For further
discussion, see Egon Schwelb, "Fundamental Change of
Circumstances", 29 Zap RV (1969), p.39, at pp. 54-59.




the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and Raptis v. South
42
Australia Cases.
Customary international law, which is based upon the
consistent practice of states, has always contained the
principle that a change of sovereignty does not affect the
status of those international boundaries. Thus, when
Ethiopia incorporated Eritrea in 1952, the alignment
between Eritrea and Ethiopia became 'internationalised'
whilst the boundaries common to Eritrea on one hand, and
French Somali land and the Sudan on the other remained
43
unaffected.
Moreover it is instructive to note that when an
alteration occurs in rivers this does not necessarily alter
its boundary. For example, in Handly's Lessee v. Anthony,
Chief Justice Marshall held that wherever a river is a
boundary between states, it is the main, the permanent
41. "The delimitation of sea areas has always an inter¬
national aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon
the will of the coastal States as expressed in its
municipal law. Although it is true that the act of
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act ... the
validity of the delimitation with regard to other
States depends upon international law". ICJ Reports,
1951, p.132. See above, Ch. 1.
42. "The territorial limits dividing the internal waters
from the territorial sea should be determined in
accordance with the prevailing rules of international
law which are an important part of the world order".
Raptis v. South Australia (1977), 15 ALR 223, at
262—63, per Murphy. See above, Ch. 1.
43. Since this is a question concerning state succession




river, which constitutes that boundary. Similarly, in
Nebraska v. Iowa, it was laid down that when a boundary
water-course suddenly abandons its old bed, for whatever
reason — such as accretion or alluvio or erosion produced
by natural causes - and follows another new course, the
boundary remains unchanged in the centre of the old
45
channel, even though the water does not run through it.
This was followed by the International Boundary Commission
in the Chamizal Boundary Arbitration. It decided that the
natural 'changes which have taken place in the river have
not affected the boundary line which was established and
46
marked in 1852'. However, this is not a general rule.
There are many treaties which state that the boundary will
47
change with the alterations of the river. It may be noted
that the question of 'stability' has given many complications
in the case of river boundaries.
44. (1820) 18 US (5 Wheat) 374. See also B.M. Ziegler,
The International Law of John Marshall (Chapel Hill,
The Univ. of North Carolina, 1939), p.58.
45. 14 US 359. Cf. Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 US 23. The
doctrine of thalweg, in some cases, is of even stricter
application. Once provincial boundaries are fixed by
law they can only be altered by another law.
46. £1911] XI RIAA, p.316.
47. See, e.g., the 1908 Treaty between the U.K. and U.S.A.
De Martens, Nouveau Recueil General, 3rd Ser., IV,
p.191; the 1934 Agreement between the U.K. and Siam,
ibid., XXX, p.107-9.
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As boundary treaties are excluded from clausula rebus
sic stantibus, it is submitted that the principle of
stability in some way corresponds to the maxim pacta sunt
servanda.
2.6 Practice of Judicial and Arbitral Tribunals
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was of the opinion that the
demands of stability and peace in international relations
were more urgent than in private relations, and concluded
that there is a special reason for subordinating on occasions
the stringency of the proof of the requirement of good faith
48
to considerations underlying the maxim quieta non movere.
2.6.1 South Australia v. Victoria
In the State of South Australia v. The State of Victoria,
the boundary between South Australia and New South Wales was
by Act 4 & 5 Will. IV, c.95 and the Letters Patent issued
under that Act defined to be the 141st meridian of East
Longitude. In 1847, by the authority of the Governors of
New South Wales and South Australia and with the knowledge
and approval of the Secretary of State a line was demarcated
on the ground as being the 141st meridian, but in 1869 it was
48. H. Lauterpacht, 'Regies generales du droit de la paix'_>
62 Recuell de Cours (1937-IV), p.333, English Trans,
text in E. Lauterpacht (ed.), Hersch Lauterpacht
International Law Collected Papers, Vol. I (Cambridge
U.P. 1970), p.378; see also MacGibbon, o£. cit., 31
BYIL (1954) p.152, n.l.
49. [1911] 12 C.L.R. 667.
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discovered that the line of demarcation was in fact about
two miles to the westward of that meridian. The 1847 line
of demarcation had been proclaimed by the respective Governors
as the boundary and was the de facto boundary thenceforward.
In dealing with the dispute which had arisen in regard to
the true boundary between the two States the Privy Council
referred to the fixation of the boundary in 1847 and held
that on the true construction of the Letters Patent it was
contemplated that the boundary line of the 141st meridian
of East Longitude should be ascertained and represented on
the surface of the earth so as to form a boundary line
dividing the two colonies, and that it therefore implicitly
gave to the executive of the two colonies power to do such
acts as were necessary for permanently fixing such boundaries.
The Privy Council also held that
the material facts showed that the two Governments
made with all care a sincere effort to represent as
clearly as was possible the theoretical boundary assigned
by the Letter of Patent by a practical line of
demarcation on the earth's surface. There is no
trace of any intention to depart from the boundary
assigned, but only to reproduce it, and as in its
nature it was to have the solemn statu# of a boundary
of jurisdiction their Lordships have no doubt that it
was intended by the two executives to be fixed finally
as the statutablg^boundary and that in point of law
it was so fixed.
It would thus be clear that the settlement of the boundaries
which was held not to amount to an alienation in that case
50. [1914] A.C. 283, 309.
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had been made wholly on the basis of 'good faith'with
reference to the principle quieta non movere.
2.6.2 Opinion of the PCIJ
International tribunals on several occasions have
themselves subordinated the condition of good faith to the
more pressing requirements of stability and order. The
PCIJ in the following cases particularly confirmed this
approach. In the Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian
52
Frontier (Question of Jaworzina) Case and the Delimitation
51. The notion of 'good faith' in relations between states
may be considered in two main aspects: (i) as the
condition precedent for the existence of an international
legal order - in this sense the principle 'pacta sunt
servanda' is fundamental, not just to the law of
treaties, but to international law in general;
(ii) as a principle extrapolated from municipal law
(a 'general principle of law recognised by civilised
nations') and appearing in certain specific legal
contexts: in particular, in the law of treaties, not
just as a general notion of obligation, but with
important implications for creation of treaty obligations,
interpretation and performance thereof; in particular,
termination; also in the notion of 'preclusion' or
'estoppel'.
52. 1923. PCIJ Ser. B, No. 8. In this case the PCIJ was
requested to give an advisory opinion on the following
points: Is the question of the delimitation of the
frontier between Poland and Czechoslovakia still open,
and, if so, to what extent; or should it be considered
as already settled by a definitive decision?
After reviewing the relevant facts, including the
decision of the Conference of Ambassadors which was
called upon to divide the Spisz Territory, the Court
declared,inter alia, that the frontier line had been
directly or indirectly fixed in a definitive manner
throughout the whole region of Spisz by the decision
of 28 July 1920 and that it was final. See above,
Ch. 1.
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of the Serbo-Albanian Frontier (Question of the Monastery
53
of Saint-Naoum) Case, the PCIJ insisted upon the finality
of the decisions taken by the Conference of Ambassadors
on the delimitation of their respective frontiers. In the
54
Frontier between Turkey and Iraq (Mosul Boundary) Case,
the same Court asserted that the decision which was taken
by the Council of the League of Nations constituted a
definitive determination of the frontier between Turkey and
Iraq. These cases show the reluctance of international
tribunals in adjudicating frontier disputes to disturb
the principle quieta non movere.
The same considerations of stability had been assessed
by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Arbitration. He decided
to disregard effective occupation in a case where, after
it had taken place, it had been discontinued and displaced
by an effective and undisputed occupation. He held that
The Netherlands title of sovereignty, acquired by
continuous and peaceful display of state authority
during a long period of time going probably^ack
beyond the year 1700, therefore holds good.
53. 1924 PCIJ Ser. B, No. 9. See above, Ch. 1.
54. In the Mosul Boundary Case the PCIJ observed that
Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne was intended to
lay down (fixer) the frontier of Turkey from the
Mediterranean to Persian and that the object of the
article was to establish a continuous and definitive
frontier. 1925 PCIJ Ser. B, No. 12. Cf. Ser. E. No. 2,
p.140. See above, Ch. 1.
55. II RIAA, p.829, at p.869. In the Alaska Boundary Dispute
(1903), the United States maintained that for more than
sixty years after the 1825 Treaty, Russia, in succession
to her the United States occupied, possessed and governed
the territory around the heads of the inlets without any
protest or objection, while Great Britain never exercised
the rights or performed the duties of sovereignty there,
or attempted to do so. The Alaska Boundary Tribunal
Proceedings, Vol. I, p.29; USFR (1903), p. 543.
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The pragmatic approach to discourage uncertainty and
instability was also shown in the Legal Status of Eastern
56
Greenland Case. The Danish claim to sovereignty in the
non-colonised parts of Greenland was based on acts no more
extensive than legislation concerning navigation in the seas
around Greenland, the regulation of fishing or hunting, the
issue of permits to visit that area, and the conclusion of
commercial agreements referring to the whole of Greenland.
But Norway could not even point to similar general activities.
The alternative before the PCIJ, if it had adhered to the
rigid requirement of complete occupation, would have been
to declare the area in dispute terra nullins and open it
for competition - with all the ensuing uncertainty and
confusion. Undoubtedly, any such decision would have been
contrary to those principles of finality, stability and
effectiveness of international relations which have
characterised the work of the Court. Therefore, the Court
57
refused to make such decisions.
2.6.3 Jurisprudence of the ICJ
The jurisprudence of the ICJ has consistently given
58
priority to the need for 'stability' in territorial situations.
56. 1933, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22.
57. Cf. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International
Law by the International Court (London: Stevens & Sons,
1958), pp. 240-241.
58. For details, see Suzanne Bastid, "Les problems territoriaux
dans la jurisprudence de la cour internationale de justice"
107 Recueil des Cours (1962-III), p.365, esp. at
pp. 452-67, 469, 481. Professor Jennings found that
'the bias of the existing law is towards stability, the
status quo, and the present effective possession; the
tendency/
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In the Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier
59
Land (Belgium-Netherlands'), the Court was requested to
determine whether the sovereignty over the disputed plots,
60
i.e. Baarle-Duc and Baarle-Nassau, belonged to Belgium or
the Netherlands.^ 3elgium relied on a Descriptive Minute^2
in holding that sovereignty over the disputed plots belonged
to her. The Netherlands, nevertheless, interpreted the status
63
quo provision as upholding the text of the Communal Minute
tendency of international courts is to let sleeping
dogs lie. This is right, for the stability of territ¬
orial boundary must always be the ultimate aim...'
Jennings, o£. cit., p.70.
59. Perhaps more appropriately entitled the Zondereygen Case,
ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209. For discussions, see Roger Pinto,
"Chronique de Jurisprudence: Affaire relative a la
Souverainete sur certaines parcelles frontalieres
(Belgique c. Pays-Bas). Arret du juin 1959", 87 Journal
du Droit International (1960), pp. 238-49; Bastid,
op. cit., 107 Recueil des Cours (1962-III), Ch. IV,
pp. 452-67; J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence of the
World Court, Vol. II (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1966),
pp. 353-58.
60. The two villages, the Dutch village of Baarle-Nassau and
the Belgian village of Baarle Hertog, often shown on
maps as if they were distinct entities, are really only
one village. For details, see C. d'Olivier Farran,
"International Enclaves and the Question of State
Servitudes", 4 ICLQ (1955), p.294, at pp. 299-303.
ICJ Reports, 1959, p.211.
The Minute was signed on 22 March 1841. It stated under
Section A, called 'Zondereygen®, that 'Plots numbers 78
to 111 inclusive belong to the commune of Baarle-Nassau'.
Ibid., p.213.
63. After the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands in
1839, the two States concluded a boundary treaty on
6 November 1842. Art. 14 provided: 'The status quo shall
be maintained both with regard to the villages of





which did not exclude the disputed plots from her sovereignty.
After an analysis of the records between 4 September 1841
and 4 April 1843 of the Mixed Boundary Commission, the Court
stated that the work of delimitation had indeed been done
on the basis of the maintenance of the status quo. When
the Boundary Commission laid down an article in the Descriptive
Minute of 1843 which purported to be transcribed word for
word from the Communal Minute of 1841 and proceeded to
attribute the disputed plots, it may be held that the Boundary
Commission was actually intending to give a final ruling in
accordance with the requirements of the status quo. The
discrepancy between the texts of the Communal and the
Descriptive Minute was therefore irrelevant. The Court held
64
that sovereignty over the disputed plots belonged to Belgium.
Judge Lauterpacht, however, voted in favour of a
decision determining the sovereignty over the disputed plots
belonged to the Netherlands based on the principle quieta
non movere. He said:
It has been contended that the uninterrupted
administrative activity of the Netherlands was due
not to any recognition of Netherlands sovereignty
on the part of Belgium but to the fact that the plots
in question are an enclave within Netherlands Territory
and that, therefore, it was natural that Netherlands
administrative acts should have been performed there
in the ordinary course of affairs. However, the fact
that local conditions have necessitated the normal
and unchallenged exercise of Netherlands administrative
activity provides an additional reason why, in the
64. ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 217-22, 230.
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absence of clear provisions of a treaty, there is
no necessity to disturb the existing state_of affairs
and to perpetuate a geographical anomaly.
Factually, it was true that at the local level the
plots had been treated since 1841 as belonging to Baarle-
Nassau (the Netherlands). Administrative activities (for
instance collection of taxes; registration of property titles
and transfers thereof; sales of state property and a lawsuit
over these properties in Dutch courts; the building and
occupation of houses by Dutch nationals; registration of
births, marriages, deaths, etc) in Baarle-Nassau have been
carried out to a considerable extent without any opposition
66
from Belgium. It is worthwhile noting that in the
Beagle Channel Arbitration, the Tribunal found that:
The important point throughout is not whether Argentina
was under a duty to protest against Chilean acts in
order to avoid the loss of the islands because of
unilateral acts performed outside the terms of the
Treaty (which obviously could only be devoid of legal
effect): the important point is that her continued
failure to react to acts openly performed, ostensibly
by virtue of the Treaty, tended to give some support
to that interpretation of it which alone could justify
such acts.
65. ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 230-32 [italics added]. See also
E. Lauterpacht (ed) International Law: being the
collected papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Vol. 3 (Cambridge
U.P., 1977), pp. 207-9.
66. ICJ Reports, 1959, p.228. Belgium's reply was that it was
quite unaware that tax had been collected by the
Netherlands. Cf. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ibid.,
1962, 6. MacGibbon, o£. ext., 7 ICLQ (1958), p.469.
67. Award of Her Britannic Majesty's Government pursuant
to the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) of a
Controversy between the Argentine Republic and the
Republic of Chile concerning the region of the Beagle
Channel (London: HMSO, 1977), pp. 105-6, para. 172
[italics supplied]. See below, 3.4.1.
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Judging from the Netherland's 'actual administration'
at a local government level of the plots and the 'acquiescence'
and 'estoppel' by Belgium in the Frontier Land Case, it is,
in this context, the principle of quieta non movere which
should be taken into account.
Disputed boundaries do not, as we shall see later, yield
to simple delimitation on the basis of 'effectiveness' alone.
For, as with territorial disputes, it is commonly the
'ineffectiveness' of administration by the claimants which
is at the roots of the dispute. This is obvious in
relatively isolated and unpopulated areas; but, as the
Frontier Land Case shows, similar conflicts between claims
by central government authorities, and acts by local authorities
and assumptions by individuals along a boundary can occur
even in one of the most densely populated parts of Europe.
The decision, in effect, required the weighing of acts at
local government level against acts at the central government
level. It is evident that the acts of the central government
68
overrode those of the local government. It is the central
government that represents the state as a subject of
69
international law. It would, moreover, be short-sighted
68. It is interesting to compare this point to the Sino-
Indian Boundary Dispute in the area covered by the
McMahon line which was signed at the local government
level and was neither recognised nor ratified by the
Central Government of China; in 1950, the British Foreign
Secretary said: 'We have over a long period recognised
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding
that Tibet is regarded as autonomous'. Hansard, H.C. Debs.,
Vol. 408, Col. 602: 6 November 1950. See above, Ch. 1.
69. Art. 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.
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for any tribunal concerned with the delimitation of a
boundary between two states to ignore the need for the
boundary to be durable. 'Stability' in such cases may
require something other than the confirmation of a territ¬
orial status quo.
In the Temple of Preah Vihear Case (Cambodia v.
Thailand), the ICJ said:
when two countries establish a frontier between
them, one of the primar^Qobjects is to achieve
stability and finality.
Various factors support the view that the purpose of frontier
treaties is to achieve stability on a basis of certainty
and finality. In spite of the ambiguities of the boundary
demarcation in dispute, the Court emphasised that Thailand
had:
for fifty years, enjoyed such benefits as the
Treaty of 1904 conferred on h^p, if only the
benefit of a stable frontier.
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland),
Judge de Castro also invoked the principle of quieta non
movere in his separate opinion. He said:
70. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.34 [italics added]. See above,
Ch. 1.
71. Ibid., p.32. In the British Guiana Boundary Arbitration
(1897) the parties agreed that adverse holding or
prescriptions during a period of fifty years shall
make good title. 21 Hertslets Commercial Treaties,
p.1123. Cf. Her Majesty's Attorney-General for British
Honduras v. John Bristowe and Charles Thomas Hunter
(1880) L.R. 6 App. Cas. 143.
146.
Along with the special interest and the preferential
rights of the coastal state, account should be taken
of the historic rights of the countries concerned
with high sea fishing. The acquisition of rights
over the sea by prescription is not admitted, but
long usage should be respected, and that for the same
reasons as for the interests of the coastal states.
It is contrary to the concept of justice to disregard
situations which have been established for years, the
capital invested, the establishment of industries,
the protein needs of populations, and above all the
confidence inspired by a respect for the status quo
concerning the use of the high seas as common property.
1'n the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judge Ammoun
expressed his separate opinion that:
The states which claim rights of [historic waters
(gulfs, bays, etc), sedentary fisheries and
preferential fishing zones], from the states of
Latin America to those of Europe, Asia and Africa,
rely ... on historic title or on regional custom,
which could not and cannot be prejudiced by the
establishment of the custom of the freedom of the
high seas, by reason of the priority or effectiveness
of the former; whereas rights over the continental
shelf are considered to be exercised ipso jure, without
aid of effectiveness.
These states can consequently avail themselves of
the adage quieta non movere, and take shelter behind
situations consolidated by time which have changed
into rules of law, no longer admitting for the future
of any possible protests. The feeling of society ...
is in general favourable to the recognition of historic
rights, whether such recognition be shown by the
conduct of states, by judicial or arbitral decisions,
or in the teaching of publicists ... the possibility
is not excluded of similar legal situations coming
to birth by the normal operation of legal creation.
These cases provide ample evidence of the fact that
judicial tribunals consider that one of the important functions
of law including in its relation to boundaries is to preserve
72. ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 98-99 [italics added]. See
below, Ch. 4.
73. ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 113-114.
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the status quo. This is undoubtedly correct but is not the
whole picture as recent cases show. In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases and Anglo-French Continental Shelf
Arbitration, 'stability® was related directly to an equitable
solution, acceptable to the parties in both cases, giving
prominence to the role of 'special circumstances® and other
74
relevant factors.
Certainly the rules of positive international law are
the expression of a temporary stabilisation of international
boundaries. It has been repeatedly observed that the
guiding concept in the jurisprudence of the arbitral awards,
the PCIJ and ICJ in territorial and frontier cases, has been
that of 'stability® or quieta non movere. It may therefore
be submitted that the principle has already received the
imprimature of the courts. All this shows that territorial
boundaries are ipso jure the most stable of all institutions.
2.6.4 The Acquired Right; Local Government Level
Versus Central Government Level
It has been pointed out that the requirements of
'stability® have not always been seen simply in terms of
74. ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 50-51, para. 94; In the Anglo-
French Continental Shelf Arbitration, the Court of
Arbitration decided that equity required that the
Channel Islands which are situated 6.6 nautical miles
to the French coast should therefore be accorded only
a 12 mile continental shelf, so that France could have
sovereign rights beyond them to mid-channel.
Miscellaneous No. 15 (1978), Cmnd. 7438. See above, 2.1.
148.
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conserving existing possession. In both the Frontier Land
7 6
and the Temple of Preah Vihear Cases, the ICJ attached
relatively little weight to actual possession of the disputed
territory, adjudicating in favour of the dispossessed party.
Since this was undoubtedly against the trend of arbitral
awards, and indeed the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and the ICJ
in the Eastern Greenland and Minquiers and Ecrehos Cases, it
is worth examining the reasons for it.
If the Court's aim has been to 'stabilize' or to
refrain from disturbing an established de facto sovereignty,
it must still determine the lineaments of the de facto
situation. That these may not be altogether unambiguous
has been pointed out in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case above.
As we have seen, the Court in that case stressed the importance
of actual exercise of 'state functions', e.g., local
administration, local jurisdiction, and acts of legislative
authority, as proving the continuous display of sovereignty
necessary to confirm title. For this reason, upon the
evidence as to long continued exercise of state functions
by British authorities, the Court preferred the claim of the
77
United Kingdom. This same principle of the exercise
of state activity on an adequate scale, as distinct from
75. ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209.
76. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6. See above, Ch. 1, below Ch. 4.
77. ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 68-70.
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routine or inconclusive acts not necessarily evidencing a
firm intention to establish territorial sovereignty, was
also applied by the Court, in its Advisory Opinion on the
78
Western Sahara Case.
In the Frontier Land and Temple of Preah Vihear cases,
the nub of the factual problem confronting the Court was
that the manifest attitudes of the parties at central and
at local governmental levels had diverged over a fairly
considerable period. Even granted that the guiding principle
behind the Court's decisions on both cases was to 'stabilize'
the situation, it had first to choose which situation to
stabilise - that which had been maintained at local
governmental level, or that apparently manifested over
certain period of time at central governmental level. In
79
both cases, the Court chose the latter.
Similar conflicts between acts by the central government
and local acts on the ground were also manifested in the
80
Rann of Kutch Arbitration primarily in the form of the
description in maps published by the official Survey of India
78. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.12.
79. In the Argentine-Chile Boundary Arbitration, Argentina
sought to discredit much of Chilean evidence, especially
those parts of it which depended upon the acts of local
as opposed to central authorities, and even more those
parts of it which reflect the conduct and sentiments
of private individuals, XVI RIAA, p.109, at p.173.
80. 50 ILR (1976), p.2.
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of the Kutch-Sind boundary as following the northern shore
of the Rann. It appeared that British officials in Sind
had treated the boundary as running through the middle of
the Rann, and similarly, the acts of the Kutch authorities
were confined for the most part to the southern half of the
Rann. The arbitration resolved this conflict by means of a
presumption in favour of the map boundary, rebuttable by
evidence of acts on the ground to the contrary. Accordingly,
Judge lagergren, Chairman of the Tribunal said that:
In respect of those sectors of the Rann in relation
to. which no specific evidence in the way of display
of Sind authority, or merely trivial or isolated
evidence of such a character, supports Pakistan1s
claim, I pronounce in favour of India ... However,
in respect of sectors where a continuous and for the
region intensive Sind activity, meeting with no effective
opposition from the Kutch side, is established, I
am of the opinion t|^at Pakistan has made out a better
and superior title.
In respect of the two islets of the Rann in Pakistan
territory, he made the following remarks:
The paramount considerations of promoting peace and
stability in this region compels the recognition and
confirmation that this territory, which is wholly
surrounded Pakistan territory, also be regarded
as such ...
Even after full examination, there is room for doubt as to
whether or not the presumption in favour of the central
81. Ibid., pp. 518-9. In this case the maxim in aequali
jure melior est conditio possidentis (where the rights
of the parties are equal, the claim of the actual
possessor shall prevail) seems to have been applied.
Plow. 296.
82. 50 ILR, p.520 [italics added].
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government level was the more correct or even the more
sensible approach, but in either case, the most interesting
and significant feature of these judgments was not that
they 'stabilised' a situation, but which situation they
stabilised.
The problem before the Court can be put in a different
way. The guiding concepts of 'stability' or quieta non movere
might alternatively be put in terms of a search for a
83
consensual frontier. The frontier to be 'stabilised'
is then the frontier to which both parties have either at
some time explicitly consented, or to which they are deemed
by their conduct to have consented. If the consensual
boundary at local and central governmental levels differs,
the Court must still determine to which consensual boundary
to give effect. However, if the problem is put in terms
of 'sovereignty' - which state is actually exercising
sovereignty over the disputed territory - the question is
still whether 'sovereignty' is to be equated with local
administration or with the views and assumptions of the
84
central government.
83. Cf. the approach of the Arbitral Tribunal in the
'Oeil de la Mer' (or Meerauge) Arbitration, 8 RDILC
(1906), p.196.
84. In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, the question was
whether the establishment of a special local administration
was necessary to bring the tribal organisation effectively
within the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Judge Huber
held that the creation of a special administration in the
Island was unnecessary and that it was enough if the
Netherlands showed a 'continuous and peaceful display
of actual power'. II RIAA, p.831.
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It may be that the difficulty which the Court found
in these cases in giving effect to acts of local authorities,
arises from the present inability to fit such acts into
convenient legal categories. It would,, moreover, be short¬
sighted for any tribunal, concerned with the delimitation
of a boundary, to be inflexible. The question of 'stability'
has given rise to many complications, especially in relation
to boundaries in rivers. Establishing 'stability' in such
cases may require something other than the recognition and
confirmation of a territorial status quo or quieta non
movere. In practice, however, to apply the principle quieta
83
non movere indiscriminately may equally produce injustice.
Although it is proper to emphasise the importance of
'stability' which is so great as to override other consider¬
ations, it is unrealistic to over-stress the stability of
any specific boundary.
3. Principle of Effectiveness
It will be noticed that international judicial and
aribtral tribunals have, when faced with territorial disputes,
found little assistance in, and rarely discussed, the 'modes'
of acquiring and losing sovereignty over territory, discussed
by traditional writers. In fact, the major statements of
principle to be found in international awards relating to
land territory support the 'principle of effectiveness'.
85. See, for example, the Norwegian Reply in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Pleadings. 1951, Vol. Ill,
p.462.
153.
That is, they substantially equate the exercise of state
functions with the possession of sovereignty. These
statements of principles will be discussed later, but two
points should nevertheless be noted. In the first place,
on closer examination of the decisions in which those
statements of principle are made, it will be found that even
the 'principle of effectiveness' was applied with difficulty.
Indeed, frequently, the major issue in a territorial dispute
is which of two states is actually exercising state
functions; for the disputes referred to arbitration, not
unnaturally, concern remote and sparsely inhabited or
entirely uninhabited areas in which the opportunity for
exercising state functions is small. Secondly (and for
a not dissimilar reasons), the 'principle of effectiveness'
is inappropriate to, and has not been adopted in, decisions
concerning maritime or submarine areas. It these latter
cases, as will be seen, geographical, economic and strategic
86
factors have predominated.
86. It must not be forgotten that the principle of
effectiveness is also in private law a question of
fact, and frequently, of legal fiction. For legal
fiction, see Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford
U.P., 1967), Ch. 1; p.l; Jean J.A. Salmon, "Le Procede
de la fiction en droit international public", 10
Revue Beige de Droit International (1974), p.11.
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3.1 Ex Factis Jus Oritur
One of the important aspects of the jurisdiction concept
of sovereignty is shared with the 'possession' analogy. Both
make the legal rights inherent in territorial sovereignty
depend upon the factual exercise of governmental powers:
87
ex factis jus oritur. The jurisdictional theory describes
this as the principle of effectiveness. In Kelsen's words:
The exclusive validity of a national legal order
extends, according to international law, just as
far as this order is, on the whole, efficacious,
that is, permanently applied, as far as the
coercive acts provideggfor by this order are
actually carried out.
The territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty of the state
extends in law as far as it extends in fact. There can be
no 'abstract' right of sovereignty divorced from its exercise.
According to Kelsen, the acquisition and loss of
territorial sovereignty is solely dependent on 'effectiveness';
whether a state effectively asserts and exercises governmental
functions, as sovereign, over a territory, or fails to do so.
There are, however, situations, notably where territory has
been acquired by force, or where territory is administered
under a lease, a mandate or trusteeship agreement, where it
may be important to distinguish de jure sovereignty from mere
de facto administration. Some of the other problems and
inadequacies of this approach have been mentioned in the
87. 2 Co. Inst. 49. The law-creating influence of facts.
88. See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State,




the context of the 'possession' analogy. 'Effectiveness'
justifies a territorial status quo; it is an obstacle to
peaceful change or an invitation to the use of force. It
gives legal title to the state which acquires territory by
conquest or subjugation, but would make it impossible for
an international judicial tribunal presented with a
territorial dispute to make an award to a party other than
the one in control.
3.2 Ownership and Possession
Normally the areas over which a state might claim
dominium and imperium are co-extensive. They are what we
think of as the territory of the state. Usually under its
own municipal law the state will formally be the owner of
a substantial area, if not the whole, of its territory.
Thus, in feudal law, the proprietary rights of the individual
in land are based on vassalage and derived from his feudal
90 . .
overlord. The principle remains embodied in the common
law: the basis of English land law is that all land in
England is owned by the Crown. A small part is in the
Crown's actual occupation; the rest is occupied by tenants
holding the land either directly or indirectly from the
89. It is one thing to say that law is ultimately based
on the facts of life and that it is a body of rules
established by a system of force; it is another thing
to say that breaches of law, if they are repeated
and remain unpunished, become part of the legal
order. Hersch Lauterpacht International Law Collected
Papers, Vol. 1, p.342.
90. See S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English
Feudalism (Cambridge U.P., 1976), p.36.
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Crown. Accordingly, xt has been observed, soverexgnty
and property are indistinguishable concepts to the
Anglo-American lawyer. British and American writers on
international law have consequently regarded sovereignty
92
over terrxtory as a real rxght ox property. The terrxtory
of the state was its 'international property'; the property
of a state is marked by the same characteristics to other
states, gust as the property of individuals is relative to
other individuals: in other words, it is exclusive of all
foreign interference and susceptible to free disposition.
The meaning of possession is a visible possibility
of exercising physical control over a thing, coupled with
the intention of so doing. There are three requisites of
possession. First, there must be actual or potential
physical control. Secondly, physical control is not
possession, unless accompanied by intention. Thirdly, the
possibility and intention must be visible or evidenced by
external signs, for if the thing shows no signs of being
under the control of anyone, it is not possessed. Theory
and practice agree upon the rule that the territory must
. 93
really be taken xnto possessxon by the occupyxng state.
91. Cf. J.G. Riddall, Introduction to Land Law, 2nd ed.,
(London: Butterworths, 1979), pp. 1 et seq. Cf. E.J.
Schuster, The Principles of German Civil Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1907), pp. 385—86.
92. John Westlake, International Law (Cambridge U.P., 1910)
Pt. 1, p.86; L. Oppenheim (ed) The Collected Papers of
John Westlake on Public International Law (Cambridge
U.P., 1914), Ch. IX, p.131.
93. Jowetts Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed., by John
Burke (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), Vol. 2, p.1387.
Cf. R.W.M. Dias, "A Reconsideration of Possessio",
14 Cambridge L.J. (1956), pp. 235-47.
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For this purpose it is necessary that it should take the
territory under its sway (corpus) with the intention of
94
acquiring sovereignty over it (animus).
The conception of territorial sovereignty as analogous
to, even distinguishable from, the right of property of the
individual in private law, did not resolve the problem of
the nature of territorial sovereignty in international law.
Although this analysis seemed attractive at first sight,
it created more difficulties than it solved, because the
private law of property is sophisticated and stable enough
to admit of a variety of rights in land. More especially,
95
it distinguishes the concepts of 'ownership* and
96
•possession', and possession in fact from possession in law.
3.2.1 Possession in Fact and Possession in Law
In municipal law, the issue whether factual control
is to be recognised as constituting possession in law, as
appropriate for legal protection under a right of action
distinct from that available to the owner, arises in two
diverse situations. First, when the 'possession in fact'
is possession with the consent of the owner. Second, when
94. See, e.g., the Delagoa Bay Arbitration, 66 BFSP, p.554;
Clipperton Island Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1105;
Island of Palmas Arbitration, ibid., p.831; Eastern
Greenland Case, PCIJ Series a/b"] No. 53, p. 22. See
below, 3.4.1.
95. Ownership implies the complete dominion. Cf. Sec. 903,
Burqerliches Gesetzbuch.
96. Possession means 'the actual control' over the thing
to which it refers. Sec. 854(1), Burqerliches
Gesetzbuch.
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possession has been acquired without the consent of the
owner, or after lawful possession, or otherwise relating
to law. In both these situations, it nust also be decided
whether the de facto possession is to be protected as
against third parties only, or as against the owner as well.
3.2.1.1 Possession with consent of territorial sovereign
In the first situation in international law, the issue
whether a state in occupation of territory with the consent
of the territorial sovereign - under a. lease, for example -
is entitled to protection of that possession as against a
third state is perhaps of little significance. In municipal
law the issue arises in consequence of restricted rights of
procedure, and international law knows little of such
technicalities. It is true, however, that the elaboration
of the concept of locus standi or legal interest by the ICJ
97
in the South West Africa (Second Phase) and Barcelona
98
Traction (Second Phase) cases suggests that the issue might
be raised as to whether a lessee state might bring an
international claim for possession of territory raised by
a third state independent of any claim which might be
brought by the territorial sovereign. Conversely, it might
97. ICJ Reports, 1966, p.6.
98. ICJ Reports, 1070, p.3. The Court dismissed the action
on the procedural ground that Belgium lacked jus standi,
since its only interest in the case was through the
shareholders in the company, and that it did not suffice
to confer a right of diplomatic protection in this case.
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be contended that a 'suzerain' state, or territorial
sovereign of territory ceded in perpetual occupation, had
a nudum jus1^ insufficient to support a claim for possession
from a third state. The interests of justice would suggest
that technical losses should not be created where they are
not clearly shown to exist.
The second aspect, whether the possession of a lessee
state should be protected as against the claim of the
territorial sovereign, or, perhaps more vitally, whether the
lessee state is to be entitled to reclaim possession from
the territorial sovereign, is of considerable significance.
For in international law it is closely related to the
significance attached to territorial sovereignty. It is
arguable that the interests of the territorial sovereign
relate so closely to the interests and perhaps the very
survival of the state, that a discretion remains in the
territorial sovereign - in law as clearly as it does in
fact - to retake possession of territory held by another
state under express or tacit agreement. In municipal law,
excepting customary rights (e.g. rights of way etc.), most
99. Suzerainty may be defined as a relation between a
dominant and a dependent state, the incidents of which
are in part defined by treaty or agreement, and in
part by lex specialis peculiar to that relation or
that class of relations. It differs from protectorate
only in that certain of its incidents are more likely
to be undefined, or to involve general claims of
supremacy. Although suzerainty is practically obsolete,
the Indian Native States until 1947 were the obvious
example. See The Creation of States in International
Law, op. cit. , pp. 209 _et seq.
100. A naked law.
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property rights short of absolute ownership are created
for a term of years only; moreover, the existence of facilities
for governmental regulation permit the modification of all
property rights where that is deemed desirable. However,
international agreements regarding territories are frequently
couched in terms implying permanence, or at any rate their
indefinite continuance, or perhaps simply provide no method
for their examination appropriate to all circumstances.
For some of these there are no ready 'legislative1 means
for the alteration of territorial rights. Indeed, it is
remarkably difficult to determing precisely the relative
rights of the 'possession' of territory and the territorial
sovereign. Consider, for example, the following cases:
the relative rights of the United States and Panama in the
Panama Canal Zone;^^ the United States and Cuba in the
101. See generally, T.J. Lawrence, Essays on Some Disputed
Questions in Modern International Law, 2nd Rev & Enlarged
(Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co., 1885), pp. 41-88, 89-162;
E.R. Johnson, 'The Panama Canal: The Title and the
Concession', XVIII Pol. Sci. Quart. (1903), p.197;
H.S. Knapp, 'The Real Status of the Panama Canal as
Regards Neutralization', 4 AJIL (1910), p.304; Harmodio
Arias, The Panama Canal (London: P.S. King & Son, 1911);
G.C. Butte, Great Britain and the Panama Canal: A Study
of the Tolls Question (Heidelberg, 1913); L. Oppenheim,
The Panama Canal Conflict between Great Britain and the
United States of America, 2nd ed. (Cambridge U.P., 1913);
26 BDIL, pp. 281-338; R.R. Baxter, The Law of International
Waterways, With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals
(Harvard U.P., 1964), pp. 71-72, 74-84, 288; E.C. Hoyt
'Law and Politics in the Revision of Treaties Affecting
the Panama Canal', 6 Virginia J.I.L. (1965-66), p.289;
M.D„ Simpson, 'Panama: The Proposed Transfer of the
Canal and the Canal Zone by Treaty', 5 Georgia J.I.C.L.
(1975), p.195; Hans Smit, 'The Panama Canal: A National
or International Waterway?' 76 Columbia L.R» (1976),




Guantanamo Bay; the United Kingdom and Cyprus in the
103
sovereign base area. Also it may be asked whether some
rights of territorial sovereignty were going beyond a right
of pre-emption (the application of which itself involves
some complexities) - reserved to Spain over Gibraltar under
A Minisymposium', 9 NYUJILP (1976), p.l; 'Treaty
Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of
the Panama Canal', 16 ILM (1977), p.1040; 'Panama -
U.S.: The Panama Canal Treaties and Related Documents',
ibid., pp. 1021 et seq. See also 19 Harvard I.L.J.
(1978), p.279; Walter la Feber, The Panama Canal:
The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford
U.P., 1978).
102. See generally, Joseph Lazar, 'International Legal Status
of Guantanamo Bay', 62 AJIL (1968), p.730; idem,
"'Cession in Lease" of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
and Cuba's "Ultimate Sovereignty"', 63 ibid (1969),
pp. 116-18; Cf. G.L. Maris, "Guantanamo: No Rights of
Occupancy*, ibid., pp. 114-16.
103. In reply to questions as to the deployment of rockets
and nuclear weapons within the British sovereign base
area in Cyprus, the Minister of Defence said: 'The
essence of a sovereign base area is that we can deploy
such weapons as we think fit at such time as we think
fit...' BPIL (1963-1), pp. 2-3. Cf. Treaty of Guarantee
between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of
1960, 382 UNTS, No. 5475, p.3; see also the Treaty
concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus
of 1960, ibid., No. 5476, p.10. 'Her Majesty's
Government consider that the 1960 Cyprus settlement
is an international treaty which can only be altered
by mutual agreement'. See BPIL (1965-1), p.67.
Cf. ibid (1964-11), p.243.
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the Treaty of Utrecht? The mandate and trusteeship
agreements also raise problems regarding the relative
rights of the administering power and the supervisory
authority."^5 Agreements or customs regarding the use of
106
territory, such as neutralisation of territory and rights
107
of passage, also raise problems regarding the relative
rights and interests of the territorial sovereign and those
states interested in perpetuating the agreement of motion
concerned.
104. Art. X of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 in Documents
on Gibraltar, presented to the Spanish Cortes by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Non-official translation)
(Madrid, 1965), pp. 16, 155. See also W.C. Abbott,
An Introduction to the Documents Relating to the
International Status of Gibraltar, 1704-1934 (New York:
MacMillan Co., 1934); Cf. Resolution Relating to the
Scheme of Observation of the Spanish Frontiers by Land
and Sea during Spanish Civil War, 31 AJIL Suppl. (1937),
p.163. Cf. BPIL (1965), pp. 35-38. UN Doc. A/Res. 2231
(XVI); Question of Gibraltar, December 20, 1966. BPIL
(1966), p.208; ibid (1967), pp. 75-79. 2b BDIL, pp.
748-49; Gibraltar Talks with Spain, May-October 1966,
Miscellaneous No. 13 (1966) Cmnd. 3131; Oliver Pritchett,
'How Safe is Gibraltar?' The Sunday Telegraph, November 4,
1979, pp. 8-9. For Lisbon Agreement between Britain and
Spain on the future of Gibraltar, see The Daily Telegraph
29 January 1981, p.10.
105. See E. Lauterpacht, 'The Contemporary Practice of the
U.K. in the Field of International Law - Survey and
Comment, VIII*, 9 ICLQ (1960), pp. 257-58; Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith¬
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ
Yearbook (1970-71), No. 25, p.100.
106. The neutralization of specific territories, such as
Austria, Belgium and Switzerland, was aimed at preventing
them becoming areas of war. It was often, but not
necessarily, accompanied by demilitarization, which
implied a permanent deprivation of fortifications and
military forces, a status which was not necessarily
accompanied by neutralization. See J.H.W. Verzijl,
International Law in Historical Perspective, Pt. IX-B
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), p.21.
107./
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3.2.1.2 Possession without consent of territorial
sovereign
There are three major substantially distinct situations
in which a state may be in possession of territory under the
sovereignty of another state. First, a state may be in
possession as a result of the manifest use of force. This
situation is generally discussed by writers under the head
of the validity of title acquired by conquest. Secondly,
a state may be in possession of territory as a result either
of peaceful occupation without the actual use of force -
although perhaps with an implied threat of its use - or
simply as a result of peaceful encroachment (perhaps indeed
in good faith), or it may be a territory under the sovereignty
of another state. Thirdly, territory may pass out of the
actual possession of a territorial sovereign in a manner
unlawful under its municipal public law, for instance, as
a result of revolt and secession. Although these three
situations are distinguishable, in practice they will
inevitably overlap. There is really no clear dividing
line between the occupation of territory by force and that
occupation which is the result of peaceful penetration.
107. Cf. Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian
Territory (Portugal v. India), ICJ Reports, 1960,
p.6. Cf. E. Lauterpacht, 'Freedom of Transit in
International Law', 4 Transactions of the Grotius
Society (1958 and 1959), p.313.
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It has customarily been accepted that military
occupation of territory does not confer sovereignty, although
it does, of course, confer the right, and indeed the duty,
of administration. Accordingly, annexation of territory
durante bello is ineffective. This is, naturally, independent
of the issue whether territory occupied in consequence of
the use of force may be validly annexed at any time.
In face of these examples, it appears impossible to
maintain that sovereignty is inseparable from actual
possession of territory. Nonetheless, this doctrine is
not only regularly maintained but in one form or another,
has been fashionable over a considerable period of time.
The reasons usually given are the requirements of inter¬
national order: the need for 'stability' of territorial
situations, the discouragement of self-help, and the
inadequacies of the international judicial system.
3.2.2 Concepts of Ownership and Possession
Means of assessing the above notions vary in different
legal systems. These distinctions are important, at least,
in two ways. First, 'ownership* is capable of existing as
108
an 'abstract right* divorced from 'factual possession*.
108. Where one state has acquired the right to administer
a portion of the territory of another in such
circumstances that all or virtually all governmental
authority is vested in the former state, though without
that state acquiring sovereignty, a jus in re aliena
in strictness arises. For instance, by the Convention
of 4 June, 1878 Cyprus was assigned by Turkey 'to be
occupied and administered by England'. See Hertslet's
Commercial Treaties, Vol. XIV, p.1170.
165.
'Possession', moreover, may be a more sophisticated concept
from simple holding, the factual occupation of land -
possession in fact. Such possession is not necessarily
recognised by the law, and consequently an 'abstract' right
of possession may also be recognised - possession in law.
Secondly, acquisition and transferance of ownership is a
relatively formal process; possession is acquired informally
by the simple acquisition of effective control, even if that
control is not deemed sufficient to confer legal possession.
Consequently, it is necessary for international law to
determine whether or not an abstract right of sovereignty,
divorced from actual manifestations of control over territory,
is to be recognised; and also to determine the means by
which territorial sovereignty is acquired.
It must, of course, always be borne in mind that in
practice municipal legal systems may either pay little
regard to ownership divorced from possession, or, whatever
their theoretical starting point, they may be compelled to
face the fact of possession and to protect the possessor
against the owner by means of concepts such as the limitation
109
of rights of action or extinctive and acquisitive prescription.
110
Even wrongful possession may in time confer a good title.
109. English medieval law knows no acquisitive prescription
for land; all it knows is a limitation of actions.
110. Art. 4(a) of the Treaty of Washington of 1897 provides:
'Adverse holding or prescription during a period of
fifty years shall make a good title'. See Stuyt,
op. cit. No. 207, p.213. Cf. Temple of Preah Vihear
Case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6.
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These are questions of practical legal policy which the
international, like any other legal system, must face.
If we now accept that international law acknowledges,
in the form of the concepts of territorial sovereignty and
administration or control of territory, analogies to the
municipal law concepts of both ownership and possession, we
must further consider what legal consequences should be
drawn from these analogies. First of all, it is clear that
although ownership and possession are distinguishable, they
111
are also closely linked. Possession is the basis for
the modes of acquisition of property: by occupation and
112
natural accession. In every acquisition of possession
there is a physical act, corpus, accompanied by an act of
113
will, animus. Thus, possession in international law is
111. Roman law regarded dominium and possessio as quite
distinct conceptions. Dominium denoted primarily a
right, which might or might not connote the fact of
physical control. Possessio primarily denoted the
fact of physical control. It had, as such, no legal
consequences, and was therefore totally distinct from
dominium. Holdsworth, A History of English Law,
Vol. VII (London: Methuen & Co., Sweet & Maxwell,
1966), p.458; Fischer Williams, o£. cit., 7 BYIL (1926)
p. 38.
112. Possession in English law is prima facie evidence of
ownership. Holdsworth, o£. cit., Vol. VII, p.478.
113. See Von Saviqny's Treatise on Possession, 6th ed.,
English trans, by Sir Erskine Perry (London: S. Sweet,
1848), Bk. II, Sec. XIV, p.142. Savigny held that
animus required for possession was the intention of
ownership, for which modern jurists commonly use the
term animus domini, not found in the ancient texts.
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also the exercise of power and xvill in and from a territory.
Sovereignty over newly-discovered lands can be acquired by
taking the most real and positive possession. Under
contemporary international law, mere 'seizure with the eyes'
is insufficient.1^5
However, apart from historical possession in the form
of uti possidetis11^ and prescription,1"^ some agreements
explicitly exclude actual present possession from consideration
unless it fulfils certain conditions. For instance, the
Guatemala-Honduras Convention of 1895 provides that:
Possession shall only be considered valid so far as
it is just, legal, and well founded, in conformity with
general principles of equity, and with th^gules of
justice sanctioned by the law of nations.
Possession becomes continuous by the continuance of corpus
and animus by which it was originally acquired; but it is
very evident that the same immediate physical control is not
114. Cf. the Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Series A/B,
No. 53, pp. 45-46. See below, 3.4.1.
115. Cf. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.829.
In contrast, in the Clipperton Island Arbitration,
where the island was uninhabited, physical and continuing
occupation was not required as a condition of
possession. Ibid., p.1108. Similar reasoning is found
in the Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53.
116. As you possess, so you shall continue to possess.
117. Where a right, immunity or obligation exists by reason
of lapse of time.
118. Art. 6, 87 BFSP, p.530. See also Stuyt, o£. cit.,
No. 185, p.191 [italics added]. See also No. 184
(Honduras-Salvador), p.190; No. 249 (Bolivia-Peru),
p.256.
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necessary to continue the possession, as was required to
give rise to it; and continuing possession depends rather
on the constant power which exists of reproducing the
original relation at will. For this reason, possession is
not lost by mere absence from the subject which was once
119 . .
appropriated. Moreover, as Max Huber observed, municipal
law, while recognising abstract rights of property, never¬
theless Jlimited their effect by the principles of prescription
and the protection of possessionJ
It must also be noted, however, that the concept of
possession is in some respects more complex than that of
ownership. In a non—technical sense, possession may simply
be defined as the actual holding or occupation of a thing.
But if possession is to be protected by law, further problems
arise. Should all possessions, whoever be the possessor
and by whatever means possession was obtained, be protected,
and against whom? What factual elements of holding or
occupation are to constitute possession in law? As well
as this, if it be accepted that possession in fact is not
for all purposes to be treated as possession in law, further
legal concepts need to be brought into play. So, just as
we have the concept of ownership divorced from actual
possession, we also need the concept of legal possession
119. See below, Ch. 4.
120. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.839. Cf.
Clipperton Island Arbitration, ibid., p.1108.
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divorced from actual possession. And when it is desired
to protect the de facto possessor against some, but not all,
possible claimants, the notion of concurrent rights to possess
121
of differing degrees of weight may be needed.
In order to acquire title to sovereignty, it is crystal
clear that the following conditions must be fulfilled.
First, the taking of possession must be carried out with
the intention of establishing or manifesting sovereignty
122
(a titre de souverain). A state must be willing to
maintain order, organisation and the administration of
justice. Secondly, possession must be taken with effective
action, that is, a state must bring the territory under its
control and administration. Thirdly, possession must be
123
peaceful and uninterrupted.
121. See above, 3.2.
122. An important dictum of the PCIJ in the Eastern
Greenland Case was the requirements of 'the intention
and will to act as sovereign'. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53,
pp. 45-46. See below, 3.4.1.
123. Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Arbitration refers
to 'continuous and peaceful state authority'. II
RIAA, p.869. Cf. The Eastern Greenland Case. In
the Chamizal Boundary Arbitration, the Commissioners
were of the opinion that possession must be peaceful
to provide a basis for prescription. XI RIAA, p.317.
See above, 2.5.
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3.3 Possession, control and jurisdiction
Terms like 'possession', 'control', 'jurisdiction'
and 'effectiveness' are clumsy concepts to apply to complex
territorial regimes. They fail to distinguish situations
in which governmental functions are exercised with the
intention of establishing or manifesting sovereignty
(a titre du souverain) from those in which they are exercised
by some other title. For instance, a state may be 'in
possession' of territory by virtue of an international
124 125
lease or concession, military occupation, mandate or
trusteeship, and in consequence exercise governmental
functions in that area without at any time claiming sovereignty.
124. See generally, Westlake, o£. cit., pp. 136-37;
D.P. O'Connell, International Law, Vol. I (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1970) pp. 328-30; H. Lauterpacht's
Collected Papers, Vol. I, pp. 372-73; J.G. Starke,
Introduction to International Law, 8th ed., (London:
Butterworth, 1977), p.183; Ian Brownlie, Principles
of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), pp. 115-16. See above 2.4.
125. McNair and Watts, The Legal Effects of War (Cambridge
U.P., 1966), Ch. 17, p.366; Georg Schwarzenberger,
International Law as Applied by International Courts
and Tribunals, Vol. II (London: Stevens & Sons, 1968),
Chs. 25-29, pp. 316-55; Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest
of International Law, Vol. 10 (Dept. of State Publ.,
1968), p.540; J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in
Historical Perspective, Pt. IX-A (The Netherlands:
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), p.209.
126. See generally, Norman Bentwich, The Mandates System
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930), esp. Ch. 1, p.l;
Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and the Mandates System
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930), Ch. V, p.106;
Charmain Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of
the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons, 1956).
Cf. The Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons, ICJ




In Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic, Libya abstained from
the proceedings. It did, however, raise certain objections,
inter alia, that Libya's nationalisation of the assets of
foreign oil companies was 'an act of sovereignty' which
could not be judged by jurisdictions other than those of
128
the state concerned. The possible justification of the
nationalisation thus lay in the 'lessor' state's sovereignty.
Although the Tribunal accepted the basic right of the lessor
state to nationalise, it did not accept that this was an
unlimited right in respect of an international concession
129
with a foreign contracting party, since Libyan law and
international law recognised that the sovereign could be
bound by agreements, the making of which was an exercise of
130
sovereignty. States have an absolute right to control
their natural resources, and so the Court was not able to
recognise the principle of sovereignty over natural resources
131
as a standard of ius cogens which overrode agreements.
127. 53 ILR (1979), pp. 393, 422. See above, 2.4.
128. It was in a memorandum attached to a letter of 26 July
1974 by the Libyan Government to the President of the
ICJ. See 53 ILR (1979), p.418.
129. 53 ILR (1979), p.468 et seq.
130. The Concession was governed by and interpreted in
accordance with the principles of the law of Libya
common to the principles of international law.
Clause 28 of the Deeds of Concession. 53 ILR (1979), p.450.
131. Ibid., pp. 479, 482 et seq. For Jus cogens, see
Jerzy Sztucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal (Wien
New York: Springer-Verlag, 1974); Ian McTaggart Sinclair,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester
U.P., 1973), p.150; George Schwarzenberger 'International
Jus Cogens? * 43 Texas LR (1965), p.455. Cf. the United
Nations General Assembly Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN DOC. A/Res. 1803
(XVII), 14 December 1962.
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Moreover, for the question of permanent sovereignty, the
Tribunal observed that:
The state granting the concession retains the
permanent enjoyment of its sovereign rights;
it cannot be deprived of the right in any way
whatsoever; the contract which it entered into
with a private company cannot be viewed as an
alienation of such sovereignty but as a limitation,
partial and J^pjited in time, of the exercise of
sovereignty.
The general situation in which a state asserts juris¬
diction over nationals outside its territory is explained as
an 'interpenetration of competences1 by virtue of the inter¬
action of personal and territorial jurisdiction. Leases
(or concession) and military occupation are simply treated
as exceptions to the general rule that a state cannot
legally perform acts on the territory of another state.
The case of the international lease or concession in which
♦sovereignty* is vested in the 'lessor1 state, while
administration and control might rest with the 'lessee'
133
state party is explained as a transfer of 'actual local
132. 53 ILR (1979), pp. 481-82, para. 77. The Arbitrator
declared that in entering into concession contracts
with the plaintiffs, the Libyan State did not alienate
but exercised its sovereignty and ensured that it would
not be affected in principle, the limitations accepted
by it in respect of exercise of certain of its
prerogatives having been accepted only in particular
areas and for a specific period of time. Ibid., p.482,
para. 78. See above, 2.4.
133. See e.g., Art. 3 of the Convention signed on 6 March
1898 which provides that China 'will abstain from
exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory
[both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiao—Chau]
during the term of the lease [ninety-nine years]'.
Blue Book China No. 1 (1899), p.69. Extract from the
Reichsanzeiqer of April 29, 1898. Cf. the 1898 Convention
for the Lease of Kuang Chou Wan. 4 AJIL Suppl. (1910),
p.293.
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competence' with a reservation of 'potential local competence'.
Clearly, such situations can be expressed in terms of juris¬
diction or competence; whether they are illuminated by this
terminology is more doubtful.
It is true that a state is generally regarded as
sovereign over that territory in which it exercises the
ordinary functions of the state. The limits of state
territory can normally be ascertained by reference to the
limits of the effective possession, control, or jurisdiction of
the state. But there are, admittedly, situations in which
'sovereignty' is not coterminous with possession, control
or jurisdiction over territory. Possession, control or
jurisdiction are not conclusive indicia of sovereignty.
Accordingly, the 'principle of effectiveness' may be one,
but it cannot be the sole criterion for attributing sovereignty
over territory. Nevertheless, the principle of effectiveness,
like the concept of 'possession', finds support not only
among writers, but also in the practice of international
judicial and arbitral tribunals as illustrated by the
following cases.
3.4 Practice of Judicial and Arbitral Tribunals
3.4.1 Land Areas
The major statements of prL nciple regarding sovereignty
over land areas are to be found in Max Huber's well-known
134
award in the Island of Palmas Arbitration, the decision of
134. II RIAA, p.831.
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the PCIJ in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case,
and the decisions of the ICJ in the Minquiers and Ecrehos,
137
and Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) Cases, as well as
138
by Judge Lagergron in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration.
It will be convenient first to discuss the statements of
principle, and then to examine their application to the
facts of these disputes.
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, Max Huber said
that 'boundaries of lands were necessarily determined by
the fact that the power of a state was exercised within
them, so too, under the reign of international law, the
fact of peaceful and continuous display is still one of the
most important considerations in establishing boundaries
139
between states'. He started from the compromis that
'sovereignty in relation to a portion of the surface of the
globe is the legal condition necessary for the inclusion of
140
such portion m the territory of any particular state',
and arrived at the conclusion that 'the actual continuous
135. PCIJ Ser. A/b, No. 53, p.22. See above, 2.6.2.
136. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47. See above, 2.6.3.
137. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.3.
138. 50 ILR (1976), p.2. See above, 2.6.4.
139. II RIAA, p.839.
140. Ibid., p.838.
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and peaceful display of state functions is in case of dispute
141
the sound and natural criterion of territorial sovereignty.'
Judge Huber's approach has been substantially endorsed
by writers, by the decisions in the Eastern Greenland,
Minquiers and Ecrehos and Western Sahara Cases, and by
Judge Lagergron in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration. It is,
however, in some respects an extreme view, and has not in
all respects been followed by international tribunals, as
the decisions concerning prescription which will be discussed
in Chapter 3 below have shown. His approach is therefore
worth examining in more detail. He begins with a definition
of sovereignty:
Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the
exclusj^g of any other state, the functions of a
state.
However, although initially defining territorial sovereignty
in terms of the 'right to exercise ... the functions of a
state', with regard to any given territory, he then goes on
to make the existence of this right conditional on its
actual exercise:
If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a
portion of territory, it is customary to examine which
of the states claiming sovereignty possesses a title
- cession, conquest, occupation etc., superior to that
which the other state might possibly bring forward
against it. However, if the contestation is based on




sovereignty, it cannot be sufficient to establish
the title by which territorial sovereignty was
validly acquired at a certain moment; it must also
be shown that the territorial sovereignty has
continued to exist and did exist at the moment which
for the decision of the dispute must be considered
as critical. This demonstration consists in the
actual display of state activities, such as belongs
only to the territorial sovereign.
Titles of acquisition of territorial sovereignty in
present day international law are either based on an
act of effective apprehension, such as occupation or
conquest, or, like cession, presuppose that the ceding
and the cessionary Power or at least one of them,
have the faculty of effectively disposing of the ceded
territory. In the same way natural accretion can only
be conceived of as an accretion to a portion of
territory where there exists an actual sovereignty
capable of extending to a spot which falls within its
sphere of activity. It seems therefore, natural that
an element which is essential for the constitution of
sovereignty would not be lacking in its continuation.
So true is this, that practice, as well as doctrine,
recognises ... that the continuous and peaceful
display of territorial sovereignty (peaceful in ^
relation to other States) is as good as a title.
It is clear from this passage that Huber, like Kelsen and
other modern writers on the law of territory, laid primary
f
weight on the concept of 'effectiveness'. But although it
is common for writers to designate 'effectiveness' as the
major factor in determining whether territory has been
acquired, and to emphasise the importance of recognising
'effectiveness' as a means of imposing territorial stability,
Huber is perhaps the only writer who has not shrunk from
drawing the conclusion that 'effectiveness' is necessary
also to the maintenance of territorial sovereignty, and that
143. Ibid., pp. 838-39 [italics added].
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loss of effective control may involve loss of territorial
144
sovereignty. And this aspect of the principle of effectiveness
has met with considerable criticism. It may however be
remarked that in the very context of the Island of Palmas
Arbitration, Huber found the utmost difficulty in determining
whether either party had fulfilled the requirement of both
effective apprehension of the territory and of continued
effective control. This problem indeed illustrates the
difficulty of applying the theory to resolve certain types
of territorial or boundary dispute in which the 'effectiveness'
of administration by one party or another is the very matter
in dispute. Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether Huber
would have applied this principle in the face of clearly
delimited or demarcated boundaries, or seated boundaries,
or if there were some clear title by 'cession, conquest,
occupation etc.' The reasons which he gives for emphasising
the need to 'display State activities' within the territory
suggest that, in principle, he would not, although conceding
that states may bind themselves to respect a conventional
boundary unsupported by manifestations of sovereignty.
144. Professor MacGibbon points out that 'effectiveness is
necessary for the maintenance of title by occupation'
'failure to protest against competing acts of sovereignty,
openly performed, might suffice to indicate that the
requisite degree of effectiveness in maintaining the
title was not being shown'. I.C. MacGibbon, ojd. cit. ,
31 BYIL (1954) p.168. Cf. idem, "Some Observations
on the Part of Protest in International Law", 30
ibid., (1953), p.293.
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Thus, he founded his approach on two bases:
First, territorial sovereignty, as the exclusive right to
display the activities of a state, has a corollary duty:
the obligation to protect within the territory the
rights of other states, in particular their right
to integrity and invoilability in peace and in war,
together with the rights which each state may claim
for its nationals in foreign territory. Without
manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a manner
corresponding to j^jrcumstances, the state cannot
fulfil this duty.
Secondly, sovereignty is not an abstract right capable of
existing without concrete manifestations;
Although municipal law, thanks to its complete
judicial system, is able to recognise abstract
rights of property as existing apart from any
material display of them, it has none the less
limited their effect by the principles of
prescription and the protection of possession.
International law, the structure of which is not
based on any super-state organisation, cannot be
presumed to reduce a right such as territorial
sovereignty, with which almost all international
relations are bound up, to the category of an
abstract right, without concrete manifestations.
Certainly both these arguments, whether or not valid in
themselves, would support a view that territorial sovereignty
was lost by failure to display it, even when the actual
display of state functions had been usurped by force or was
in contravention of international agreements. This problem
did not arise as such from the facts of the Island of Palmas
Arbitration. There the United States claimed sovereignty
under a treaty of cession from Spain, but, in substance,
145. II RIAA, p.939.
146. Ibid.
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Huber held that Spain did not possess territorial sovereignty
at the date of the purported cession and, indeed, had never
possessed more than at best an 'inchoate title' by discovery
(as a claim to establish sovereignty by effective occupation
147
which, as he held, was never in fact done). It is evident
that the maxim nemo potest plus juris ad alium quam ipso
148 149
habet or nemo date qui non habet applied. However,
it is possible for a state which has acquired an 'inchoate
title' by cession to perfect that title by the appropriate
acts and thereby acquire by action subsequent to the cession
a better title than that of the cessionary state. In this
connection, it is important to note that the mode of 'cession'
147. Ibid., pp. 866-69.
148. Co. Litt. 309. No one can transfer a greater right to
another than he himself has. Cf. in Lighthouses in
Crete and Samos [1937] PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 71, the Court
held that the lighthouses in Crete and Samos are
lighthouses situated in territories which were assigned
to Greece after the Balkan wars.
149. Jenks, Cent. 250. No one gives who possesses not.
In the Frontier Land Case, a draft Convention was
signed by the plenipotentiaries of Belgium and the
Netherlands in 1892, in which Belgium agreed to assign
the two disputed plots, i.e. Baarle-Nassau and Baarle-
Duc, to the Netherlands. The Court observed that:
'the unratified Convention of 1892 did not ... create
any legal rights or obligations, but the terms of the
Convention itself and the contemporaneous events show
that Belgium at that time was asserting its sovereignty
over the two plots...' ICJ Reports, 1959, p.229. See
above, 2.6.3. In the course of debate on the Aden,
Perim and Kuria Muria Bill an amendment was proposed
in 1967 for the purpose of excluding Perim from the
Bill and for empowering the Government to lease the
island to the UN to be administered as a trust territory.
The Foreign Secretary commented on this proposal: 'How
does one lease anything unless one has the ownership
of it?... One cannot lease something unless one retains
ownership'. Hansard, H.C. Deb., Vol. 749, Cols. 641-42:
28 June 1967.
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cannot legally apply to sea areas; as Schucking rightly
observed:
the cession [of the territorial sea], for example,
of this area of dominion to another state, without
the simultaneous cession of the coastal territory,
cannot be regarded as legally possible. The
intimate conn^gjion between the two precludes such
a proceeding.
The approach is endorsed by the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case which spoke of
the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the
land domain. It is the land which confers upon the
coastal state a right to waters off its coasts ...
Another fundamental consideration ... is the more or
less close relationship existing between certain sea
areas., and the land formations which divide or surround
them.
It is equally true that a state's continental shelf is an
extension of its land territory into and under the sea.
The PCIJ in the Eastern Greenland Case adopted, in
principle, a very similar approach to both the acquisition
and maintenance of sovereignty. From the judgment, it would
seem that the demands that can be made in accordance with
the principle of effectiveness concerning the exercise of
150. At his report to the League Committee of Experts,
LN Doc. C.44, M.21, 1926, v, p.6.
151. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.133. In the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, Waldock remarks: 'just as a certain right
with respect to internal waters, with respect to the
territorial sea and with respect to the contiguous zone,
appertain ipso jure to a coastal state simply in virtue
of its coast, so also do exclusive rights with respect
to the continental shelf'. ICJ Pleadings, North Sea
Continental Shelf, Vol. II, p.92.
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•sovereignty1 are very small, particularly in sparsely
populated areas and in areas with no fixed settlements.
Though Denmark had actually never exercised authority on
the eastern coast of Greenland, the Court still recognised
that in the course of time and because various Danish acts
and other legislation had assumed validity for the whole
Greenland area, Denmark had exercised sufficient authority
over the non-colonised part to create a valid title of
•sovereignty*. The Court declared in terms reminiscent of
those of Huber:
a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular
set or title such as a treaty of cession but merely
upon continued display of authority, involves two
elements each of which must be shown to exist; the
intention and will to act as sovereign, and sgtQg
actual exercise or display of such authority.
The Court referred to the fact that legislation is one of
153
the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign power.
This is a further example of how the terminology of
•sovereignty1 may obscure clearer understanding. To legislate
for a certain territory is merely a vain pretension when
there are no authorities to enforce the laws of the state
152. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46 [italics added].
153. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, the Court took the
same view and attached particular importance to
legislation as a display of state sovereignty; *This
legislative Act [a British Treasury Warrant of 1875]
was a clear manifestation of British sovereignty
over the Ecrehos at a time when a dispute as to such
sovereignty had not yet arisen', ICJ Reports, 1953,
p. 66.
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asserting the claim, unless of course, the area in question
is remote and uninhabited, where, as in the case in question,
little is needed. In the view of the Court in this case,
the purported occupation by Norway of portions of Greenland
was null in the sense of non-existent, because the land was
already subject to Danish sovereignty and consequently an
essential ingredient of the acquisition of title by occupation
154
- i.e., that the territory should be res nullius - was
missing. But in his dissenting opinion, Judge Anzilotti
expressed the view that the area in dispute was indeed res
nullius and the occupation, though it fulfilled all the
requirements for title by occupation, was ineffective because
of a previous undertaking given to Denmark, which made it
wrong vis-a-vis Denmark. Yet, in practice, the Court
stood the requirements of sovereignty on their head.
In the Island of Palmas and Clipperton Island15^
Arbitrations, it had at least been possible, in the face
of two claimants to sovereignty, for the arbitrators to
154. The first rule of the acquisition of title by occupation
is the requirements that territory must be terra nullius
and territory is in such case acquired simultaneously
with possession. Quod anim nullius est, id ratione
naturali occupanti conceditur. Dig. L. XLI. Tit. I, para
155. PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, p.76, at pp. 84-86; see R.Y.
Jennings, 'Nullity and Effectiveness in International
Law', in Cambridge Essays in International Law (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1965), p.67.
156. II RIAA, p.1107.
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declare that one party had 'displayed state activities'
and the other had not. In the case of Eastern Greenland
there was, at the critical date to which the Court was asked
to direct its attention, only one claimant to sovereignty
over the island. The Court was unwilling to declare that
Greenland had at any time constituted territorium nullius.
Consequently, while paradoxically emphasising the need for
a display of state authority, it was forced to lay still
greater stress on the fact that:
Another circumstance which must be taken into account
by any tribunal which has to adjudicate upon a claim
to sovereignty over a particular territory, is the
extent to which the sovereignty is also claimed by
some other Power ...
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions
in cases as to territorial sovereignty without
observing that in many cases the tribunal has been
satisfied with very little in the way of actual
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the
other state could not make out a superior claim.
This is particularly so in the class of claims to
sovereignty over are^g^in thinly populated or
unsettled countries.
The reason for this is that various judicial decisions
on sovereignty over territory - the Clipperton Island and the
Island of Palmas Arbitrations - are concerned with very small
and insignificant areas compared with that of Greenland. In
the Clipperton Island Arbitration, where the island was
157. PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, p.46. Judge Huber held in the
Island of Palmas Arbitration that 'a jus in re once
lawfully acquired shall prevail over de facto possession
however well established', II RIAA, p.840.
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uninhabited, physical and continuing occupation was not
required as a condition of possession. It should also be
noted that the Court!s view that 'the intention and will to
act as sovereign' which it found that Denmark continued to
possess in Eastern Greenland in spite of a complete failure
to 'display ... such authority' for five centuries, was
sufficient to maintain that sovereignty, in being at least,
when there was no competing activity on the part of any
other state. However, there was substantial dissent within
the Court. Moreover, it is important to distinguish acts
creative of title, as in the Clipperton Island Arbitration,
and acts which are merely evidence of a title, as in the
Beagle Channel Arbitration. In the latter case, title to
the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands derived from the 1881
boundary treaty between Chile and Argentina. Evidence of
Chilean acts of jurisdiction and Argentinian failure to
protest was regarded as evidence confirming the Court's
153
view that the treaty allocated these islands to Chile.
The next major dictum in support of Huber's theory of
sovereignty is the well-known statement in the judgement of
the ICJ in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, dismissing the
158. Award of Her Britannic Majesty's Government pursuant
to the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) of a
Controversy between the Argentine Republic and the
Republic of Chile concerning the region of the Beagle
Channel (London: HMSO, 1977), pp. 105-6, para. 172.
For discussion, see Malcolm Shaw, "The Beagle Channel
Arbitration Award", VI International Relations (1978),
p.415. See above, 2.6.3.
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relevance of the elaborate historical arguments of the
parties, which went back to the Norman Conquest of England
in 1066 and the dismemberment of the Duchy of Normandy in
1204, with the words:
What is of decisive importance, in the opinion of
the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced
from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence
which relates directly to the^pppsession of the
Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.
The term 'possession* must be read as meaning 'possession
in sovereignty' rather than, necessarily, 'physical occupation'.
In this aspect, the Court found sovereignty lay with the
United Kingdom on the basis of facts presented by the Jersey
authorities involving the exercise of criminal jurisdiction,
the conduct of inquests on corpses washed ashore, the
imposition of taxes on huts, the maintenance of a register
of fishing boats, a register of sales of real property,
the establishment of a customs house and the construction
of a slipway and various mooring buoys and beacons.Yet
again, however, the contrast between the statement of
principle and the actual evidence of possession is considerable.
A further statement of principle, to similar effect,
but giving still greater emphasis to the relativity of the
display of state functions, was made by Judge Lagergron,
159. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.57 [italics added]. This question
must ultimately depend on the evidence which relates
directly to the possession of these groups. Ibid., p.55.
160. Ibid., pp. 65-69.
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the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Rann of Kutch
Arbitration. He observed:
Territorial sovereignty implies, as observed by
Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case, certain
exclusive rights which have as their corollary certain
duties. In adjudging conflicting claims by rival
sovereigns to a territory, all available evidence
relating to the exercise of such rights, and to the
discharge of such duties, must be carefully evaluated
with a view to establishing in whom the conglomerate
of sovereign functionj^^as been exclusively or
predominantly vested.
The most interesting part of that statement is the reference
to the question of 'in whom the conglomerate of sovereign
functions has [been] exclusively or predominantly vested'.
Where there are competing acts of sovereignty, 'effectiveness'
in the abstract cannot be determined, but the 'comparative'
or 'relative' effectiveness of each claimant can be assessed.
Much of the evidence in suppoet of the vesting of
'sovereign functions' in Sind or Pakistan related to acts
of individuals; it was therefore necessary, if this evidence
was to be taken into account, to attribute it to the sovereign.
To this end Judge Lagergron laid stress upon the social and
economic organisation of the neighbouring states. Both Sind
and Kutch were agricultural societies, and
The activities and functions of Government ... were ...
limited mainly to the imposition of customs duties and
taxes on land, livestock and agricultural produce in
the fiscal sphere, and to-the maintenance of peace and
order by police and civil and criminal courts and othej^
law enforcement agencies in the general public sphere.




the borders between territories under different
sovereignty still marked a strict division of economic
rights as well as Government functions . . . ownership
by an Indian ruler of agricultural property could
imply and carry with it such a measure of sovereignty
over it as to include Jg^ing authority, and civil and
criminal jurisdiction.
In consequence, state and private economic interests and
activities were closely associated 'because of the close
dependence of the taxation system on the land and the
164
agriculture production'. Thus, where the sovereign
virtually owned the territory of the state, acts of his
tenants might without difficulty be deemed creative of
rights for the state. The line of reasoning is however,
more appropriate to the 'property* than to the 'jurisdictional'
concept of sovereignty.
Again, in the Western Sahara Case, the ICJ was asked
'what were the legal ties between Western Sahara and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?' Morocco's
claim to legal ties was based on the public display of
sovereignty, uninterrupted and uncontested, for centuries.
In support of this claim, Morocco not only referred to a
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid. In the Frontier Land Case, the Netherlands relied
on the fact that it had collected Netherlands land tax
on the two disputed plots without any resistance or
protest on the part of Belgium. .ICJ Reports, 1959,
p.229. See above, 2.6.3.
165. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.3.
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series of historical material but also invoked, inter alia,
the decision of the PCIJ in the Eastern Greenland Case.
Stressing that during a long period Morocco was the only
indpendent state which existed in the north-west of Africa,
it rested upon the geographical contiguity of Western Sahara
to Morocco and the desert character of the region. In the
light of these considerations, it maintained that the
historical material sufficed to establish Morocco's claim
to a title based 'upon continued display of authority', on
the same principles as those applied by the PCIJ in upholding
Denmark's claim to possession of the whole of Greenland.
The method of formulating Morocco's claim encountered certain
difficulties. As the Court stated in the Eastern Greenland
Case, a claim to sovereignty based upon continued display
of authority involves two elements each of which must be
shown to exist: animus occupandi coupled with corpus occupandi.
Moreover, such activity must be continuous: by discontinuing
it, the state will either have lost or the state will be
deemed never to have acquired a title. It is true that
166. PCIJ Series A/b, No. 53, pp. 45-46.
167. Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas Arbitration held
that 'the growing insistence with which international
law has demanded that ... occupation shall be effective,
would be inconceivable if effectiveness were required
only for the act of acquisition and not equally for
the maintenance of the right'. See II RIAA p.839.
Professor Waldock observes that 'an established title
may be lost not only by voluntary abandonment but by
mere inactivity, that is, by failure to display state
activity with a continuity appropriate to the
circumstances'. See C.H.M. Waldock, 'Disputed
Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependences',
25 BYIL (1948), p.321.
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the PCIJ in the Eastern Greenland Case recognised that in the
case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated
or unsettled countries 'very little in the way of actual
168
exercise of sovereign rights' might be sufficient in the
absence of a competing claim. But in the present case, the
Western Sahara, if somewhat sparsely populated, was a
territory across which socially and politically organised
169
tribes were in constant movement. Likewise, it seems
that the Court was much influenced by the judgment in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case. It declared:
What must be of decisive importance in determining its
answer ... is not indirect inferences drawn from events
in past history but evidence directly relating to
effective display of authority in Western Sahara at
the time of its colonisation by Spain a^^Qin the
period immediately preceding that time.
Consequently, the Court held that Morocco could not be
considered to have exercised effectively internal sovereignty
r- , 171
over Western Sahara.
It is clear that there has been a certain change in
legal thinking on the exercise of 'state functions'. The
emphasis has shifted from the taking of physical possession
of the land and the exclusion of others to the manifestation
168. PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, p.46. This judgment is in
complete harmony with the Clipperton Island Arbitration
in holding that the requisites of effective occupation
depend on the circumstances of the territory, and that
settlement or local administration is not necessarily
required in the case of uninhabited territory. II RIAA,
p.1107.
169. ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 42-43 paras. 90-92. Cf. the
Barotseland Boundary Arbitration [1905] XI RIAA, p.59.
170. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.43, para. 93 [italics added].
171. Ibid., p.47, para. 103.
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and exercise of the functions of government over the territory.
This change is a natural consequence of the recognition that
in modern international law occupation is the acquisition of
sovereignty rather than of property. Occupation is not only
the assumption of the exclusive right to display state
activities in the territory. It is also the assumption of
a duty to protect within the territory the rights of other
states both in regard to their security and in regard to
172
the treatment of their nationals in the territory. Thus,
in the Award of the Grisbadarna Arbitration, among the reasons
given for the allocation of the Grisbadarna bank to Sweden
was that Sweden had performed various acts in the Grisbadarna
region (for instance, the placing of the beacons, the
measurement of the sea and the installation of a light-ship),
acts which involved considerable expense. In doing so,
Sweden was not only exercising its right but even more was
performing its duty; whereas Norway showed much less solicitude
173
in this region in these various regards.
172. See Waldock, o£. cit., 25 BYIL (1948), p.317. Cf.
Sir Gerlad Fitzmaurice 'The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 1951-54: Points of
Substantive Law, Part II', 32 ibid (1955-56),pp. 49-52.




The delimitation of sea boundaries reflects a continuum
of experience gained from state practice relating to land
boundaries, thence to nearshore limits, and finally to those
further offshore. As a result, the concepts of boundary
delimitation have undergone gradual evolutions as new
environments xvere divided. Relevant experiences gained on
174
land were often utilised for territorial sea boundaries.
However, there has always been considerable doubt concerning
the application of the principle of effectiveness to the
sea areas in which state authority cannot actually be displayed.
The important considerations are not dissimilar for sea
areas to those applied in terra nullius or uninhabited land
territory; the major distinction is that, because the
outward boundaries of maritime claims are a res communis,
the interests of the general international community must
be taken account of, and a concept of 'reasonableness' has
been applied. Actual administration of land territory is a
paramount factor, but actual administration of sea areas is,
ipso facto, somewhat fictional. Judge Reed in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case recognised that:
174. For details, see Robert D. Hodgson and Robert W. Smith,
'Boundaries of the Economic Zone', Miles and Gamble (ed)
Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes and Problems of
Implementation, Proceedings of the Law of the Sea
Institute, Tenth Annual Conference, June 22-25, 1976
(Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1977), p.183.
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The only convincing evidence of state practice is to
be found in seizures where the coastal state asserts
its sovereignty over the waters in question by
arresting a foreign ship and by maintaining its
position in the course of ^i,glomatic negotiation and
international arbitration.
Apart from the fictitious nature of actual administration
of maritime areas, it is doubtful whether submarine areas
can actually display state authority. Although it has been
suggested that submarine areas were either res communis, which
might be acquired by prescription, or res nullius which any
state might occupy and exploit in conformity with the rules
on the right of occupation, it is now manifest that the
principle of effectiveness is inapplicable to the bed and
subsoil of the marginal sea, not only because submarine
areas differ by nature from the land territory, but also
because 'the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be
actually part of the territory over which the coastal state
already has dominion' - in the sense that, although covered
with water, they are a 'prolongation', 'continuation' or
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'extension' of the state's land territory. This emerges
175. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.191.
176. H. Lauterpacht's remarks, I YBILC (1953), p.74,
paras. 4-8; idem, 'Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas',
27 BYIL (1950), p.376; D.H.N. Johnson, 'Acquisitive
Prescription in International Law', ibid., p.332;
M. Roger Pinto, 'La Prescription en Droit International',
87 Recueil des Cours (1955-1), p.391.
177. ICJ Reports, 1969, p.31, para. 43. Cf. Art. 2(3)
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
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clearly from the emphasis placed by the ICJ in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases on 'natural prolongation' of
the land as a criterion for determining the extent of a
coastal state's entitlement to continental shelf as against
other states abutting on the same continental shelf. The
criterion of natural prolongation has been invoked by both
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Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case.
Also, this criterion was re-affirmed by the Court of
Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration.
Moreover, actual administration of submarine areas, as has
been shown, is indeed fictional. Actual exploitation of the
resources of the sea area is probably the most decisive
ISO
consideration.
178. ICJ Reports, 1978, p.36, para. 86. See below, Ch. 7.
179. Miscellaneous No. 15 (1978), Cmnd. 7438, pp. 82-83,
para. 165; 86-87, para. 174; 91, para. 191; 93,
para. 194. Professor Brown views that natural
prolongation is not a good criterion for delimitation
of boundaries of adjacent states though alright for
opposite states, see E.D. Brown, 'The Anglo-French
Continental Shelf Case', 16 San Diego LR (1979), p.461,
at pp. 479-82. See also idem, 'The Anglo-French
Continental Shelf Case', YBWA (1979), p.304. Cf. D.W.
Bowett, 'The Arbitration between the United Kingdom
and France concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary
in the English Channel and South-Western Approaches',
49 BYIL (1978), p.l; D.M. McRae, 'Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and
France: The Channel Arbitration', 15 Canadian YIL
(1977), p.187. See below, Ch. 7.
180. See e.g., the Grisbadarna Arbitration, Scott, The
Hague Court Reports, 1916, p.121; North Atlantic Coastal
Fisheries Arbitration, XI RIAA, p.173; Gulf of Fonseca
Arbitration, 11 AJIL (1917), p.674; Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951, p.116; and Anglo-
Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, ICJ Reports,
1974, p.3. See below, Ch. 5.
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4. Conclusion
It is important to remember, in the first place, that
the primary object of a boundary is to maintain territorial
'stability' and 'effectiveness'. Secondly, the principal
function of the international boundary is to preserve the
territorial status quo, i.e. stability. Thirdly, the
principle of stability appears in various different forms.
In boundary treaties, it corresponds to the maxim pacta
sunt servanda; in principle, the clausula rebus sic stantibus
is not applicable to boundary treaties. In the delimitation
of the continental shelf boundaries, this principle is not
only related to an equitable division of all aspects of the
continental shelf among the states concerned: stress is
often laid on the need for acceptable, agreed delimitation
based on equitable principles, and on the notion of a
concession. Unless and until the acquired concession rights
are guaranteed as being stable, foreign companies would be
reluctant to engage in offshore explorations and exploitations.
In boundary disputes, international judicial and arbitral
tribunals have consistently observed and often given priority
to the need for stability. However, indiscriminate application
of the principle of stability is liable to result in injustice.
Fourthly, with regard to territorial acquisition, the
continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty
is as good as a title. Essential constituents of the
principle of effectiveness are: State activity _a titre du
souverain, continuity of activity over some undefined period of
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time, and, to the extent appropriate to the territory, over
the disputed area; and some element of acquiescence by other
states. The principle of effectiveness might serve as an
adequate justification for undisputed territorial sovereignty,
and might suffice to determine disputes such as those of
the Island of Palmas, Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland,
but it could not serve to determine disputes in which no
sovereignty or conflicting acts of sovereignty were asserted,
or the elements of a passage of time, or of acquiescence, were
not fulfilled.
Fifthly, it may be suggested that these obiter dicta
are more interesting and valuable as statements of judicial
method than as statements of the basis of territorial
sovereignty. An international tribunal would be manifestly
failing in its duty if it did not examine the evidence
adduced by the parties. But if the requirement of some
exercise of sovereign functions is to be regarded as a test
of title to territory, rather than a mere description of
the type of evidence offered by the parties to a territorial
dispute, we must consider whether international tribunals
have established any standard regarding the type or weight
of evidence required. If this were so, then one might
expect an international tribunal to have been prepared on
occasion, to declare that neither party to a territorial
dispute had established a claim in law. However, consideration
of the facts and reasoning of the cases in which those
statements of principle have appeared to suggest the
contrary.
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Sixthly, international tribunals have not awarded
disputed territory to this or that state on the ground that
the state itself had made its sovereignty 'effective', but
rather awards of territory were made on the basis of an
assessment of 'connecting factors', 'equity' and
'reasonableness'. For, as with territorial disputes, it
is commonly the 'ineffectiveness' of administration by
claimants which is at the root of the dispute. This is
particularly true in relatively isolated and unpopulated
areas.
Seventhly, the principle of effectiveness may be
modified and made more elastic or more stringent as inter¬
national conditions require. This is merely a manifestation
of the necessity of adapting the genera.1 principles of law
to the requirements of international order and stability.
Such modifications do not, in principle, affect the
fundamental analogy in the processes of acquisition of
territorial title and of private proprietary rights.
Finally, the principle of effectiveness is inappropriate
in decisions concerning claims to submarine and sea areas.
The important considerations for sea areas are not dissimilar
to those applied to terra nullius or uninhabited land territory.
Actual administration of sea areas is somewhat fictional.
Actual exploitation of natural resources is probably the
most decisive consideration.
181. Cf. the Principle of Natural Prolongation. See below, Ch. 7.
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CHAPTER 3
TRANSFERS OF TITLE TO TERRITORY, THE LEGAL STATUS
OF WHICH IS IN DOUBT
1. Introduction
International judicial and arbitral tribunals have
approached issues involving sovereignty over territory in
a manner generally pragmatic and unconcerned with the
theoretical issues treated by writers. Discussions of
issues of principle are rare in arbitral awards and
decisions of courts; in particular, the attribution of
sovereignty over territory has rarely been put in terms of
the modes of acquiring property which writers on the
international law of territory have borrowed from municipal
law. Generally, such modes as 'occupation' and 'prescription'
have been rejected as inapplicable to the facts, of doubtful
application in international law, or simply ignored in favour
of other Considerations. In this chapter the considerations
which have motivated awards regarding territorial sovereignty
will be considered seriatim. First, the views expressed by
tribunals on the orthodox modes of acquiring territory which
have arisen before them will be considered: primarily,
discovery, settlement, use, occupation, prescription and
abandonment. It is manifestly true that contemporary
international law rejects any title based on 'mere discovery'
or on an 'act of a purely symbolic nature', such as hoisting a
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flag, or even on a formal proclamation of annexation without
further effective occupation. As a consequence, title based
on effective occupation is still considered valid.
Then, the criteria which have more frequently motivated
decisions will be examined: the exercise of state functions,
acquiescence, estoppel and recognition. Before we proceed
to discuss these fundamental rules of acquisition and loss
of territory, it should be emphasised that all these modes
are closely involved in the controversy concerning claims to
the Tiao Yu Tai and Nansha Islands and their adjacent sub¬
marine areas and are of particular relevance to the dispute
concerning claims to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
and their adjacent submarine areas which has resurged during
the writing of this work. It is considered that such
disputes justify a detailed re-examination of the fundamental
principles concerning modes of acquiring title to territory
and their effect on rights over contiguous submarine areas.
2. Discovery, Settlement or Use
2.1 Discovery
The term 'acquisition by discovery' has from earliest
times had an inherent ambiguity. Questions were asked
concerning whether 'discovery* required 'visual apprehension'
alone, or whether it required some additional act of physical
taking of possession or occupation. Gaius, for example,
declared that a hunter acquired nothing by seeing an animal,
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or even by so wounding it as to make its capture possible.
It becomes his only on actual capture."'" In actual practice,
the principal states engaged in explorations in the age of
discoveries founded their claims upon more than a mere
'visual apprehension'. Grotius for instance wrote as
follows:
For discovery consists, not in perceiving a thing
with the eye, but in actual seizure ... Thus the
philologists treat the expressions to discover'
(invenire) and 'to take possession of' (occupare)
as synonymous terms; and, according to all Latin
usage, we have 'discovered' only that which we have
acquired (adepti), the opposite process being that
of 'loss' (perdere), ... discovery suffices to create
a title to ownership only when possession is an
accompanying factor; that is to say, only in cases
where ... immovable property is marked off by
boundaries and placed under guard.
In contemporary international law, discovery of
territory does not confer a valid title unless followed by
occupation. In earlier times, however, mere discovery was
sufficient to create a good and complete title. Thus Spain
claimed the whole coast of America northward from the Gulf
of Mexico on the grounds of a possible discovery of Florida
in 1498 by Amerigo Vespucci and a certain landing on its
shores by Ponce de Leon in 1513. But the English claimed
1. Francis de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius, Pt. 1
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p.83, para. 67.
2. Hugo Grotius, De lure Praedae Commentarius, Vol. 1
English trans, by G.L. Williams 'and W.H. Zeydel
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), Ch. XII, pp. 220-21.
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the greater part of the same coast on account of the
discovery of Cape Breton or Newfoundland by John Cabot in
1497, and the exploration of the shore from Nova Scotia to
Cape Hatteras, by his son Sebastian in 1498, while a few
years afterwards France put in a similar claim based on the
discovery of what is now North Carolina in 1524 by Verrazzano,
Q
a Florentine in the service of the French king.""
In 1506 Pope Julius II confirmed the Treaty of
Tordesillas of 1494 by which Spain and Portugal modified
their boundary extending the right of Portugal to a line
4
drawn 370 leagues west of the Cape Verda Islands. In 1562
however, Queen Elizabeth I repudiated Portugal'*s claim to
sovereignty over lands which Portugal claimed merely on
the basis of discovery:
As she did not acknowledge the Spaniards to have any
title by donation of the Bishop of Rome, so she knew
no right they had to any places other than those they
were in actual possession of; for that their having
touched only here and there upon a coast, and given
names to a few rivers or capes, were such insignificant
things as could in no way entitle them to a propriety
further than in the parts^where they actually settled
and continued to inhabit.
3. Thomas Joseph Lawrence, A Handbook of Public International
Law, 10th ed., Rev. by P.H. Winfield (London, 1925), p.149.
4. The Treaty was ratified by Ferdinand and Isabella at
Arevalo on 2 July 1494, and by John II at Setubal on
5 September of the same year. Peter Fischer (ed),
A Collection of International Concessions and Related
Instruments, Vol. 5 (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publ.,
1977), pp. 23 ^t seq.
5. Camden *s Annals (1580). Translated as in Travers Twiss,
The Oregon Question Examined in Respect to Facts and
the Law of Nations (Longman, Brown, Green.and Longmans,
1846), p.151. See also L. Oppenheim (ed), The Collected
Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law
(Cambridge U„P., 1914), p.160.
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Evidently a controversy of this kind could not be long
maintained on the grounds of abstract and contradictory
principles, neither of which could be entirely ignored by
those who invoked the other.
Up to the sixteenth century, title by discovery - in
the sense of symbolic taking of possession rather than merely
sighting - was generally recognised. It should be emphasised
that, under the doctrine of inter-temporal law, the right
of states to land territories discovered in the sixteenth
century is determined not by the contemporary international
law but by the traditional international law as understood
at the time of the initial claim.
In the declaration of 4 June 1790, signed by the
Conde de Florida Blanca and sent to all the courts of Europe
during the Nootka Sound controversy, the King of Spain limited
his claim in the Pacific to 'the continent, islands and seas
which belong to His Majesty, so far as discoveries have been
made and secured to him by treaties and immemorial possession
6. In the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in
Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), the Court stated that
Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles must be
construed 'in the light of the law in force at the
time transfer of sovereignty tobk place*. PCIJ Ser. A,
No. 7, p. 41. Cf. Island of Palrnas Arbitration, II RIAA
p.839; Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53;
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports, 1953, p.56.
For a full statement of the doctrine, see Oral Argument
of Sir Lionel Heald (U.K.), ICJ Pleadings, The Minquiers
and Ecrehos Case, Vol. II, pp. 50 et seq. See also
T.O. Elias, 'The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law',
74 AJIL (1980), p.285, esp. at pp. 305-7.
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and uniformly acquiesced in, notwithstanding some infringements
by individuals who have been punished upon knowledge of their
offences1.^
A formal ceremony of taking of possession used to be
deemed sufficient to establish immediately a right of
sovereignty over, or a valid title to, areas so claimed
and did not require to be supplemented by the performance
of other acts, such as, for example, 'effective occupation'.
A right or title so acquired and established was deemed to
be sufficient against all subsequent claims set up in
opposition thereto unless, perhaps, transferred by conquest
or treaty, relinquished, abandoned, or successfully opposed
8
by continued occupation on the part of some other state.
During the nineteenth century it became clearly
established that neither mere sighting of new lands nor
symbolic takings of possession would suffice, unless
accompanied by some degree of actual occupation, if habitable.
The principle, repeatedly affirmed and applied by inter¬
national aribtral tribunals, was sought from Sir William
Scott who in The Fama declared:
7. Twiss, o£. cit., pp. 109, 163; The Collected Papers
of John Westlake on Public International Law, pp. 160-61.
8. A.S. Keller, O.J. Lissitzyn et aJ, Creation of Rights
of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts, 1400-1800 (New
York: Columbia U.P., 1938), pp. 148—49. See also F.A.F.
von der Heydte, 'Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and
Virtual Effectiveness in International Law', 29 AJIL
(1935), pp. 448-71.
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Even in newly-discovered countries, where a title
is meant to be established, for the first time,
some act of possession is usually done and proclaimed
as a notification of the fact.
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration,10 the USA based
its claim to the island, inter alia, on the acquisition,
through discovery, by Spain of a title to sovereignty over
the island. The Netherlands argued that the fact of discovery
by Spain was not proven, nor yet any other form of acquisition,
and even if Spain had at any moment had a title, such title
had been lost.^^ Moreover, the Netherlands, through the
Netherlands East India Company, had possessed and exercised
rights of sovereignty from 1677 onwards, arising from
conventions with the native princes of Sangi, which established
the suzerainty of the Netherlands over those princes'
territories including Palmas. Judge Huber held that the
records of the discovery of the Island of Palmas stated only
that an island was "seen", which apparently was the island
in dispute. No mention was made of any landing, and no signs
of talking of possession by Spain, or of administration, had
been shown until a very recent date. Even if the effect of
discovery by Spain was to be determined by the rules of
international law which were in force in the first quarter of
the sixteenth century, it was by no means certain that even at
9. 5 C. Rob. 115 [italics supplied].
10. II RIAA, p.829.
11. Ibid., p.837.
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that date mere discovery conferred territorial sovereignty,
as opposed to an inchoate title which would be completed
eventually by taking possession within a reasonable time.
The Netherlands title based on continuous and peaceful
display of state authority - an inchoate title for completing
the conditions of sovereignty - would prevail over an
inchoate title derived from discovery.
The actual decision on the facts of this case, as we
shall see in the next section, is of slight authority as an
application of the principle of effectiveness, still less of
prescription. It is authority in favour of the proposition
that a weak and doubtful 'inchoate title' may become
obsolete by reason of its 'ineffectiveness'; and for the
establishment of a 'hierarchy' of inchoate titles to guide
decision on the relative equities of the parties.
12
In the Clipperton Island Arbitration, the dispute
between Mexico and France related to a small guano island
in the Pacific Ocean. It had been annexed to France by a
proclamation of 1858. No further act of sovereignty was
shown by France or any other power until 1897. The island
was uninhabited; a guano concession had been granted in 1858,
but was not exploited. A protest was made by France to the
United States when it was found in November 1897 that three
American citizens were gathering guano on the island and had
raised the American flag; the United States disowned any
12. 26 AJIL (1932), p.390.
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claim to the island, and denied having granted any concession.
In the same year a Mexican detachment of officers and marines
landed on the island, raised the Mexican flag, and left
two days later. France claimed the island on the basis of
its annexation proclamation; Mexico based its claim by
succession to a precedent Spanish sovereignty, founded on
discovery. The question of the ownership of Clipperton
Island was referred by France and Mexico to the arbitration
of the King of Italy. The award rejected the Mexican claim
as successor to Spain; discovery and occupation of the
island took priority because the prior Spanish discovery
was not proved, and furthermore there was no proof of any
effective occupation by Mexico itself before 1858. Even
if Spain had discovered the island,
it would be necessary for Mexico to prove that Spain
not only had the right to incorporate the island in
her possessions, but also had effectively exercised
the right. That has not been demonstrated at all.
Mexico's claim based on an historic right is not
supported by anymanifestation of her sovereignty
over the island.
It is a settled law that in modern practice, no state
seems to have claimed that mere discovery, unaccompanied by
some act to show that possession was taken Qf the land, was
sufficient to found a title. Discovery per se is not a root
of title but merely creates a right that gives to the state
in whose service it was made an inchoate title, which acts
13. 26 AJIL (1932), p.390.
206.
as a temporary bar to occupation by another state for such
a period as is reasonably sufficient to allow for effective
occupation of the discovered territory. Discovery must be
followed by an act of possession, also by acts amounting to
a notification of the claims to other states. A concealed
discovery will not prevent others. In other words, discovery
should be accompanied or followed up by a claim or assertion
of sovereignty on the basis of the discovery, either by the
discoverer himself, if empowered or commissioned to do so,
or by his government, either separately or by way of
ratification of the discoverer's act.
2.2 Settlement or Use '
Two problems, however, are raised by the possible
acquisition of uninhabited territory by an existing state:
first, what is the geographical extent of the right of
appropriation - is it, in particular, dependent on and
limited to the area which is in fact settled? Secondly,
are sparsely inhabited areas to be assimilated to uninhabited
areas for the prupose of appropriation?
For Vattel, the answer to the first question was that
the acquisition of both ownership and sovereignty was
14
conditional on either 'settlement' or 'use'. He states:
14. Settlement, accordingly, in a country or in the case of a
Nation corresponds to the continuing detention of a
thing in the case of an individual, and the Natural Right
of a Nation founded on Settlement corresponds to the
Natural Right of an individual founded on Possession.
Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as
Independent Political Communities, On the Right and
Duties of Nations in Time of Peace (Oxford U.P. MDCCCLXI),
p.161, para. 109; Title by settlement is in itself an
imperfect/
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[I]t is questioned whether a Nation can thus appropriate
by the mere act of taking possession, lands which it
does not really occupy, and which are more extensive
than it can inhabit or cultivate. It is not difficult
to decide that such a claim would be absolutely contrary
to the natural law, and would conflict with the designs
of nature, which destines the earth for the needs of
all mankind, and only confers upon individual Nations
the right to appropriate territory so far as they can
make use of it, and not merely to hold it against
others who may wish to profit by it. Hence the Law
of Nations will only recognise the ownership and
sovereignty of a Nation over unoccupied lands when the
Nation is in actual occupation of them, when it forms a
settlement upon them, or makes some actual use of them.
In fact, when explorers have discovered uninhabited
lands through which the explorers of other Nations had
passed, leaving some sign of their having taken
possession, they have no more troubled themselves over
such empty forms than over the regulations of Popes,
who divided a large part of the between the
crowns and Castile and Portugal.
imperfect title, and its validity will be conditional
upon the territory being vacant at the time of the
settlement, either as never having been occupied, or
as having been abandoned by the previous occupant.
For further discussion, see idem, The Oregon Question
Examined in Respect to Facts and the Law of Nations
Ch. IX, p.168. It is noteworthy that the presumption
of law will always be in favour of a title by settlement
rather than by discovery. Cf. Justin. Institut. Lib.
IV. Tit. 15, para. 4. Lawson, o£. cit., Ch. XII, p.127;
Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property, 11th ed.,
Edited by E.H. Burn (London: Butterworths, 1972),
pp. 70 ejt seq; Cf. Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B
No. 53.
E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, English trans, by
C.G. Fenwick (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1916),
Bk. I, Ch. XVIII, p.85, para. 208 [italics added].
Cf. Bk. II, Ch. VIII, pp. 138-39, para. 83. Christian
Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum
(1764; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), Cap. Ill,
para. 291. For Papal Grants, see A Collection of
International Concessions and Related Instruments,
Vol. 5, p.23. See above, 2.1.
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Further, Vattel envisaged two primary means of
acquiring territory: the acquisition of dominium and
imperium over unoccupied territory by settlement: and the
establishment of a state by the inhabitants of a territory.
The first means finds its justification in the dictum that:
All men have an equal right to things which have not
yet come into the possession of anyone, and these ^
things belong to the person who first takes possession.
It seems necessary to point out that the first rule
of the acquisition of title1' by occupation is the require-
18
ment that territory must be terra nullius; and territory
is in such cases acquired simultaneously with possession.
Quod enim nullius est, id ratione naturali occupandi conceditur.
16. Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Bk. I, Ch. XVIII, p.84,
para. 207. 'When a Nation takes possession of a country
which belongs to no one, it is considered as acquiring
sovereignty over it as well as ownership', see ibid.,
para. 205. The acquisition of sovereignty, therefore,
attends as a necessary consequence upon the establishment
of a nation in a country. Cf. ibid., Bk. I, Ch. XX, p.97,
para. 250.
17. Title is a shorthand term used to denote the fact which,
if proved, will enable a plaintiff to recover possession
or a defendant to retain possession of a thing.
18. It may be in this condition either because no one has
ever appropriated it or because, though once appropriated,
it has subsequently been abandoned. In the Western Sahara
(Advisory Opinion) Case, the Court said that the expression
terra nullius was a legal term of art employed in connection
with 'occupation' as one of the accepted legal methods of
acquiring sovereignty over territory. ICJ Reports, 1975,
pp. 38-39, para. 79.
19. That which is no-one's is granted to the occupant by
natural right. See Dig. L. XLI. Tit. I, para. 3;
Just. Inst. Lib. II, Tit. I, para. 12. Sir William Scott
held in The Fama (1804) 5 C Robinson 114 that 'all
corporeal property depends very much upon occupancy.
With respect to the origin of property, this is the
sole foundation, Quod nullius est ratione naturali
occupandi id conceditur'.
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The question of whether a territory is terra nulllus
arises as a practical issue when a state proclaims its
sovereignty over it by an act of occupation. If such an act
is challenged by another state, the validity or invalidity
of the occupation is determined by the character of the
territory in question as terra nullius. This expression
describes a territory over which no state exercises its
sovereignty and is regarded as open to acquisition by any
20
state. For example, in the Eastern Greenland Case, the
PCIJ rejected the Norwegian contention that Eastern Greenland
was terra nullius; on the strength of this finding it decided
that the declaration of occupation promulgated by the
Norwegian Government, and any steps taken in this respect,
were 'accordingly unlawful and invalid'.
Secondly, it must be remembered that title by discovery
is only an inchoate title which is neither recognised by Roman
21
law nor has a place in the systems of Grotius or Vattel.
Title by discovery is different from title by settlement. A
title by a later settlement may be set up against a title by
an earlier settlement, even where this has been formed by the
first occupant, if the earlier settlement can be shown to have
22
been abandoned. However, there can be no second discovery




PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.75. See below, 3.3.3.
Justinian's Institutes, Lib. II, Tit. I.
For this notion see below, Ch. 4.
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set up against a title by first discovery. Thirdly,
'title by settlement' is distinct from 'title by discovery'
and 'title by occupation'. In this connection, no second
discovery and occupancy can take place, whereas a series of
settlements may have been made successively and each of them
in its turn abandoned, and the last settlements may, under
certain circumstances, constitute" an exclusive title.
Fourthly, if discovery were followed by 'use* or 'settlement',
it would clearly constitute a perfect title; but a title
by 'use' or 'settlement' when not combined with a title by
24
discovery is in itself imperfect.
Uninhabited and uncultivated areas within the territory
of a state were, nevertheless, regarded by states in general
as included within its 'ownership* and 'sovereignty':
23. 'A second-comer', Vattel writes, 'who has an equal right,
may not exercise it to the impairment of mine [the first-
comer], and in stopping me by his arrival he would be
claiming a greater right than mine [the first-comer]
and violating the law of equality'. Le Droit des Gens
op. cit., Bk. I, Ch. XX, p.97, para. 250. Wolff also
explains this reason very clearly. Christian Wolff,
Institutes du Droit de la Nature et des Gens (Leide,
Chez Elie Luzac, MDCCLXXII), p.82, para. CCIII:
Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined, Ch. VIII, p.156;
idem, The Law of Nations, p.161, para. 110.
24. See, e.g. Clipperton Island Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1105;
Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53. Although
these cases do not expressly indicate that discovery must
necessarily be followed by effective occupation to render
a claim to title valid, there can be no doubt that
occupation is as clear evidence of ownership as can be
manifested. Cf. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA,
p.830. See generally, J.B. Moore, A Digest of International
Law, Vol. I (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1906),
p.258; Westlake, o£. cit., Part I, pp. 96-98, 101-5;
The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public Inter¬
national Law, pp. 158-66; W.E. Hall, A Treatise on
International Law, 8th ed. edited by A. Higgins (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 126-27.
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Whatever is included in its territory belongs to a
Nation, and no one else may dispose of such property
unless the Nation has transferred its rights; if it
has left certain districts wild and untitled, they
may not be taken possession of at will without its
permission. * Although it may not be making actual use
of them, these districts belong to it, and it has an
interest in keeping them for future use; also it need
render account to no one of the manner in which it
employs its property. Nevertheless ... no Nation may
lawfully appropriate an extent of territory entirely
disproportionate to its needs, and thus restrict the
opportunely of settlement and sustenance for other
Nations.
In dealing with the problem of partially inhabited
areas, Vattel took the view that at least such areas as were
needed, inhabited and cultivated - or were appropriate to
satisfy a potential need - might properly be appropriated
26 . .
by other nations. Conquest consists in the appropriation
of the property, and in the acquisition of territory.
Vattel indeed distinguished the conquest of the civilized
as from the cultivated areas of the New World:
While the conquest of the civilized Empires of Peru
and Mexico was a notorious usurpation, the establishment
of various colonies upon the continent of North America
might, if done within just limits, have been entirely
lawful. The peoples of those vast tracts of^and
rather roamed over them than inhabited them.
25. Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Bk. II, Ch. VIII, p.140,
para. 86.
26. Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. XVIII, p.85, para. 209. Cf. Art. 35
of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin of 1885
recognised 'the obligation to insure the establishment
of authority in the regions occupied by [the signatory
States] on the coasts of the African Continent sufficient
to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be,
freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions
agreed upon'. Africa No. 3 (1886) C. 4739.
27. Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Bk. I, Ch. VII, pp. 37-38,
para. 81.
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Now it is manifest that Grotius and Vattel deal in the
passages quoted with a number of different situations,
justifications for attributing certain areas to the dominium
or imperium (or both), or - in the terminology adopted by
later writers - 'modes of acquiring territory', which cannot
all be brought under the rubric of the mode of acquiring
territory described as 'occupation'. The extent of the
area 'occupied' in law is determined by actual 'settlement'
or 'use'. But to this are normally to be added in the case
of a state, further areas, the bounds of which are determined
by criteria of geographical unity, security, potential value
and the extent of the effective control - imperium or
soverainete or empire of the state. It is therefore an
error - which is commonly committed by most writers on
territory - to suppose that the classical writers on inter- •
national law slavishly adopted in discussing the acquisition
of state territory the analogies of Roman private law. And
it would clearly be a mistake to subsume, as later writers
have been want to do, those latter criteria (other than
settlement and use) into a category of 'constructive'
occupation or possession. In consequence, Vattel considered
that:
When ... a Nation finds a country uninhabited and
without an owner, it may lawfully take possession
of it, and after it has given sufficient signs of its
intention in this respect, it may not be deprived of
it by another Nation. In this way navigators setting
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upon voyages of discovery and bearing with them a
commission from their sovereign, when coming across
islands or other uninhabited lands, have taken
possession of them in the name of their Nation; and
this title has usually been respected,^grovided actual
possession has followed shortly after.
According to this statement, the act of discovery must be
sanctioned by a commission from the sovereign, and the will
of a nation to take possession must be made known sufficiently
29
by its agent. That this doctrine still applies is
evidenced by the fact that the Island of Rockall off the
west coast of the United Kingdom was formally taken in the
name of Her Majesty on 18 September 1955 in pursuance of a
Royal Warrant dated 14 September 1955 addressed to the
Captain of Her Majesty's ship "Vidal". In 1972, the Island
of Rockall Act was promulgated and Rockall was incorporated
30
into the United Kingdom as part of the County of Inverness.
28. Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. XVIII, p.84, para. 207. [italics
added]. Mere discovery is no longer a sufficient
basis for the acquisition of state territory. It
must be followed by some act of appropriation amounting
to assertion of intent to hold the territory. See,
e.g., Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.831;
Clipperton Island Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1105;
Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53.
See above, 2.1.
29. These claims rested in part on ancient Roman legal
theories, asserting that to obtain a right of possession
required both 'a bodily act and a mental attitude'.
The mental attitude was the intention to possess; the
bodily act was prehensile. John Westlake, International
Law, Part I (Cambridge U.P., 1910), pp. 97-98.
Cf. Le Droit des Gens, Bk. I, Ch. XVIII, p.85, para. 208.
30. The Island of Rockall Act 1972 (C.2.)
That the acts should be recognised by international
law, and be held sufficient to make known formally the will
of a state to avail itself of a discovery, has been confirmed
by Lord Stowell in The Fama. He said that 'where a title
is meant to be established for the first time, some act of
possession is usually done and proclaimed as a notification
31
of fact'. In this connection, notification is to be
32
understood in the general sense of making known, and not
in the special sense of an express communication to other
states. For example, Article XXXIV of the General Act of
the Conference of Berlin of 1855 provided:
31. (1804) 5C. Robinson 115. 'A proclamation', as
Lauterpacht rightly asserted, 'is a means by which
a title, claimed or acquired, is announced. It is
not a source of a title nor a means of acquiring
it'. See H. Lauterpacht 'Sovereignty over Submarine
Areas', 27 BYIL (1950), p.418.
32. The notification should describe the geographical
situation and the boundaries of the occupied territories.
In the Declaration of the Institute de Droit International
in 1888, it provides: "La notification officielle de
la prise de possession ... La notification de la prise
de possession se fait, soit par la publication, dans
la forme qui, dans chaque Etat, est en usage pour la
notification des actes officiels, soit par la voie
diplomatique. Elle contiendra la determination
approximative des limites du territoire occupe".
See Resolutions de L'Institute de Droit International
1873-1956, publie par Hans Wehberg (Bale: Editions
juridiques et sociologiques S.A., 1957), p.68. Gaston
Jeze, Etude Theorique et Pratique sur L'Occupation
comme mode d'acquerir les Territories en Droit
International (Paris: V. Giard & E. Briere, 1896),
pp. 270-96.
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Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a
tract of land on the coasts of the African Continent
outside of its present possessions, or which, being
hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them,
as well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate
there, shall accompany the respective act with a
notification thereof addressed to the other Signatory
Powers of the present Act, in order to enable theg^
if need be, to make good any claims of their own.
The words of this article show that it does not require
notification to be given to third parties. Nevertheless,
notifications had in fact been given by some parties to the
Act to a third party, the United States. By a despatch of
5 September 1885, M. Roustan informed Mr. Bayard of the
34
annexation of Quatchis by France. And by another despatch
of 2 August 1888, Baron de Fava informed Mr. Bayard of the
35
establishment of an Italian Protectorate over Zoula. Both
these despatches purported to be in conformity with the
above Article XXXIV of the General Act, and there was no
33. Africa, No. 3 (1886). C. 4739. Roxburgh writes in
1917 that this Act 'has become, or will become, a
rule of customary law'. See R.F. Roxburgh, International
Conventions and Third States (London: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1917), p.89.
34. U.S.F.R. (1885), p.385.
35. Ibid., (1888), Part II, p.1057. In the Clipperton
Island Arbitration, Lieutenant Victor Le Coat de
Keriveguen of the French Navy officially notified
the Consulate of France at Honolulu that he had
proclaimed French sovereignty over the island. The
Consulate then informed the Government of Hawaii of
this. Later, the same Consulate published in English
in the journal The Polynesian, of Honolulu, on 8
December 1858, the declaration by which French
sovereignty over Clipperton had already been proclaimed.
26 AJIL (1932), p.391.
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suggestion in them that they were sent by courtesy, and not
under conviction of legal necessity. Upon this evidence,
it was concluded by Roxburgh that a usage was growing up
that all members of the international community should be
notified of an occupation, wherever made. However, this
usage was not then universal, and was not yet a custom,
because the conviction of legal necessity was still absent.
At present, it is widely accepted that this usage is now
crystallised as a customary law.
What has been deemed sufficient, to make known the
intention of appropriating the sovereignty, has naturally
37
varied with the circumstances of different times. It is
widely accepted by the practice of states that the act of
possession is landing, hoisting the flags, and proclaiming
the significance of these acts. These ceremonies were
generally regarded as being wholly sufficient in themselves
36. Roxburgh, o£. cit., p.91. Chief Justice Marshall of the
United States Supreme Court held in the United States v.
Percheman (1833) 7 Peters 51 that 'the usage of nations
becomes law and that which is an established rule of
practice as a rule of law'. See also same Court in
The Paquete Habana, The Lola (1900) 175 U.S. 677, 700.
37. Bynkershoek, who was opposed to the continuance of
proprietary right from discovery, unless corporal
possession was maintained, subsequently qualified his
view. Cornelius von Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris
Dessertatio (1774 rpt.; New York: Oxford U.P., 1923),
C.l, p.353; Wolff also observes that the intention
to take possession at the time of discovery must be
declared. See Institutes du Droit de la Nature et
des Gens, op. cit., para. CCXIII.
217.
38
to establish sovereignty over the claimed land. It was
never thought that a discovery might be kept secret and
benefit of it retained. Mere proclamation and unilateral
declaration, needless to say, can amount to no more than
•inchoate titles', requiring some measure of occupation to
perfect them.
In the following territorial adjudications there are
dicta to the effect that the •exercise of governmental
functions' is the most appropriate criterion for determining
sovereignty in case of dispute. Rather than providing suppo
however, these cases demonstrate the limitations of this
criterion. For few, if any, governmental functions had
been exercised by any state in the disputed areas. Not
unnaturally, those territorial disputes referred to inter¬
national adjudication concern remote and sparsely populated
or uninhabited areas in which opportunity for exercising
governmental functions would be small. These cases indicate
therefore, a serious obstacle to the application of
effective occupation in international adjudication.
39
In the Island of Falmas Arbitration the island in
dispute was inhabited by native tribes and the question
concerned whether settlement was necessary to effective
38. The formal ceremony of taking of possession, the
symbolic act, was generally regarded as being wholly
sufficient per se to establish immediately a right
of sovereignty over, or a valid title to, areas so
claimed and did not require to be supplemented by
the performance of other acts, such as, for example,
'Effective offupation'. See Keller, Lissitzyn et al,
op.cit., pp. 148-49.
39. II RIAA, p.829.
218.
occupation was not precisely raised.
Normally occupation would require the setting up of
some form of administration in a territory, and not simply
the expression of an animus occupandi as we have discussed.
In practice, the degree of state activity required to confer
a valid title would depend much upon the local circumstances
of each territory. In the case of uninhabited territory,
the establishment of a local administration is not always
necessary. International tribunals, as will be noted in
the following cases, may be satisfied with very little
state activity provided the other state could not make out
a superior claim.
40
In the Clipperton Island Arbitration, the arbitrator
found that a single French landing on that uninhabited island
in 1858, coupled with a ceremony on board a French naval vessel
near the island and publication of a notice in a Hawaiian
newspaper, sufficed to give France title by occupation to
an island discovered in 1705 by an English adventurer,
Captain Clipperton, though there was no evidence of any
subsequent French steps prior to an 1897 inquiry by France
regarding the conduct of three persons who were exploiting
guano for an American company and who raised the American
flag on the approach of a French vessel. The award stated:
40. II RIAA, p.1108; 134 BFSP, p.842; 26 AJIL (1932), p.390;
27 ibid., (1933), p.130; 29 ibid., (1935), p.463.
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This taking of possession consists in the act, or
series of acts, by which the occupying state reduces
to its possession the territory in question and takes
steps to exercise authority there. In ordinary cases
this only takes place when the state establishes in
the territory itself an organisation capable of making
its law respected ... [I]f a territory, by virtue of
the fact that it was completely uninhabited, is, from
the first moment when the occupying state makes its
appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed
disposition of that state, from that moment the taking
of possession must be considered as accomplished,
and the occupation is thereby completed.
It is indubitable that an administration coupled with
physical and continuing occupation was not required as a
condition of possession, since the island was completely
uninhabited.
In the Eastern Greenland Case the need for settlement
to support effective occupation was directly raised and
as directly discounted by the Court. The Court acted on
the principle that the true tests of sovereignty by occupation
are the intention and will to act as sovereign, animus
occupandi; and some actual exercise or display of sovereignty,
42
corpus occupandi. The award in the Clipperton Island
Arbitration was regarded as in complete harmony with the
other cases in holding that the requisites of effective
occupation depend on the circumstances of the territory and
that settlement or local administration is not necessarily
43
required in the case of uninhabited territory. It is enough
41. 26 AJIL (1932), p.390.
42. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46.
43. II RIAA, p.1106.
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if the state displays its function in a manner corresponding
to the circumstances of the territory, assumes the
responsibility to exercise local administration, and does
so in fact as and when the occasion demands.
Now there is no doubt that, in certain circumstances,
a right of sovereignty may be recognised in the absence of
actual control of territory. A state does net and cannot
manifest governmental functions at every part of its
Territory in equal measure, or in some parts at all. It
has always been accepted that the sovereignty of the state
extends to uninhabited and uncultivated lands within its
borders. If such territories are on, as distinct from
within, its perimeter, then it is probable that sovereignty
depends upon recognition by neighbouring states and the
existence of a boundary delimited by custom or treaty.
That is, a unilateral claim to sovereignty unaccompanied by
the exercise of governmental functions over an area dis¬
proportionate to the area under de facto settlement and
control may be treated as ineffective in international law.
Policy may, however, lead to its recognition.
It may, moreover, be accepted that the 'natural
boundaries' of territory claimed may set the limits to
sovereignty irrespective of any manifestations of governmental
control. For example, in the case of Eastern Greenland, the
PCIJ accepted a Danish claim to sovereignty over the whole
of Greenland on the basis of hardly more than evidence of
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an intention manifested in the terms of Danish legislation
44
to claim sovereignty. It has been recognised in this case
as well as in the Clipperton Island Arbitration that in
thinly populated or uninhabited areas very little actual
exercise of sovereign rights might be necessary in the
absence of any competition.
In the Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) Case, the
Moroccan representatives argued that Morocco had been the
immemorial possessor of the territory for centuries, actual
authority having been exercised in accordance with the
principles laid down in the Eastern Greenland Case in respect
of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated
or unsettled countries. Morocco had invoked alleged acts
of internal display of Moroccan authority and alleged that
Western Sahara had always been linked to the interior of
Morocco by common ethnological, cultural and religious ties.
In the view of the Court, however, the information and
arguments invoked by Morocco could not be considered as
disposing of the difficulties in the way of its claim to have
45
exercised effectively sovereignty over Western Sahara.
44. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22. The total area of Greenland
is 2,175,600 square kilometres; 5/6 of this area is
covered by permanent 'Inland Ice', and parts only of
the western coast had been settled. For details, see
Isi Foighel, 'Home Rule in Greenland 1979', 48 Nordisk
Tideskrift for International Ret (1979), p.4; Cf. The
Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No. 577 (29 November 1978),
ibid., p.10.
45. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.3, at pp. 45-47, paras. 99-103.
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Finally, in connection with this basis of claim to
territory it must be noted that rivers, streams, lakes and
portions of the sea were also, without necessarily having
regard to 'settlement' or 'use', generally regarded either
as geographically forming an integral part of national
46
territory, as adjuncts, or as natural boundaries.
The question naturally arises from the preceding
paragraph, how much is a 'portion' of the sea? To what
extent can a state determine the baseline of its territorial
waters? Is there any geographical limit on unilateral
claims? It will be remembered that water is held to be
appurtenant to land, not land to water. When the action
of waters adds to the land or when islands are formed off
the coast of a state, whether by alluvium or from any other
cause, they are regarded as portions of the territory.
The baseline must, of course, be 'the coast' and the
coast's extent is a geographical fact, which can hardly be
influenced by laws and decrees. That in certain cases the
baseline is composed of the outer limits of areas of water
instead of land areas is due to the fact that these areas of
water are internal waters, and as such are included in the
land area as parts thereof, and their outer limits are
46. When a Nation takes possession of a country with the
intent to settle there, its jurisdiction extends over
all that is included within the territory - land, lakes,
rivers, etc. See Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Bk.I,
Ch. XXII, p.102, para. 266.
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constituent parts of the coastline. The state cannot change
the coast's direction by decree when it consists of a
relatively straight and level land contour. Can it then
change the coastline when internal waters are included
therein? The Coast is by definition that place where the
land and the sea meet, and no sta.te is capable of reproducing
the feat that was performed on the third day of creation,
when the land and the sea were separated. Nor can it, by
issuing ordinances, transform the open sea into internal
waters, because it cannot alter geography. The contour
of the land can be changed by constructing, for example,
a pier for a port or by reclaiming land from the sea, but
otherwise it appears that a coast's extent can only be
changed as a result of natural events, of gradual accretion
and sinking, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, etc.
Due to the unsatisfactory and uncertain nature of the
lex lata, a fresh conflict of interests, not provided for
in the 1958 Geneva Conventions, has arisen and states demand
the right to protect their food and energy, control their
immigration and safeguard their defence. Obviously, this
cannot be done with a concept of the territorial sea which
has not evolved very far from the original idea of a cannon
shot. The conventions are being broken more frequently now
that recent advances in technology have empowered the
industrial states to better exploit the resources of the sea.
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State practice, as will be seen in Chapter 5, seems to
assert the principle of reasonableness, that extensions of
47
established limits require the concurrence of other states.
48
In the Beagle Channel Arbitration, the record revealed
that until 1892 there were no significant acts of jurisdiction
specifically concerning three small islands in the Beagle
Channel. This was explained by Chile on the ground that
owing to the sparseness of the population and the character
of the region, no exercise of authority on the islands was
called for.
With regard to the question of sovereignty over the
islands in the Channel, the two different approaches adopted
by the parties, i.e. the 'maritime' (Argentina) and the
'territorial' (Chile) appeared to the Tribunal to lead to
49
much the same thing. The Tribunal declared that:
47. See e.g., the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports
1951, p.116; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland)
Ibid., 1973, p.3 per Fitzmaurice; Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Merits) Case, ibid., 1974, p.3 per Waldock.
48. Award of Her Britannic Majesty's Government pursuant to
the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) of a
Controversy between the Argentine Republic and the
Republic of Chile concerning the region of the Beagle
Channel (London: HMSO, 1977), p.101, para. 166(a).
49. Recently, the dispute is being negotiated under Papal
mediation in the Vatican, but Argentina has so far failed
to follow Chile in accepting the Pope's arbitration
proposals made in December 1980. These not only gave
Chile the three islands but also recommended that the
two countries should undertake joint development of the
area's natural resources. Argentina would not accept
all this. It would insist on Chile recognising 'the
'bioceanic principle', under which Chile takes the
Southern Pacific, but Argentina the Atlantic. John
Retti,"'Junta' may accept Chile Beagle claim",
The Guardian, 31 March 1982, p.2; idem, "Chile denies
settlement claims on Beagle Channel", ibid., 2 June
1982, p.2.
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Title to territory automatically involves jurisdiction
over the appurtenant waters and continental shelf and
adjacent submarine areas ... 'Maritime jurisdiction'
does not exist as a separate concept divorced from
dependence on territorial jurisdiction. To draw a
boundary between the maritime jurisdiction of states,
involves first attributing to them, or recognising as
being theirs, the title over the territories that
generate such jurisdiction. But this once done, the
maritime jurisdiction will follow from general
principles of law which ... will enter^jnto the
determination of the boundary line ...
Thus, the question would appear to involve a boundary dispute
concerning title to territory rather than the determination
of the course of a maritime boundary between neighbouring
states. Different criteria may apply in the case of the
settlement of land boundary disputes on the one hand and
maritime boundary disputes on the other. As will be seen,
in the former case regard would normally be given to the
factors of discovery, settlement, use, occupation and acts
of sovereignty encompassing administrative activities and
other manifestations sometimes included in the modes of
'effective occupation' and 'prescription'. In the case of
maritime boundaries, however, geographical factors such as
continuity and contiguity of territory; convenient boundary
lines; economic considerations; security and history, assume
greater importance, especially in the area of resource
utilisation. It may be noticed that where the boundary in
dispute is that between two states only, such factors will
be of less significance than would otherwise be the case.
50. Beagle Channel Award, p.3, para. 6 [italics added].
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As has already been mentioned, sea areas are, in
general, however, neither inhabited nor habitable, and thus
are not, within the traditional terminology of territorial
acquisition, subject to effective occupation. States rights
over them must therefore be based on other grounds, which
can include constructive inclusion in the mainland territory,
as above, or reference to analyses which confer rights less
than sovereignty, or other grounds all of which are considered
later in this work. Clearly uncertainty concerning the amount
of territory that can be included in a claim to title, whether
land or submarine territory, makes subsequent delimitation
of maritime boundaries difficult, particularly once the
existence of submarine mineral resources is established.
3. Occupation and Effective Occupation
3.1 Occupation
As a legal term, 'occupation' has not always received
51
a precise and technical meaning. The word 'occupation', as
applied to the acquisition of a territory not yet under a
52
sovereign, is derived from the Latin occupatio, which means
51. Lindley pointed out that the method of acquiring territory
in Africa was referred to generally as 'occupation*, the
term was used with a broad meaning equivalent to 'acquisition'
or 'appropriation', and was not confined to occupation in
the strict sense which applies only to territorium nullius.
M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward
Territory in International Law (New York: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1926), p.34. Cf. Ch. Salomon, L'Occupation des
territoires sans maitre (Paris: A. Giard, 1889).
52. The act of taking possession of a thing belonging to no
one, res nullius, but capable of being owned. J.A.C.
Thomas, The Institutes of Justinian (Amsterdam: North-
Holland Publ., 1975), pp. 76-77.
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appropriation of a thing which belongs to no one, res nullius,
but capable of being owned. In international law, occupation
means the appropriation of sovereignty, not of soil; the way
53
in which sovereignty may be acquired over terra nullius,
the right to take such action being open to all states. A
state may acquire title to territory (or sovereignty over
territory) by occupation. By occupation a state under
contemporary international law acquires sovereignty only
over the territory of which it has taken 'effective possession'.
3.2 Effective occupation
Effective occupation involves some course of adminis¬
trative action of a permanent or frequently repeated
character, where it is humanly possible, a permanent
54
settlement.
The requirement that a nation claiming territory must
show physical possession to make good its title is a principle
that has been recognised by legal authorities from the
earliest times.
53. The acquisition by a state of terra nullius has been
much influenced by the Roman law. For example, the
first rule of rightful acquisition is, that a person
may take possession of a thing which has no owner;
the second rule is, that a person may acquire rightful
possession of a thing of which the previous owner has
renounced possession. See Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli
ac Pacis, Vol. II, English trans, by Francis W. Kelsey
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), Bk. II, Ch. Ill,
Sec. 1, p.206; Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Bk. I,
Ch. XVIII, p.84, para. 207.
54. See above, 2.2.
55. Inst. 2, 1, 12. Bartolus de Saxoferratio says in'his
treatise De Insulis that 'whatever is occupied belongs
to the occupant'.
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The view that the delimitation of territorial sovereignty
is governed by the criterion of the area effectively occupied
has been a commonplace among writers on international law from
Vattel to the present day. For Vattel, as has been seen,
in principle the boundaries of state territory were determined
by occupation, settlement and use, and it was indeed by
application of these criteria that he justified the
56
appropriation of North America by the European Powers.
Nevertheless, it has been equally commonplace among
writers for them to modify the criteria of occupation,
settlement and use to meet particular problems - although
such modifications and exceptions have not usually been
treated as such, nor have they been cast down as the
fundamental principle. Thus, for example, both Grotius and
Vattel explicitly conceded that uncultivated or uncultivable
areas within the territory of a state were no less subject to
its sovereignty: 'rivers, lakes, ponds, forests, and rugged
57
mountains' together with 'deserted and unproductive soil'.
But the major inroads into the principle of 'effective
occupation' as a criterion for the delimitation of boundaries
have been caused by the considerations of potential settlement
and use, security, and natural boundaries, or natural
geographical units.
56. Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Bk. I, Ch. XVIII, pp. 84-86,
207-9.
57. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, op. cit., Bk. II, Ch. II, Sec. IV,
pp. 191-92.
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Increasing competition for land areas available for
colonisation and commercial exploitation, and perhaps higher
standards of administrative responsibility, in the nineteenth
century were manifested in the theoretical requirement of a
higher level of activity in order to acquire sovereignty:
58
i.e. that occupation must be 'effective'. In other words,
a state must take effective possession of a territory when
it wants to occupy it; bring the territory under its control
and administration, and be willing to maintain order,
59
organisation, and administration of justice.
'Effective occupation' in the modern sense, is a term
denoting not physical settlement but the actual, continuous,
and peaceful display of the functions of a state. Judge Huber
in the Island of Palmas Arbitration held that the test of
sovereignty by occupation is the actual, continuous, and
peaceful display of state functions with respect to the
60
territory in dispute. Moreover, the PCIJ in the Eastern
58. Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.829. See
below, 3.3.1.1
59. Gustaw Smedal, Acquisition of Sovereignty over Polar
Areas, English trans, from Norwegian by Chr. Meyer
(Oslo: A.W. Broggers, 1931), p.32.
60. II RIAA, p.829. Titles of acquisition of territorial
sovereignty in present-day international law is, inter
alia, based on an act of effective apprehension.
ibid., p.839. Customary international law laid down
the principle that occupation, to constitute a claim
to territorial sovereignty, must be effective, that is,
offer certain guarantees to other states and their
nationals. ibid., p.846.
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Greenland Case acted on the principle that the true tests
of sovereignty by occupation are the 'intention and will
to act as sovereign', 'some actual exercise or display of
sovereignty'. The court did not in fact use the phrase
•effective occupation' but referred to a title derived from
'continued display of authority' involving two elements,
61
namely, animus occupandi and corpus occupandi. The first
element seems to mean no more than that there must be
positive evidence of the pretensions of a particular state
to be the sovereign of the territory. The evidence may
consist either of proclaimed assertions of title or acts of
sovereignty. The second element further involves an actual
exercise or display of sovereignty. It is recognised that
these two elements need not be simultaneous, and that either
may precede the other, provided that the other element is
realised within a reasonable time. Thus the fundamental rule
of acquisition of territorial sovereignty by occupation is
the double requirement of animus and corpus. From Grotius,
Vattel and Bynkershoek, through the long series of disputes
61. PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46. In the Venezuela-
British Guiana Arbitration, Venezuela demended that the
requirements of corpus and animus should be strictly
applied to the claims of the Netherlands and Great
Britain as conflicting with their good and original
title. See Proceedings (Paris edition, 1899), Vol. ix,
pp. 2599, 2603.
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following the discoveries of the new world, to the Berlin
Declaration of 1885, which, in Articles 34 and 35, gave a
62
modern formulation to the requirement of corpus and animus,
it is the same principle which ultimately asserts itself
both in theory and in practice of original acquisition of
territory.
3.3 Decisions of International Judicial and Arbitral
Tribunals
The four major international judicial and arbitral
awards which deal explicitly with the concept of 'occupation'
63
are those in the Brazil-British Guiana Boundary, Clipperton
Island,Minquiers and Ecrehos^ and Western Sahara (Advisory
66
Opinion) Cases. In the first award, the Brazil-British
Guiana Boundary Arbitration, the arbitrator examined the
requirements for the occupation of territory by occupation,
but held that they had not been fulfilled by either party
in the greater part of the disputed area. He made an award,
62. Africa No. 3 (1886), C. 4739. The principle of
effectiveness is firmly embedded in contemporary
international law, and the writers use the term
corpus and animus for the purpose of explaining the
rules of occupation as a title of acquisition of
territorial sovereignty. See H. Lauterpacht, Private
Law Sources and Analogies of International Law
(Archon Books, 1970), p.103. See above, Ch. 2.
63. [1904] XI RIAA, p.11.
64. [1931] 26 AJIL (1932), p.390; II RIAA, p.1105.
65. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47.
66. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.3.
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however, which was based in principle on an equal division
of the territory and in detail on a natural and convenient
boundary. The Clipperton Island award is, without extensive
discussion of the principles of law involved, substantially
based on the occupation of uninhabited island by France.
The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case is however somewhat different
from the Clipperton Island Arbitration which concerned the
acquisition of sovereignty over res nullius; the ICJ found
sovereignty lay with the exercise of legislative authority,
jurisdiction and administration. In the Western Sahara Case,
the Court described occupation as one of the accepted legal
methods of acquiring sovereignty over territory. It
considered the existence of terra nullius to be the cardinal
condition for a valid 'occupation'.
From the ratio decidendi and dicta of such previous
cases, the rules relating to effective occupation have been
settled. To establish an effective occupation, a state must
show both intention and acts of sovereignty, sufficient to
confer a valid title to sovereignty, and actual, peaceful
and continuous display of sovereignty. It is convenient
to examine these rules in turn.
3.3.1 Intention and Acts of Sovereignty
3.3.1.1 The Brazil-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration
The boundary dispute between British Guiana and Brazil
was submitted to Victor Emmanuel, the King of Italy, for
arbitration. The tribunal stated that the occupation cannot
be held to be carried out except by effective, uninterrupted
and permanent possession being taken in the name of the
state and that a simple affirmation of rights of sovereignty
or a manifest intention to render the occupation effective
cannot suffice.^7
3.3.1.2 Island of Palmas Arbitration
68
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, sovereignty over
this island in the Pacific was disputed between the Netherlands
and the United States. The United States claimed sovereignty
as a successor of Spain, under the Treaty of Paris which
had put an end to the Spanish-American war, alleging that
Spain had acquired the title to that island by discovery and
occupation. However, the Arbitrator, Max Huber, took as
the basis for his decision a determination of which of the
parties had shown 'an actual display of sovereignty' since
'the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty
is as good as a title'. He justified this position of
principle on the ground that a state cannot limit itself
to excluding actions of other states from a given territory,
but must assume therein the functions and responsibilities
of a territorial sovereign, and in particular the duty to
protect in respect of that territory the rights of other
states. On this basis the island was awarded to the Netherlands
which had shown unchallenged 'acts of peaceful display of
67. [1904] XI RIAA, p.11, at p.21.
68. II RIAA, p.829.
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sovereignty' in the critical period. Among these the
Arbitrator took account of agreements made by the East India
Company with native chiefs. These agreements, whatever
their legal nature, were considered as facts constituting
evidence of an indirect means for exercising state authority
over the territory.
In this award, Max Huber emphasised the need to found
title upon acts. 'Deeds speak louder than words' would be
an accurate summary of his thesis, albeit lacking in the
nuances of the original. Little consideration was given,
on the other hand, to the role of intention in the acquisition
and maintenance of sovereignty. Thus, the Arbitrator did
not consider whether the acts of the Netherlands (such as
they were) manifested an intention to act as sovereign. The
question might have been of some importance, since the
evidence was of acts of native rulers - 'vassals' of the
Netherlands — and of apparently spontaneous acts of the
69
inhabitants. Passing reference alone was made to the
issue whether Spain had intended, and maintained an intention,
69. It is interesting to compare this point with the
Barotseland Boundary Arbitration [1905] 97 BFSP, p.504.
The Arbitrator, in determining the limits of the
Barotse Kingdom, adopted the test of dependency;
more precisely, the exercise of governmental authority
by the paramount chiefs, deposing them, deciding
disputes between them and causing them to recognise
his supreme authority. In applying this test, the
Arbitrator took account only of the situation in 1891,
and not of subsequent increases in the Barotse Chief's
power. By the application of this criterion, the
Arbitrator succeeded in determining which tribes were
subject to the Barotse Chief, but failed to determine
the precise limits of the territory of the Kingdom.
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to assert sovereignty over the island. In this connection
the arbitrator distinguished four territorial situations.
The first, the normal situation in which territorial sovereignty
is undisputed and delimited by recognised boundaries. The
second, in which territorial sovereignty is disputed and the
conflicting claims are based on formal titles such as
cession, conquest or occupation. The third, in which a
claim based on a formal title is countered by a claim based
on the exercise of governmental functions in the disputed
territory. And, finally, the fourth, in which a boundary
contains gaps or is otherwise unclear, or the issue is
whether a title is valid, not simply as between two claimants,
but erga omnes, as against all states - as in the case of an
island (such as Palmas) in the high seas.
In the first situation, 'effectiveness' or the display
of sovereignty must, in Huber's view, be regarded as of little
significance. 'Although continuous in principle, sovereignty
cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every point
of a territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible
with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according
as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or regions
enclosed within territories in which sovereignty is uncontestably
displayed or again regions accessible from, for instance, the
70
high seas'. Moreover, the practice of states provided
examples of the recognition of unilaterally delimited
70. Ibid., p.840.
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boundaries in unexplored areas, the hinterland of continents.
There was, however, scope for the application of the principle
of prescription by which title might be acquired as a result
of a 'continuous and peaceful display of the functions of a
state' for a period of time.
In the second situation, 'effectiveness' was an 'element
essential for the constitution of sovereignty'. Thus, titles
of acquisition of territory rested in modern international
law upon 'an act of effective apprehension' - by occupation
or conquest — or alternatively presupposed, in the case of
cession, 'that the ceding and the cessionary Power or at
least one of them, have the faculty of effectively disposing
71
of the ceded territory'. Similarly, title based upon
natural accretion depended upon the existence of 'a portion
of territory where there exists an actual sovereignty capable
of extending to a spot which falls within its sphere of
72
activity'. Nevertheless, in case of dispute in which
each claim was based on some such title, sovereignty would
be awarded to the claimant with 'superior' title, not
necessarily determined by 'effectiveness'.
Where, however, a claimant asserts that it has actually
been administering territory to which another state asserts
a formal title, the disputed area should, in Huber's view,




functions at the date which is 'critical' for resolution of
the dispute. A formal root of title, even if originally
constituted or accompanied by the exercise of state functions,
should not be treated as conclusive:
If the contestation is based on the fact that the
other Party has actually displayed sovereignty,
it cannot be sufficient to establish the title by
which territorial sovereignty was validly acquired
at a certain moment: it must also be shown that the
territorial sovereignty has continued to exist and
did exist at the moment which for the decision of
the dispute must be considered as critical. This
demonstration consists in the actual display of
State activities, such belongs only to the
territorial sovereign'.
Similar principles applied, in Huber's opinion, to the filling
of gaps, in, and clarification of, doubtful boundaries, and
to territory over which title erga omnes must be established.
It is worth emphasising that Huber was not here
discussing the principle of acquisitive prescription (although
the Island of Palmas Arbitration is sometimes cited as an
example of its application). He was concerned rather with
the requirements of international law for the maintenance
of title once acquired, and with its possible extinction
if those requirements were not fulfilled. He was concerned,
that is, with the legal consequences of an 'ineffective'
display of state functions, rather than with acts of sovereignty
as a means of acquiring title. Huber's reasons for linking
the maintenance of territorial sovereignty to its continued
and effective display were threefold: first, because in
73. Ibid.
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modern international law acquisition of sovereignty is
closely linked to the effective display of state functions,
it seemed 'natural that an element which is essential for
the constitution of sovereignty should not be lacking in
74
its continuation'. Secondly, he emphasised the positive
aspect of sovereignty: the duty to protect within state
territory the rights of other states, and 'without manifesting
its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to
75
circumstances, the state cannot fulfil this duty'. Finally,
as has already been mentioned, Huber regarded it as impossible
in the absence of any 'super-state organisation' to reduce
territorial sovereignty to the 'category of an abstract right,
76
without concrete manifestations'. These reasons have
clearly a good deal of substance: in particular, if the
'principle of effectiveness' is accepted as the determinant
of title to territory, the consequences of 'ineffectiveness'
must not be baulked. Equally, it may fairly be countered
that under these circumstances 'title ceases to have
significance ... [I]t has so to speak to be earned again
at every moment of time'. This would, however, be true
only of a relatively limited range of titles: only, that is,
to titles to territory which have gone unrecognised by








titles which must be maintained erqa omnes, such as islands
on the high seas. In any other situation one must suppose
that the exacting conditions of acquisitive prescription,
if indeed this principle is admitted in international law,
must be fulfilled. It is, moreover, an exaggeration to
suggest that what we may term 'the principle of ineffectiveness'
is incompatible with stability. If it is incompatible with
the stability of territorial titles, it nonetheless preserves
the stability of the existing administration of territory
77
and is in accord with the maxim quieta non movere.
In the context of the Island of Palmas such problems
are, nevertheless, academic. It was more than doubtful
whether Spain at any time acquired title - more than an
'inchoate' title - to the island. Not merely was Spanish
sovereignty never effectively exercised; it was never
exercised at all. No act, however token and symbolic, was
performed on the island. The only evidence in support of
a Spanish claim was that the island must at least have been
sighted by Spanish explorers. Spain, then, had either never
acquired title, or by failing to maintain any degree of
'effectiveness' had, prior to the cession of the Philippines
to the United States, lost any title to the island. But
could the Netherlands be regarded as having acquired title?
If it had, it must have done so by fulfilling the positive
requirements of effectiveness. Huber put these requirements
77. See above, Ch. 2.
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like this:
If the claim to sovereignty is based on the continuous
and peaceful display of state authority, the fact of
such display must be shown precisely in relation to
the disputed territory. It is not necessary that
there should be a special administration established
in this territory; but it cannot suffice for the
territory to be attached to another by a legal
relation which is not recognised in international
law as valid against a state contesting this claim
to sovereignty; what is essential in such a case
is the continuous and peaceful s^jsplay of actual
power in the contested region'.
Apart from the traditional modes of acquiring territory,
Huber's view was that 'the continuous and peaceful display
79
of state authority' is as good as a title. Essential
constituents of this theory were: (a) state activity or
manifesting sovereignty a titre de souverain; (b) continuity
over some undefined period of time, and, to the extent
appropriate to the territory, over the disputed area;
(c) some element of acquiescence by other states. This
criterion might serve as an adequate justification for
undisputed territorial sovereignty, and suffice to determine
disputes such as the Island of Palmas, where the basis of a
claimant's title was the exiguous one of mere discovery, but
it could not serve to determine disputes in which no, or
78. II RIAA, p.857.
79. Acts of display of state authority was considered
as good as a title by the Arbitral Tribunal in the
Rann of Kutch Arbitration [1968] 50 ILR (1976), p.2.
See above, Ch. 2.
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conflicting, acts of sovereignty were asserted, or the
elements of a passage of time, or acquiescence, were not
fulfilled.^
81
3.3.1.3 The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case
The question of sovereignty over territory in Eastern
Greenland contested by Denmark and Norway was submitted to
the PCIJ in 1931. The Danish assertion that the Norwegian
•occupation' was invalid rested upon, inter alia, that
Denmark had enjoyed and had peacefully and continuously
exercised an uncontested sovereignty over Greenland for a
long time, and that Norway had recognised Danish sovereignty
over the whole of Greenland. Norway, however, contended
that Danish sovereignty in Greenland was restricted to the
areas of its colonies, and that it did not therefore extend
to the area that Norway had occupied since 10 July 1931.
It seems that the Court was very much influenced by the
Clipperton Island and Island of Palmas Arbitrations on
80. Cf. Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public
International Law, English Trans, by P.E. Corbett
Princeton U.P., 1968), pp. 204-6; Suzanne Bastid,
"Les problemes territoriaux dans la jurisprudence de
la cour internationale", 107 Recueil des Cours (1962-
III), p.365; A.L.W. Munkman, "Adjudication and
Adjustment - International Judicial Decision and the
Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes",
47 BYIL (1972 - 73), p.l, at p.103.
81. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22. See above, Ch. 2.
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sovereignty over islands. The Court defined very broadly
the basic requirement for the establishment of such a title:
there must be the intention and will to act as sovereign,
and some actual exercise or display of such authority
(although very little actual exercise of authority was
necessary, especially in thinly populated or unsettled
82
areas); and there must be no competing or stronger claim
to sovereignty. The Court declared that
a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular
act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely
upon continued display of authority, involves two
elements each of which must be shown to exist: the
intention and will to act as sovereign, and sgge
actual exercise or display of such authority.
Denmark thus regarded herself as possessing sovereignty over
all Greenland and displayed and exercised her sovereign
rights to an extent sufficient to constitute a valid title
to sovereignty over all Greenland.
3.3.2 The Exercise or Display of Sovereignty Must
be Sufficient to Confer a Valid Title to
Sovereignty: a titre de souverain
To be of legal significance in the context of a claim
to sovereignty, acts must be done with the intention of
establishing a_ titre de souverain, i.e. as specific manifestations
of sovereignty, and with the intention of asserting, or in
82. See below, 2.2
83. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46. See above, Ch. 2.
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in the assertion of a claim to sovereignty. This means
that the manifestations of state authority relied upon in
support of the acquisition of a territorial title must be
carried out animus occupandi: and there must be implied a
claim of sovereignty.
On acquisitive prescription, Professor Johnson rightly
observes that the possession of the prescribing state must
be exercised a titre de souverain, the state must base its
„ 85claim upon its own acts.
3.3.2.1 Competing Acts of Sovereignty
In the Aves Island Arbitration between the Netherlands
and Venezuela of 1865, the Arbitrator held that the Netherlands
did nothing except exploit the fisheries on this island
through its subjects, while Venezuela had been the first to
hold an armed force there and to exercise acts of sovereignty.
This action thus confirmed the dominion which it had acquired
through a general title derived from Spain. Fishing for
84. Art. 1. Projet de declaration internationale relative
aux occupations de territoires (7 Septembre 1888,
Session de Lausanne) provides that "L'occupation d'un
territoire a titre de souverainete ne pourra etre
reconnue comme effective que si elle reunit les
conditions suivantes:
1. La prise de possession d'un territoire enferme
dans certaines limites, faite au nom du gouvernement;
2. La notification officielle de la prise de
possession". See Resolution de l'Institut de Droit
International 1873-1956, publie par Hans Wehberg
(Bale: Editions juridiques et sociologiques S.A. 1957),
p.68; D.W. Bowett, The Legal Regime of Islands in
International Law (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana,
1979), p.54.
85. D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International
Law, 27 BYIL (1950), pp. 344-45.
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turtles and gathering eggs on the Island of Aves was held
as not supporting sovereignty but only signifying a temporary
and precarious occupation of the island, without being an
exclusive right. The island was therefore declared to be
the property of Venezuela, which, however, had to pay an
indemnity to the Netherlands for the loss of the fishery
86
rights of its subjects.
In the Grisbadarna Arbitration, the Tribunal awarded
the Grisbadarna fishing banks to Sweden because Sweden had
performed various acts in the region, for instance, the placing
of beacons, the measurement of the sea, and the installation
of a light boat at her own expense. In so doing, Sweden not
only thought that she was exercising her right but even more
that she was performing her duty. Norway, however, had
never taken any measures which were in any way equivalent
to the placing of beacons and a light boat. It was abundantly
clear that Sweden had no doubt as to her rights over the
Grisbadarna and that she did not hesitate to incur the
expenses incumbent on the owner and possessor of these
87
banks even to the extent of a considerable sum of money.
86. (1865) J.B. Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. 5,
p.5037; La Fontaine, Pasicrisie internationale (Berne,
1902), p.152; A. de Lapradelle et N. Politis, Recueil
des arbitrages internationaux, Vol. 2, (Paris, 1923),
p.415; J.H. Ralston, The Law and Procedure of Inter¬
national Tribunals, Rev. ed. (Stanford U.P., 1926),
p.315.
87. [1909]. James Brown Scott (ed), The Hague Court Reports
(New York: Oxford U.P., 1916), p.122.
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In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, Max Huber said
that territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right
88
to display the activities of a state. He further stated
that:
the actual continuous and peaceful display of
state function is ... the sg^nd and natural criterium
of territorial sovereignty.
Indeed the exercise of state authority was a decisive factor
of the case.
90
In the Clipperton Island Arbitration, the Aribtrator
found that Mexico, although considering that the island
belonged to her, had not exercised sovereignty over the
island by any acts until the expedition of 1897. Thus,
the award declared that the sovereignty of Clipperton Island
resided in France from the 17 November 1885 onwards.
As has been seen in the Eastern Greenland Case, the
PCIJ, in evaluating the activity of Denmark over Eastern
Greenland during successive periods, measured it each time
by reference to the question of whether the activity was
'sufficient to confer a valid title to sovereignty'. The
state activity must be sufficient to show that the claimant
really acted as an international sovereign would have acted
in such circumstances.^^
88. II RIAA, p.839. See above, Ch. 2.
89. Ibid., p.840 [Italics added].
90. II RIAA, p.1105; 26 AJIL (1932), p.390.
91. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53. In the Island of Palmas Arbitration
Judge Huber's test that activity must be sufficient to
provide minimum guarantees to other states probably
means much the same thing. See above, 3.3.1.2.
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In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, the Court considered
the contentions of both parties that they possessed an ancient
or original title to the islands but concluded:
What is of decisive importance ... is the evidence
which relates directly to theggossession of the
Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.
On this aspect the Court attached, in particular, probative
value to the acts which related to the exercise of juris-
93
diction and local administration and to legislation.
It found in favour of the United Kingdom on the ground that
British authorities during the greater part of the nineteenth
century and in the twentieth century had exercised state
94
functions in respect of both groups of islands.
In the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
95
Land, the Belgians listed the disputed plots on their
military staff maps and their survey records from 1847 to
1852 as acts of sovereignty. The Dutch however were able to
show that they, too, put them in their surveys and collected
taxes from them at local government level. Moreover, the
92. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.57. See below, 3.3.3.
93. Ibid., p.65.
94. Ibid., pp. 67, 70. In the oral proceedings Fitzmaurice
adhered that the United Kingdom is in sole effective
possession and invoking an ancient title and a long
continuance of this possession; that all the normal
manifestations of sovereignty during that period
are carried out from the British side, and none from
the French. These and many other factors create a
virtually irresistable presumption that the islands
were British at the earlier dates. ICJ Pleadings,
1953, Pt. II, pp. 94-95.
95. ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209. See below, 4.3.4.
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local authority kept registers for land transfers, births,
marriages and deaths for the plots. In weighing the acts
of sovereignty, the ICJ ruled in Belgium's favour because
of its acts at central government level.
The Island of Palmas and Eastern Geeenland Cases
presented not dissimilar problems, albeit on a different
scale. The legal issue in both was one of sovereignty over
a discrete unit of territory, an island. The Eastern Greenland
Case might have been more complex, had the decision of the
Court been in favour of Norway, for it would then have been
necessary to determine the limits of Norwegian sovereignty
in Greenland and to delimit the boundary between Norwegian
96
and Danish territories. The Rann of Kutch Arbitration
is, however, the only judicial decision in which an attempt
was made to apply the 'principle of effectiveness' to delimit
the course of a part of an inter-state boundary. It reveals
at least four problems in application which are typical of
boundary disputes. First, there may be competing 'acts of
sovereignty' by the claimant states in the border area.
Secondly, there may be doubt as to what acts are attributable
96. 50 ILR (1976), p.2. Munkman, o£. cit., 46 BYIL (1972-73),
pp. 70-80. See generally, C.J. Chacko, 'The Rann of
Kutch and International Law', 5 Indian JIL (1965),
p.147; T.S.R. Rae, 'An Appraisal of the Kutch Award',
9 ibid. (1969), p.140; R. Khan 'Relinquishment of Title
to Territory: The Rann of Kutch Award - a Case Study',
ibid., p.157; R.P. Anand, Studies in International
Adjudication (India: Vikas Publ., 1969), p.218;
M.G. Utawale, 'The Kutch-Sind Disputes: A Case Study
in International Arbitration', 23 ICLQ (1974), p.818.
See below, 3.3.2.2.
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to the 'state': the acts of central and local authorities
97
may be at variance. Thirdly, the activities of individuals,
the local inhabitants in the area, may have to-be taken into
account, but their status in international law may be
doubtful. Fourthly, such matters as the physical geography
of the area, economic interests and national security may
have to be taken into account; but again it is difficult
to bring such considerations under the rubric of 'effectiveness'.
Very properly, the award in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration
takes all these matters into account, but they involved some
significant modifications in the operation of the concept
of effectiveness.
The Rann thus presented one of the characteristics which
we have seen in the Island of Palmas and Eastern Greenland
Cases: it was not the sort of region in which any sovereignty
could be 'effective' in the fullest sense - uninviting and
difficult for access and supporting no permanent human
population. Equally clearly, however, each claimant state
(or its predecessors) had performed some acts of administration
in the Rann. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal, Judge Lagergren emphasised that
In adjudging conflicting claims by rival sovereigns
to a territory, all available evidence relating to
the exercise of such rights, and the discharge of
such duties, must be carefully evaluated with a view
to establishing in whom the conglomerate of sovereign Qg
functions has been exclusively or predominantly vested.'
97. See abive, Ch. 2.
98. 50 ILR (1976), p.500.
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This is to say that where there are competing acts of
sovereignty, 'effectiveness* in the abstract cannot be
determined, but the 'comparative' or 'relative effectiveness
of each claimant can be assessed.
3.3.2.2 Acts of Private Individuals
The following cases will illustrate the fact that
acts of private individuals, however numerous, cannot be
imputed to the state.
In the Brazil-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration
the dispute was referred to the arbitration of the King of
Italy. He not only recognised that 'the discovery of new
channels of trade in regions not belonging to any state cannot
by itself be held to confer an effective right to the
acquisition of the sovereignty of the said regions by the
state whose subject the person who in their private capacity
made the discovery may happen to be', but also
That to acquire the sovereignty of regions which are
not in the dominion of any state, it is indispensable
that the occupation be effected in the name of the
state whi^ intends to acquire the sovereignty of those
regions'.
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, it was the continuous
and peaceful display of 'state authority', not the 'acts of
individual Dutchmen' that made Max Huber award the island's
sovereignty to the Netherlands.1^
99. XI RIAA, p.21.
100. II RIAA, p.829.
An important dictum of the PCIJ in the Eastern Greenland
Case, as has been seen, was the requirement of 'the intention
and will to act as sovereignAs only a state can have
'the intention and will to act as sovereign', it follows that
the acts of authority relied upon must be those of the state
as an international person, not those of mere individuals or
even of subordinate divisions of the state. This implies
that private individuals bearing no commission from the
Government are not' capable of performing valid acts of
acquisition, unless their acts are immediately ratified by
their Government. The same requirement excludes the possibility
of acquiring title by a display of authority when the reason
for the physical presence of a state in a given territory is
incompatible with the quality of sovereignty, as in the case
of a lease, a mandate or a trusteeship.
Since the acts must be done with the intention of
establishing or manifesting sovereignty, it follows that
acts by private persons, be they settlers, fishermen, traders
or seacaptains, will not in themselves have legal effect in
establishing sovereignty; in order that they may be used to
this end, the prior authorisation of a recognised state to
occupy in its name, or the subsequent ratification by such a
state of the purported occupation or annexation, is required.
If the proper authorities had sent out an official especially
charged with the duty of making a particular acquisition, the
101. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46. See above, 3.3.1.2.
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act of annexation is therefore valid. In o'der to annex a
102
piece of territory a state act is necessary. It is
axiomatic that a private person cannot perform even an
inchoate annexation, any ceremony he may go through being
invalid ab initio, and incapable of ratification.
As has already been shown above that private individuals,
bearing no commission from their Government, are not capable
103
of effecting legal occupation. In the Anglo-Norwegian
104
Fisheries Case, the United Kingdom contended that it is
acts of state sovereignty which may provide the foundation
x
for a title to territorial sovereignty. Norway, however,
relied on habitual fishing by the local people and prohibition
of fishing by foreigners.
On the question of the status of individual action in
the acquisition of title to territory, Judge McNair referred
to the well-established principles in the following terms:
102. See e.g., the Clipperton Island Arbitration [1931]
II RIAA, p.1105; the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case.
ICJ Reports, 1953, p.65. Acts by state officials such
as formal declarations of sovereignty, the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction or taxation etc.
103. The United States in the Oregon dispute based a claim
on an unratified discovery and occupation by private
individuals. This xvas not admitted by Great Britain,
and the question was settled by the 1946 Treaty of
Washington, followed by an arbitration before the
German Emperor. For details, see Twiss, The Oregon
Question Examined, op. cit. , passim; Wheaton's Elements
of International Law, 6th English ed., Rev. by A.B.
Keith, Vol. 1 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1929), pp. 345-50.
104. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.116.
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some proof is usually required of the exercise of
state jurisdiction ... the independent activity of
private individuals is of little value unless it can
be shown that they have acted in pursuance of a
licence or some other authority received from their
Governments or that in some other vjay th^r Governments
have asserted jurisdiction through them.-'""
Judge Hsu Mo also emphasised that 'individuals, by
undertaking enterprises on their own initiative for their
own benefit and without any delegation of authority by their
106
Government, cannot confer sovereignty on the state'.
107
In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, Jersey fishermen
had visited the islands. France, after 1839, had allowed
British fishermen to go peacefully to the disputed islets.
Britain, however, had never allowed the French to frequent
these islets. Professor O'Connell has rightly observed
that in such a situation 'mere exploitation by fishermen
unaccompanied by legislative and executive action, designed
to render their exploitation nationally exclusive, cannot
found title'. He further stated that acts of private
individuals are in themselves insufficient for occupation
108
but nevertheless there may be no occupation without them.
The Court followed this line of reasoning and thus included
105. Dissenting Opinion of Judge McNair, see ICJ Reports,
1951, p.184. Cf. The Clipperton Island Arbitration
II RIAA, p.1105.
106. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.157.
107. ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 57-59. See above, 3.3.2.1.
108. D.P. O'Connell, International Law, 2nd ed., Vol. 1
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), p.418.
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the "actual and permanent settlement" of Britons on the
islets as amounting to acts of sovereignty. In this
context, Judge Levi Carneiro formulated his remarks on
this question as follows:
in certain cases, and in certain circumstances, the
presence of private persons who are nationals of a
given state may signify or entail occupation by that
state. Sovereignty is exercised over persons who
recognise that sovereignty. I have in mind the fact
that the limits of the Portuguese and Spanish possessions
in South America, which had been strictly laid down in
the Treaty of Tordesillas, were exceeded by persons
from Brazil in search of gold and emeralds, and that,
although these persons were frequently disappointed
in their expectations and their ranks decimated by
fever, they achieved the uti possidetis for Brazil
and greatly increased her territory.
Such individual actions are particularly important
in respect of territories situated at the border of
two couy^ies which both claim sovereignty in that
region.
It seems that under certain limited circumstances the
presence of private persons may signify or entail occupation
of territory by a state. The passage quoted above by no
means implies that purely private acts could per se create
a title but that the de facto position could afford evidence
of what the position was de facto.
The Rann of Kutch is a seasonally inundated -salt marsh
on the border betxveen what was then West Pakistan and
Gujarat in India. In the Rann of hutch Arbitration, it
was, indeed, a matter of disagreement between India and Pakistan
109. ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 104-5 [italics added].
110. 50 ILR (1976), p.2. See above, 3.3.2.1.
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whether the Rann was akin to land, or should be treated as
a marine feature. Both states claimed effective control,
India over the whole of the Rann, Pakistan over the northern
half. During the period of British administration of India
the Rann formed the boundary between the states of Sind (to
which Pakistan succeeded) and Kutch (to which India succeeded).
Pakistan thus derived support for its claim to have exercised
•effective and exclusive control over the northern half of
the Rann' from two sources. In the period up to the British
conquest of Sind in the nineteenth century, there was evidence
of a broad historical trend of Sind expansion and control
from the sixth century onwards, manifested in invasions and in
the crossing and garrisoning of the area in the eighteenth
century. In the British and post-independence period, the
evidence relied primarily on acts of private individuals
- cultivation, fishing and grazing of cattle on 'bets' in
the Rann. In his ruling, the Chairman of the Tribunal took
into account inter alia the activities of individuals -
'the inhabitants of Sind who openly used the grazing grounds
for over one hundred years — and therefore those sectors
(i.e. Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet) were awarded to Pakistan.
In the Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) Case, the
Court had to examine a claim by Morocco to ties of sovereignty
over the territory based not on an isolated act of occupation,
but upon continued display of authority on the same principles
111. 50 ILR (1976), p.510. See above, 3.2.2.2.
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as those applied in the Eastern Greenland Case. The Court
found in this case that 'the paucity of evidence of actual
display of authority unambiguously relating to Western Sahara'^
and the Sherifian State does not establish any tie of
territorial sovereignty to Western Sahara. The Court further
found that the materials before it provided indications that
a legal tie of allegiance had existed at the relevant period
between the Sultan and some, but only some, of the nomadic
114
peoples of the territory.
3.3.3 The Exercise or Display of Sovereignty Must
be Actual
It is incontestably established in international law,
both in theory and in practice: there must be a taking of
possession with the intention to occupy as sovereign. This
statement can only be genuine and not a mere paper claim
dressed up as an act of sovereignty. Thus the Arbitrator
in the Clipperton Island Arbitration said that
by immemorial usage having the force of law, besides
the animus occupandi, the actual and not the nominal,
taking of possession is a necessary condition of
occupation. This taking of possession consists in
the act or series of acts, by which the occupying
state reduces to its possession the territory in
question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority
there.
112. ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 42-43. See below, 4.4.
113. Ibid., p. 43.
114. Ibid., p.49.
115. 26 AJIL (1932), p.393. See above, 3.3.2.
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In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, it may be recalled,
that the Court dismissed those arguments of France and the
United Kingdom which were founded upon the complexities of
feudal relationships with the observation 'what is of decisive
importance, in the opinion of the Court, is the evidence
which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and
«116Mxnquiers group.'
In the Rann of Kutch Arbitration Pakistan stressed
that the starting point in any process of consolidation is
'actual possession, actual control, physical exercise of
sovereignty. Without that, the process does not begin'.
In support of this proposition, Pakistan quoted a passage
from Professor Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in
International Law, to the effect that actual effective
control is necessary both for the creation of a title and for
its maintenance, and that the process of consolidation
cannot begin to operate until actual possession is first
117
accomplished.
3.3.4 The Exercise or Display of Sovereignty Must
be Peaceful
It is generally considered a condition of the acquisition
of "sovereignty by occupation that possession should always be
116.' ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47. See above, 3.3.2.1.
117. 50 ILR (1976), pp. 105, 385. Cf. Jennings, o£. cit.
p.26. See above, Ch. 2.
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uninterrupted and peaceful. This rule seems to mean no
more than that the first assertion of sovereignty must not
be a usurpation of another's subsisting occupation, nor may it be
contested from the first by competing acts of sovereignty.
Thus it may be noted in Michigan v. Wisconsin that the
United States Supreme Court said:
long-continued, and uninterrupted possession of
territory, is a doctrine not confined to individuals,
but applicable to sovereign nations as well ...
Similarly, in Lubeck v. Mecklenburq-Schwerin, Provisional
Orders of the Staatsgerichtshof held in 1925 that:
in view of the long undisturbed possession and
exercise of the rights by Lubeck and the absence of
any protest by Mecklenburg-Schwerin against the
Lubeck law of 1896, the application of Lubeck for
a provisional order should be granted, namely, ...
the regulation^gg the rights of fishery in the
Travemund Bay.
121
In the Clipperton Island Arbitration, the requirement
of 'effective, uninterrupted, and permanent possession' is
clearly something more than the 'peaceful and continuous
display of sovereignty' applied to exiguous evidence by
Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Arbitration.
118. Cf. the Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.831.
The continuous and peaceful display of the functions
of a state within a given region is a constituent
element of territorial sovereignty.
119. 1926. 270 U.S., 295. See also 3 Annual Digest (1925-26),
Case No. 84, p.113. Cf. Indiana v. Kentucky 136 U.S.,
479; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S., 503, 522-24;
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S., 1, 53.
120. Wenzel, Die Hoheitsrechte in der Lubecker Bucht (1926),
see 3 Annual Digest (1925-26), Case No. 85, pp. 114-15.
121. 26 AJIL (1932), p.390.
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In the Eastern Greenland Case, the PCIJ accepted the
Danish claim which, as described by the Court, was not
founded upon any particular act of occupation but alleged
- to use the phrase employed in the Island of Palmas
Arbitration - 'a title founded on the peaceful and continuous
122
display of state authority over the island'.
In the Falkland Islands Dispute the Argentine Republic,
as successor to the state rights of Spain,has asserted inter
alia that its title resulted 'from a possession uncontested
and uninterrupted for fifty-nine consecutive years' (1774-
125
1833)
In the Certain Frontier Land Case, it is true that
during the years 1889 to 1892 efforts were made by the
Netherlands and Belgium to achieve a regular and continuous
frontier between them. A new Mixed Boundary Commission
prepared a Convention which was signed by the plenipotentiaries
of the two states in 1892,but was never ratified. The Court
said that the unratified Convention of 1892 did not create
122. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 46, 48. As in the case of
an island situated in the high seas, the question arises
whether a title is valid erga omnes, the actual continuous
and peaceful display of state functions is the sound
and natural criterion of territorial sovereignty.
II RIAA, p.840. See above, 3.3.1.2.
123. Charles Calvo, Le Droit International: Theorique et
Pratique, Vol. 1 (Paris & Berlin, 1887), pp. 417-24,
para. 287. Cf. David Cross, 'Centuries of Dispute:
History of Sovereignty Claim', The Times, 15 April
1982, p.7. For details, see below, 5.
any legal rights or obligations, but the terms of the
Convention itself and the contemporaneous events show that
Belgium at that time was asserting its sovereignty over the
two disputed plots, and that the Netherlands knew it was so
doing. In a letter of 20 August 1890, the Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs had informed the Netherlands Minister
in Brussels that an enclave which comprised the disputed
plots had been omitted from the list of territories to be
ceded by Belgium to the Netherlands. The Netherlands,
neither in 1892, nor at any time thereafter until the dispute
arose between the two states in 1922, repudiated the Belgian
assertion of sovereignty. After considering the situation
for almost a century,the Netherlands made no challenge to
the attribution of the disputed plots to Belgium. 'The
Court therefore held that Belgian sovereignty over the dis—
124
puted plots, established in 184^had not been extinguished.
In the Chamizal Boundary Arbitration, it is clear that
the United States laid claim to an area of Mexican territory
on the ground of 'undisturbed' possession. This argument
was rejected by the Tribunal because Mexico not only made
a number of diplomatic protests but also brought effective
125
diplomatic pressure to bear on the United States.
124. ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 227, 229-30. See below, 4.3.4.
125. [1911] XI RIAA, p.309. See below, 4.3.3. Cf. Venezuela
- British Guiana Boundary Arbitration (1899) No. 7,
Cmd. 9533. See also Pari. Papers, Cmd. 9501, pp. 29, 45.
Diplomatic protest is generally accepted by writers as a
means of preventing the maturing of a prescriptive or
historic title. For details, see I.C. MacGibbon 'Some
Observations on the Part of Protest in International
Law', 30 BYIL (1953), pp. 293-319.
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3.3.5 The Exercise or Display of Sovereignty Must
be Continuous
On whatever basis the initial claim to sovereignty
over territory is founded, it is evident that active and
continual exercise of state authority will normally be
confined to an area substantially less than that formally
claimed. It must be pointed out, when explaining the inter-
12 6
temporal doctrine, that the Tribunal in the Island of Palmas,
127 128
Eastern Greenland and Minquiers and Ecrehos Cases
treated continuity of display of state activity as a
constituent element in title by occupation, quite apart
from any question of abandonment. Failure to show continuing
state activity, which may also be evidence of an intention
to abandon a title, will be fatal to the proof of a definitive
title by occupation regardless of intention.
The degree of the continuity, like the degree of
sufficiency, of the occupation varies according to circumstances.
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration Judge Huber pronounced:
126. In the Island of Palmas Arbitration Judge Huber said:
'a distinction must be made between the creation of
rights and the existence of rights. The same principle
which subjects the act of creation of a right to the
law in force at the time the right arises, demands
that the existence of the right, in other words its
continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions
required by the evolution of law'. II RIAA, p.845.
See above, 3.3.1.2.
127. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53; See above, 3.3.1.3.
128. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.56. See above, 3.3.2.1; 3.3.2.2.
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[I]f the contestation is based on the fact that the
other Party has actually displayed sovereignty, it
cannot be sufficient to establish the title by xvhich
territorial sovereignty was validly acquired at a
certain moment; it must also be shown that the
territorial sovereignty has continued to exist ...
Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot
be exercised in fact at every moment on every point
of a territory. The intermittence and discontinuity
compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily
differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions
are involved, or regions enclosed within territories
in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or
again^ j^gions accessible from, for instance the high
seas.
With reference to this principle, a display of sovereignty
at irregular and comparatively long intervals was held to be
sufficient for effective occupation both in the Island of
Palmas and Eastern Greenland Cases. The Clipperton Island
Arbitration may perhaps also be regarded as a correct though
130
extreme example of the principle. In the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case, Judge Carneiro stated that:
The origin of the occupation of the islands by the
English being clearly defined and the circumstances
confirming that occupation being (sic) acknowledged,
the acts carried out during this occupation, although
they are scattered in time, bear witness to the
continuity of that occupation and reflect the "slow
evolution" o^Jhe process whereby sovereignty is
established.
129. II RIAA, pp. 839-40 [italics added]. See above 3.3.1.2.
130. In contrast, in the Clipperton Island Arbitration,
where the island was uninhabited, physical and
continuing occupation was not required as a condition
of possession. II RIAA, p.1110. See above, 2.2.
131. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.104 [italics added].
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This passage is inconclusive because it is not clear whether
the word 'occupation' is used as a term signifying the
acquisition of sovereignty over terra nullius, or whether
it refers merely to the physical presence of the English
on the islets without specifying the juridical justification
for their presence or the rights which might be derived
from such activity.
4. Prescription and Limitation
4.1 Prescription
Title by prescription, known in the civil law as
132
usucapio, arises from a long-continued and uninterrupted
possession of property, and is thus defined by Sir Edward
Coke, Praescriptio est titulus ex usa et tempore substantiam
133
capiens ab authoritate legis.
132. In Roman law usucapio indicated ownership acquired by
enjoyment through long though undefined lapse of time.
Usucaption in the civil law was ownership resulting
from prolonged possession. Grotius, however, rejected
the usucaption of the Roman law, yet adopted from
the same law immemorial prescription for.the law of
nations. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, op. cit., Bk. II,
Ch. IV, I, VII, IX.
133. Co. Litt. 113b. Prescription is a title from use and
time ta'ing its substance from the authority of the
law. There are two main categories of prescription,
namely: acquisitive prescription which includes
(a) immemorial possession and (b) a form of prescription
akin to usucapio; and extinctive prescription.
263.
The old Roman plea for prescription ne dominia rerum
134
diutius in incerto essent applies in the abstract with
equal force to international law, and the majority of writers
are agreed that international rights may be acquired and lost
through the lapse of time. The doubts, however, suggested
135 236 137
by von Martens, Kluber, ~ Heffter and others, as to
whether the doctrine of prescription is applicable at all
in international law, cannot be dismissed as entirely
fanciful. The justification for the inclusion of the private
law notion of prescription in international law is generally
that it is conducive to the greater stability of international
order since it denies validity to ineffective outdated claims.
In municipal law the prescriptive acquisition of rights
is ordinarily regulated by the maxim, fraus omnia vitiat;
thus guarded, the limitation which ownership undergoes for
its own protection does not come into conflict with the
general conscience. In international law such a reservation
has no place, and the fraudulent root of title is as good as
134. Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II. Tit. VI.
135. G.F. von Martens, The Law of Nations, English trans.
by W. Cobbett, 4th ed. (London: William Cobbett, 1829),
Ch. 3, p.63.
136. J.-L. Kluber, Droit des gens moderne de L'Europe,
Nouvelle Edition revue by M.A. Ott (Paris: Guillaumin
et Cie, Libraires, 1861), pp. 6-7, para. 6.
137. A.-G. Heffter, Le droit international de L'Europe
translated by Jules Bergson, Third Edition, by the
Author, (Paris: Libraires du conseil d'etat, 1873),
pp. 30-31, para. 13; 140-42, para. 69.
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another where time has consecrated the original offence.
Prescription in international law has the same rational basis
as in municipal law, namely, the promotion of stability of
order. Oppenheim defines prescription in international law
as the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory; it must
be a continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty,
long enough to create, under the influence of historical
development, the general conviction that the present condition
139
of things is in conformity with international order.
What are the conditions necessary for the acquisition
of a title by prescription? It has already been noted that
possession of the prescribing state must be exercised _a titre
de souverain and must also be actual, peaceful and continuous.
Prescription appears in international law either as a
mode of acquisition and loss of territorial rights or as a
rule limiting the time in which both contractual claims and
138. The Earl of Birkenhead, International Law, 6th ed.
Edited by R. Moelwyn-Hughes (London & Toronto:
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1927), p.95. Cf. Le prescription
liberatoire en droit international public, 31 juillet
1925, Session de la Haye, Resolutions de L'Institut
de Droit International 1873-1956, published by Hans
Wheberg (Bale: Editions juridiques et sociologiques
S. A. , 1957 ), pp. 8 e_t seq; 32 Annuaire (1925),
pp. 467-87, 558-60.
139. L. Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed. Edited by
H. Lauterpacht, Vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green and
Co. 1961), p.576.
140. Cf. Reply of Mr. Fitzmaurice in the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case, ICJ Pleadings, 1953, Pt. II, pp. 364-65.
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those arising out of an international tort may be put
141
forward. While the field of application of acquisitive
prescription is naturally a limited one, extinctive
prescription, corresponding to limitation of action in
municipal law, is of growing importance in international
.. . .. 142
arbitration.
141. If a state claims from another state reparation for
an injury done to itself or its nationals, is that
claim governed by the principle of continuity as they
existed at the time of the alleged injury or by the
law, customary or conventional, as it may have developed
in the meantime? E. Lauterpacht (ed), Hersch Lauterpacht
International Law Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge
U.P., 1970), pp. 129-34. Cf. Sir Francis Vallat,
International Law and the Practitioner (Manchester
U.P., 1966), p.19.
142. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, so
frequently rejected on account of its private law
origin, is now generally recognised as forming a
part of international law. See H. Lauterpacht,
Private Law Sources and Analogies of International
Law, p.116; Ralston, ojd. cit. , Ch. XII, p.375, para. 683.
It was held in Willaims' Case that 'prescription has
a place in the international system and is to be
regarded in these adjudications'. Moore, International
Arbitrations, IV, p.4181, at pp. 4194-95; and see the
critical note by Alberic Rolin in Recueil des
Arbitrages Internationaux, by A. de la Pradelle &
N. Politis, 2nd ed., Vol. II (Paris: Les Editions
Internationales, 1957), p.206. In the Garcia Cadiz
Case, the American-Venezuelan Claims Commission
also applied the international law of prescription
not because international law was regarded as the
lex fori, but on the ground of international public
policy. Moore, o£. cit., IV, p.4199, at p.4203.
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There are four concepts which may conveniently be
treated under the general head of 'prescription' since they
bear significant resemblances: limitation, extinctive
prescription, acquisitive prescription and immemorial
possession. Not all of them are necessarily found together
in the same context in systems of municipal law, but in
some respects they all serve similar purposes; they serve
to protect and validate the title of the possessor as against
the original abstract right of the owner. Obviously,
however, not every possessor will be thought to deserve and
require protection, so the concepts necessarily involve
complexity.
4.2 Limitation:
'Limitation' in municipal law means the extinction
of state claims and obsolete titles; rights of action are
limited in point of time, and are lost if not pursued within
143 .... .
due time. Limitation is recognised as a 'general rule
144
of jurisprudence'. It is the principle that the exercise
of a right of action may be barred by the passage of time.
In the case, say, of a right of action to recover property,
it does not involve the extinction of the property right;
only the action is barred. The principle may take a number
143. R.E. Megarry and H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real Property
3rd ed (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966), p.996.
144. See B.E. King "Prescription of Claims in International
Law", 15 BYIL (1934), p.82, at p.96.
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of forms. It may take the form of prescribed time-limits
146
for the exercise of a right of action. or it may take the
more general form of the prescription of a claim on the basis
_ . 147
of, say, laches or supposed acquiescence. In the case of
145. English law knew no acquisitive prescription for land,
it merely knew a limitation of actions. It has been
said that every acquisition of seisin, however
unjustifiable, at once begot a title of a sort, a
title good against those who have no older siesin
to rely upon. See Pollock and Mitland, The History
of English Law, Vol. II, p.81.
146. Extinctive prescription is the prescription of rights
of action directed to enforce an obligation, and is dealt
with domestically by the Statutes of Limitation of
Actions, whereby the remedy but not the right is
barred. Extinctive presciption of personal actions
is governed by the English law to which the respective
obligations are subjects, a provision which may exclude
the lex fori, but the law of the situation governs the
extinction of real rights of action as well as the
acquisitive prescription of property, whether movable
or immovable. If the situation of movable property
has been changed, both extinctive and acquisitive
prescription is governed by the law of the place in
which the time necessary for prescription is completed.
Cf. Cayuga Indians Claim Case [1926] 3 Annual Digest
1925-26, p.246.
147. In the Gentini Case the claimant, seeking to recover
for injuries inflicted upon him in 1871, did not
appear before the Venezuelan authorities, or even
ask the legation of Italy, his country, to make his
demand until 1903, a period of thirty-two years from
the original date of injury. The umpire pointed out
the distinction between rules of prescription which
were established by a government, and the principle
of prescription which was well-recognised in inter¬
national law. He further found that the common law
writers on prescription and the cognate title of
laches reached a like conclusion. 3 Venezuelan
Arbitrations of 1903, p.720; see Ralston, o£. at.,
pp. 375, para. 683, 378, para. 687; idem 'Prescription'
4 AJIL (1910), p.133.
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an original right iri rem, only the action against the individual
is normally barred; if the property is transferred subsequently
to another individual, the right of action will normally
revive.
Limitation has to be distinguished from prescription;
although they are similar in terms of the end results they
produce, they are different in principle. Prescription is
primarily a common law doctrine, though extended by statute,
by which certain rights can be acquired over the land of
148
others. Fundamentally it is a rule of evidence, leading
to the presumption of a grant from the owner of the land
149 . .
and therefore of a title derived through him. Limitation
is wholly statutory, and is concerned with the title to the
land itself. It simply extinguishes a former owner's right
148. In the boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru the
actual occupation of the disputed Oriente for a long
period lent much weight to the Peruvian claim to the
region by 'prescription'. See George Maier, 'The
Boundary Dispute between Ecuador and Peru', 63 AJIL
(1969), p.28, at p.30. Cf. L.H. Woolsey, 'The Ecuador-
Peru Boundary Controversy', 31 AJIL (1937), p.97.
149. As evidence of its claim in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case Norway cited a number of decrees dating back to
1812 in order to prove that its practice was 'continuing'.
ICJ Reports, 1951, p.135. In the boundary dispute
between Ecuador and Peru, Ecuador relied on the Spanish
colonial decrees of 1563, 1739 and 1740, plus the
Treaty of Guayaguil in support of its de jure title.
Maier, o£. cit., 63 AJIL (1969), p.30. In the Eastern
Greenland Case, the Court held that 'legislation is
one of the most obvious forms of the exercise of
sovereign power'. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.48. In
the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, the Court held that
the legislative act was a clear manifestation of British
sovereignty over the Ecrehos at a time when a dispute
over such sovereignty had not yet arisen. ICJ Reports,
1953, p.66. See above, 3.3.2.1.
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to recover possession of the land, leaving some other person
with a title based on adverse possession. Prescription
operates positively, like a conveyance; limitation operates
negatively, by eliminating the claim of a person having a
+-+1 150
superior title.
4.3 Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription'*'5^
Under a system of prescription, the title to property
itself is extinguished or acquired. It should be noted that
extinctive prescription as such merely extinguishes the
right without giving any corresponding right to anyone else,
whereas acquisitive prescription operates to create a new
right. The merit of either system of prescription depends
on the relative weight and rights of action given in different
legal systems to the owner or possessor. In a legal system
under which a claimant must show either that he had been
dispossessed by the defendant or that he is the owner, extinctive
prescription would be so inconvenient as to be unworkable.
150. Megarry and Wade, op. cit. , p.996.
151. English medieval law knows no acquisitive prescription
for land; all it knows is a limitation of actions.
Pollock and Maitland, ojd. cit. , p. 141. For details,
see Johnson, op. cit., 27 BYIL (1950), p.332; idem,
'Consolidation as a Root of Title in International
Law', 13 Cambridge L.J. (1955), p.215. Cf. MacGibbon,
op. cit., 30 BYIL (1953), p.307; Yehuda Z. Blum,
Historic Titles in International Law (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Cn. II, p.6.
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Conversely, in the English legal system, which in principle
gives to anyone who has lost possession without his consent
an action, not merely against the dispossessor but also
against any third party who has no better title than he has,
152
extinctive prescription is all that is needed. To
anticipate later discussion of this issue, international
law is in this respect probably more akin to English law
153
(as indeed was observed by Fischer Williams). Although
neither the term 'extinctive prescription' nor the not
dissimilar concept of 'limitation' appears ever to have
been used in international jurisprudence, the concepts of
acquiescence, dereliction, preclusion and recognition have
operated to similar effect.
Contrary to occupation, which relates to terra nullius,
acquisitive prescription concerns acquiring territory which
was subject to the sovereignty of another state. The
possibility of the acquisition of territory by acquisitive
prescription or adverse holding seems to have arisen or
been considered explicitly in only five cases concerning
territory. In none was it expressly treated as applicable
to the facts, and in one it was regarded as of doubtful
validity generally in international law.
152. For details see Sir William Holdsworth, A History of
English Law (London: Methuen & Co. Sweet & Maxwell,
1966), Vol. Ill, p.166; Vol. IV, pp. 485-86; Vol. VII,
pp. 69-72, 78-79, 343; Vol. XV, p.171.
153. We get in international law the same result as to the
international title to territory as we have in English
law as to the title to land. See Sir John Fischer
Williams, 'Sovereignty, Seisin, and the League',
7 BYIL (1926), p.24.
4.3.1
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Venezuela-British Guiana Arbitration
This dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela
regarding the boundary of the colony of British Guiana was
referred to arbitration under a compromis of 1897. The
compromis laid down unusually detailed rules for the guidance
of the arbitral tribunal. Article 3 provided that:
The Tribunal ,shall investigate and ascertain the
extent of the territories belonging to, or that
might lawfully be claimed by, the United Netherlands
or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at the time
of the acquisition by^peat Britain of the Colony
of British Guiana ...
Article 4 laid down three further specific rules, of which
the first was
Adverse holding or prescription during a period of
fifty years shall make a good title. The Arbitrators
may deem exclusive political control of a district,
as well as actual settlement thereof, sufficient to
constitute adyggse holding or to make title by
prescription.
The award of the tribunal is not reasoned, and examination
of the actual course of the boundary with reference to the
arguments of the parties affords no clear evidence that the
154. 1899. Award in Pari. Papers No. 7 (1899), c.9533;
21 Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, p.1123; La H.
Fontaine, Pasierisie internationale: Histoire
documentaire des arbitrages internationaux (Berne,
1902), p.556; 92 BFSP, p.160. For discussion of the
award see Otto Schenrich, 'The Venezuela-British Guiana
Boundary Dispute', 43 AJIL (1949), p.523; C.J. Child,
'The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of
1899', 44 ibid., (1950), p.682; W.C. Dennis, 'The
Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899',
ibid., p.720.
155. Art. 3 of the Treaty of Washington of 1897; see USFR
(1896), p.254; 89 BFSP, p.57; 92 ibid., p.160.
156. Art. 4(a) [italics added].
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principles of adverse holding or prescription, at any rate
in the form in which they are set out in that rule, were
applied or influenced the award. In fact, the evidence of
the parties, as in the very similar - and partly identical -
territory dealt with in the Brazil-British Guiana Boundary
157
Arbitration showed very little in the way of 'exclusive
political control' or 'actual settlement' of the greater
part of the disputed area at any date. The arguments of
the parties before the Tribunal do, however, show that even
in its apparently clear form expressed in the compromis the
application of the principle of adverse holding or prescription
was polemic. Thus, there was considerable dispute regarding
the termini quo and ad quern for the running of the fifty-
year period. It was contended on behalf of Venezuela that
in view of the terms of Article 3, the tribunal was only
entitled to consider the possible acquisition of title by
adverse possession or prescription prior to the date of the
acquisition by Great Britain of British Guiana from the
Netherlands. Great Britain, on the other hand, naturally
enough contended that the fifty-year period would apply
also to any such period subsequent to the cession of the
colony. Even supposing this to be accepted, however, it
would have been unclear how relevant (a) acquiescence by
Venezuela, (b) the 'critical date' at which the dispute
arose, and (c) the effect of subsequent agreements to
maintain the administrative status quo pending agreement
157. XI RIAA, p.11.
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on the principal issue of sovereignty, would have been.
Thus, even in this case, which is the major example
of the possible application of acquisitive prescription in
international law, it is doubtful whether it was in fact
applied; its possible application raised a number of
serious problems, and was a matter of controversy between
the parties.
158
4.3.2 Island of Palmas Arbitration
The award rendered in this case is frequently relied
159
upon by the supporters of the doctrine of prescription
who allege that it applies in international law. In this
case the arbitrator, Max Huber, had to decide whether
sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) belonged
to the Netherlands or to the United States. The United States
as successor to Spain claimed that its original title to
the island based on Spanish discovery and on contiguity to
the Philippines. The Netherlands on the other hand, maintained
that they had been exercising effective control over the
island for several centuries without having encountered
opposition of any kind and that consequently the legal title
rested upon them. Judge Huber gave a number of reasons for
rejecting the claims of the United States and found in favour
of the Netherlands on the basis of 'continuous and peaceful
158. II RIAA, p.831. See above, 3.3.1.1.
159. Prescription indicates the acquisition of title by a
long-continued and undisturbed possession. Cf. Dare
v,. Heathcote (1856) 25 L.J. Ex. 245.
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display of state authority (so-called prescription)' up to
the moment of the critical date in 1898 and the acquiescence
by the United States. In regard to acquisitive prescription,
he expressed the view that the recognition of the law-
creating effect of prescription in international law is
particularly necessary in view of the particular needs
of the international society. He further pointed out that
although municipal law is able to recognise, subject to rules
of prescription and protection of property, abstract rights
of property as existing apart from any material manifestation
of them, 'international law ... cannot be presumed to reduce
a right such as territorial sovereignty, with which almost
all international relations are bound up, to the category
160
of an abstract right, without manifestation'. The
claimant must show continuity of enjoyment.
4.3.3 Chamizal Boundary Arbitration"*"^1
In this dispute, in addition to its claim based on
accretion, the United States had also set up a claim to the
Chamizal tract by prescription 'alleged to result from the
undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged possession of
162
the territory since the treaty of 1848. The plea of
prescription was not accepted by the commissioners. They
insisted that possession maintained in the face of constant
opposition had not amounted to prescription. They therefore
160. II RIAA, p.839.
161. [1911] XI RIAA, p.309. Cf. the U.S. Mexican Boundary
Treaty of 1970, 23 UST, p.371. See above, 3.3.4.
162. Ibid., p.317.
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unanimously rejected the United States claim based on
prescription:
In the countercase of the United States, the contention
is advanced that the United States has acquired a good
title by prescription to the tract in dispute ...
Without thinking it is necessary to discuss the very
controversial question as to whether the right of
prescription invoked by the United States is an accepted
principle of the law of nations, in the absence of any
convention establishing a term of prescription, the
commissioners are unanimous in coming to the conclusion
that the possession of the United States in the present
case was not of such a character as to found a pres¬
criptive title. Upon the evidence adduced it is
impossible to hold that the possession of El Chamizal
by the United States was undisturbed, uninterrupted,
and unchallenged from the date of the treaty or the
creation of a competent tribunal to decide the question,
the Chamizal case was first presented. On the contrary,
it may be said that the physical possession taken by
citizens of the United States and the political control
exercised by the local and Federal Governments, have
constantly been challenged and questioned by the
Republij^gf Mexico, through its accredited diplomatic
agents.
Furthermore, in the view of the commissioners, the very
existence of the 1884 Treaty - which had as its object the
resolution of the disputes concerning the boundary
precludes the United States from acquiring by
prescription against the terms of their title, and,
as has been pointed out above, the two Republics
have ever since the signing of that convention treated
it as a source of all their rights in respect of
accretion to Jjag territory on one side or the other
of the river.
The commissioners went on to refer to one of the obvious
difficulties in applying principles of extinctive or acquisitive
prescription in international law: the interruption of the
running of a period of prescription by protest or force.
163. Ibid., p.328 [italics added].
164. Ibid., p.329.
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They observed that another characteristic of possession serving
as a foundation for prescription is that it should be
peaceable:
It is quite clear from the circumstance ... that however
much the Mexicans may have desired to take physical
possession of the district, the result of any attempt
to do so would have provoked scenes of violence and
the Republic of Mexico cannot be blamed for resorting
to the milder forms of protest contained in its
diplomatic correspondence.
In private law, the interruption of prescription is
effected by a suit, but in dealings between nations
this is of course impossible, unless and until an
international tribunal is established for such
purpose. In the present case, the Mexican claim was
asserted before the International Boundary Commission
within a reasonable time after it commenced to exercise
its functions, and prior to that date the Mexican
Government had done all that could be reasonably
required of it by way of protest against the alleged
encroachment.
Under these circumstances, the commissioners thus
concluded that the plea of prescription should be dismissed.
It will be noted that in this, as also in the following cases,
there is a tendency to link the principles of acquisitive
and extinctive prescription, with those of acquiescence and
protest, to make the possible theoretical fulfilment of the
conditions for acquisitive prescription dependent on the
concurrent extinctive prescription of the claim of the state
not in possession by dereliction, acquiescence or estoppel.
165. Ibid. 'Interruption' means some hostile obstruction
and not mere non-user ... Prolonged non-user, however,
may mean that there has been insufficient activity to
support a claim; and, conversely, an interruption may
be too intermittent to be effective. Megarry & Wade,
op. cut., p.848.
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4.3.4 Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain
_ , . T .166Frontier Land
This case primarily concerned the interpretation of
the boundary treaty of 1843 between Belgium and the Netherlands
and the validity of certain acts performed by the boundary
commission established under that treaty. It was a matter
of dispute between the parties as to in which party that
treaty vested sovereignty over certain plots of land in
their border area - and the court was not unanimous on this
point. In addition to relying on an interpretation of the
treaty and of the acts of the boundary commission which was
not accepted by the majority of the Court, the Netherlands
asserted that its sovereignty over the area was established
by acts of sovereignty performed since the date of the
treaty, that is, adverse holding or acquisitive prescription.
The Court, however, looked rather to the other side of the
question: had the rights of Belgium been extinguished in
action? The Court said:
This is a claim to sovereignty in derogation of title
established by treaty. Under the Boundary Convention,
sovereignty resided in Belgium. The question for the
Court is whether Belgium has lost its sovereignty,
by non-assertion of its rights and by acquiescence
in acts of sovereignty alleged to have been exercjged
by the Netherlands at different times since 1843.
166. ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209. See above, 3.3.4.
167. Ibid., p.227.
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The Court considered the evidence offered by the parties:
As to the question whether Belgium ever relinquished
its sovereignty over the disputed plots, it is to be
observed that Belgian military staff maps since their
first publication in 1874 have shown these plots as
Belgian territory. The plots were included in Belgian
survey records from 1847 to 1852, when one plot for
some reason was struck out but restored about 1890,
since which time both have continued to appear
therein.
Transfer deeds relating to one of the plots were
entered in the Records of the Survey a^^gorities at
Baerla-Duc (Belgium) in 1896 and 1904.
The evidence adduced by the Netherlands was considerably more
varied and weighty. The Court summarised it as follows:
The Netherlands relies, in addition to the incorporation
of the plots in the Netherlands survey, the entry in
its registers of land transfer deeds and registrations
of births, deaths and marriages in the communal
register Baarie-Nassau (Netherlands), on the fact
that it has collected Netherlands land tax on the
two plots without any resistance or protest on the
part of Belgium.
Belgium's reply is that it was quite unaware that tax
was being collected; that neither plot was under
Belgian law liable to its land tax, since both plots
were until recent years uncultivated and one of them
was state property ....
Reliance is also placed by the Netherlands upon certain
proceedings taken by the commune of Baerla-Duc (Belgium)
before a Breda (Netherlands) tribunal in 1851. These
proceedings were concerned with a proposed sale of
a large area of heathland over which the commune of
Baerla-Duc claimed to have certain rights of unsufruct.
This area included part of the disputed area.
A further act relied upon by the Netherlands is the
sale by the Netherlands State, publicly announced in
the year 1853, of the heathland above referred to.
The Belgian Government states that the fact that this




The Netherlands also claims that Netherlands' laws,
more particularly in regard to rents, were applied
to houses built on the plots.
Finally, the Netherlands places reliance upon the
grant of a railway concession which related to a
length of line, a small por|jLgn of which passed
through the disputed plots.
The Court, however, regarded this evidence as insufficient
to displace what it regarded as the Belgian sovereignty
established by treaty. It said:
The weight to be attached to the acts relied upon by
the Netherlands must be determined against the back¬
ground of the complex system of intermingled enclaves
which existed. The difficulties confronting Belgium
in detecting encroachments upon, and in exercising
its sovereignty over these two plots, surrounded as
they were by Netherlands territory, are manifest.
The acts relied upon are largely of a routine and
administrative character performed by local officials
and a consequence of the inclusion by the Netherlands
of the disputed plots in its Survey, contrary to the
Boundary Convention. They are insufficient to disp^ge
Belgian sovereignty established by that Convention.
The repeated emphasis which the Court gives to its holding
that Belgian sovereignty over the disputed area was established
by the Boundary Convention suggests that a very different
view might have been taken of the weight of Netherlands'
acts of sovereignty had the position under the Boundary
Convention been thought to be less clear-cut. One may compare
the views of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who took the view
that 'the relevant provisions of the Convention must be
169. Ibid., pp. 228-229. F.E. Krenz, International Enclaves
and Rights of Passage (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1961),
pp. 22, 45, 100, 122, 125.
170. ICJ Reports, p.229.
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considered as void and inapplicable on account of uncertainty
171
and unresolved discrepancy'. He consequently also took
a very different view of the operation of the principle of
prescription in the light of the facts; he said:
it seems proper that a decision be rendered by
reference to the fact, which is not disputed, that
at least during the fifty years following the adoption
of the Convention there had been no challenge to the
exercise, by the Government of the Netherlands and
its officials, of normal administrative authority with
regard to the plots in question. In my opinion, there
is no room here for applying the exacting rules of
prescription in relation to a title acquired by a
clear and unequivocal treaty; there is no such treaty.
It has been contended that the uninterrupted
administrative activity of the Netherlands was due
not to any recognition of Netherlands sovereignty on
the part of Belgium but to the fact that the plots
in question are an enclave within Netherlands territory
and that, therefore, it was natural that Netherlands
administrative acts should have been performed there
in the ordinary course of affairs. However, the fact
that local conditions have necessitated the normal
and unchallenged exercise of Netherlands administrative
activity provides an additional reason why, in the
absence of clear provisions of a treaty, there is no
necessity to disturb the existing state o^affairs
and to perpetuate a geographical anomaly.
Judge Armand-Ugon in his dissenting opinion seems to
have relied upon the same principle when he stated that the
Netherlands had exercised preponderant governmental functions
in respect of the disputed plots, without these having given
rise on the part of the Belgian Government to any protest
or any opposition. This prolonged tolerance of the Belgian
Government has created an indisputable right of sovereignty
171. Ibid., pp. 230-231.
172. Ibid., pp.231-232 [italics added].
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173
in favour of the Netherlands. He further declared that
the Netherlands have over a long period of years exercised
effective, notorious and peaceful possession of the disputed
plots, since the 1843 Convention. This constitutes further
evidence of the status quo of the Netherlands recognised
174
by the Communal Minute of 1836-1841.
175
4.3.5 Argentine-Chile Frontier Arbitration.
The major issue raised in this case concerned the
interpretation of a prior award in 1902 covering a substantial
part of the boundary between Argentina and Chile, of which the
area in dispute in this case formed a small part. Neither
party in fact claimed that any part of the disputed area
had been acquired by 'prescription' as such for both parties
relied on divergent interpretations of the 1902 Award.
Evidence of administration of at least a part of the area,
of the kind adduced by the Netherlands in the Sovereignty
Over Certain Frontier Land Case, was offered by both parties
- and in particular by Chile in respect of the period of
approximately forty years preceding these proceedings - in
support of claims of acting upon - and corollary acquiescence
173. Ibid., p.250. Cf. the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53. See below, 4.5.1.
174. ICJ Reports, 1959, p.245.
175. [1966] XVI RIAA, p.109. For a useful summary, see
R.Y. Jennings, 'The Argentine-Chile Boundary Dispute'
in International Disputes; The Legal Aspects (London:
Europa, 1972), p. 315; Munkman, ojd. cit. , 46 BYIL
(1972-73), pp. 33-41. See below, Ch. 4.
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in - the interpretation of the boundary line in the sense
contended for on the basis of the interpretation of the 1902
Award. No title by prescription independent of the award
was asserted, apparently reliance on prescription would
presuppose that the territory properly belonged (under the
treaties or the 1902 award, or both) to the other party.
This conceptual dilemma illustrates the problems raised by
the failure of customary international law in theory to
admit the validity of evidence of administration of territory
except under the rubric of 'prescription*. This category
simply cannot be applied to factual and legal situations
as ambivalent as they were in this case; but, such evidence
was relevant - the difficulty is to find an appropriate
legal category for it.
4.4 Immemorial Possession
The concept of 'immemorial possession' is in substance
a device to evade difficulties of proof. 'Immemorial' means
176
'beyond legal memory'; the meaning of 'possession' is
a visible possiblity of exercising physical control over
a thing, coupled with the intention of so doing. There are,
thus, three requisites of possession. First, there must be
176. Longum tempus et lonqus usus, qui excedit memorjam
hominum, sufficit pro jure. Co. Litt. 115 a. It was
well recognised that the user of easements and profits
from before the time of legal memory supplied the place
of a grant, and, for that reason, operated to confer
a title by prescription. See Holdsworth, o£. cit.,
Vol. VII, p.343; Megarry and Wade, op. cit., pp. 842-43;
Westlake, International Law, Pt. I, p.94; Jowitt's
Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed. by John Burke (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), Vol. I, p. 938; Cf. R.W.M. Dias,
'A Reconsideration of Possession', 14 Cambridge L.J.
(1956), p.235.
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actual or potential physical control; secondly,there must
be more than mere physical control; this is not possession,
unless accompanied by intention; and thirdly, the possibility
and intention must be invisible or evidenced by external
signs, for if the thing shows no signs of being under the
177
control of anyone, it is not possessed.
Theory and practice, as has been seen, agree upon the
rule that the territory must really be taken into possession
by the occupying state. For this purpose it is necessary
that it should take the territory under its sway (corpus)
1
with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it (animus).
Some agreements, however, explicitly exclude actual present
possession from consideration unless it fulfils certain
conditions. For example, the Guatemala-Honduras Convention
of 1895 provided that:
Possession shall only be considered valid so far as
it is just, legal, and well founded in conformity
with general principles of equity, and with the ^
rules of justice sanctioned by the law of nations.
Among the factors to be taken into consideration, it is
clear that immemorial possession refers to a possession which
has been so long established that its origins are now not only
177. Jowitt's ojd. cit. , Vol. 2, pp. 1387, 1413. Cf. Munkman,
op. cit., 46 BYIL (1972-73), pp. 22, 106.
178. See, e.g. The Delagoa Bay Arbitration, 66 BFSP, p.554;
Clipperton Island Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1105; Island
of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.831; the Legal Status
of Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22.
179. Art. 6 of the Guatemala-Honduras Convention of 1896.
87 BFSP, p.530; see also A.M. Stuyt, Survey of Inter¬
national Arbitrations 1794-1970 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1972), No. 185, p.191 [italics added].
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beyond question but also unknown. It must therefore be
presumed that the possessor is entitled omnia praesumuntur
180
solemniter esse acta. However, Grotius \vas of the
opinion that this is not merely a matter of presumption, but
that this law was introduced by an instituted law of nations,
that a possession going beyond memory uninterrupted, and not
accompanied with any appeal to justice, absolutely transfers
ownership.
The Lake 'Oeil de la Mer' (or 'Meerauge') Arbitration
181
(Austria-Hungary).
This case related to the course of the boundary between
Galicia (formerly under Polish sovereignty) and Hungary. A
reference was made to arbitration under the authority of
182
concurrent Austrian and Hungarian law. The disputed
territory pertaining to Hungary rested on a contract of
sale of land including the disputed area of 1589, which was
ratified by the Emperor in 1594. And the evidence against
the Austrian claim was a declaration made by the adjoint fiscal
180. All things are presumed to have been done rightly.
Co. Litt. 6. The basis of prescription is that if
long enjoyment of a right is shown, the court will
strive to uphold the right by presuming that it had
a lawful origin. Clippens Oil Co. Ltd. v. Edinburgh
and District Water Trustees [1904] A.C. 64 at 69, 70.
This is understood to give title when a state of
affairs exists the origin of which is uncertain and
may have been legal or illegal but is presumed to be
legal. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Inter¬
national Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
p.157.
181. 1902. Award in 8 Revue de droit international de le
legislation comparee, 2nd Series, 1906, p.162, at
pp. 196-212.
182. See compromis of 5 January 1897.
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of Galicia before a delimitation commission, interpreted
as admitting the Hungarian claim. Austria, on the other
hand, relied on various public acts, including a land survey,
exploration by the state of a Galician estate including
amongst its dependencies the area in dispute, and the later
sale of this estate in 1824. On these facts, the tribunal
found this evidence inconclusive, for it showed only that
sovereignty had been claimed and, at various times, exercised
by both parties; nor was there any evidence of acquiescence
by either party in the claim of the other.
The tribunal thus held that there had been no settlement
of the frontier by agreement or any other binding act in
existence between the parties. Having failed so to find,
the tribunal considered the delimitation of the frontier
in the light of immemorial possession. But following the
finding that the area in question had been disputed for a
long time, and that both parties had, for about a century
and a half, exercised sovereign rights there, the requirements
of immemorial possession were held to be as follows:
Immemorial possession is one which has lasted for so
long a time that it is impossible to furnish the
proof of a different situation and which no person
can remember having heard spoken of. Besides such
possession should be uninterrupted and uncontested.
It goes without saying that such possession should
also have lasted up to the moment when the di^ggte
and the conclusion of a compromis took place.




Since the requirements of immemorial possession were not
fulfilled, the tribunal considered that the only solution
ivas to determine the natural frontier on the bases of
equitable principles. As the tribunal required that such
a situation should be uninterrompue and incontestee up to
the date at which a rival claim is made and a compromis
concluded, it is obvious that if such conditions are to be
set such an approach can only have theoretical value
insofar as it provides a legal basis for the possession of
territory by states long established therein, where historical
research cannot bring to light any convincing root of title,
and possession has not been contested in practice. The
territory in question in such circumstances is scarcely
likely to be claimed by another state. In other words,
as far as contentious cases are concerned, immemorial
possession in such circumstances could hardly be questioned.
The point has come up incidentally in several other
cases. For example, in the Grisbadarna Arbitration (Sweden-
Norway), the Arbitral Tribunal held that
it is a settled principle of the law of nations that
a state of things which actually exists and has
existed for ^^onq time should be changed as little
as possible.
184. [1909] Award in Scott (ed) The Hague Court Reports,
1916, p.130. See above, 3.3.2.1.
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In the Gulf of Fonseca Case (El Salvador v. Nicaragua)
the Central American Court of Justice held that the Gulf of
Fonseca 'is an historic bay possessed of the characteristics
of a closed sea', as it combines all the requisites prescribed
by international law as essential, to wit, secular or
immemorial possession accompanied by animo domini, both
'peaceful' and 'continuous' and by 'acquiescence' on the
part of other nations.
In the Island of Palmas Arbitration, Judge Huber found
that the Netherlands had a good title to the disputed island
which it had 'acquired by continuous and peaceful display of
186
state authority during a long period of time'.
In the Clipperton Island Arbitration, the Aribtrator
found that Mexico's claim based on an historic right was
not supported by any manifestation of her sovereignty•over
this uninhabited island. The regularity of the act by which
France made known in a clear and precise manner, her intention
to consider the island as' her territory, is incontestable.
For immemorial usage to have the force of law, besides the
animus occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking
of possession is a necessary condition of occupation. He
thus held that sovereignty over the disputed island belonged
187
to France.
185. 11 AJIL (1917), p.674. See below, Ch. 5.
186. II RIAA, p.869. Beckett concluded that Judge Huber
awarded the Island of Palmas to the Netherlands rather
than to the United States on the basis of prescription.
W.E. Beckett, 'Les Questions D'Interet General au Point
de Vue juridique dans le Jurisprudence de la Cour
Permanente de Justice Internationale', 50 Recueil des
Cours (1934—IV), pp. 218-55.
187. 26 AJIL (1932), p.390. See above, 2.1.
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In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ accepted
that Norway had exercised the necessary jurisdiction over
fjords and chores for a long period without opposition from
other states, a kind of possessio lonqi temporis, with the
result that its jurisdiction over these maritime areas must
be recognised although it constituted a derogation from
183
the rule in force. The Court first laid great stress
upon the historical aspect of the process. It then gave
considerable weight to the fact that the Norwegian straight
baselines system had been long 'tolerated' by other states.
Thus, from the standpoint of international law, the Court
regarded the Norwegian system as having its legal basis in
* ^ * * 189the consent of states.
190
In the Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) Case,
Morocco claimed that its legal ties with Western Sahara at
the time of colonisation by Spain had been put to the ICJ
as a claim to ties of sovereignty on the ground of an alleged
immemorial possession of the territory. This immemorial
possession was based not on an isolated act of occupation
but on the public display of sovereignty, uninterrupted and
188. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.130. In his separate opinion
Judge Hsu Mo stated that 'as for prohibition by the
Norwegian Government of fishing by foreigners, it is
undoubtedly a kind of state action which militates
in favour of Norway's claim of prescription', p.157.
See above, 3.3.2.2.
189. Ibid., p.138.
190. ICJ Reports, 1975, p.12. See above, 3.3.2.2.
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uncontested, for centuries. Was Morocco in possession
of Western Sahara at the time of colonisation by Spain?
Judge de Castro in his separate opinion said that:
The allegation of immemorial possession does not make
proof of possession unnecessary. Immemorial possession
sive indefinita manifests itself as a present and
evident fact, the commencement of which is unknown.
It requires the fulfilment of two conditions. One
condition is positive: proof of a peaceful possessio
during the critical period, exercised for so long
that there is no longer any memory of a time when it
did not exist. The other is negative: the uninterrupted
- that is to say, neither sporadic nor transitory -
character of such possession.
Morocco has not attempted to prove its possession of
Western Sahara at the time of the colonisation by
Spain. It has sought to prove its immemorial
possession by a series of isolated facts which, it
has contended, established continuous possession
by the Sultan of Morocco as sovereign...
The above decisions were partly concerned with the
concept of acquisitive prescription or usucapio. They were
also referred to, however, without elaborating on the
essential requirements. In the light of the jurisprudence
of international judicial and arbitral tribunals, it is
evident that 'immemorial possession' is sometimes referred
to as 'immemorial prescription', but since the element of
'adverse possession' essential to any form of prescriptive
title is not definitely established, such a term only tends
191. Ibid., p.42, para. 90. In support of this claim
Morocco refers to a series of events stretching back
to the Arab conquest of North Africa in the seventh




to confuse. Hitherto it has been difficult fully to
understand the relations between 'immemorial possession'
and 'prescription'. Perhaps the best explanation is that
193 194
given by both P.A. Verkios and D.H.N. Johnson,
who agreed that immemorial possession and prescription
differed in degree, but not in kind. Nevertheless, Johnson
in his well-known article "Consolidation as a Root Title
in International Law", came to the conclusion that to class
what he finally calls 'straight—forward possession' and
'adverse possession' together, was 'fraught with difficulties',
195
and he would now appear to treat them separately.
On closer analysis, it is submitted that immemorial possession
may be considered in two different ways which should be kept
strictly apart.
First, it may be envisaged in a static form as conceived
by Vattel who, distinguishing it from prescription based
upon a presumption of abandonment, stated:
[I Immemorial possession is ... an indefeasible title,
and immemorial prescription is a plea which cannot be
overruled; Both are founded upon a presumption which
the na^ygal law requires to be taken as an incontestable
truth.
193. P.A. Verykios, La prescription en droit international
public (Paris, 1934), p.44.
194. Johnson, o£. cit., 27 BYIL, pp. 335-36.
195. Johnson, o£. cit., 13 Cambridge L.J. (1955), p. 215
at p.220.
196. Le Droit des Gens, Bk. II, Ch. XI, p.158, para. 143.
Vattel says it is the acquisition of domain founded
on a long possession, uninterrupted and undisturbed,
that is to say, an acquisition solely proved by this
possession. Prescription, on the other hand, is the
exclusion of all pretensions to a right, an exclusion
founded on the length of time during which that right
has been neglected. Bk. II, Ch. XI, pp. 156-57, para. 140.
291.
Or, as Rivier puts it, it is consecration of a right rather
197
than a mode of acquisition. It may correspond with a
198
mode of losing state territory. This has already been
illustrated by the Lake 'Oeil de la Mer' (or 'Meerauge')
Arbitration.
Secondly, immemorial possession can be given a more
dynamic interpretation to effect title when the facts are
such that it is uncertain whether occupation or prescription
is applicable. In this case long possession of territory
would be regarded as the most important element, though
there would be no need to delve into antiquity in order
that the possession be 'immemorial'; in fact such a concept
of immemorial possession would amount to a historical
199
consolidation of title.
197. A. Rivier, Principes du droit des gens, Vol. I (Paris,
1896), pp. 182-83.
198. See, e.g., the Brazil-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration
II RIAA, p.11; Island of Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA,
p.829; Rann of Kutch Arbitration, 50 ILR, p.2. See
below, Ch. 4.
199. ' [Consolidation ... may have practical importance for
territories not yet finally organized under a state
regime... is not subject to the conditions specifically
required in other modes of acquiring territory.
Proven long use, which is its foundation, merely
represents a complex of interests and relations which
in themselves have the effect of attaching of territory
or an expanse of sea to given state.'
Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public
International Law, Rev. ed., English trans, by P.E.
Corbett (New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 1968), p.209.
For details, see Blum, o£. cit., Ch. VI, p.241;
Johnson, o£. cit., 13 Cambridge L.J. (1 '55), p.215;
Jennings, o£. cit., pp. 23-28. See above, Ch. 2.
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The meaning of 'historical consolidation of
title' is that it is a perfection of title which originally was
lacking, and which, in the course of time, is granted by a
growing number of states. Ultimately, even an absolute
title is granted with legal effect erga omnes.
The concept of a 'historic title' has traditionally
formed the basis for national claims to appropriate maritime
areas. It has, in particular, been adopted as justification
for the appropriation as national territory — i.e. internal
waters - of bays, gulfs and straits; for long-established
claims to an unusual extent of territorial sea; and for
an unusual method of delimiting the baselines from which
the territorial sea is measured - for, that is, the enclosure
of an unusually large area of sea within the 'internal waters'
of the coastal state. Although, for the resolution of a
dispute concerning a few states, it may be sufficient simply
to show that the rights of the claimant state are enforceable
against an objecting state, it is in the interests of all
maritime states that the title be established erga omnes
in claims to sea areas. There is little room for notions
of 'relative' or of 'inchoate' title. The adjective 'historic'
is to some extent misleading; it carries two implications:
(a) that the claim must be longstanding, that a form of
'immemorial possession' must be shown. (This has misled
some writers to assume that title is founded upon recognition,
or on the acquiescence by states in the claim over a long
period of time);
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(b) it might appear that title is founded upon the principle
of the 'intertemporal law', the principle that a claim to
territory shoxild be tested by the law in force at the time
when the claim was first put forward. On these bases
longstanding claims to maritime territory would reap the benefits
of both a more generous international custom at the
date of their inception, and of the subsequent passivity
of the international community in face of their continued
assertion.
These elements certainly play a part in the formation
of title to maritime areas. The practice both of inter¬
national and of municipal tribunals shows, however, that
considerations of geographical propinquity, economic
interests and national security play at least as important
a role. This would be easily understandable in maritime
areas, even if we accepted criteria such as 'possession'
or 'effectiveness' in land areas. For the extent to which
the authority of the coastal state can make itself felt
continuously in areas which are not capable of settlement
is clearly relatively slight. Moreover, sea areas, especially
bays and gulfs and the inland waters of archipelagoes and
coastal island fringes, are closely connected with the land
domain; the exploitation of their fisheries and natural
resources is of special concern and importance to the
neighbouring mainland, and such areas may often be of the
greatest importance for the defence of the coastal state.
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CHAPTER 4
OTHER MEANS OF ACKNOWLEDGING OR LOSING TITLE TO
TERRITORY
1. Introduction
Limitation and acquisitive prescription - the form
of prescription which gives title by usucapio - has already
been described in the previous chapter. This chapter
therefore deals with acknowledgement and the loss of title
by prescription.
Although the concepts of acquisitive and extinctive
prescription, limitation, derelictio (or abandonment),
acquiescence, estoppel, protest and recognition may be
distinguished in theiry, the application in practice of
any of these principles shows their similarities and close
relationship.1 Thus, the examples already given in Chapter 3
of discussion of the applicability of the principle of
'acquisitive prescription', have shown how closely inter¬
national tribunals have linked the possible acquisition of
territorial sovereignty by adverse possession with the
corollary abandonment of that right (derelictio) or loss
of the right through the combination of the passage of time
1. For details, see I.C. MacGibbon, 'Some Observations
on the Part of Protest in International Law', 30
BYIL (1953), p.293; 'The Scope of Acquiescence in
International Law', 31 ibid., (1954), p.143; 'Customary
International Law and Acquiescence', 33 ibid., (1957),
p.115; 'Estoppel in International Law', 7 ICLQ (1958),
p.468; D.W. Bowett, 'Estoppel Before International
Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence', 33 BYIL
(1957), p.176; Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), Ch. 29, p.485; Antoine
Martin, L'Estoppel en droit international public
(Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1'79), pp. 255-330.
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and acquiescence (evidenced by recognition or failure to
protest), that is, extinctive prescription or limitation.
In effect, international tribunals have found it necessary,
in order to declare that one state has acquired territorial
sovereignty, to examine first whether territorial sovereignty,
has been lost. In the Certain Frontier Land and Argentine-
Chile Frontier Cases it will be noticed later that the
tribunals were unwilling to come to the conclusion that
territorial sovereignty had been lost. A similar approach
will be seen in the following cases; although they turn on
the application of concepts of the category of extinctive
prescription, they are put rather in terms of some form of
consensual acceptance of territorial sovereignty by the
parties - by way of recognition, acquiescence, or estoppel.
These notions are of great significance in the determination
of sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) and the Tiao Yu Tai
(Senkaku) Islands.
2. Limitation and Extinctive Prescription; Municipal and
International Legal Systems
In municipal legal systems, the concepts of limitation
and extinctive prescription may reasonably be distinguished.
They normally appear in the clear and straightforward form
of prescribed time-limits. They take, however, more general
forms which are not dependent upon the passage of strict
periods of time in the concepts of derelictio, or acquiescence,
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laches, and some forms of estoppel, preclusion or personal
2
bar. In municipal legal systems even these relatively
broad concepts tend to be elaborated through relatively
frequent use into technical, restrictive rules. In the
international legal system, however, not only is the
straightforward type of strict period of limitation or
prescription lacking, but even the broader principles
borrowed from municipal law for the purpose of doing
justice in appropriate cases are relatively rarely referred
3
to and are consequently technically undeveloped.
2. For details, see John Rankine, A Treatise on the Law
of Personal Bar in Scotland Collated with the English
Law of Estoppel In Pais (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son,
1921); Sir Rupert Cross, Evidence, 5th ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1979), Ch. 13, p.329; Antoine Martin,
L'Estoppel en droit international public (Paris:
Editions A. Pedone, 1979).
3. The Institute of International Law in its Resolution
on Limitation of Actions in Public International Law
states that this principle is 'long accepted in
arbitral jurisprudence'. 33© Session (La Haye, 1925),
19 AJIL (1925), p.760. In 1925, Professor Schucking
thought that it would be impossible to introduce into
international law rules as to the acquisition of
rights by prescription, or the loss of rights by
prescription, so far as concerned territory. The
prevalent doctrine of international law knew nothing
of institution of prescription. Professor Diena,
however, thought prescription existed in international
law, for example, the Caroline Islands Arbitration
(1885) USFR (1886), p.776 carried out by the Holy See
between Spain and Germany which related to prescription.
Shabtai Rosenne (ed), League of Nations Committee of
Experts for the Progressive Codification of International
Law [1925-1928], Vol. I (New York: Oceana, 1972),
pp. 37-38; Cf. 183-84.
The attitude of international tribunals towards the
concept of prescription, in both its extinctive and its
acquisitive forms, has been consistent only in its ambivalence.
On the one hand, international tribunals have been loath to
admit that in any individual case a state which has once
acquired sovereignty over territory has subsequently lost
such sovereignty by a dimunition in the exercise of the
normal powers of government. On the other hand — as has
already been illustrated in the preceding chapter - there
is a strong line of authorities in favour of awarding sover¬
eignty over disputed territory to that claimant state which
has performed - either exclusively or to a greater degree
than any other claimant - acts of government over the
territory. Yet a third strand of judicial decision is
represented by cases which have turned less on the question
of whether the original sovereignty of one claimant has been
displaced by the acquisition of governmental powers in the
territory by another claimant, than on concepts of acquiescence,
laches or limitation and presclusion or estoppel. These
latter concepts have, as will be seen, operated in either
direction, i.e., both in favour of and against the state
exercising governmental powers in the disputed territory.
3. Recognition, Acquiescence, Estoppel and Protest
It has already been observed, in noting the approach
of international tribunals to the concept of acquisitive
prescription, that claims that territorial sovereignty has
been acquired by adverse prescription have in general been
298.
/
considered from the converse viewpoint; as raising the
issue of whether territorial sovereignty has been lost or
extinguished. For this reason it is certainly arguable that
the theoretical orientation of international laiv is towards
a system of extinctive prescription rather than one of
acquisitive prescription - if it is to be assumed that any
legal system requires one system or the other. Emphasis
on 'possession' or the effective exercise of governmental
authority also lends support to this view. But if this is
correct in international legal theory, it is nevertheless
by no means easy to predict its practical application. For
if we cannot point to one international judicial decision
in which the concept of acquisitive prescription - sovereignty
acquired by possession adverse to a pre-existing sovereign -
has been applied (as distinct from discussed), neither can
we instance a case in which a judicial tribunal has un¬
equivocally held that title to territory once established
has thereafter been extinguished. In general, the problem
has been elided in the cases. Take the Clipperton Island
Arbitration, for example; the arbitrator denied that Spain,
upon whose pre-existing title Mexico relied, had ever
effectively acquired territorial sovereignty prior to the
4
French claim. In the Island of Palmas Arbitration Max Huber
invoked the concept of an 'inchoate' title, which, although
it might comprehend certain rights, might be displaced by
4. II RIAA, p.1105. See above, Ch. 3.
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a subsequent effective possession.^ By prescription, the
extinction of a right which has been tacitly renounced by
action which proves the consent.
In the Chamizal Boundary Arbitration, the possible
extinction of Mexican sovereignty over the disputed areas
was treated as turning not upon the facts of possession,
but upon the evidence for Mexican 'acquiescence' in that
possession and the significance of 'protest' as a bar to
the acquisition of title by adverse possession. And in the
Eastern Greenland Case the PCIJ emphasised the precedence
7
of animus over corpus, of the spirit over the flesh, to
a degree implying the incorporation of the Manichean heresy
into international law.
Two major decisions on territorial disputes turn
fundamentally on the application of principles of this
category: the decision of the PCIJ in the Eastern Greenland
Case, and the decision of the ICJ in the Temple of Preah
Vihear Case. There has, moreover, been a relatively recent
predelicition of v/hich the decision of the ICJ in the Temple
of Preah Vihear Case is the major example for the application
to international legal - and more particularly territorial -
issues of the principles of 'estoppel' (or 'preclusion')
and 'acquiescence'. Dicta in the North Sea Continental Shelf
5. II RIAA, p.831. See above, Ch. 3.
6. I RIAA, p.309. See above, Ch. 3.
7. PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, p.22. See above, Ch. 3.
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judgment, and also in the Argentine-Chile Frontier, Rann of
Kutch and the Beagle Channel awards, suggest that this trend
may be on the wane. It is abundantly clear that a broad
principle employed as a catch-all basis of decision can be
harmful, since it may work injustice in particular cases
and be also inimical to the development and elaboration of
rules of law.
Q
3.1 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway)
In this case, the principles of recognition of territorial
claims and estoppel in particular, merit further attention.
Let us now examine them as follows:
3.1.1 Recognition
The pliability of recognition as a general device
of international law makes recognition an eminently suitable
means for the purpose of establishing the validity of a
9
territorial title in relation to other states. The concept
of recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland by third
states was considered, both in the form of incidental
'recognition* in treaties dealing with other matters and in
the more direct form of responses to the explicit request
for recognition made by Denmark between 1915 and 1921;
second, the effect of recognition by Norway of Denmark's
claims to the whole area of Greenland was also considered.
8. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22.
9. Judge Hsu Mo's separate opinion in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951, p.157; Judge McNair's
dissenting opinion, ibid., p.184; see also Judge Levi
Carneiro's individual opinion in the Minauiers and
Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 104-5.
301.
On reading the judgment of the Court it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that recognition of Danish sovereignty
by the major powers played a considerable part in the decision
which the Court reached. The majority of the interested
states such as France, Japan, Italy, Great Britain and Sweden
show that they agreed to recognise that the Danish sovereignty
extended to the whole of Greenland.^ The fact of such
recognition, together with its concomitant that no other
claim to Greenland had been made before that of Norway in
1931, was repeatedly emphasised by the Court. Perhaps
because there is no easy category of international law which
gives such recognition relevance, the Court rarely explicitly
stated the relevance of this evidence, and to what extent
it was effective against Norway. Logically, even if
accumulated recognitions were not regarded as a mode of
conferring title by the international community, and ipso
facto opposable to even non-recognising states, they still
could not be dismissed as wholly irrelevant to any dispute
over sovereignty. If it does not confer title, recognition
affords at least indirect or circumstantial evidence of a
situation of fact, i.e. that a particular state is, because
it is regarded by other states as administering, in fact
10. See e.g., the French reply on 31st March 1920, the
Japanese reply on 24th June 1920, the Italian reply
on 29th June 1920, the British reply on 6th December
1920, and the Swedish reply on 28th January 1921.
PCIJ Ser. A/b, No. 53, pp. 58-60. See also Judge
Anzilotti's dissenting opinion, ibid., pp. 81-82.
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administering a certain territory. It is not evidence of
sovereignty, but evidence of the exercise of sovereign rights.
On the negative side, it also no doubt estops, at least in
certain circumstances, the recognising state from itself
laying claim to the administration of the same territory.
Also, it affords evidence that the state which is 'recognised'
does claim sovereignty over the area in question.
With respect to a series of commercial conventions
concluded by Denmark which contained stipulations to the
effect that they should not apply to Greenland, the Court
said:
The importance of these treaties is that they show
a willingness on the part of the States with which
Denmark has contracted to admit her right to exclude
Greenland ... The importance of these conventions ...
is due to the suppoet which they lend to the Danish
argument that Denmark possesses sovereignty over
Greenland as a whole [and] To the extent that these
treaties constitute evidence of recognition of her
sovereignty over Greenland jiji general, Denmark is
entitled to rely upon them.
But the Court did not state what impact such recognition has
on the legal problem of title. Similarly, in considering
the Danish requests for recognition of sovereignty over
Greenland from 1915 to 1921, the Court, although emphasising
that such recognition was granted by all those states of
which it was requested except Norway, nevertheless treated
these declarations in the context of estoppel only: as
evidence, that is, of Denmark's claims and representations.
11. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 51-52.
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3.1.2 Estoppel
When an estoppel binds a state to an international
litigation it is prevented from placing reliance on or
denying the existence of certain facts.
12
Although recognition
and estoppel are technically distinct concepts, they inevitably
become confused in practical use. In theory either recognition
it may then be regarded as constitutive of title or declaratory
of a pre-existing title. It may be thought of as unambiguously
constitutive in a case, for example, where sovereignty over
a certain territory is recognised in a treaty of cession;
or as purely declaratory where the pre-existing situation
is unambiguous. But in any dispute the pre-existing situation
or the situation which might be created by the act of
'recognition', is unlikely to be unambiguous. In the context
of any individual disputes 'recognition' is perhaps best
regarded not as having of itself substantive legal consequences
but as evidence of a factual situation or as creating an
estoppel.
12. A state party to an international litigation is bound
by its previous acts or attitude when they are in
contradiction with its claims in the litigation.
Separate opinion of Vice-President Alfaro, the Temple
of Preah Vihear Case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p.39.
13. For details, see Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition
in International Law (Cambridge U.P., 1947); Oppenheim,
International Law, op. clt., p.124; D.P. O'Connell,
International Laiv, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1970), p.127; H. Blix, 'Contemporary Aspects of
Recognition', 130 Recueil des Cours (1970-11), pp. 587-
704; L.L. Kato, 'Recognition in International Law: Some
Thoughts on Traditional Theory, Attitudes and Practice
by African States', 10 Indian JIL (1970), pp. 299-323;
James Crawford, 'The Criteria for Statehood in Inter¬
national Law', "48 BYIL (1976-77), p.93; C.R. Symmons,
'United Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Recognition
of Governments: A Rose by Another Name?' Public Law
(1981), p.249. ~~




In this case, one of the peculiar features was that
until 1931 there was no claim by any state other than
Denmark to sovereignty over Greenland. Indeed, up to 1921
14
no state had ever disputed the Danish claim to sovereignty.
Moreover, the Court considered the various acts of the
Norwegian Government as 'undertakings which recognised
Danish sovereignty over all Greenland'. These were, first,
the 'Hoist Declaration* formally made by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Norway shortly after the cession
of Norway to Sweden under the Treaty of Kiel, abandoning
Norwegian claims to Greenland in favour of Denmark;^5
second, a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements
in which Greenland is described as a 'colony' or a 'part'
of Denmark;^ and third, the 'Ihlen Declaration' of 22 July
1919 that 'the plans of the Royaf [Danish] Government
respecting the sovereignty of Denmark over the whole of
Greenland ... would meet with no difficulties on the part
17
of Norway' was binding on Norway and barred a subsequent
14. PCIj Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.46.
15. Ibid., pp. 64—66. The Convention of 1st September 1819,
signed by the King of Sweden and Norway in his capacity
as King of Norway and the King of Denmark, stated that
'everything in connection with the Treaty of Kiel' of
1814, which inter alia reserved Greenland to Denmark,
was to be regarded as completely settled . Ibid., pp. 66-68.
16. Ibid., pp. 68-69. For discussion, see Bowett, o£. cit.,
33 BYIL (1957), pp. 182, 185; MacGibbon, o£. cit.,
7 ICLQ (1958), p.468; McNair, op. cit., p.485.
17. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 36, 69-71.
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Norwegian attitude contrary to its notified intent. From
the Ihlen Declaration, the Court reached the conclusion that
Norway had debarred herself (or was 'under an obligation to
refrain') from contesting a historic Danish sovereignty
18
extending over the whole of Greenland:
In these circumstances, there can be no ground for
holding that, by the attitude which the Danish
Government adopted, it admitted that it possessed
no sovereignty over the uncolonised part of Greenland,
nor for holding that it is estopped from claiming ...
that Denmark posses^s an old established sovereignty
over all Greenland.
The application of the principle of estoppel, in this case,
is not necessarily conclusive as regards the facts admitted:
its force may vary according to the circumstances. Similarly
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ considered
that the 'prolonged abstention' of the United Kingdom from
protesting against the Norwegian system of straight baselines
in delimiting territorial waters was one of the factors
which, together with the general tolerance of the international
20
community, estopped the United Kingdom's action.
18. Ibid., pp. 68-69. It is noteworthy that there are
universal requirements which limit the operation of
the doctrine of estoppel by conduct. The first
requirement is that the estoppel must relate to existing
fact. The second requirement of an estoppel by conduct
is that it should be unambiguous. The third requirement
is that an estoppel cannot be relied on if the result
of giving effect to it would be something that is
prohibited by the law. Cross, o£. cit. , p.351.
19. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.62 [italics added].
20. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.138. Cf. the Minquiers and Ecrehos
Case, ICJ Reports, 1953, p.71; the Temple of Preah
Vihear Case, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 21-24.
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3.2 Case Concerning the Te pie of Preah Vihear (Cambodia
^ 21
v. Thailand
This was an important dispute over territorial sovereignty.
The basic issue was the question of whether the Temple of Preah
Vihear was situated in territory under the sovereignty of
Cambodia or under that of Thailand. The area in dispute is
described thus in the judgment of the ICJ:
The Temple of Preah Vihear is an ancient sanctuary and
shrine situated on the borders of Thailand and Cambodia.
Although now partially in ruins, this Temple has
considerable artistic and archaeological interest,
and is still used as a place of pilgrimmage. It
stands on a promontary of the same name, belonging
to the eastern sector of the Dnagrek range of
mountains, which in a general way, constitutes the
boundary between the two countries in this region -
Cambodia to the south and Thailand to the north.
Considerable portions of this range consist of a
high cliff-like escarpment rising abruptly above the
Cambodian plain. This is the situation at Preah
Vihear itself, where the main Temple buildings stand
in the apex of a triangular piece of high ground
jutting out into the plain. From the edge of the
escarpment, the general inclination of the ground
in the northerly direction is downwards to the Nam
Moun river, which is in Thailand.
Up to 1904, this area, together with a great part of the
22
Cambodian plain, was in the possession of Siam (now Thailand).
21. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.15. For discussions, see D.H.N.
Johnson, 'The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear'
11 ICLQ (1962), p.1183; Cedric Thornberry, 'The Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)', 26 Modern LR
(1963), p.448; K. Krishna Rao, The Preah Vihear Case
and the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, The Sino-Indian
Boundary Question and International Law, No. 1 (The
Indian Society of International Law, 1963).
22. For a discussion of the historical background see G.M.
Kelly, 'The Temple Case in Historical Perspective',
39 BYIL (1965), pp. 462-472; Alastair Lamb, Asian
Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem, (London:
Pall Mall, 1968), pp. 159 _et_ seq. Cf. Jean-Pierre Cot,
'Affaire du temple de Preah Vihear', Annuaire Francais
de Droit International (1962), p.217.
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During the period, Cambodia came under French rule and the
delimitation of the Cambodia-Thailand frontier was effected
by a series of treaties to which France and Siam were parties.
The reversal of the roles of the parties on either side of
the frontier is strikingly evident in the fact that these
treaties provided for a steady but dramatic regression of the
actual frontier, to the benefit of Cambodia.
The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 13 February 1904, which
delimited the frontier in the region of Preah Vihear, provided
as follows:
The frontier between Siam and Cambodia starts on the
left shore of the Great Lake, from the mouth of the
river Stung Roluos it follows the parallel from that
point in an easterly direction until it meets the
river Prek Kompong Tiam, then, turning northwards,
it merges with the meridian from that meeting-point
as far as the Pnom Dang chain. From there it follows
the watershed between the basins of the Nam Sen and
the Mekong, on the one hand, and the Nam Moun on the
other hand, and joins the Pnom Padang chain the crest
of which it follows eastwards as far as the Mekong.
Upstream from that point, the Mekong remains the
frontier of the Kingdom of Siam, in accordance with
Article 1 of the Treaty of 3 October 1893.
The Thai-Cambodian boundary in the relevant sector of the
Dangrek range, separating the Korat Plateau in Thailand from
the Cambodian plains, was therefore to be a watershed line
between two river basins. It was further provided that the
•delimitation' (more properly, perhaps, 'demarcation') of
the frontier should be carried out by a French-Siamese Mixed
24
Commission under articles 1 and 2.
23. Article 1 of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 15 February
1904, see de Martens, Rec. de Tr. Second Series, Vol. 32
p.130; ICJ Reports, 1962, p.16; ICJ Pleading, 1962,
Vol. 1, p.5 [italics added].
24. Article 3.
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It is not clear whether the boundary in the Preah Vihear
section was in fact demarcated by the Mixed Commission. The
French and Siamese chairmen of their respective sections of
the Mixed Commission visited the area in 1906-1907; maps were
produced by the French members of the Commission to whom the
task of mapping the area had been entrusted in 1907 by the
Siamese, who themselves lacked the requisite topographical
and cartographical expertise. There was, however, no record
of any meeting of the Mixed Commission approving any demarcation.
A second Mixed Commission was set up under a further boundary
treaty of 1907 to demarcate a further adjacent sector of the
Dangrek range; this seems to have assumed that the Preah Vihear
section had already been demarcated. Maps of the frontier
as prepared by a team of four French surveyors - Colonel Bernard
and Captains Tixier, Kerler and de Batz - were published in
France by a French cartographical firm, H. Barrere, with the
line of the boundary marked on them, and were communicated
in due course to the Siamese Government. They included a map
of the Preah Vihear section of the Dangrek range with the
boundary marked on it, and headed 'Dangrek-Commission of
Delimitation betiveen Indo-China and Siam'. This 1907 map
appeared to have indicated the boundary wrongly by placing
the Temple of Preah Vihear on the Cambodian side of the frontier.
The Siamese Government and, later, the Thai Government,
had by their conduct apparently accepted the map frontier line,
and had not shown that any special importance was attached to
the watershed line. Cambodia mainly relied on these 1907 maps
in support of her claim to sovereignty over the Temple. Thailand,
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on the other hand, contended that the map, not formally being
the work of the Mixed Commission, was not binding; that the
1907 map embodied a material error (the frontier line indicated
on it was not the true watershed line); that she had never
accepted this map; and that, if she had ever done so, it was
only because of the mistaken belief that the frontier line
25
shown in the map was the true watershed line.
In view of the following facts, the Court found as
clear proof of the intention of the parties:
(i) the wide publicity given to the map by the Siamese
authorities;
(ii) the silence of the Siamese members of the Mixed Commission
27
on the inaccuracy of the map;
(iii) Prince Damrong, the Siamese Minister of the Interior,
acknowledged the receipt and recognized the character
28
of these maps;
25. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.21.
26. Ibid., p.23.
27. Ibidv, p.24.
28. Prince Damrong thanked the French Minister in Bangkok
for the maps and asked him for another fifteen copies
of each of them for transmission to the Siamese
provincial governors. Ibid., p.24; Judge Wellington Koo,
In his dissenting opinion, considered that the Siamese
Prince Damrong, who expressed appreciation to the
French for copies of the map, v/as displaying a mere
act of normal courtesy which 'cannot reasonably be
considered to support a legal presumption of Siam's
acceptance of the boundary line marked on map Annex 11.
Ibid., pp. 84, 90. However, in his separate opinion,
Judge Fitzmaurice averred that the burden of demonstrating
such an acceptance by Thailand lay with Cambodia and,
though 'acceptance by conduct alone of an obligation
in the nature of a treaty obligation is not lightly to
be presumed, especially where a frontier is concerned',
in his view, and in that of the majority, there was
ample evidence of acceptance. Ibid., p.58.
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(iv) the silence of the Siamese members of the Commission
of Transcription, made no suggestion that the Annex 5
29
map or line was unacceptable;
(v) the Annex 1 map, presumably, was seen by the Governor
of Khukhan province, the Siamese province adjoining
the Preah Vihear region on the northern side, who
remained silent.^
Since all these Siamese authorities - Prince Devawongse,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Damrong, the Minister
of the Interior, the Siamese members of the First Mixed Commission
and the Siamese members of the Commission of Transcription - did
not make any reservation or raise any query about the accuracy
of the Annex 1 map, either then or for many years, they must
thereby be held to have acquiesced. It may be of interest to
compare this point with the criterion adopted by the PCIJ in
the Eastern Greenland Case. The Court held:
a reply of this nature given by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response
to a request by the diplomatic representative of a
foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within
his province, is bind^g upon the country to which
the Minister belongs.
A Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting within the scope of his
departmental affairs, is therefore in a position to bind his
country by a declaration or statement made to the representative






PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.71.
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also recognised that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the
direct agent of the head of the state, had the authority to
32
to make statements which are binding upon the state.
The delivery of the map called for some reaction on
the part of the Siamese authorities if they were not to be held
to have agreed. Instead, the Court said that its receipt had
at the time been acknowledged and that its character had been
recognised by Siam. In the application of the principles
underlying acquiescence, recognition and estoppel, the Court
declared: 'Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset
33 .34
ac potuisset! By its silence, which amounted to acquiescence
or implied acceptance of the map line, and only on this basis,
Thailand was precluded or estopped by her conduct from now
35
rejecting the validity of this line as the boundary line.
32. Ibid., p.91.
33. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.23. He who is silent is deemed to
consent. Assent to an infringement of rights, either
express or implied from conduct, by which the right
to equitable relief is normally lost. Cf. Jenks,
Cent. 32.
34. In a separate opinion, Vice-President Alfaro said
it was a general principle of law which had been
frequently applied by International Tribunals that
"a State party to an international litigation is bound
by its previous acts or attitude when they are in
contradiction to its claims in the litigation".
ICJ Reports, 1962, p.39. Cf. J.D. Heydon, 'Silence
as Evidence', 1 Monash University L.R. (1974), p.53.
35. In Judge Wellington Koo's view, the application of the
principle of preclusion against Thailand was not
justified because Thailand had not made a statement
at any time indicating her acceptance or recognition
of the frontier marked on the Annex 1 map. As regards
the allegation that her silence amounted to her acceptance
or recognition, it is plainly contradicted by evidence
of sustained state activity in the exercise of sovereignty
in the Temple area ... for over forty years, no such
reliance appears to have been placed by France on the
alleged binding character of the said map. ICJ Reports
1962, p.97.
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The Court further held that:
Even if there were any doubt as to Siam's acceptance
of the map in 1908, and hence of the frontier indicated
thereon, the Court would consider, in the light of
the subsequent course of events, that Thailand is now
precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did
not accept it ... It is not now open to Thailand,
while continuing to claim and enjoy the benefits of
the settlemegg, to deny that she was ever a consenting
party to it.
In this case Thailand had several opportunities to
raise with the French authorities the question of the Annex I
map. These consisted of occasional archaeological visits.
In 1930, for example, Prince Damrong, the former Minister of
the Interior and President of the Royal Institute of Siam,
visited the Temple in a quasi-official role. He was received
at Preah Vihear by the French resident for the adjoining
Cambodian province which, on behalf of the Resident Superior,
acted as the host country with the French flag flying. A
clearer affirmation of title on the French Indo-Chinese side
can scarcely be imagined; it demanded a reaction, but Thailand
37
made no protest.
In 1937 Thailand, making its own survey of the area,
became aware that the watershed in the immediate vicinity of
the Temple did not run on the Thai side but on the Cambodian
38
side, roughly following the escarpment. It made, however, no
36. Ibid., p.32 [italics added].
37. Ibid., p.30. Indeed, Prince Damrong had subsequently
communicated with the French Resident in language which
seemed to admit of the construction that French sover¬
eignty was acknowledged.
38. Thailand produced a map of her own in 1937, showing
Preah Vihear as being in Cambodia. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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representations to France on the issue and indeed, continued
to reproduce and use maps showing the Temple as being within
Cambodian territory without any express reservation. In
the Argentina-Chile Boundary Arbitration, Argentina had relied
upon an alleged estoppel which was vreated by a Chilean official
military map, published in 1952, which clearly showed a boundary
line very like the line claimed by Argentina and quite
39
irreconcilable with the line then claimed by Chile.
In 1941, by a treaty concluded under Japanese mediation,
Thailand recovered a good deal of formerly Thai territory in
Cambodia in the area including the Temple. These retrocessions
were annulled after the war, but some questions of boundary
adjustment were referred to by a Franco-Siamese Conciliation
40
Commission. These, however, did not include the Temple.
Looking at the incident as a whole, it appears to have
amounted to a tacit recognition by Siam of the sovereignty of
Cambodia (under the French Protectorate) over Preah Vihear.
In his separate opinion, Vice-President Alfaro engaged in a
valuable discussion of the principles underlying acquiescence,
preclusion and estoppel. He said:
Silence by a state in the presence of facts contrary
or prejudicial to rights later on claimed by it before
an international tribunal can only be interpretec^as
tacit recognition given prior to the litigation.
39. XVI RIAA, p.109. See above, 4.3.5.
40. Thailand, on 12 May 1947, even filed with the Franco-
Siamese Conciliation Commission a map showing Preah
Vihear as lying in Cambodia. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.28.
41. Ibid., p.40.
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Considering the fact that the acceptance of the Annex 1
map by the parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement
and to become an integral part of it, the Court subsequently
decided to hold to the boundary line on the 1907 map rather
than to endeavour to demarcate according to the watershed line
in Article 1 of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 and held,
by nine votes to three, that the Temple of Preah Vihear was
42
situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia.
In his dissenting opinion Sir Percy Spender pointed
out that a mere adoption or acquiescence in Annex 1 by Thailand
did not suffice to establish the Cambodian claim; another
element appeared to be necessary:
The crucial question is ... whether the conduct of
France and Siam ever gave rise to an implied
conventional arrangements between the two states
under which they mutually agreed to be bound by
the frontier line shown on Annex 1 ... This^guestion,
in my opinion, the Court leaves unanswered.
This, he conceded that acquiescence could provide an essential
element in the establishment of a legal right, but it could
not be a unilateral act.
44
3.3 Argentine-Chile Frontier Case
In this case, Chile relied upon a diplomatic correspondence
between the parties in the years 1913-14 in which Argentina, in
seeking only to raise a query about the correctness of the 1903





Dissenting opinion of Sir Percy Spender, ibid., p.130.
XVI RIAA, p.115, at pp. 164-66. See above, Ch. 3.
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that the Rio Encuentro was the stream having its source in
the mountains eastwards of the disputed area, viz., admitting
the essence of what was then the Chilean case. This, said
Chile, constituted an 'estoppel' and it was then, accordingly,
too late to resile from that position. Argentina, however,
countered by relying upon an alleged estoppel created by a
Chilean official military map published in 1952, which marked
clearly a boundary line very like the Argentine claimed line,
and quite irreconcilable with the line then claimed by Chile.
It appears that each party used its estoppel arguments as
counters to the other's estoppel arguments, in the expectation
that the case would be decided on the basis of estoppel.
Estoppel indeed, played a particularly prominent part in the
proceedings. The Court was appreciative that both the 1913-14
letters and the 1952 map were cogent evidence, even if not
the basis for estoppel. In this connection the Court held
that no claim of estoppel was made out by either Party against
the other, and that therefore both parties were free without
estoppel of any kind to put forward their respective contentions
as to the course of boundary.
45
3.4 Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pakistan)
Recognition and acquiescence were, in the circumstances
of the case, matters of evidence rather than exclusively matters
of international law. India and Pakistan differed on the
applicability of international law to the relations between
45. [1968] 50 ILR (1976), p.2. See above, Ch. 2.
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the Paramount Power (British India) and its vassals, such as
Kutch. While Pakistan contended that the relations between
the Paramount Power and the native states were not governed
by international law, and that if international law was ever
applied it was only 'a matter of grace and concession' by
the Paramount Power, India refuted these contentions. The
question was, however, particularly important because after
the British conquest of Sind, the Paramount Power remained
the neighbour of its own vassals, Kutch and the other states
under its suzerainty. Judge Bebler was of the opinion that
international law applied between Great Britain and its vassal
Indian states, and that such principles of international law
as acquiescence and recognition in general, and in boundary
matters in particular, were applicable to the relationship
between the suzerain and the vassals in India under British
rule. The' Chairman, Judge Lagergren explained the relationship
in terms of the relation between Great Britain, as Paramount
Power, and the Indian vassal states and went on to examine
the evidence put before the Tribunal, including the evidence
submitted by India about the acquiescence and recognition of
the Kutch-Sind border by the British authorities and its
impact on the alignment of the boundary.
317.
3.5 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic
of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany
v. The Netherlands)
In these cases, an attempt was made to imply in the
conclusion of the treaties of 1964 and 1965, between the
United Kingdom on the one side and the Netherlands and Denmark
on the other. This seems to be an acquiescence in the
application of equidistance rule. Considering that the
negotiations which culminated in the above treaties and the
annexed Protocol, constitute an indivisible whole, the Court
concluded that the FRG had formally reserved its position:
In both ... cases the Government of the Federal
Republic pointed out to all the Governments concerned
that the question of the lateral delimitation of the
continental shelf in the North Sea between the
Federal Republic and the Kingdoms of Denmark and the
Netherlands was still outstanding and could not be
prejudiced by the agreements conelude^between those
two countries and the United Kingdom.
In a separate opinion, Judge Ammoun observed:
Acquiescence flowing from a unilateral legal act, or
inferred from the conduct or attitude of the person
to whom it is to be opposed - either by application
of the concept of estoppel by conduct of Anglo-American
equity, or by virtue of the^rinciple of ... alleqans
contraria non audiendus est ... is numbered among the
general principles of law accepted by international
law as forming part of the law of nations, and obeying
the rules of interpretation relating thereto. Thus
when the acquiescence alleged is tacit, as it would
be in the present case inasmuch as it is inferred from
the conduct of the party against whom it is relied on,
it demands that the intention be ascertained by the
manifestation^gf a definite expression of will, free
of ambiguity.
46. ICJ Reports, 1969, p.19, para. 12. See below, Ch. 5, 7.
47. 4 Co. Inst. 279; Jenk., Cent. 19. He who makes statements
which are mutually inconsistent is not be be listened to.
48. ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 120-121, para. 22 [italics supplied].
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Judge Padilla Nervo in his separate opinion said that
the principle of estoppel could not be applied against the
FRG. It could not be proved that Denmark and the Netherlands
changed their position for the worse relying on such acts of
the Federal Republic as its Proclamation or its manifestation
of its intention to ratify the 1958 Convention on the
49
Continental Shelf.
As to whether or not a situation of estoppel existed
Judge Tanaka expressed, in his dissenting opinion, the view
that 'there is no evidence that Denmark and the Netherlands
were caused to change position or suffer some prejudice in
reliance on the conduct of the Federal Republic, as is
properly stated by the Court's judgment.'5^
3.6 The Beagle Channel Arbitration (Chile-Argentina)51
In the case, as has already been seen, Chile maintained
that its acts of jurisdiction in relation to three small
islands in the Channel, commencing in 1892 and encompassing
the encouragement of colonisation, the establishment of a land
lease system and the provision of various postal and other
public services as well as the general exercise of civil and
criminal jurisdiction, confirmed that the Chilean interpretation
of the 1881 Treaty was the correct one. This was reinforced
by the fact that Argentina was aware of such activities and
did not issue any protest until 1915. In this context,
49. Ibid., p.96.
50. Ibid., pp. 173-74.
51. Beagle Channel Award, pp. 100-106, paras. 164-75.
See above, Ch. 3.
319.
Argentina's 'continued failure to react to acts openly
performed, ostensibly by virtue of the treaty, tend to give
some support to that interpretation of it which alone could
52
justify such acts'. In other words, the actions taken by
Chile between 1892 and 1915 were deemed to be in pursuance
of its understanding of the treaty.
Argentinian silence in that period underlined its
acquiescence in that interpretation. A situation had been
created which required a reaction on the part of Argentina
in the area in question. The Argentine failure to protest
for 34 years after the conclusion of the treaty, amounted to
an adoption or recognition of the allocation effected by its
53
provisions. The tribunal did not consider it necessary
to enter into a detailed discussion of the probative value
.of acts of jurisdiction in general. Nevertheless, it did
indicate the reasons for holding that the Chilean acts of
jurisdiction, while in no sense a source of independent right,
called for express protest on the part of Argentina in order
to avoid a consolidation of title; whilst these acts did not
create any situation to which the doctrines of estoppel or
preclusion would apply, they tended to confirm the correctness
54
of the Chilean interpretation of the Island clause of the Treaty.
52. Ibid., pp. 105-6, para. 172 [italics supplied].
53. Oral Proceedings, VR/7, p.23; see also Award, p.102,
para. 167.
54. Beagle Channel Award, p.101, para. 165.
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To conclude, it is worth remembering that prescription
is defined as a claim to peaceful, continuous and undisturbed
exercise of territorial sovereignty during a period which is
long enough to create, under the influence of historical
developments, the general conviction that the present condition
of things is in conformity with international order. The
rational basis of prescription rests on consideration of
quieta non movere, but no general rule has been laid down
regarding the length of time and other requirements for
creating a legitimate title. Much depends on the undisturbed
possession and the absence of repeated protests and claims
by other states.
Moreover, it is clear that without any specified limits,
prescription is of little value; whilst no time limit has ^
actually been agreed upon, long continuance of possession
gives support to,territorial claims. Acquiescence and
recognition are assumed with the passage of time: a form of
'estoppel'. It is pertinent to add that there is in inter¬
national law a principle of estoppel which is a principle of
substantive law and not just a technical rule of evidence.
55. See ahove, Ch. 2.
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4. Abandonment or Derelictio
'A thing which is thrown away', Grotius writes, 'is
56
understook by the act to be abandoned'. Abandonment is defined
as a voluntary relinquishment of a known right with no intention
57
to reclaim. By abandonment, rights of property and control
become extinct. A state, as an incident of losing possession,
animo et facto and sine spe redeundi, gives up these rights
of property and control, and no immediate successor is at hand
to keep them alive. In such a case, the territory becomes res
58
nullius and is thereupon open to occupation by any other state.
Indeed, de Wolff adhered to the customary view that:
a thing is abandoned, if only the owner (maitre) does
not wish it to be his any longer ... Whence it would
seem that he who abandons a thing ceases to be the
owner of it, and that, by consequence, the thing
abandoned becomes a thing which belongs to no one;
but so long as the owner has no intention^o abandonhis property, he remains the owner of it.
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Vol. II, English
trans, by Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1925), Bk. I, ii, Ch. IV, S. IV, pp. 221-22.
Menzel v. Liszt, 49 Misc. 2d. 300; 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804
(Sup. Ct. 1966). In the North At3 antic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal said that 'though a
state cannot grant rights on the High Seas, it certainly
can abandon the exercise of its right to fish on the
High Seas within certain definite limits. Such an
abandonment was made with respect to their fishing
rights in the waters in question by France and Spain
in 1763', XI RIAA, p.167, at p.195.
See generally, Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law
Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States
Vol. I (Boston: Little, Brown, 1922), p.197; L. Oppenheim,
International Law, op. cit., pp. 579-91.
Christian Wolff, Institutions du Droit de la Nature et
des Gens (Le ide, Chez Elie Luzac, MDCCLXXII), p.82,
para. CCIII; T. Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined
(London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1846),







This point of view was also shared by Cobbett:
If territory once occupied is abandoned, it will again
become open to occupation by other states. At the
same time, if there has once been a definitive approp¬
riation, the title accruing therefrom ivill not only be
capable of being kept alive by an exercise of authority,
less effectual than that required to establish an
original claim; but even if there should be a temporary
withdrawal, or even if the exercise of all authority
should be temporarily relinquished, the territory will
be deemed to be opened to resumption or recovery within
a reasonable time,paving regard to the circumstances
of the withdrawal.
It may be taken, just as wild bird or wild animal is taken,
by seizing it with the intention to keep it; but it is expressly
laid down that a wild animal, if it escapes, ceases to be the
property of the captor; and the question is, therefore: is
the captured property so reduced to possession as to make it
altogether the property of the captor?^ There was much
dispute on this point among the interpreters of Roman law.
Some, including Grotius, maintained that the proper test was
time. In his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius observed:
60. Pitt Cobbett, Leading Cases on International Law, 4th ed.,
Edited by Hugh H.L. Bellot, Vol. I (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1922), pp. 111-12. Cf. Grotius, o£. cit.,
Bk. I. ii. Ch. IV. S. IV. pp. 221-22: '... unless the
circumstances of the case are such that we ought to
think it was thrown aside [abandoned] for the moment
and with the intention of recovering it later'.
61. Cf. Henry Sumner Maine, International Law (London: John
Murray, 1888), p.95. In Roman law the acquisition of
an object abandoned by its owner is construed, not as
derelictio cum occupatio, but as traditio incertae
personae. See David Daude, 'Derelictio, Occupatio
and Traditio: Romans and Rabbis', 77 ILQ (1961),
p.382.
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Because a length of time exceeding the memory of man
is in its essential character practically infinite,
a silence for that length of time will always seem
sufficient to imply abandonment of ownership, ^gless
there are very strong reasons to the contrary.
Lapse of time, combined with the facts, may amount to
63
abandonment of a title, either before or after presentation.
The effect of the lapse of time upon the property or right
of a state relative to another is the real subject for
consideration. If this is borne in mind, two consequences
can be seen to follow: first, that it would be contradictory
to deny that prescription can function as a mode of acquisition;
and second, that it is both inexpedient and impracticable
to attempt to define a precise period of time within which
title of national possession can be said to have become
64
established.
62. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, op. cit., Bk. I. ii. Ch. IV.
S. VIII. p.224 [italics added]. As the Island of Palmas
Arbitration indicates, the doctrine of inchoate title,
though the uncertainty concerning a length of time for
which the title lasts is a disadvantage, does, on the
whole, make a useful contribution to international juris¬
prudence by forbidding unscrupulous attempts to jump
the first occupant's claim before he has time to make
his occupation effective. II RIAA, pp. 846, 868-69.
63. Cf. The Case of Sarropulos v. Bulgarian State, the Greco-
Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 14 February 1927,
4 Annual Digest of Public International Law (1927-28),
Case No. 173, p.263.
64. Vattel expresses a wish that such a period could be
ascertained by means of treaties. See E. de Vattel,
De Droit des Gens, Bk. II, Ch. XI, p.159, para. 151.
Cf. Treaty of Washington between Great Britain and
Venezuela on 2 February 1897: 'Adverse holding or
prescription during a period of fifty years shall make
a good title'; see 20 Hertslet's Commercial Treaties,
p.943.
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What duration or lapse of time, then, is required by
the canons of international jurisprudence in order to
constitute a laivful possession? First, the title to a
territory in the actual possession of the state, however
originally obtained, must be peaceful.^5 Secondly, a
forcible and unjust seizure of a territory, with the inhabitants
overpowered by the use of superior physical force, is a
possession which, lacking an originally just title, requires
66
the aid of time to cure its original defect; if the nationals
so subjugated succeed, before that cure has been effected, in
shaking off the foreign yoke, the state is legally and
morally entitled to resume its former position in the
international cummunity.
65. This rule seems to mean that the first assertion of
sovereignty must not be a usurpation of' another's
subsisting occupation nor contested from the first
by competing acts of sovereignty. See, e.g. Island of
Palmas Arbitration, II RIAA, p.830; the PCIJ held in the
Eastern Greenland Case that mere protests from Norway
did not alter the peaceful character of Denmark's display
of state activity. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.62.
However, Judge Levi Carnerio in his separate opinion
of the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case took the view that a
protest can preserve and keep alive the claim of the
protesting Government, so that no inference of abandonment
can be drawn from its silence, or of recognition of
the other party's position. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.106.
For details, see MacGibbon, o£. cit., 30 BYIL (1953), p.293.
66. This seems to have done in the case of Israel, which in
1948 by Military force occupied territory beyond that
which the United Nations Resolution of 1947 had assigned
to it. The United Nations seems to have acquiesced
not only in Israel's forcible acquisition of territory,
but also in that country's refusal to accept the policy
for the internationalisation of Jerusalem.
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'Prescription', as has been acknowledged, is part of
lex lata, and international tribunals have indeed applied
the rules of prescription, on account of lapse of time, with
regard both to acquisition of territorial title and to loss
67
of the right to advance a claim.
In contrast, the title of 'prescription' in another
state is often, though not necessarily, founded on the presumed
abandonment of the possession by the original owner. To
interpret the absence of state activity by one state where
there has been adverse possession by another as a presumption
of abandonment is merely to invoke 'prescription' under
another name, though the inactivity of a state may serve
to interpret the consequences of a specific act which might
have been an abandonment, for instance the British withdrawal
68
from the Falkland Islands in 1774. Thus, it is difficult
67. It is interesting to note that in 1927 the Greco—Bulgarian
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in the case of Sarropoulos v.
Bulgarian State, affirmed that prescription being an
integral part of every system of law must be admitted
in international law and that 'it ivas the duty of an
arbitral tribunal ... to consider the principles of
international law in regard to prescription and to
apply it in the specific case submitted to it'.
4 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International
Law Cases (1927—28), Case No. 173, p.263. For further
discussion, see King, 'Prescription of Claims in
International Law', 15 BYIL (1934), pp. 88-89, 94-95.
68. Attempts have been made to retain possession without
actual presence. So when, in 1774, Great Britain
retired from the Falkland Islands, the Commander
thought it well to leave behind a leaden plate as a
marK of possession.
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to base them upon a presumed abandonment ^ as de Vattel says:
... a long silence can with difficulty support a lawful
presumption of abandonment. Consider ... that as the
ruler of the society has not ordinarily the power to
alienate what belongs to the state, silence on his
part, even did it suffice to raise a presumption of
abandonment as far as he is concerned, does not impair
the rights of the nation or his successors. The
question will then be whether the nation has failed
on its part to assert the right which its ruler was
silent about and^^as thus given its implied approval
of his attitude.
Goebel, Jr., points out the importance of abandonment
where the adverse possessor cannot show the bona fides
necessary for 'prescription' as bona fides was not an
71
essential element for 'occupation'. However, it has been
argued that bona fides is not an essential factor in 'prescription'
and therefore the significance of abandonment is thereby
72
reduced. Yet it is relevant in so far as the differences
between occupation and prescription are concerned, because
if the land reverts to the status of terra nullius it may
legally be occupied by any state without the need for presc¬
ription to run. Therefore, the distinction between occupation
69. De Wolff defines usucaption to be an acquisition of
domain founded on a presumed desertion and caused by
long silence. See Wolff, op. cit., p.201, para. MCXXXIX.
Cf. Vattel, o£. cit., Bk. II. Ch. XI, pp. 156-59. In
Roman law, 1usucaptio indicated ownership acquired by
enjoyment through long though undefined lapse of time'.
Little, Commissioner, John H. Williams v. Venezuela
(1885); Moore, International Arbitrations, IV, p.4181.
70. Le droit des gens, op. cit., Bk. II, Ch. XI, p.159,
para. 148.
71. Julius Goebel, Jr., The Struggle for the Falkland Islands:
A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (New Haven:
Yale U.P., 1927), pp. 422-23.
72. Alexander George Roche, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case
(Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1959), pp. 35-36.
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and prescription may make a considerable difference as to
the final result of the case.
Although cases of abandonment in recent times are
extremely rare, history knows of several such cases. But,
very often, when such occupation of abandoned territory has
occurred, the former owner protests and tries to prevent the
new occupier from acquiring it. The island of Santa Lucia
and the Falkland Islands, referred to in the following sections,
are the obvious examples. When an occupied territory is
definitely abandoned, either voluntarily, or in consequence
of expulsion by natives or by a state which does not attempt
73
to set up a title for itself by conquest, the right to its
possession is lost, and it remains open to occupation by
states other than that which originally occupied it. But
when occupation has net only been duly effected, but has been
maintained for some time, abandonment is not immediately
supposed to be definitive. If it has been voluntary, the
title of the occupant may be kept alive by acts, such as
the assertion of claim by prescriptions, which would be
insufficient to confirm that mere act of taking possession;
73. Traditional international law recognised 'conquest'
as a mode of acquisition of territory. But in so far
as contemporary international law is concerned, conquest
can no longer be regarded as a legitimate mode of
acquisition. See above, Ch. 1.
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and even where the abandonment is complete, an intention to
return must be presumed for a reasonable time. If it has
been involuntary, the question of whether the absence of
the possessors shall or shall not extinguish their title
depends upon whether the circumstances attendant upon, and
following, the withdrawal suggest the intention, or give
grounds for reasonable hope, of returning. Where intention
is relied upon in the case, it is evident that, as abandonment
was caused by the superior strength of others who might
interfere with the return, a stronger proof of effective
intention must be afforded than on an occasion of voluntary
abandonment, and that the effect of a mere claim, based




4.1 Island of Santa Lucia
Santa Lucia, one of the Antilles Islands, was discovered
by Columbus on his fourth voyage in 1502. In 1605 the first
attempt at settlement was made by Englishmen, most of whom
were killed by the Caribs. In 1638 there was another attempt at
74. W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed.,
edited by A. Pearce Higgins (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1924), pp. 140-41. 'Abandonment should not be deemed
to have ta'en place without ample proof of a design
to give up all rights of property and control. Such
a design might be established by evidence of long-
continued and complete neglect of the territory, or
of a formal and appropriate declaration of policy.' Hyde,
op. cit., pp. 198-99.
75. James Lorimer, The Institute of the Law of Nations,
Vol. II (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood &
Sons, 1884), pp. 584-85; Hall, o£. cit., p. 140;
Moore, International Law Digest, I, p.298.
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settlement by English settlers who were overcome by the
Caribs in 1640. France, considering the territory to be
terra nullius, took possession of it in 1650 as unappropriated
territory and made a treaty with the Caribs; but an English
force under Lord Willoughby attacked the French, driving
them into the mountains, and held the island until it was
restored to the French by the Treaty of Breda on 21 July
76
1667. When the English withdrew, the French came down
from the mountains and effectively re-occupied the island.
No further attempt was made by England to recapture the
island, but nevertheless for many years she asserted that
she had not abandoned it sine spe redeundi, and that therefore
France in 1650 had no right to consider it terra nullius nor
77
to treat the island as abandoned territory. In February
1762 the island was re-captured by the English, but it was
given back to France once more by the Peace Treaty of Paris
78
of 1763. Britain finally relinquished her claims to Santa
79
Lucia in the Treaty of Versailles in 1783. Considering the
76. Arts. 12, 13, Knapton, Gen. Coll. of Treaties, 2nd ed. I
(London, 1732), p.127. Alternately in French and English
hands till treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, when it was
declared neutral in 1748.
77. In Her Majesty's Attorney-General for British Honduras
v. John Bristowe and Charles Thomas Hunter, Sir Montague
E. Smith held that: 'In 1798 during the war which commenced
in 1796, an attack was made by the Spanish forces on the
English settlers in British Honduras, which, was repulsed,
and the Spaniards withdrew from the territory. There
appears to be no trace of their having re-occupied it.
Down to this time the sovereignty of the territory had
... remained in the Crown of Spain; but no future attempt
was made by the Spanish Crown to restore its authority,
and its dominion seems to have been tacitly abandined'.
2 BILC p.403, at p.406. Cf. R.A. Humphreys, The Diplomatic
History of British Honduras 1638-1901 (Oxford U.P., 1°16),
pp. 1-19.
78. Article 9. Martens, Rec, de Tr., I (1817), pp. 104-112.
79. Article 7. Martens, Rec. de Tr., III (1818), p.519.
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shortness of the period of English occupation of the island,
and the length of the period during which the English made
no attempt to re-establish occupation, there can be little
doubt that the French were justified in supposing the English
to have abandoned the island and that the occupation would
. , . , 80be good in law.
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4.2 Bay Islands
This group of small islands lies in the Gulf of Honduras
off the north coast of Honduras. It includes Roatan or Coxin's
Hole, which is the largest; Guanaja or Bonaca, the next in
size; and the smaller Barbareta, Elena, Morat, Puercos and
Utila islands. In the seventeenth century the islands were
occupied by the British who, in 1742, erected forst on Roatan
and settled on Guanaja as well as Utila. On 19 May 1744
Philip V of Spain ordered the governor of Honduras to destroy
the settlements. There were allegations of subsequent
abandonment by Great Britain, but in 1835 and again in 1841
80. Hall, o_q. cit. , p. 140; Cf. Island of Palmas Arbitration
II RIAA, pp. 838-39. By the Treaty of Amiens in 1802
St. Lucia was yet again returned to France but it was
captured by Britain in 1803 and has remained under
British rule since then. By the Treaty of Paris in 1814
it was excepted from territories restored to the French
by whom it was formally ceded. St. Lucia finally ended
up as a British colony. For a brief history see
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1966), p.857. Now independent
state after brief period of status as an associated
state under the West Indies Act of 1967 (UK).
81. On 17 July 1852 the British Colonial Secretary issued a
proclamation that 'Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen
has been pleased to constitute and make the islands of
Roatan [Ruatan], Bonacea, Utilla, Barbarat, Helene and
Mozat to be a colony to be known and designated as 'the
Colony of the Bays Islands'. See Moore, International
Law Digest, III, pp. 140-145. Cf. Gordon Ireland,
Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in Central and
North America and the Caribbean (Harvard U.P., 1941),
p.316.
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the British landed on Roatan, hauled down the Honduran flag,
and raised that of Great Britain. On 20 March 1852 Lord
Aberdeen declared the Bay Islands to be a British Colony
82
under the Governor of Jamaica. The United States, however,
under the Clayton—Bulwer Treaty of 1850, urged Britain to
abandon the Bay Islands Colony and to return all the islands
83
to the sovereignty of Honduras. Finally, a treaty was






In 1820 a claim to the Falkland Islands (Isles Malvinas)
82. 41 BFSP 156; Pari. Papers, 1856 (15 & 16 Vict.), H.C.
XLIV No. 141, pp. 1-5;' ibid., LX, No. 2052, p.223;
Martens, Rec. de Tr., XV (1857), p.204.
83. 42 BFSP 186; 47 ibid., 661-667; 50 ibid., 143-328.
Moore, International Law Digest, III, pp. 140-45, 163,
166, 169, 181.
84. 49 BFSP 13; Martens, Rec. de Tr. XVI (1860). II, 370.
De Wolff says that 'occupation ... gets a new value
from abandonment, so that the occupation, which was
before illegal, when there is an abandonment by consent
of the owner, now begets a right, by force of the tacit
consent of the owner'. See Christian de Wolff, Jus
Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, Vol. II,
English trans, by Joseph H. Drake (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1934), pp. 49-50, para. 84.
85. Report by Herbert Jenner to the Earl of Aberdeen with
regard to the Falkland Islands on 28 July 1829, F.O. 83.
2227: Argentina. See Lord McNair, International Law
Opinions, Vol. I (Cambridge U.P., 1956), pp. 229-301;
20 BFSP, pp. 314-15; 338-55; 1197-99; 22 BFSP, p.1394;
23 BFSP, p.193; 31 BFSP, p.1004; Moore, International Law
Digest, I, p.876; C.H.M. Waldock, 'Disputed Sovereignty
in the Falkland Islands Dependencies', 25 BYIL (1948),
p.311; Robert-Wray, o£. cit., p.865; David Cross, 'History
of Sovereignty Claims', The Times, 15 April 1982, p.7.
86. In a debate in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly
on a draft resolution concerning the Falkland Islands
(UN Doc. A/C.4/L.802) the U.K. representative, Mr. Brown,
requested/
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was made by the United Provinces of Rio de la Plate, (later
the Argentine Republic) as successors to the rights of Spain.
These islands, though not then newly discovered, were first
claimed on behalf of his country by the French explorer
37
Louis Antoine de Bougainville in the year 1764. In the
following year Commodore John Byron took formal possession
of the Islands in the name of His Britannic Majesty and formed
a settlement in West Falkland at Port Egmont, on the small
island called 'Saunders'.
About 1765, de Bougainville, acting in a private capacity,
formed a settlement in East Falkland, which he called 'Port
Louis'. In 1766, at the protest of Spain, France relinquished
this settlement and ceded the islands to Spain, which later
abandoned the islands in 1806. De Bougainville was compensated
for his expenses and a Spanish force took possession of the
requested that the Spanish term 'islas Malvinas' in
the text should be translated into English as 'Falkland
Islands'. It should be understood that the terms used
could have no implication so far as the question of
United Kingdom sovereignty over the islands was concerned.
UN Gen. Ass., 20th Sess. 4th Committee, 1556th Meeting,
Provisional Summary Record, A/C.4/SR, 1556, p.5.
87. It is stated by the British that the Falkland Islands
were first discovered by an Englishman Captain John
Davis in 1592. Goebel, Jr., however, maintains that
the first discovery of the islands is uncertain.
Goebel, Jr., o£. cit., Ch. 1.
88
Port, changing its name to Puerto de la Soledad. It did
not appear that the English or Spanish settlements knew of
each other till 1769, when an English vessel, cruising off
the island, met a Spanish vessel belonging to Soledad. The
Commanders of the British and Spanish settlements thereupon
laid claim to the exclusive sovereignty of the islands on
behalf of their respective Crowns, and warned the other
party to leave the coast. On 4 June 1770, a Spanish force
89
attacked and took by force the British settlement. After
serious discussions which ensued between the two Courts, the
Spanish Ambassador, Prince de Masserano, disavowed the act
of violence and agreed in 1771 to restore the settlement and
Port Egmont to the British, the state in which it existed
before the attack; but concluded his note with a declaration
that 'this restoration cannot, nor ought it to, in any way
affect the question of the prior Sovereignty of ... the
Falkland Islands'.
88. Great Britain contended that France by her retirement
had confessed her lack of title and hence could transfer
no rights to Spain. 'If', as the U.S. Charge d'Affaires
at Buenos Aires expressed it in a note of 10 July 1832,
'the doctrine assumed by Spain was correct, that France
had not even a colourable title, the cession was a nullity
and it is a fact that Spain so regarded it, and relied
on her prior rights alone, in her subsequent controversy
with Great Britain'. 20 BFSP, p.345.
89. Argentina was at that time still one of the dominions of
the Kingdom of Spain. Buccarelli, the Governor of Buenos
Aires, without instructions sent a task force of five
Spanish frigates to seize the Falklands. Philip Howard,
'The First Missile to Hit the Falklands', The Times,
2 June 1982, p.10.
90. Cf. Report by Herbert Jenner on 28 July 1829, F.0. 83.
2227: Argentina. See McNair, ojd. cit. , Vol. I,
pp. 299-300.
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In 1774, in pursuance of economic reductions in the
91
Naval Department, the British left the islands but
Lieutenant Clayton, commanding Port Egmont, had a lead plaque
engraved and attached to the fort, in order to preserve
the rights of the Crown of Great Britain; it read as follows:
Let it be known to all nations that the Falkland Islands,
as well as this Fort, the Magasins, Quays, Havens, Bays
and Creeks, thereof, belong by right only to His Most
Sacred Majesty George III, King of Great Britain, France
and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, C. In witness
whereof this Plaque has been fixed and the flags of
His Britannic Majesty deployed (unfurled) and hoisted,
as a mark of possession, by Samuel William Clayton, ^
Officer commanding the Falkland Islands, 22nd May, 1774.
It was argued on behalf of Argentina that the withdrawing
of the British troops in 1774 amounted to a virtual abandonment
of the right originally acquired, and that the islands in
question reverted to their original state, and were thus
terra nullius and open for occupation. In a note of 19
November 1829, the British Government stated that:
91. IThe withdrawal of His Majesty's force from these islands,
in the year 1774, cannot be considered as invalidating
His Majesty's just rights ... when the Governor took
his departure, the British flag remained flying, and
all those formalities were observed which, indicated
the rights of ownership, as well as an intention to
resume the occupation of the territory, at a more
convenient reason'. A Note was instructed by Woodbine
Parish, the British Charge d'Affaires, on 19th November
1829 to the Argentine Republic. 20 BFSP, pp. 346.
92. Martens, Rec. de Tr., III (1818), p.252; see also
Wyndham A. Bewes, 'The Monroe Doctrine and Entangling
Alliances', 13 Transactions of the Grotius Soceity
(1927), p.16.
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The withdrawal of His Majesty's forces from these
islands, in the year 1774, cannot be considered as
invalidating His Majesty's just rights. That measure
took place in pursuance of a system of retrenchment,
but the marks and signals of possession and property
were left upon the islands: when the governor took
_ his departure, the British flag remained flying, and
all those formalities were observed which indicated
the rights of ownership, as well as an intention to
resume the occupat^gn of the territory, at a more
convenient season.
9
Moreover, Herbert Jenner, a member of Doctors' Commons
was of the opinion that:
The Symbols of property and possession which were left
upon the Islands sufficiently denoted the intention of
the British Government to retain those rights which
they had previously acquired over them, and to reassume
the occupation of them when a convenient opportunity
should occur ... the rights acquired by this Country
[Great Britain] to the Falkland Islands [are] not
invalidated by any thing that h^g occurred previous
or subsequent to the year 1774.
93. A note of diplomatic protest from Woodbine Parish, the
British Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, to the
Government of Buenos Aires. 20 BFSP, pp. 346-47.
94. In the sixteenth century it became common for the Crown
when confronted with a question of international law to
seek the 'Opinion of the Doctors' - the opinion of the
group of civil lawyers who were members of the college
located near St. Paul's Cathedral known as Doctors'
Commons. See A.D. McNair, 'The Debt of International
Law in Britain to the Civil Law and the Civilians', 39
Transactions of the Grotius Society (1953), p.183;
G.D. Squibb, Doctors' Commons: A History of the College
of Advocates and Doctors of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977); For H. Jenner see Appendix III, p.201.
95. F.O. 83. 2227: Argentina. On 20 December 1832, possession
was formally resumed on behalf of Great Britain. See
McNair, o£. cit., pp. 300-1. Cf. 2b BDIL, p.613; the
U.K.'s Application filed with the ICJ on 4 May 1955:
UN Monthly Chronicle (December 1965), pp. 83-84. A
corollary to Argentina's claim to have succeeded to
Spanish rights in the Falklands is her appeal to the
principle of uti possidetis. Metford, however, argued
that uti possidetis was not formally adopted until the
Congress of Lima in 1848, by which time the Falklands
had again been under British control for a number of
years. See C.J. Metford, 'Falklands or Malvinas?'
44 International Affairs (1968), p.463, at pp. 472-73.
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It will be noted that abandonment is a question to be
decided, inter alia, by intention and that the simple leaving
of a possession without the intention of definitely abandoning
96
it, is net sufficient. This view was also expressed by
the League of Nations in 1924 - when they examined the
97
Mosul frontier, between Turkey and Iraq - to the effect
that a district, the actual possession of which has been
lost by a state, remains in international law an integral
part of the territory of that state and is subject to that
state's legal sovereignty until that state renounces its
rights. However, an intention to abandon may be spelled
out from the circumstances of the supposed withdrawal of
state authority. In Judge Huber's view, which was formulated
in the Island of Palmas Arbitration, the 'continuous and
peaceful display of territorial sovereignty' is a way of
acquiring title to territory, and conversely, failure to
'display state activities' or failure to protest against
competing acts of sovereignty, openly performed, would suffice
*
to indicate that the requisite degree of state activities in
. . 98
maintaining the title was not being shown. As has been
96. Cf. The Clipperton Islands Arbitration, II RIAA, p.1108;
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B,
No. 53, p.22. See above, Ch. 3.
97. Frontier between Turkey and Iraq (Advisory Opinion) Case
[1925] PCIJ Ser. B, No. 12; Ser. E, No. 2, p.140.
See above, Ch. 2.
98. II RIAA, pp. 838-39. Cf. I.C. MacGibbon, 'The Scope of
Acquiescence in International Law', 31 BYIL (1954),
p.143, at p.168. See above, Ch. 3.
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mentioned, the Argentine claim is based, inter alia, on a
possession uncontested and uninterrupted for fifty-nine
years (1774-1833). It is recognised that where there has
been no reaction to adverse assertions of sovereignty
which were (or ought to have been) known to the original
owner, such failure to protest (in circumstances in which
both judicial authority and practice of states afford ample
indication of the necessity for protest to preserve the
right in question) ought to bear the necessary implication
99
of an intention to abandon the right.
After maintaining the settlement at Soledad, on East
J
Falkland, for forty years, the Spanish Governor Martinez
also abandoned it in June 1806 on hearing that Buenos Aires
was in the hands of the British. Both the East and West
Falkland Islands were therefore without permanent occupation
for some years.
99. Conversely, von Martens observed that 'abstaining from
the use of a right, or keeping silence while another
makes use of it, can never have the force of consent,
except we are obliged to speak of, or make use of, a
right; ... As long as there is no engagement, simple
presumption, founded on our silence or inaction, cannot
deprive us,.in spite of ourselves, of our rights for
the time to come. Prescription does not, then,
constitute a natural right; ... if it be presumed that
they have consented to it; still we are so far from
the object as ever, as long as the time required for
losing or acquiring by prescription remains undetermined,
and as long as the universal law of nations cannot
determine it with precision'. G.F. von Martens, The
Law of Nations, trans, from the French by W. Cobbett,
4th ed. (London: William Cobbett, 1829), pp. 64-65.
In 1010 a revolution broke out in the Spanish Vice-
royalty of Rio be la Plata which resulted in its complete
severance from Spain.100 Ultimately, the Spanish territories
in Latin America became the seat of several independent
states, successors to the Spanish sovereignty, among them
the Argentine Republic.
On 9 July 1816, the United Provinces of the Rio de la
Plata declared their independence from Spain. They claimed
to succeed Madrid in sovereignty over the Falklands. On
6 November 1820, the United Provinces took possession of
Soledad, on the arrival of their representative, Colonel
Daniel Jewett, in the name of 'the Supreme Government of
the United Provinces of South America'.
In 1826, with the approval of the Buenos Aires Government
Lewis Vernet (a German who had long resided in Latin America
and was later appointed governor of the islands) initiated
101
the revival of the Port Louis settlement.
100. Principal events leading to the occupation of the
Falkland Islands by Britain were the revolt of Argentina,
a Vice-royalty, against Spanish rule, beginning in 1810
and bringing the province to virtual independence over
the next decade. J.E.S. Fawcett, 'The Falklands and
the Law', The World Today (June 1982), p.204; On 1
November 1836 Capt. George Grey wrote: 'Either in 1811
or 1812, the Provinces of the River Plate having declared
their independence, the Spanish garrison was withdrawn
and for a number of years there appeared to have been
no inhabitants at all and no nation claiming authority'.
G. Grey, 'Letter from CLEOPATRA at Sea', (1836 Manuscript
rpt.) in The Observer Review, 2 May 1982, p.25.
101. 26 BDTL (1967), p.46.
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On 10 June, 1829, the Government of Buenos Aires issued
102
a decree asserting sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.
British protests followed; a note of 19 November 1829
stated that:
These rights, founded upon the original discovery
and subsequent occupation of the said islands, acquired
an additional sanction from the restoration, by His
Catholic Majesty, of the British settlement, in the
year 1771, which, in the preceding year, had been
attac ed and occupied by a Spanish force, and which
act of violence had led to much angry discussion between
the Governments of the two countries ... The undersigned,
therefore ... formally protests, in the name of His
Britannic Majesty, against the pretensions set up by
the Government of Buenos Ayres, in their decree of
the 10th of June, and against all acts which have
been, or may thereafter be done, to the prejudice of
the just rights of sovereignty which heretofojg^have
been exercised by the Crown of Great Britain."
In his note of 8 January 1834, Lord Palmerston, the British
Foreign Secretary, declared that
the Government of the United Provinces could not
reasonably have anticipated that the British
Government would permit any other state to exercise
a right, as derived from Spa^.g^ which Great Britain
had denied to Spain herself.
102. 'When by the glorious revolution of the 25th May, 1810,
these provinces separated themselves from the dominion
of the Mother Country, Spain held the important possession
of the Islands of Malvinas (Falkland Islands)... this
possession was justified by the right of being the
first occupant, by the consent of /the principal maritime
Poxvers of Europe, and by the proximity of these islands
to the continent which formed the Vice-*royalty of Buenoq^
Aires, unto which government they depended. For this
reason, the Government of the Republic, having succeeded
to every right which the mother country previously
exercised over these provinces, and which its Viceroys
possessed, continued to exercise acts of dominion in
the said islands, its ports, and coasts, notwithstanding
circumstances have hitherto prevented this Republic
from playing the attention to that part of the territory
which ... it demands ...' 20 BFSP, pp. 314-15.
103. Ibid., pp. 346-47.
104. 22 BFSP, p. 1386.
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In 1832 Great Britain reasserted its sovereignty by
sending out a naval expedition. The United Provinces'
Commander was ordered to quit; he acquiesced. In January
1833, the British landed and replaced the United Provinces'
105
flag with the British flag. After the British had again
taken possession, the Argentine Minister, while demanding
the restoration of the Islands as having been Spanish, and
so passed on to the Argentine Confederation as a result of
its assertion of independence, asked for the restoration
of East Falkland 'which never was English'.
If the Argentines are right in asserting that they
were forcibly removed from the islands and that they
have been debarred ever since, and that they have
taken all rea^g^able and practical steps, such as
protestations to keep their claim alive, then
clearly they have a case in law which requires to be
answered.
105. 20 BFSP, pp. 1196-97.
106. It may be construed as a distinct implication of the
British right to West Falkland which were unreservedly
handed over to the British when Spain abandoned its
possession of the islands in 1771, and the first
assertion of a claim on behalf of the Buenos Ayres
Government was made in 1820 by a native of Pennsylvannia.
Subsequently, the United States supported the claim
of the British Government.
107. In certain circumstances, a protest can preserve and
keep alive the claim of the protesting state, so that
no inference of abandonment can be drawn from its
silence, or of recognition of the other state's
position. Cf. Judge Carneiro's separate opinion,
the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports, 1953,
p.106. The Argentinian protests could be used as a
means of preventing the maturing of the British
prescriptive title. For details, see E. Bruel 'La
protestation en droit international', 3 Nordisk
Tidsskrift fur International Ret (1932), p.76;
MacGibbon, ojd. cit., 30 BYIL (1953), pp. 293-319.
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The British claim is based on discovery, settlement,
use and continuous occupation by its citizens for the last
108
one hundred and forty-nine years (1833-1982). The
Argentine claim is, however, based on: (a) the acquisition
by treaty of all Spanish rights; (b) possession begun
and exercised; (c) recognition, tacit and explicit, by
other states; (d) prescription, 'resulting from a possession
uncontested and uninterrupted for fifty-nine consecutive
109
years' (1774-1833). It thus asserted that - from the
aspect of the acquisition of a prescriptive right following
an originally 'illicit seizure' - the British claim was
illegal ab initio.
108. The British claim is based on (i) prior discovery;
(ii) formal possession by Commodore Byron in 1765;
(iii) actual occupation in 1766; (iv) the disavowal
by Spain, in 1771, of the dispossession of the British
colony the year before and the subsequent restoration
to Great Britain without any secret understanding that
Britain was pledged to restore the islands to Spain
at a subsequent date; (v) the formalities observed
on the evacuation in 1774, 'calculated not only to
assert the rights of ownership, but to indicate the
intention of resuming the occupation of the territory
at some future period'. See Ellery C. Stowell and
Henry F. Munro, International Cases, Vol. 1 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1916), p.215.
For details of the British title asserted, see 2 a
BDIL, Ch. 5 above.
109. Calvo, op. cit., pp. 417-25, para. 287. 'Accordingly',
says Calvo, 'the Argentine Republic maintains and will
maintain over the islands in question, as long as the
usurpation of its sovereign domain by the British
Government continues, the absolute right of ownership
which Argentina holds impliedly from Spain ... and the
exercise of which would never have been interrupted
save for the abuse of force on the part of Great Britain'.
See Stowell and Munro, o£. cit., pp. 216-17.
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It should be noted that the non-recognition of territorial
gains resulting from an 'unlawful' use of force has its
origins in the League of Nations Resolution of 1932"*" ^
and in similar declarations, made for the most part by
groups of American states, during the inter—war period.
When, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the
Falkland Islands were seized from Argentina, conquest was
112
not forbidden under inter-temporal law. It is therefore
submitted that the principle ex injuria jus non oritur seems
to have been rendered valid only in contemporary international
law.
110. Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations,
11 March 1932. See 26 AJIL (1932), p.343. It is often
maintained that the Covenant of the League of Nations
changed the foundations of law in respect of the place
of war in international law. The Covenant not only
created express obligation to use peaceful means to
settle disputes, but also provided the means of limiting
the use of force by sovereign states.
111. In the Chaco Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, the
other nineteen American Republics declared on 3 August
1932 that they will not recognise any territorial
arrangement of this controversy which has not been
obtained by peaceful means nor the validity of territorial
acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation
or conquest by force of arms. For details, see W.R.
Garner, The Chaco Dispute (Washington D.C.: Public
Affairs Press, 1966).
112. Khan has recently stated that prescription was not
universally recognised at the time of the British
repossession of the Falklands in 1833; this, however,
is not the case in relation to conquest which was a
legal basis of title until the early twentieth century.
Kabir-ur-Rahman Khan, 'Letters to the Editor', The
Scotsman, 1 June 1982, p.8. Professor Fawcett says
that the taking of the Falkland Islands by force in
1833 was not contrary to the law applicable at that
time. Fawcett, op. cit., The World Today (June 1982),
p.204. Cf. Khan, 'The Falkland Islands Conflict:
Images and Reality of International Law' The Old College
Times, No. 6 (Summer Ed. 1982), p.11. Cf. Gaston Jeze,
Etude Theorique et Pratique sur L'Occupation Comme
mode d'acquerir les Territories en Droit International,
(Paris: V. Giard & E. Briere, 1896), Livre III, pp. 59
et sea.
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Having re-occupied the Falkland Islands by force in
1833, the United Kingdom claims that 'by open continuous
and peaceful occupation for over a century and a half it
113
has acquired a clear prescriptive title'. Khan suggests
that this contention relies on three essential assumptions.
First, that prescription, at the time of the forceful
occupation, was not a universally recognised rule of inter¬
national law. The second assumption, according to Khan,
is that consent of the vanquished is either unnecessary or
is simply assumed to be given by virtue of occupation.
Khan argues that neither assumption is valid since Travers
Twiss denies automatic operation of prescription, and notes
that it is not the superior power of the conqueror which
gives right to his conquest, but the consent of the conquered
which ultimately sanctions the Conqueror's right.
Khan then summarises the Argentine claims based, inter
alia, on prescription. Thirdly, Khan alleges the UK is
contending that legal rules remain static and should be
examined in an insulated' manner impervious to any changing
norms and international standards, whereas most of the
114
world does not seem to share this 'sophistry'.
113. UN Doc. A/5800/Rev. 1 (1965).
114. Khan, o£. cit., The Scotsman, 1 June 1982, p.8.
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In view of the historical facts there are, however, at
least four points to be made concerning the above point of
view. First, the British claim, as has already been shown,
is not solely based on prescription, but also on discovery,
use, settlement, conquest and effective occupation. Secondly,
Khan seems tc have contradicted himself: he states that
the British claim is based on prescription, which he says
was not part of general international law in the first half
of the eighteenth century; he then says prescription is one
of the bases for the Argentine claim. Thirdly, Khan seems
to believe that all Spanish rights include the sovereignty
of all the Falkland Islands. He does not, however, note
that, following the continuous settlement at Puerto de la
Soledad for forty years, the Spanish Governor Martinez
abandoned the islands in June 1806. Fourthly, Khan seems
to acknowledge, at first, the validity of inter-temporal
law, which was recognised by international tribunals in
the Island of Palmas, Eastern Greenland and Minquiers and
Ecrehos Cases; later, he states that:
Most of the world does not seem to share this sophistry
... that legal rules remain static and should be
examined in an insulated manner impervious
changing norms and international standards.
It seems Khan confused 'inter-temporal law' with the
'transformation of international law'. This kind of
transformation is one of the difficult paradoxes of inter¬
national law, due to the absence of a legislator at the
115. Khan, ojd. cit. , The Scotsman, 1 June 1982, p.8.
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international level, and to the dependence of international
law on international practice for its development. It is
through international practice that a new general international
law may come into existence. While normally insisting on
ex injuria non oritur, it is nevertheless accepted in
international law that breaches of the law may bring about
changes in the law, or that a state may, by breaches of
the law acquiesced in by other states, build up a prescriptive
or historic right to behave or act in a certain way, as
the ICJ found in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.
116. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the Court held
that, assuming that a valid legal case existed (by
reason of the geographical character of a coast,
generally; or the existence of an island infringe
for measuring territorial waters from straight base¬
lines, drawn between txvo outlying points, instead of
from low-water marks along the coast), Norway had
acquired a historic right to establish straight base¬
lines in certain regions, irrespective of the general
law. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.116. It is precisely
through international practice that the straight
baselines rule has been established. The following
states employ straight baselines: Bangladesh (1974),
Bulgaria (1951), Cambodia (1957), Canada (1964),.
People's Republic of China (hereafter cited as PRC)
(1958), Dominican Republic (1952), Ecuador (1938,
1951), Egypt (1951), Finland (1956), Iceland (1948),
Indonesia (1971), Iran (1934), Ireland (1959), the
Maldives (1975), Mexico (1919), Norway (1812), the
Philippines (1961), Portugal (1966), Saudi Arabia
(1949), Venezuela (1956), Yugoslavia (1948).
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The Republic of Argentina was constituted in 1853,
and her claims to the Falklands remained muted throughout
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Was
this silence enough to imply acquiescence, just as the
ICJ declared in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, that
117
silence was tantamount to acquiescence? Or was there
sufficient protest to prevent such a presumption?
In 1946, the election of President Juan Peron of
Argentina led to a strong revival of his country's claims
118
to the Falkland Islands.
Increasing pressure from Argentina during the 1950s
and early 1960s led to a review of the position of the
_ _. _ ^ 119Falklands.
In 1972 the Argentinians struck oil in Patagonia and
a number of U.S. and Canadian companies applied to Argentina
for oil exploration licences in the seas surrounding the
Falkland Islands. A geological survey was made, but the
position under international law concerning which state
117. ICJ Reports, 1962, p.24.
118. General Peron got the idea from the success of Nazi
wartime propaganda about the Falkland Islands among
the German-trained Argentine officer corps. See
E.W.H. Christie, 'Letters to the Editor', The Times
1 June 1982, p.15.
119. In 1962, the United Kingdom representative (Mr. Sankey)
said in the United Nations that the United Kingdom
Government had no doubts concerning its sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands. UN General Assembly, 17th
Sess. Fourth Committee, 1414th Meeting (7 December 1962),
UN Doc. A/c.4/SR.1414, p.4. See also UN General
Assembly 18th Sess. 1267th Plenary Meeting (29
November 1963), Provisional Verbatim Record, A/PV.
1267, p.81; UN General Assembly, 20th Sess. 4th Committee,
1558th Meeting (16 November 1965), Provisional Summary
Record, A/C.4/SR.1556, p.5.
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can licence prospectors remains obscure. On the one hand,
the discovery of oil might exacerbate the problem of the
Argentine claim; but, on the other hand, it would be
120
indefensible not to exploit the area's natural resources.
On 24 November 1974, the Argentine press reacted
emotionally to reports from London that the British Government
might be considering granting exploration rights to a
121
Canadian oil company off the Falkland Islands. Two
Argentine parliamentary groups suggested that force be
used to ensure that any oil deposits found around the
J
Falklands be exploited solely by the Argentine state-owned
oil company, YPF. It a rich oil field does exist off the
120. Richard Luce, 'The Falkland Islands', 20 The World
Today (1972), pp. 98-101.
121. It is interesting to compare this point with what
J. Harding, the Queen's advocate, said in August
1854 viz. that: 'Her Majesty's Government will be
legally justified in preventing foreigners from
whale and seal fishing within three marine miles (or
a marine league) from the coast, such being the
distance to which, according to the modern inter¬
pretation and usage of nations a cannon-shot is
supposed to reach'. Colonial Office 885/3, p.21,
No. 19. See D.P. O'Connell and Ann Riordan, Opinions
on Imperial Constitutional Law (Australia: The Law
Book Co. Ltd., 1971), p.159. Under Art. 1(b) of the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf islands
are entitled to their own continental shelves. See
below, Ch. 6.
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islands, the Falklands issue might become more problematic
122
for both the British and Argentine governments.
The Falkland Islands lie on the continental shelf of
123
the South American continent. In reply to a question
concerning whether the British Government regarded the
sovereignty over the continental shelf around the Falkland
Islands as pertaining to Britain, the then Minister of
State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Goronwy—
Roberts, answered in the affirmative. He answered, 'Yes,
124
my Lords'.
122. The Times, 20 December 1974, p.6. Lord Shackleton's
Survey of the Falkland Islands in 1976 drew attention
to the United States Geological Bulletin's estimate
that the Falkland Islands might yield up to nine times
the proven North Sea oil reserves. See Lord Shackleton,
'Letters to the Editor', The Times, 14 January 1980.
See also Sir Bernard Braine, 'Letters to the Editor',
The Times, 6 February 1980. Cf. The Guardian, 25
February ln82, p.7; The Scotsman, 24 March 1982, p.5;
Sir Donald Logan, 'Resources of the Falkland Islands;
the Falkland Islands' Dependencies and Antarctica',
in The Falkland Islands Dispute: International Dimensions
(London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs),
pp. 9-13.
123. James Fawcett, 'Legal Aspects' in The Falklands Dispute:
International Dimensions op. cit., pp. 5-8.
124. Hansard, H.L. Debs., Vol. 398, Col. 591: 6 February
1979.
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Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf and under general international law, the United Kingdom
may exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf
appertaining to the Falkland Islands, for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its mineral resources in the
same way as in its other territories. Licences may be
issued for these and similar purposes by the governor
under local legislation within the 100 fathom line, as
defined by the Falkland Islands (Continental Shelf) Order
125
in Council 1950.
On 13 May 1978 an Argentine Navy aircraft and ship
intercepted a Polish fishing trawler near the Falklands
claiming that they were in Argentine waters. The United
Kingdom Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office replied:
We accept neither the Argentine sovereignty claim
to the Falklands nor any Argentine right to exercjgg
maritime jurisdiction on the basis of that claim.
125. Hansard, H.C. Debs., Vol. 963, Written Answers, Col. 308:
23 February 1979. In 1°78 consent was given to two
United States survey companies to carry out a seismic
survey around the Falkland Islands. No licences have
been isued for the prospecting or extraction of oil.
See also ibid., Vol. 946, Written Answers, Cols. 658—59:
23 March 1978. For Falkland Islands (Continental Shelf)
Order in Council, see UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/l (1951),
p.305. See below, Ch. 5.
126. Hansard, H.C. Debs., Vol. 951, Written Answers, Cols. 246-
47: 8 June 1978.
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It is clear that the United Kingdom has no doubt about
its sovereignty over the islands despite the fact that the




4.4 The Delaqoa Bay Arbitration (Great Britain - Portugal)
In 1823 England occupied, in consequence of a so-called
cession from native chiefs, a piece of territory at Delagoa
Bay which Portugal claimed as part of the territory owned by
her, maintaining that the chiefs concerned were rebels. The
dispute was not settled until 1875 when the case was submitted
to the arbitration of the President of the French Republic.
The award was in favour of Portugal, since the interruption
of the Portuguese occupation in 1823 was not to be considered
as abandonment of a territory over which Portugal had
129
exercised sovereignty for nearly three hundred years.
127. Hansard, H.L. Debs., Vol. 415, Col. 191: 26 November 1980;
Col. 199: 27 November 1980; Col. 342: 2 December 1980.
See also H.C. Debs., Vol. 994, Written Answers, Col. 201:
27 November 1980; H.C. Debs., Vol. 995, Cols. 195-96:
2 December 1980. On April 2nd 1982 Argentina seized
the Falklands by force; the Soviet Union is at present
edging towards recognition of Argentine sovereignty
over the Falklands. See Hella Pick 'Soviet Union
propaganda's move to recognise Argentine sovereignty',
The Guardian, 29 May 1982.
128. [1875] 66 BFSP, p.554; Pari. Papers XLII 1875; A. de la
Pradelle et N. Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages
Internationaux, III (Paris, 1954), p.596.
129. Cf. Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land (Belgium v. Netherlands)(1959), ICJ Reports, 1959,
p.209. See above 4.3.4.
351.
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4.5 Island of Trinidad
The island of Trinidad had been discovered by Columbus
131
on 31 July 1496 and a Spanish governor had been appointed
in 1532. In 1595 it was captured by Sir Walter Raleigh. It
was ta'en from the English by Spaniards in 1676, and foreigners
of all nations were invited to settle on the island. In 1781
the island was re-taken by a Eritish force. The Portuguese
Government objected to the occupation in 1782, claiming
the island as their own. In 1783 a Spanish Proclamation
encouraged foreigners to settle and this resulted in a large
influx of population, particularly of Frenchmen, from the
other parts of the Caribbean. In 1785 a Portuguese garrison
of 200 men was stationed on the island and remained till 1795.
From that date, the island remained quite uninhabited for a
century. After its independence in 1825, Brazil, as the
successor of Portugal, claimed that her right of ownership
of the island had never been given up and it was declared
by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs that:
130. The right of the British Government to Trinidad depends
upon the fact that the island was unoccupied, and belonged
to the territory of no state when possession was then
taken by Britain. Report by Webster and Finlay to the
Foreign Office on 24th October 1895. McNair, o£. cit. ,
Vol. I, p.301; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I,
pp. 299-301.
131. Roberts-Wray, o£. cit., p.860; Lorimer, op. cit., Vol. II,
pp. 582-83. It is also believed to have been discovered
by the pilot, Martin Vaz, in 1503. See Despatch from
the Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Phipps, 18 November
1895. McNair, o£. cit., Vol. I, p.303.
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Abandonment depends on the intention of relinquishing,
or on the cessation of physical poiver over the thing,
and must not be confounded with simple neglect or
desertion. A proprietor may leave a tiling deserted
or neglected and still retain his ownership. The
fact of legal possession does not consist in actually
holding a thing, but in having it at one's free disposal.
The absence of the proprietor, neglect, or desertion
does not exclude free disposal, and hence animp
retinetur possessio ... Possession is lost corpore
only when the ability to dispose of a thing is rendered
completely impossible, after the disappearance of the
status whi^^permits the owner to dispose of the thing
possessed.
As occupation is acquired by the combination of two elements,
of fact and intention, so by dissolution of these elements,
or by the manifestation of a contrary fact and intention, it
133
may be extinguished or lost.
134
4.6 Navassa Island
Navassa Island lies about thirty miles west of Cape
Dammarie at the extreme southwest point of Haiti and eighty-
five miles east northeast of Morant Point at the east end
of Jamaica. In 1857 Peter Duncan, an American citizen,
discovered the island and took possession of it. On 8
December 1859 the United States Secretary of State, under
the Guano Acts, issued a certificate for the protection of
American citizens engaged in removing guano. Haiti claimed
132. Mr. Carvalho, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
to Mr. Phipps, 21 July 1895. 1 USFR (1895), pp. 65-67.
Moore, International Law Digest, I, pp. 299-301;
Hyde, op. cit., p.198.
133. Cf. Dig. L. 17, 153; XLi, 2, 8; see also Robert Phillimore,
Commentaries upon International Law, Vol. I (London:
William G. Benning & Co., 1854), Ch. XVI, p.307.
134. Ireland, o£. cit., p.331; Moore, International Law
Digest, I, pp. 366, 577.
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the island in 1858, but her protest was denied by the United
States on the ground that Haiti had never occupied or asserted
jurisdiction over the island before 1857. In the years 1878
to 1901 the receiver of the Navassa Phosphate Company of New
York sold its rights. The Haitians, however, holding
that the island had been abandoned by the United States,
prevented representatives of the purshasers from landing.
At this, the United States declared to Haiti that she had
not abandoned the island. It is observed that the title
of prescription in another state is often, though not
necessarily, founded on the presumed dereliction of the
possession by the original owner. This presumption, on
the other hand, is liable to be repelled by evidence of a
136
state of facts wholly inconsistent with such a presumption.
In this case, if Haiti suffered by the United States in the
latter's unilateral arrangement to deal with the right of
possession in question as belonging to the United States,
and made no protest against this arrangement, she may be
137
held to have acquiesced in the transaction.
135. In 1898, the island was seized and held by Haitains or
Dominicans, who prevented a representative of the Navassa
Phosphate Co. from landing and declared that the island no
longer belonged to the United States. Despatch of Mr. Dent
U.S. Consul at Kingston, July 10, 1898, MSS. Dept. of State
36 MS. Cons. Let., Kingston. See Moore, International
Law Digest, I, pp. 577-78.
136. Cf. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, op. cit., Bk. I, ii, Ch. IV,
S.VII.
137. For discussion, see MacGibbon, op. cit., 30 BYIL (1953),
pp. 293, esp. 306 e_t seq; Karol Wolfke, Custom in the
Present International Law (Wroclaw: Polskiej Akademii Nauk,
1964), pp. 157-65; Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of




4.7 Island of Palmas Arbitration (Netherlands - U.S.A.)
Sovereignty over the Island of Palinas (or Miangas), an
island situated in the Pacific Ocean between the archipelagoes
of the Philippines and the former Dutch East Indies, was
claimed by the United States of America and by the Netherlands.
The United States, as successor to Spain, claimed that its
original title to the island was based on Spanish discovery
and on contiguity to the Philippines. The Netherlands,
however, maintained that her laim was founded on certain
agreements with the native prince for the establishment by
the Netherlands of suzerainty over his territories; that
Spakn had voluntarily abandoned the island; and that the
island had then reverted to the status of res nullius. The
Arbitrator, Max Ruber, however, did not find that there had
been any formal abandonment by Spain of her title. What
he found was that the Netherlands had acquired sovereignty.
It was not necessary that it should be established as having
begun at a precise d'ate. It sufficed that it existed at the
critical date. Abandonment is not necessarily dependent on
a formal act: it may arise simply from the fact. Title is
abandoned by reason of letting another state acquire it.
138. II RIAA, p.831, at pp. 846, 850; Cf. Reply of
Mr. Fitzmaurice on the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case,
ICJ Pleadings, 1953, Vol. II, p.367; MacGibbon, o£. cit.,
7 ICLQ (1958) , p.508.
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The process that causes the one to occur also causes the
other to occur, and the title to territory is abandoned by
letting another state assume and carry out for many years
all the responsibilities and expenses in connection with
the territory concerned. The effect of acquiescence may
amount to abandonment. Such a course of action, or rather
inaction, disqualifies the state concerned from asserting
the continued existence of its title. In these circumstances,
the original title, however good it may once have been,
will inevitably be lost by non-use, and the title will be
acquired by that state which exercises it. Thus, in the
view of Judge Huber, proof even of a perfect title in past
139
times will not, by reason of the inter-temporal law, be
enough to establish title to territory today, because inter¬
national law has developed a specific rule that sovereignty
must be continuously maintained. This principle was
implicitly (and to some extent explicitly) endorsed by the
140
ICJ in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case. It has two aspects:
139. The validity of title acquired by virtue of customary
international law must be judged in the light of the
law which obtained at the time of acquisition or
purported acquisition of title. Cf. Island of Palmas
Arbitration, II RIAA, p.845; Minquiers and Ecrehos
Case, ICJ Reports, 1953, p.56. For its application
to a question of title see Grisbadarna Arbitration
[1915], J.B. Scott, The Hague Court Reports, I, 1916,
p.121. See above, Ch. 3.
140. ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47.
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(i) discontinuity as constituting (or as evidence of)
tacit abandonment of title by desuetude, or as leading to
loss of title be derelictio; and (ii) discontinuity as
operating to prevent the acquisition of any completed title




4.8 Clipperton Island Arbitration (Mexico - France)
This dispute between Mexico and France concerned
sovereignty over a small uninhabited lagoon reef in the
Pacific Ocean. It had been annexed formally to France in
the name of the Emperor Napolean III by a proclamation of
1858. No further act of sovereignty was shown by France,
or by any other power until 1897. In November of that year,
a protest was made by France to the United States when it
was found that three American citizens were gathering guano
141. Principle of continuity may be an element not merely
in the retention, but in the establishment of title.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Points of
- Substantive Law, Part II', 32 BYIL (1955-56), p.66.
In the Guatemala-Honduras Boundary Arbitration, the
Tribunal held that 'the continued and unopposed assertion
of administrative authority by either of the colonial
entities ... is entitled to weight and is not to be
overborne by reference to antecedent provisions or
recitals of an equivocal character', [1933] II RIAA,
p.1324. In the Delagoa Bay Arbitration, the French
President found in favour of Portugal because Portugal
made, inter alia, continual claims to sovereignty over
the Bay and upheld her claims by force of arms against
both the Dutch and the Austrians. 66 BFSP, p.554.
Discontinuance implies abandonment, see Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon in the Case Concerning
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd.
(Belgium v. Spain) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ
Reports, 1964, p.129.
142. [1931] II RIAA, p.1105. English trans, in 26 AJIL
(1932), p.390. See above, 2.1.
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on the island and had hoisted the American flag. On 13
December 1897 a Mexican gunboat, The Democrata, landed on
the island, ivith marines under Captain Teofilo Genesta,
who found the same three Americans and made them lower the
American flag and raise in its place the Mexican flag.
France then claimed the island on the basis of its annexation
proclamation, while Mexico founded its claim on its succession
to a Spanish title of sovereignty which o iginated from
discovery. The dispute was referred to the arbitration of
the King of Italy, who awarded Clipperton Island to France
on the grounds inter alia that French sovereignty had been
acquired effectively in 1858 and had not been abandoned.
As the Award stated:
There is no reason to suppose that France has subsequently
lost her right by derelictio, since she never had the
animus of abandoning the island, and the fact that she
had not exercised her authority there in a positive
manner does not imply the forfejj^re of an acquisition
already definitively perfected.
In this case a period of thirty-nine years had elapsed since
1858, when France had first taken possession; during that
time, no acts of sovereignty had been exercised by any other
state. Under these circumstances, it was quite right to
hold that France's original prise de possession still
143. II RIAA, pp. 1110-11; 26 AJIL (1932), p.394.
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144
subsisted. However, once a clear title based on occupation
is held to have been finally and definitively established, it
would also seem to result from this Award that abandonment
as such would normally have to be express or manifest;
abandonment could only be presumed from mere inactivity,
continued for long enough to constitute abandonment or leading
to an irresistable inference of intention to abandon, even
. - , • 145
xr only acquxescence.
144. In the words of the PCIJ 'no other Power was putting
forward any claim to territorial sovereignty in Greenland,
and in the absence of any competing claim the King's
pretensions to be the sovereign of Greenland subsisted'.
Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.47.
Professor Waldock believes the Award of the Clipperton
Island Arbitration is correct because France did, in
fact, exercise sovereignty again before Mexico attempted
for the first time to assert a claim to the island in
1897* But France's complete inactivity for thirty—nine
years, even without any external manifestation of
sovereignty, would surely have been fatal to her claim
in the face of an intervening exercise of sovereignty
by another state. Waldock, o£. cit., 25 BYIL (1948)
p.325.
145. Professor Waldock said that 'an established title may
be lost not only by voluntary abandonment but by mere
inactivity, that is, by failure to display state
activity with a continuity appropriate to the circumstances'.
See Waldock, o£. cit., 25 BYlL (1948), p.321. Cf.
Fitzmaurice, ojd. cit. , 32 BYIL (1955-6), p.67. Professor
MacGibbon dealt with the matter in these words '... proof
of an intention to abandon a title once perfected may
be provided by the continued acquiescence of a state
confronted by competing acts of sovereignty*.
MacGibbon, o£. cit., 31 BYIL (1954), p.168.
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4.9 The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case
In this case, it had been contended on behalf of Norway
that, with the disappearance of the two Nordic settlements of
Eystribygd and Vestribygd during the fourteenth century,
Norwegian sovereignty was lost and the whole of Greenland
147
reverted to terra nullius. The legal basis suggested for
this view was voluntary abandonment. The PCIJ held inter
alia that there was nothing to show any definite renunciation
on the part of the Kings of Norway or Denmark which could
be regarded as voluntary abandonment, therefore, abandonment
148
in this case was irrelevant. But as the Judge Ad hoc Vogt
rightly observed in his dissenting opinion:
Even admitting that an ancient sovereignty is not
forfeited by dereliction, unless the animus is
abandoned as well as the corpus possessionis, it must
be conceded that the sovereignty could not be still
in being some centuries after the extermination of the^g
ancient colonists and the cessation of communications.
146. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.22. See above, Ch. 3.
147. Likewise, in the Clipperton Island Arbitration between
France and Mexico, the Arbitrator held that abandonment,
by which territory may revert to the status of res
nullius, will not be presumed. The Arbitrator further
required animus derelinquendi for there to be abandonment.
However, it is very doubtful indeed that a state should
be able to maintain its title animo solo, II RIAA,
p.1108. See above, Ch. 3.
148. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.47.
149. Ibid., p.105. Like occupation, in order that new lands
may be appropriated, there must be physical contact
with them, or physical contact resumable at pleasure,
coupled with an intention to hold them as one's own.
Cf. Maine op. cit., p.69.
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From the quotation above, it is submitted that there are t;vo
major elements of abandonment which are as follows:
(i) the actual withdrawal from possession (corpus)
(ii) the intention (animus) of giving up title to sovereignty.
4.10 Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land
(Belgium - The Netherlands)
This was a claim to sovereignty in derogation of title
established by treaty. Under the Boundary Convention of
1842, sovereignty resided in Belgium. The question for the
ICJ was whether Belgium had lost its sovereignty, by non-
assertion of its rights and by acquiescence in acts of
sovereignty which were alleged to have been exercised by
the Netherlands since 1843. Having examined the question
whether Belgium had ever abandoned its sovereignty over the
disputed plots, the Court concluded that Belgian sovereignty,
which had been established in 1843 over the disputed plots,
had not been abandoned.
4.11 Argentine - Chile Boundary Arbitration"*""^
This boundary dispute was concerned with the proper
interpretation of a part of the Award of King Edward VII
152
of 20 November 1902. Although the Court of Arbitration
150. ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209, at pp. 227-30. See above, Ch. 3.
151. [1966] XVI RIAA, p.109; 38 ILR (1969), p.10. For summary
see R.Y. Jennings 'The Argentine-Chile Boundary Dispute
- A Case Study' in International Disputes: The Legal
Aspects (London: Europa, 1972), p.315. Cf. D.H.N. Johnson,
'International Arbitration Back in Favour?' 34 YBWA
(1980), pp. 322-24.
152. [1902] XI RIAA, p.31.
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shared Argentina's view that the reference to 'interpretation
and fulfilment' in the corapromiso ivas intended to mean
interpretation and fulfilment by the court rather than by
the parties, the Court nevertheless rejected Argentina's
submission that the material introduced by Chile, to show
effective Chilean administration over the disputed area,
was completely irrelevant. 'The fulfilment material'
submitted by Chile was relevant, but it was insufficient
to establish any abandonment by Argentina of her rights
under the 1902 Award, or any acquisition of title by Chile
through adverse possession of territory adjacent to those
153
parts of the boundary line which were settled in 1902-3.
This case seems to point to the conclusion that any
acquisition of title through adverse possession must provide
sufficient evidence of the presumed dereliction by the
original owner.
4.12 Island of Taiwan
Taiwan is an island off the southeast coast of the
Chinese mainland. Together with the 64 islands of the
Pescadores Archipelago, 16 islands - including the main
island, Taiwan - constitute the Province of Taiwan, which is
bounded, to the North, by the East China Sea; to the east,
by the Pacific Ocean; to the south, by the Bashi Channel,
153. XVI RIAA, p.173. Cf. Case Concerning Sovereignty over
Certain Frontier Land, ICJ Reports, 1959, p.209.
See above, Ch. 3.
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which separates it from the Philippines; and to the west,
by the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait, which separates it from
the China mainland.
Taiwan became part of the Chinese Empire in 1683, and
154
remained so until the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895,
Article 2(b)(c), whereby Taiwan (Formosa) as well as Tiao
Yu Tai (Senkaku) and the Penghui (Pescadores), were ceded
to Japan.155 The islands were under Japanese sovereignty
until 1945. In the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943
the Allies declared their 'purpose ... that all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa
s [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghui], shall be restored
156
to the Republic of China' (hereafter cited as ROC). By
154. As early as the Qin and Han dynasties in the third
century B.C., the Chinese discovered Taiwan and began
to settle there. For details, see Ting-yeekuo, 'History
of Taiwan', in Hungdah Chiu (ed), China and the Question
of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis (New York-: Praeger
Publ., 1973), pp. 3-24.
155. Art. 2(b) of the 1895 Shimonoseki Peace Treaty provides
in part: 'China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full
sovereignty the following territories ... (b) the Island
of Formosa, together with all islands pertaining or
belonging to the said Island of Formosa'. 1 Hertslets
China Treaties (1908), p.363; 87 BFSP, p.799. For
discussion, see Harry J. Lamley, 'The 1895 Taiwan War
of Resistance: Local Chinese Efforts Against a Foreign
Power', in Leonard H.D. Gordon (ed), Taiwan (New York:
Columbia U.P., 1970), pp. 23-61..
156. 38 AJIL Suppl. (1944), p.8. The Cairo Conference took
place on 22-26 November 1943. The Russians did not
attend since they were not at war xvith Japan. See
J.A.S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties
1914-1917 (London: Methuen & Co., 1974), p.222.
an analogy with municipal law, it has been suggested that
when the 'thief' surrenders the loot the original owner
157
naturally regains possession. Moreover, para. (8) of
the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945 confirmed that
'The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out
and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands
of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikuku, and such minor islands
158
as we determine'. In the Instrument of Surrender of
2 September 1945, Japan undertook to carry out the provisions
of the Potsdam Proclamation. The Japanese forces in Taiwan
thereafter surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief of the
159
ROC. By Article 2(b) of the Peace Treaty of 1951 Japan
renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa [Taiwan]
150
and the Pescadores [Penghui]'; but it did not state
157. In advancing alternate arguments a reference is made
to the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur. The implication
seems to be that Japan never acquired title to Taiwan,
which legally has always belonged to China, despite the
temporary Japanese rule of the island under a treaty of
cession which was imposed on China by force. See
J.C. Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations:
A Study of Attitudes and Practice (Columbia U.P., 1972),
pp. 175-80.
158. 13 Dept. of State Bulletin, p.137. Grenville, o£. cit.,
pp. 224-25. The Cairo Declaration was a legally enforceable
instrument. According to the view of the PRC, 'when the
Chinese Government accepted the surrender of the Japanese
armed forces in Taiwan and established sovereignty over
the island, Taiwan became, not only de jure but also
de facto, an inalienable part of Chinese territory*.
See S.C.O.R. V, 490th Sess., p.34.
159. M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol." 3
(Dept. of State Publ., 1964), pp. 486-88.
160. Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, was signed on
8 September 1951 by forty-eight Allied Powers (excluding
the USSR and China). 136 UNTS, No. 1832, p.45." See also
Grenville, o£. cit., p.283. Dr. Chen considers the signing
of the San Francisco treaty without China's participation
is a violation of the wartime United Nations Declaration
of 1 January 1942 which explicitly forbade any of the Allies
to sign a separate peace treaty with the enemy. See
Chen/
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in whose favour this renunciation was made.
However, by a separate Peace Treaty between Japan and
the Republic of China of 8 August 1952, the sovereignty over
the island of Taiwan was transferred from Japan to the ROC.
Under Article 2 of this Treaty, it is recognised that Japan
renounces all right, title and claim to Taiwan and Penghui
(the Pescadores), as well as the Nansha (Spratly) Islands
and the Hsisha (Paracel) Islands. It has been suggested that
163
the Tiao Yu Tai (Senkaku) Islands should also be included.
Chen Ti-Chiang, 'Taiwan - A Chinese Territory', Review
of Contemporary Law (Brussels), No. 5 (1956), p.42.
For details, see Chiu, ojd. cit. , pp. 112-22.
161. Debate on the legal status of Taiwan, see D.P. O'Connell,
'The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition
Problem', 50 AJIL (1956), p.405; J.P. Jain, 'The Legal
Status of Formosa', 57 ibid., (1963), p.25. F.P. Morello,
The International Legal Status of Formosa (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); Tung-Pi Chen, 'Legal Status
of Formosa', 4 Philippine International Law Journal
(1965), p.99; Poeliu Dai, 'Recognition of States and
Governments under International Law with Special Reference
to Canadian Post-war Practice and the Legal Status of
Taiwan (Formosa)' 3 Canadian YBIL (1965), p.290;
D.B. Kirkham, 'The International Legal Status of Formosa',
6 ibid., (1568), p.144. Chiu, o£. cit., pp. 127-41;
James Crawford, The Creation of States in International
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 143-52.
For contrast, see W.M. Reisman & Lung-Chu Chen, "Who
Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title', 81 Yale
L.J. (1971-1972), p.599.
162. 138 UNTS, No. 1858, p.38.
163. When Taiwan and 'all islands appertaining or belonging
to' it were ceded to Japan in 1895 as a result of China's
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the Taio Yu Tai Islands
were included in that part of the Chinese territory so
ceded. In 1945, when Japan surrendered to the Allies,
she accepted the return of the Chinese territories,
among them the Tiao Yu Tai Islands, earlier ceded to
her. See below, Ch. 7.
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In the case of Re Yae Sudo. Judge X. Okuno thus declared
that:
Japan waived territorial rights over Formosa [Taiivan]
by the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, and that
the Peace Treaty with Japan and the Peace Treaty betyggn
Japan and the Republic of China both confirmed this.
Peace Treaties which provide for the redistribution of
various of the possessions of the vanquished state have
often transferred territorial sovereignty to the joint
disposal of the victorious states.1^5 But the position
of Taiwan after 1945 would seem, on the one hand, to have
more in common with an abandonment or derelictio of.sovereignty
by Japan. On the other hand, the Peace Treaty between Japan
and the ROC operates as a complete and final settlement
between the parties of the island of Taiwan. The territorial
problems are either specifically settled by the peace treaty,
or, alternatively, they are in effect settled by each party
164. [1962] Japan, Supreme Court, Grand Bench, 53 ILR (1979),
p.514, at p.516.
165. Under the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 for example,
Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France, the Saar was
placed under an International Commission of the League
and the mines of the Saar passed into French ownership;
three small territories - Moresnet, Eupen and Malmedy -
became Belgian. See Col. Lawrence Martin, The Treaties
of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. I (New York: Carnegie Endoxvment
for International Peace, 1924), Pt. II, p.24. Under
Pt. I, Sec. I, Arts 1-3, Sec. V, Art. 14 of the Italian
Peace Treaty of 1947, the conquest of Albania and Ethiopia
were annulled, the Dodecanese ceded to Greece and some
Italian islands in the Adriatic were ceded to Greece
and to Yugoslavia. Grenville, ojd. cit. , p. 277. For
further discussion, see G.G. Fitzmaurice, 'The Juridical
Clauses of the Peace Treaties', 73 Recueil des Cours
(1948-11), pp. 279 e_t seq. For a historical account,
see Sir Walter G.F. Phillimore, Three Centuries of
Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching (London: John
Murray, 1917).
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standing on the status quo as it existed at the end of the
war on the basis of the uti possidetis doctrine.^ It is
submitted that the ROC has obtained title to Taiwan by
cession, occupation and prescription; and that the Tiao Yu
167
Tai (Senkaku) Islands should also be returned to the ROC,
since they were originally ceded together with Taiwan to
Japan in 1895.
To sum up: abandonment frees a territory from the
sovereignty of the present owner-state. It is effected
through the owner-state completely abandoning territory
with the intention of withdrawing from it for good. Mere
withdrawal from territory per se when there is still the
intention of winning it back or resuming occupation, such
as the British withdrawal from the Falkland Islands in 1774,
would not affect the loss of the territory. However, an
intention to abandon a title to territory can be inferred
from the circumstances of the supposed withdrawal of state
authority, but any acquisition of title through adverse
possession must produce sufficient evidence to establish
the presumption that the territory had been abandoned by
the former owner.
166. Uti possidetis, ita possideatis means 'as you possess,
so you shall continue to possess'.
167. See below, Ch. 8.
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The principle of effectiveness is necessary for the
maintenance of a title. Occupation requires: first, the
actual taking into possession (corpus) of territory; and
second, the intention (animus) of acquiring sovereignty over
it. Similarly, abandonment requires: first, the physical
fact of the actual withdrawal from possession of a territory;
second, the intention of giving up title to sovereignty over
it. But such a rule may well be restricted solely to
uninhabited regions such as Clipperton Island and Eastern
Greenland. In a less inhospitable territory, it is submitted
that dominion will be retained only if the actual possession
subsists. Even if discovery had been sufficient to create
a valid title in the fifteenth century, the absence of any
subsequent manifestation of Spanish sovereignty over the
Palmas Island was held to be fatal to the claim of the
United States. Moreover,actual abandonment alone does not
necessarily involve derelictio as long as it can be presumed
that the owner has the will and ability to regain possession
of the territory. Thus, for instance, if a rising of natives
forces a state to withdraw from a territory, such territory
is not abandoned as long as the former possessor is able,
and makes efforts to retain possession. It is only when a
territory is really abandoned that any state may acquire it
through occupation. In the case of Taiwan, Japan renounced
its sovereignty over the island, which then either became
terra nullius and so was occupied by the Republic of China,
or was ceded by Japan to the Republic of China.
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With regard to Nansha (Spratly) Islands, it will be
seen in Chanter 8 that in 1931, unless the Nansha Islands
were still terra nullius - i.e. either China had never
appropriated them, or, if it had done so, had subsequently
1
abandoned them - they could not be subjected to occupation.
It thus appears that there is no evidence to show that China
did abandon the Nansha Islands, either in the animus or in
the corpus.
In the next chapter, we shall examine the law and state
practice in respect of claims to submarine areas prior to
the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS I).
168. France, on behalf of Vietnam, began to claim the Nansha
Islands in 1933, acting on the assumption that these
islets were terra nullius. See below, Ch. 3.
